{ "id": 8523385, "name": "DONALD E. AYERS d/b/a AYERS WOOD YARD, Petitioner v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR THE TOWN OF ROBERSONVILLE THROUGH ITS CHAIRPERSON THELMA ROBERSON, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Ayers v. Board of Adjustment for Robersonville", "decision_date": "1994-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 932SC123", "first_page": "528", "last_page": "533", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 528" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732777, 4738513, 4738804, 4734109, 4737790 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0417-02", "/nc/318/0417-01", "/nc/318/0417-03", "/nc/318/0417-04", "/nc/318/0417-05" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524395 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524266 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528575 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563992, 8564011, 8563944, 8563965 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0562-03", "/nc/300/0562-04", "/nc/300/0562-01", "/nc/300/0562-02" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0620-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 556, "char_count": 10991, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.887968066457831e-07, "percentile": 0.9646726507993323 }, "sha256": "ca0c2062bc1819f5cadaf6b97a7032a1e0eff74fc728a4cbd6136617f0cd5b36", "simhash": "1:6b77e733219c3788", "word_count": 1691 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and McCRODDEN concur." ], "parties": [ "DONALD E. AYERS d/b/a AYERS WOOD YARD, Petitioner v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR THE TOWN OF ROBERSONVILLE THROUGH ITS CHAIRPERSON THELMA ROBERSON, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nG.S. \u00a7 160A-388(e) (Supp. 1992) provides that every decision of a municipal board of adjustment \u201cshall be subject to review by the superior court by proceedings in the nature of certiorari.\u201d In proceedings of this nature, the superior court sits as an appellate court and may review both the sufficiency of the evidence presented to respondent and whether the record reveals an error of law. Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioner, 299 N.C. 620, 265 S.E.2d 379, reh\u2019g denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 106 (1980).\nIn the present case, the questions before the superior court were (1) what property uses are included within the definition of \u201cforestry\u201d as used in the ordinance and (2) whether petitioner\u2019s use of the subject property falls within that definition? It is undisputed that petitioner uses the subject property to receive, weigh, grade, temporarily store and ship cut timber. Thus, the only issue we must decide, is whether the superior court committed an error of law in interpreting and applying the ordinance.\nIn reviewing a decision of the Board of Adjustment for errors of law in the application and interpretation of a zoning ordinance, the superior court applies a de novo standard of review and can freely substitute its judgment for that of the board. Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 334 N.C. 132, 431 S.E.2d 183 (1993). Similarly, in reviewing the judgment of the superior court, this Court applies a de novo standard of review in determining whether an error of law exists and we may freely substitute our judgment for that of the superior court. Id. Questions involving the interpretation of ordinances are questions of law. Id. Applying a de novo standard of review, we conclude that the decision of the superior court is incorrect and that the decision of respondent must be reinstated.\nIn determining the meaning of a zoning ordinance, we attempt to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislative body. Concrete Co., 299 N.C. at 629, 265 S.E.2d at 385. Unless a term is defined specifically within the ordinance in which it is referenced, it should be assigned its plain and ordinary meaning. Rice Associates v. Town of Weaverville Bd. of Adjust., 108 N.C. App. 346, 423 S.E.2d 519 (1992). In addition, we avoid interpretations that create absurd or illogical results. Pritchard v. Elizabeth City, 81 N.C. App. 543, 344 S.E.2d 821, disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 598 (1986).\nWith these principles in mind, we first turn to the language of the ordinance at issue. The ordinance specifically provides that its purpose is to establish \u201ca district in which the principal use of the land is for low density residential and agricultural purposes.\u201d The enumerated uses which are permitted within the district, though not exclusively residential and agricultural, are uniformly nonindustrial. On the whole, the language of the ordinance, the title of the district it creates, and the uses which it permits, manifest an intent that the district be free from non-agricultural commercial operations.\nRespondent\u2019s definition of the term \u201cforestry\u201d, which limits the activities included thereunder to the development, management and harvesting of forest or growing timber, is not inconsistent with the zone\u2019s established residential and agricultural purposes. Rather, this definition of \u201cforestry\u201d limits timber associated activities to those which are strictly agricultural in nature. It does not include ancillary timber industry activities which are industrial in origin and which would detract from the district\u2019s residential and agricultural purpose and character.\nConversely, the expansive definition of \u201cforestry\u201d adopted by the superior court which includes the transportation of timber to the \u201cpoint at which the wood is actually converted to some type of useable product\u201d would permit uses which are clearly incompatible with the residential and agricultural purposes of the district. For example, under such a definition, industrial operations performing intermediate, but not final processing of timber, would not be prohibited. Likewise, rail and truck depots, larger than petitioner\u2019s, which receive, weigh, grade, store and ship cut timber would be permitted to operate in the Residential Agricultural District. Clearly, a definition which would permit such operations does not effectuate the manifest intent of the ordinance and would create an illogical result.\nWe are also persuaded that the meaning respondent assigned to the term \u201cforestry\u201d is its plain and ordinary meaning. The American Heritage Dictionary defines \u201cforestry\u201d as \u201c(1) the science and art of cultivating, maintaining and developing forest, (2) the management of a forest land, and (3) a forest land.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third International Dictionary defines the term as \u201ca science of developing, caring for and cultivating forest: The management of growing timber.\u201d Another source relied upon by respondent in arriving at its definition of \u201cforestry\u201d is The Terminology of Forest Science and Technology, Practice and Products, which defines \u201cforestry\u201d as \u201ca profession embracing the science, business and art of creating, conserving and managing forest lands for the continuing use of their resources . . . .\u201d\nNone of these ordinary definitions of \u201cforestry\u201d include the transportation of cut timber to the \u201cpoint at which the wood is actually converted to some type of useable product.\u201d The only such definition of \u201cforestry\u201d with which respondent was provided came from the testimony of petitioner\u2019s expert witness. That an expert was required to provide this meaning to the term, belies any contention that this definition constitutes the term\u2019s plain and ordinary meaning.\nBased on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that respondent\u2019s definition of \u201cforestry\u201d is correct because it (1) effectuates the intent of the ordinance to establish a district of residential and agricultural uses, (2) is consistent with the term\u2019s plain and ordinary meaning, and (3) avoids the illogical result of allowing intermediate timber processing operations and transportation depots in a district intended for low density residential and agricultural purposes. Therefore, we hold that the superior court erred as a matter of law by reversing the Board of Adjustment\u2019s conclusion that petitioner\u2019s business is in violation of the ordinance because it is not engaged in the development, management, harvesting, or care of growing timber.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the superior court is reversed and this case is remanded for reinstatement of the decision of the Board of Adjustment.\nReversed.\nJudges JOHNSON and McCRODDEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bowen & Batchelor, by J. Melvin Bowen and James R. Batchelor, Jr., for respondent-appellant.", "Colombo, Kitchen & Johnson, by Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., for petitioner-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD E. AYERS d/b/a AYERS WOOD YARD, Petitioner v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR THE TOWN OF ROBERSONVILLE THROUGH ITS CHAIRPERSON THELMA ROBERSON, Respondent\nNo. 932SC123\n(Filed 1 February 1994)\nMunicipal Corporations \u00a7 30.11 (NCI3d)\u2014 zoning \u2014 residential and agricultural classification \u2014 wood yard \u2014not \u201cforestry\u201d\nPetitioner\u2019s use of his property in a Residential Agricultural District for a wood yard for receiving, weighing, grading, temporarily storing and shipping cut timber does not come within the definition of \u201cforestry,\u201d which is a permitted use in the zoning classification for petitioner\u2019s property.\nAm Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning \u00a7 390.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 30 November 1992 by Judge Cy A. Grant, Jr., in Martin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 December 1993.\nIn January of 1992, petitioner, Donald Ayers, began operating a business known as Ayers Wood Yard on a leased two acre parcel of land located within the extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction of the Town of Robersonville. The business serves as a temporary destination for truckloads of cut timber. Upon arrival on petitioner\u2019s property, the timber is unloaded, weighed, and graded. The timber is thereafter reloaded onto trucks for shipment to other locations.\nThe property where petitioner operates his business is zoned RA-20 Residential Agricultural District pursuant to Article III, Section 4 of the Town of Robersonville Extraterritorial Zoning Ordinance (hereinafter \u201cthe ordinance\u201d). The ordinance provides that the Residential Agricultural District was\nestablished as a district in which the principal use of the land is for low density residential and agricultural purposes. This district is intended to insure that residential development outside the corporate limits and not having access to public water service and dependent upon septic tanks for sewerage disposal will occur at a low density in order to provide a healthful environment.\nAmong the property uses permitted in the Residential Agricultural District are:\n1. Single family dwellings\n2. Two family dwellings\n3. Schools, colleges, kindergartens and day care centers\n4. Farming, truck, gardening and nurseries\n5. Forestry\n6. Kennels\n7. Wayside stands for the sale of agricultural products on the same parcel where offered for sale\n8. Churches\n9. Home occupations\n10. Single mobile homes\n11. Uses and buildings customarily accessory to the above permitted uses\n12. Public utility transmission lines, pipes, poles, towers\n13. Small profession or announcement signs\n14. Renting of one (1) room provided no external evidence of such is created.\nShortly after petitioner began operation of his business, a residential homeowner whose property adjoins petitioner\u2019s property complained to the Zoning Enforcement Officer about petitioner\u2019s use of the property. Following this complaint, the Zoning Enforcement Officer notified petitioner that his use of the property was in violation of the ordinance. Petitioner appealed this determination to respondent Board of Adjustment, contending that his use of the property is within the definition of \u201cforestry\u201d, a use permitted by the ordinance. Following a hearing, the Board of Adjustment affirmed the decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer. In its order, respondent interpreted the word \u201cforestry\u201d to mean \u201c[t]he developing, caring for and management of forest: The management and harvesting of growing timber.\u201d\nPetitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in superior court seeking review of the decision of the Board of Adjustment. After reviewing the record and hearing the arguments of counsel, the superior court entered an order finding inter alia that \u201c \u2018forestry\u2019 includes the harvesting and transportation of timber to the first point of processing; that is, the point at which the wood is actually converted to some type of useable product.\u201d Based on this finding, the superior court concluded that petitioner\u2019s use of the subject property is \u201cforestry\u201d, permitted under the zoning ordinance, and entered an order reversing the decision of the Board of Adjustment. The Board of Adjustment appealed.\nBowen & Batchelor, by J. Melvin Bowen and James R. Batchelor, Jr., for respondent-appellant.\nColombo, Kitchen & Johnson, by Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., for petitioner-appellee." }, "file_name": "0528-01", "first_page_order": 558, "last_page_order": 563 }