{ "id": 8523585, "name": "DONALD J. BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs v. TOWN OF DAVIDSON, et al., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Town of Davidson", "decision_date": "1994-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 9326SC228", "first_page": "553", "last_page": "557", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 553" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566715 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732777, 4738513, 4738804, 4734109, 4737790 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0417-02", "/nc/318/0417-01", "/nc/318/0417-03", "/nc/318/0417-04", "/nc/318/0417-05" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523145 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307658 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 252", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6951 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "264-65" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0252-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 483, "char_count": 8721, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7723344358991988e-07, "percentile": 0.7122838049631465 }, "sha256": "522a9646bc9ef13cc0f30247170ec57bd75a19c6c9c8ce232704b0d7b99ecd2b", "simhash": "1:a0a2f68e2c6409fe", "word_count": 1347 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and EAGLES concur." ], "parties": [ "DONALD J. BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs v. TOWN OF DAVIDSON, et al., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiffs argue that their racial discrimination claim was erroneously dismissed. We disagree.\nThis claim originated when two white plaintiffs petitioned to have two lots in a residential neighborhood zoned commercial so that they could build a gas station and convenience store. When local officials indicated that the petition would be denied, plaintiffs withdrew it. Later, black residents in that neighborhood joined with the white plaintiffs in a petition to rezone the entire neighborhood commercial.\nThe neighborhood in question lies along Griffith Street and is predominantly black. Griffith Street runs from Interstate 77 to the entrance of Davidson College and is apparently the only road into the Town of Davidson from the interstate. Most of the real estate directly off of the interstate, which was formerly open fields, was purchased by Lake Norman Company and was rezoned periodically until all of Lake Norman Company\u2019s property was zoned commercial. Lake Norman Company is white-owned. One other small tract off of the interstate was purchased by a white-owned company and rezoned commercial at its request.\nThis commercial zone runs along both sides of Griffith Street until it reaches Lake Davidson, where Griffith Street crosses the lake over a causeway. Plaintiffs\u2019 lots lie immediately on the other side of the causeway. The neighborhood containing plaintiffs\u2019 lots is and always has been zoned residential. Just before Griffith Street reaches Davidson College, one block is zoned business or office. This is the last block on Griffith Street according to plaintiffs\u2019 map, and it was zoned business or office in 1977. The record shows that a white person who owned property next to the business or office zone petitioned in 1977 to have his property rezoned business, but the Town denied the petition.\nPlaintiffs contend their evidence that defendants allowed zoning petitions for the white petitioners at the western end of Griffith Street, while refusing to rezone their neighborhood, which is the only property on Griffith Street zoned residential, is sufficient to create a jury question on defendants\u2019 discriminatory intent. For that reason plaintiffs argue summary judgment should not have been granted.\nTo survive summary judgment on their racial discrimination claim plaintiffs had to forecast proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose in denying the petition to rezone. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450, 464 (1977). Disproportionate impact by itself is not enough. Id. at 264-65, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 464. We find plaintiffs\u2019 evidence insufficient as a matter of law to create a question of discriminatory intent or purpose. In our opinion, the decision to leave a residential area undisturbed, whether it be predominantly black or white, cannot be the basis for a racial discrimination claim when the only evidence directly related to the claim is that similar petitions to rezone were allowed for white-owned businesses on the other end of the street, especially when, according to plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, the areas at the other end of Griffith Street were primarily open fields before being rezoned.\nWe do not find plaintiffs\u2019 remaining evidence on this issue persuasive or pertinent. We therefore affirm the trial judge\u2019s order dismissing the racial discrimination claim.\nPlaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim of due process violations. Plaintiffs argue they were denied a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. In support of their argument, plaintiffs show that before the public hearing several of the Commissioners stated that they would vote against rezoning. Plaintiffs rely primarily on Crump v. Board of Educ., 326 N.C. 603, 392 S.E.2d 579 (1990), for the proposition that the denial of a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal constitutes a due process violation. Their reliance on Crump is misplaced. In Crump, the Supreme Court dealt with an administrative board performing a quasi-judicial function. Defendants here were performing a legislative function.\nZoning and rezoning decisions are legislative acts, Sherrill v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 81 N.C. App. 369, 373, 344 S.E.2d 357, 360, disc. review denied, appeal dismissed, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 600 (1986), and \u201c[ojrdinarily, the only limitation upon this legislative authority is that it may not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.\u201d Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440 (1971). To establish that defendants violated plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights in a manner entitling them to relief, plaintiffs needed to show that defendants\u2019 actions were \u201carbitrary and capricious so as to violate their due process rights.\u201d Sherrill, 81 N.C. App. at 375, 344 S.E.2d at 361. Plaintiffs make no such argument, and a predisposition by some defendants to vote a certain way on a legislative matter is not sufficient to constitute a due process violation. It appears from the record that plaintiffs were provided all the process they were due, in the form of public hearings. Plaintiffs do not complain that defendants violated the statutory procedures required for decision making on general zoning questions. Because plaintiffs misperceived the role played by defendants, and therefore incorrectly based this part of their complaint on the denial of procedural protections which were not applicable, the trial judge was correct in dismissing this claim.\nOur decisions on these issues render defendants\u2019 standing question irrelevant. The trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WELLS and EAGLES concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sheely & Young, by Michael A. Sheely, for plaintiff appellants.", "Frank B. Aycock, III for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD J. BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs v. TOWN OF DAVIDSON, et al., Defendants\nNo. 9326SC228\n(Filed 1 February 1994)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 86 (NCI4th); Municipal Corporations \u00a7 30.22 (NCI3d) \u2014 denial of rezoning \u2014 racial discrimination not shown\nLandowners in a predominantly black neighborhood failed to forecast proof of discriminatory intent or purpose required to support their claim of racial discrimination in the denial of their petition to rezone their neighborhood from residential to commercial where the only evidence directly related to this claim was that similar petitions to rezone were allowed for white landowners on the other end of the street across a lake, especially when the areas at the other end of the street were primarily open fields before being rezoned.\nAm Jur 2d, Civil Rights \u00a7\u00a7 4, 487.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 98 (NCI4th); Municipal Corporations \u00a7 30.21 (NCI3d)\u2014 rezoning hearing \u2014 prehearing statements by town commissioners \u2014 no due process violation\nLandowners who petitioned for rezoning of their neighborhood from residential to commercial were not denied due process because several of the town commissioners stated before the public hearing that they would vote against rezoning since rezoning decisions are legislative rather than quasi-judicial acts, and a predisposition by commissioners to vote in a certain way on a legislative matter does not constitute arbitrariness and capriciousness which violates due process.\nAm Jur 2d, Constitutional Law \u00a7\u00a7 806 et seq.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 15 December 1992 by Judge Robert W. Kirby in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 December 1993.\nThis case arises from plaintiffs\u2019 attempt to have a predominantly black neighborhood in the Town of Davidson zoned from residential to commercial. A public hearing on the proposed rezoning was held before the Planning Board and the Town Commission (Commission) on 8 May 1990. At this hearing, citizens were about equally for and against allowing the change. The Planning Board held a second hearing on 29 May 1990, after which they denied the petition and recommended that the Commission and the Mayor \u201ctake Griffith Street as an immediate project for future planning.\u201d At the Commission\u2019s regular 12 June 1990 meeting, the petition was discussed, and the Commissioners unanimously voted to adopt the Planning Board\u2019s recommendation.\nPlaintiffs brought this action seeking injunctive and monetary relief for violations of state and federal due process and equal protection guarantees. Defendants are the Town of Davidson, the Mayor, the Town Commission, the Planning Board, and the individual members of the Town Commission and Planning Board. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the trial judge allowed the motion. The trial judge thereafter entered an order dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 action in its entirety. From this order plaintiffs appeal.\nSheely & Young, by Michael A. Sheely, for plaintiff appellants.\nFrank B. Aycock, III for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0553-01", "first_page_order": 583, "last_page_order": 587 }