{ "id": 8523236, "name": "PATRICIA W. FRIEL v. ANGELL CARE INCORPORATED and DON G. ANGELL", "name_abbreviation": "Friel v. Angell Care Inc.", "decision_date": "1994-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 9221SC1305", "first_page": "505", "last_page": "511", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 505" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "146 S.E. 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627769 ], "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/196/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E. 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657511 ], "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/159/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720323, 4717258, 4716211, 4713916, 4714813 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0390-04", "/nc/315/0390-02", "/nc/315/0390-03", "/nc/315/0390-05", "/nc/315/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527531 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571309 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526234 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569668, 8569702, 8569641, 8569742, 8569722 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0385-02", "/nc/306/0385-03", "/nc/306/0385-01", "/nc/306/0385-05", "/nc/306/0385-04" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521700 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525158 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2570744 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "A statement \"invited or procured by plaintiff, or by a person acting for him, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219545 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "A statement \"invited or procured by plaintiff, or by a person acting for him, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625544 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"A publication of a libel, procured or invited by the plaintiff, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567779, 8567748, 8567717, 8567632, 8567670 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"A publication of a libel, procured or invited by the plaintiff, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0177-05", "/nc/297/0177-04", "/nc/297/0177-03", "/nc/297/0177-01", "/nc/297/0177-02" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "\"A publication of a libel, procured or invited by the plaintiff, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552987 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469", "parenthetical": "\"A publication of a libel, procured or invited by the plaintiff, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-355", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 660, "char_count": 12821, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.999790878337751e-08, "percentile": 0.5386032158631642 }, "sha256": "4988f66cc07b6b4e52719121b76c4ad4f95352393210b89e292d415943c956f2", "simhash": "1:df68f57f42273f40", "word_count": 2047 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and McCRODDEN concur." ], "parties": [ "PATRICIA W. FRIEL v. ANGELL CARE INCORPORATED and DON G. ANGELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nPlaintiff Patricia W. Friel was employed as a secretary by defendant company Angel\u00ed Care Incorporated (\u201cAngel\u00ed Care\u201d) from July 1982 until 17 April 1987. She held several positions within the company before being assigned to be the personal secretary to Bruce Smith, a new vice-president of the company. On or about 18 March 1987, plaintiff alleged that Smith had sexually harassed her. On 17 April 1987, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement signed by Angel\u00ed Care\u2019s president, Dennis Young, on behalf of Angel\u00ed Care. Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff would leave the company and would not discuss the terms and contents of the agreement. Angel\u00ed Care would pay plaintiff $9566.63; would not discuss the terms or contents of the agreement with plaintiff\u2019s prospective employers; and would provide her prospective employers with neutral employment references.\nAfter leaving Angel\u00ed Care, plaintiff stayed home with her children, intermittently caring for other children in her home.\nDuring the week of 23 May 1988, plaintiff testified against Angel\u00ed Group Inc., a company related to Angel\u00ed Care, pursuant to a subpoena in the case of Angell Group, Inc., et al. v. Bowling Green Health Care Center, Inc., et al., 86 CVS 3807, in Forsyth County Superior Court.\nIn approximately June or July 1990, plaintiff applied for several secretarial positions. She contacted a local attorney, Meyressa Schoonmaker, for employment, either with Schoonmaker\u2019s law practice or with the North Carolina Center for Laws Affecting Women (\u201cNCLAW\u201d), an organization of which Schoonmaker was the president and legal director. Plaintiff submitted an application to Schoonmaker, listing her last employer as Angel\u00ed Care and giving the names of Don Angel\u00ed and Stewart Swain. Schoonmaker asked a NCLAW employee, Linda Parker, to contact Angel\u00ed and Swain. Parker contacted Angel\u00ed. She asked him if he would rehire plaintiff. When he said he would not, Parker asked why. Parker\u2019s and Angell\u2019s accounts of his response differ. Angel\u00ed testified that he said, \u201cthere was an unproven sexual harassment charge when she left,\u201d and that he \u201cwas not aware of the details.\u201d Parker\u2019s written notes of the conversation state, \u201cAngel\u00ed said . . . that [plaintiff] left under adverse (?) circumstances, and he really could not discuss the circumstances.\u201d Plaintiff was not offered either position with Schoonmaker.\nIn August 1990, plaintiff asked Sherrill Horton, a friend who worked for a law firm, if she knew anyone who needed a secretary. Horton said that she did not know if the firm had any openings, but one of the attorneys was unhappy with his current secretary. Plaintiff asked Horton to call Don Angel\u00ed for a reference, because she wanted to know why Angel\u00ed Care would not rehire her. Horton called Don Angel\u00ed, indicating that she was calling him on behalf of her firm because plaintiff had listed him as a reference in applying for a job there, even though plaintiff had not actually submitted an application. Horton testified, and Angel\u00ed confirmed, that she asked if the company would rehire plaintiff; he said it would not; and he said plaintiff had accused a male employee of sexual harassment, but the charge was never proven. Horton further testified that Angel\u00ed said that plaintiff left the company under adverse circumstances and that she was difficult to work with.\nOn 19 October 1990, plaintiff sued Angel\u00ed Care and Don Angel\u00ed for compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff alleged that Angel\u00ed and Angel\u00ed Care had breached the settlement contract; committed slander per se; maliciously interfered with her contractual rights; and blacklisted her in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-355.\nDefendants moved for summary judgment on all the claims. The motion was heard on 16 July 1992. By written order and judgment entered 23 July 1992, the court granted summary judgment for defendants on the slander, malicious interference with contractual rights, and blacklisting claims. On 21 July 1992, plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of her breach of contract claim.\nPlaintiff appealed the claims of slander per se, malicious interference with contractual rights, and blacklisting, as to both defendants.\nI.\nPlaintiff contends that Angell\u2019s statements to Parker and Horton were slander per se because they impeached her in her profession.\nInitially, we uphold summary judgment on the portion of the slander action that is based on Angell\u2019s statements to Horton. All the evidence indicates that the conversation between Angel\u00ed and Horton took place at the request and direction of the plaintiff. A communication to the plaintiff, or to a person acting at the plaintiff\u2019s ^request, cannot form the basis for a libel or slander claim. See Pressley v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 39 N.C. App. 467, 469, 250 S.E.2d 676, 678, disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 177, 254 S.E.2d 37 (1979) (\u201cA publication of a libel, procured or invited by the plaintiff, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\u201d); see also Taylor v. Jones Bros. Bakery, Inc., 234 N.C. 660, 662, 68 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956) (A statement \u201cinvited or procured by plaintiff, or by a person acting for him, is not sufficient to support an action for defamation.\u201d). In this case, Horton contacted Angel\u00ed because plaintiff had asked her to \u201ccheck out (her) references,\u201d not because Horton\u2019s employer had independently wished to contact Angel\u00ed. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has no claim for defamation based on any statement made to Horton.\nThis leaves us with the statements made to Linda Parker. A claim of slander per se has three essential elements:\nTo establish a claim for slander per se, a plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant spoke base or defamatory words which tended to prejudice him in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood or hold him up to disgrace, ridicule or contempt; (2) the statement was false; and (3) the statement was published or communicated to and understood by a third person.\nWest v. King\u2019s Dep\u2019t Store, Inc., 321 N.C. 698, 703, 365 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1988). See also Andrews v. Elliot, 109 N.C. App. 271, 426 S.E.2d 430 (1993); Morrow v. Kings Dep\u2019t Stores, Inc., 57 N.C. App. 13, 290 S.E.2d 732, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982).\nWe find that plaintiff has not met the second element of this cause of action. Plaintiff never established that Angell\u2019s statements to Parker were false. Angel\u00ed said that he would not rehire plaintiff; there was an unproven sexual harassment charge when she left the company; and, viewing the evidence in the best light for plaintiff, that plaintiff left the company under adverse circumstances. All the evidence suggests that the statements were in fact true. Plaintiff left the employment of defendant pursuant to a negotiated settlement after making a claim of sexual harassment which was not proven. A description of this situation as \u201cadverse circumstances\u201d does not seem inaccurate.\nWe note that defendant\u2019s statements to Parker and Horton may well have been in breach of the settlement agreement between plaintiff and defendant Angel\u00ed Care, Inc. However, because plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claim for breach of contract, issues relating to performance of that contract are not before us today.\nII.\nPlaintiff next contends that defendant maliciously interfered with her right to enter into an employment contract with Meyressa Schoonmaker and the North Carolina Center for Laws Affecting Women. In order to state a claim for malicious interference with contract, plaintiff must establish that the defendant\u2019s actions were malicious in the legal sense. Murphy v. McIntyre, 69 N.C. App. 323, 317 S.E.2d 397 (1984). To establish legal malice, a plaintiff must show that defendant interfered \u201cwith design of injury to plaintiff or gaining some advantage at his expense.\u201d Johnson v. Gray, 263 N.C. 507, 509, 139 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1965). Plaintiff never established that defendant intended to injure her or gain some advantage at her expense. The only evidence of malice plaintiff put forth is her belief that Angel\u00ed felt ill will toward her because after she testified adversely to defendants in the Bowling Green Health Care case, Angel\u00ed raised his voice and exhibited anger toward the other party (not toward her). Plaintiffs speculation, without any facts to support it, is clearly insufficient to meet her burden of proof. A party cannot prevail against a motion for summary judgment by relying on \u201cconclusory allegations, unsupported by facts.\u201d Campbell v. Board of Education of Catawba County, 76 N.C. App. 495, 498, 333 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 390, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1986). We affirm summary judgment for defendant on the malicious interference with contract claim.\nIII.\nPlaintiffs third claim is that defendant Angell\u2019s conversations with Parker and Horton violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-355, which prohibits blacklisting employees. Under this statute, an employer may be 'liable if, after discharging someone from employment, it prevents or attempts to prevent that person from obtaining employment:\nIf any person, agent, company or corporation, after having discharged any employee from his or its service, shall prevent or attempt to prevent, by word or writing of any kind, such discharged person from obtaining employment with any other person, company or corporation, such person, agent or corporation shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor and . . . shall be liable in penal damages to such discharged person, to be recovered by civil action. This section shall not be construed as prohibiting any person . . . from furnishing in writing, upon request, any other person, company or corporation to whom such discharged person has applied for employment, a truthful statement of the reason for such discharge.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-355 (Supp. 1993).\nHowever, statements made by a former employer in response to a request from a prospective employer are privileged under \u00a7 14-355. For the statute to be violated, the statements to the prospective employer would have had to have been unsolicited. Seward v. Seaboard Air Line Railway, 159 N.C. 195, 204, 75 S.E. 34 (1912); Goins v. Sargent, 196 N.C. 478, 146 S.E. 131 (1929). Plaintiff admits here that Don Angell\u2019s statements came only upon inquiry from people he believed to be prospective employers of his former employee. We therefore hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-355 does not apply as a matter of law and uphold summary judgment for defendants.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and McCRODDEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harold L. Kennedy, III and Harvey L. Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Robinson Maready Rawing & Comerford, by Robert J. Lawing and Jane C. Jackson, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATRICIA W. FRIEL v. ANGELL CARE INCORPORATED and DON G. ANGELL\nNo. 9221SC1305\n(Filed 1 February 1994)\n1. Libel and Slander \u00a7 43 (NCI4th>\u2014 statements to person acting for plaintiff \u2014 no slander\nWhere plaintiff asked a friend to call defendant to \u201ccheck out (her) references,\u201d statements made by defendant to the friend could not form the basis of a slander claim.\nAm Jur 2d, Libel and Slander \u00a7 444.\n2. Libel and Slander \u00a7 44 (NCI4th)\u2014 true statements about former employee \u2014no slander per se\nPlaintiff failed to establish a claim for slander per se where her forecast of evidence tended to show that the individual defendant told plaintiff\u2019s prospective employer that he would not rehire plaintiff, that there was an unproven sexual harassment charge when she left defendant company, and that plaintiff left the company under adverse circumstances, and all the evidence suggested that these statements were in fact true.\nAm Jur 2d, Libel and Slander \u00a7 444.\n3. Labor and Employment \u00a7 90 (NCI4th)\u2014 interference with prospective employment \u2014failure to establish malice\nPlaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence was insufficient to support her claim against her former employer for malicious interference with her right to enter into an employment contract where it failed to establish that her former employer intended to injure her or gain some advantage at her expense.\nAm Jur 2d, Interference \u00a7 51.\n4. Labor and Employment \u00a7 90 (NCMth)\u2014 blacklisting of former employee \u2014statements to prospective employer \u2014 statute inapplicable\nThe statute prohibiting the blacklisting of discharged employees, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-355, did not. apply where defendant\u2019s statements came only upon inquiry from people he believed to be prospective employers of his former employee.\nAm Jur 2d, Interference \u00a7 51.\nAppeal by plaintiff from summary judgment entered 23 July 1992 by Judge Peter M. McHugh in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 October 1993.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harold L. Kennedy, III and Harvey L. Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.\nRobinson Maready Rawing & Comerford, by Robert J. Lawing and Jane C. Jackson, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0505-01", "first_page_order": 535, "last_page_order": 541 }