{ "id": 8523743, "name": "PHYLLIS WAGONER v. ELKIN CITY SCHOOLS' BOARD OF EDUCATION, BRUCE MORTON, DONALD T. LASSITER, and CHARLIE PARSONS", "name_abbreviation": "Wagoner v. Elkin City Schools' Board of Education", "decision_date": "1994-02-15", "docket_number": "No. 9317SC241", "first_page": "579", "last_page": "589", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 579" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "52 ALR4th 853", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757224 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488329 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "complaint must admit of no other motive for interference other than malice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "complaint must admit of no other motive for interference other than malice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "complaint must admit of no other motive for interference other than malice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "complaint must admit of no other motive for interference other than malice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "complaint admits defendants had proper motive by alleging they were directors of \"Center\" and Center's \"Lab\" thereby showing they had interest in insuring proper work procedures and legitimate professional interest in plaintiffs performance at Center" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520634 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "complaint admits defendants had proper motive by alleging they were directors of \"Center\" and Center's \"Lab\" thereby showing they had interest in insuring proper work procedures and legitimate professional interest in plaintiffs performance at Center" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 S.E. 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" }, { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628210 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566728 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4777283, 4773604, 4775440, 4775350, 4777148 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0341-02", "/nc/317/0341-03", "/nc/317/0341-04", "/nc/317/0341-01", "/nc/317/0341-05" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522041 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491716, 2492262, 2491956, 2491610, 2489499 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0546-05", "/nc/325/0546-02", "/nc/325/0546-04", "/nc/325/0546-01", "/nc/325/0546-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520544 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "all inferences drawn in favor of non-movant in deciding motion for summary judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500046 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "all inferences drawn in favor of non-movant in deciding motion for summary judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529255 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525636 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4690404, 4686826, 4689527, 4687736, 4688381 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0114-05", "/nc/314/0114-02", "/nc/314/0114-04", "/nc/314/0114-03", "/nc/314/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525414 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499459 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538399 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575227 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498222 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520576 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0142-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 951, "char_count": 22498, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.434263275615393e-07, "percentile": 0.9695026621243169 }, "sha256": "4276b012b4095a2ed899df2861a97979780b9d6e0be31da94af31687b7289f1d", "simhash": "1:0d51d032a40698e4", "word_count": 3572 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "PHYLLIS WAGONER v. ELKIN CITY SCHOOLS\u2019 BOARD OF EDUCATION, BRUCE MORTON, DONALD T. LASSITER, and CHARLIE PARSONS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nPhyllis Wagoner (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court\u2019s granting of Elkin City Schools\u2019 Board of Education, Bruce Morton, Donald T. Lassiter, and Charlie Parsons\u2019 (defendants) motion for summary judgment in this action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive wrongful discharge, malicious interference with contract, and punitive damages. Plaintiff also appeals from the trial court\u2019s order denying her motion to compel discovery and from the trial court\u2019s sustaining of defendants\u2019 objection to the affidavit of Dr. Melvin F. Gadson (Dr. Gadson).\nThe evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reveals that the Elkin City Schools\u2019 Board of Education (the Board) hired plaintiff in 1974, and David Thrift, then principal of Elkin High School (EHS), informed her she was being hired to teach health and physical education, the only areas she was certified to teach. The probationary contract between the Board and plaintiff for the 1976-1977 school year and the career contract between the Board and plaintiff for the 1977-1978 school year state plaintiff is \u201c[tentatively assigned to Elkin High School.\u201d Plaintiff signed no other employment contract after signing the 1977 career contract. In 1974, plaintiff began teaching physical education and health.\nIn August 1985, Bruce Morton (Morton), EHS principal from the fall of 1985 until the summer of 1990, asked in front of the entire faculty, \u201cWhich one of you is Phyllis Wagoner?\u201d and did not ask for anyone else. Morton visited the gym while she was teaching and stared at her for \u201cminutes at a time,\u201d did not show up for scheduled evaluations of plaintiff, told her once \u201cif I were grading you today, I would give you an F,\u201d switched her from a physical education teacher to an ISS coordinator, told her she could \u201cthrow all of [her] health and physical education materials away because [she] would never need them again,\u201d placed her office in a small room in the girls\u2019 locker room with a temperature of 90 to 100 degrees without providing a phone in that room, denied her the opportunity to attend workshops in her area, assigned different working hours than the other teachers, told her that her job was the worst job in the school, told her she would receive a good evaluation if she went on a school skiing trip, filled out an evaluation without a formal observation and claimed that plaintiff had agreed to an interview type observation when she had not, and returned a student that had pushed plaintiff to her classroom.\nPlaintiff complained to the Board and Donald Lassiter (Lassiter), superintendent of Elkin City Schools, about her position and working hours as ISS coordinator; however, Lassiter and the Board upheld Morton\u2019s assignment of duties and the hours under the Senate Bill 2 plan. After she informed the Board and the new principal, Charlie Parsons (Parsons), that she would work the regular hours, Lassiter suspended plaintiff without pay pending termination for alleged insubordination. After plaintiff appealed this suspension to a Professional Review Committee under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325, which determined on 23 October 1990 that plaintiff was wrongfully suspended, Lassiter reinstated her. After returning to EHS in November 1990, Parsons placed plaintiff back in the ISS program. On 30 November 1990, she resigned, citing that her work environment from 1989 through November 1990 was intolerable and unbearable, and she had been given \u201cnothing to do\u201d since her return. As a result of these events, plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress, has been on medication for depression and anxiety, and has been diagnosed by her psychiatrist as having a major psychiatric disorder.\nDuring discovery, plaintiff deposed Tony Duncan (Duncan), the teacher who was placed in plaintiff\u2019s position of physical education and health teacher, on 20 February 1992, but Duncan refused to answer questions regarding his relationship with a female high school student at his place of employment before coming to EHS. In written discovery, plaintiff sought personnel records of nine EHS teachers and certain student records. Plaintiff moved to compel discovery of such information on 28 February 1992, which motion was denied by the trial court on 2 April 1992.\nSam Tesh, Assistant Principal at EHS from 1983-87, James W. Halsey, Director of Personnel for the Board from 1985-87, Ralph Clingerman, a teacher at EHS, and Laura C. Overbey stated that Morton had told them he was under pressure from the Board to get rid of plaintiff. Morton stated that as principal of EHS, he had the responsibility of making teaching assignments and evaluating each teacher, and switched Duncan and plaintiff because he became \u201cconcerned that she was not doing an effective job of teaching the basic skills of various sports to the students\u201d and because switching the responsibilities between Mr. Duncan and [plaintiff] would improve the overall school program.\u201d\nPlaintiff tendered into evidence at the summary judgment hearing, the affidavit of Dr. Gadson. He stated in his affidavit that in his opinion, (1) defendants\u2019 treatment of plaintiff was an \u201cextreme departure from the normal operation of a public school program,\u201d and that she was forced to work under \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d conditions; (2) replacing plaintiff with Duncan was a \u201cwrongful interference with her contract because it was motivated not by a legitimate educational purpose, but was rather due to a malicious and calculated design to drive her out of the Elkin school system\u201d; (3) because defendants\u2019 conduct was \u201cso far outside the bounds of human decency and normal standards for the operations of a public school,\u201d plaintiff would have been expected to resign; and (4) defendants violated North Carolina\u2019s public policy by placing Duncan in plaintiff\u2019s position because they knew of his immoral conduct. After defendants objected to the trial court\u2019s consideration of Dr. Gadson\u2019s affidavit on the grounds that the affidavit \u201cpurported to offer expert opinions regarding issues of law,\u201d the trial court sustained the objection and ruled those portions offering opinion testimony inadmissible. Defendants then objected to the affidavit on the grounds that Dr. Gadson was not qualified to be an expert in the subject areas in which his affidavit purports to offer expert opinions. The trial court sustained the objection and ruled the affidavit inadmissible.\nBased on the evidence presented at the summary judgment hearing, the trial court, on 30 June 1992, granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment as to each of plaintiff\u2019s claims and dismissed her action.\nThe issues presented are whether the trial court erred in (I) denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel discovery; (II) sustaining defendants\u2019 objection to consideration of Dr. Gadson\u2019s affidavit; and (III) granting defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion on plaintiff\u2019s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious interference with contract, constructive wrongful discharge, and punitive damages.\nI\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to compel discovery. Plaintiff wished to retake Duncan\u2019s deposition for the \u201cpurpose of having him answer questions about those matters which he failed to do\u201d in his deposition on 20 February 1992. Those matters concern the alleged involvement between Duncan and a female student at the high school where Duncan was employed before accepting employment at EHS. Plaintiff also wished, under her Second Request for Production of Documents, for defendants to supply plaintiff \u201cthe complete student record, including report cards, discipline records, etc.\u201d of all students in the ISS program and EHS during 1989-90 and 1990-91 school years.\nUnder the rules governing discovery, a party may obtain discovery concerning any unprivileged matter as long as relevant to the pending action and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b) (1990). If defendant fails to respond or specifically object to a request within forty-five days, or such other time the court states otherwise, Rule 84,/ the serving party, upon reasonable notice, may move to compel discovery under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(a) (1990). Whether or not the party\u2019s motion to compel discovery should be granted or denied is within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Tucci, 104 N.C. App. 142, 152, 408 S.E.2d 859, 865-66 (1991), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 331 N.C. 749, 417 S.E.2d 236 (1992).\nPlaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving that her requests relate to information both relevant and necessary to her claims. Whether or not Duncan had a relationship with a high school student during his previous employment, the complete student records at EHS, and school personnel records are irrelevant to whether defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress on plaintiff, constructively and wrongfully discharged her, or maliciously interfered with her contract. The trial court did not therefore abuse its discretion in denying her motion to compel discovery.\nII\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants\u2019 objection to Dr. Gadson\u2019s affidavit. We disagree. Whether a witness is competent to testify as an expert is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State ex rel. Utilities Comm\u2019n v. General Telephone Co., 281 N.C. 318, 373, 189 S.E.2d 705, 740 (1972). Furthermore, expert testimony which suggests whether legal conclusions should be drawn or whether legal standards are satisfied is inadmissible. See Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, 328 N.C. 578, 587, 403 S.E.2d 483, 489 (1991). In this case, Dr. Gadson\u2019s entire affidavit consists of legal conclusions; therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining defendants\u2019 objection to Dr. Gadson\u2019s affidavit.\nIII\nIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress\nIn an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the essential elements are \u201c0 extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 2) which is intended to and does in fact cause 3) severe emotional distress.\u201d Waddle v. Sparks, 331 N.C. 73, 82, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1992) (quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)). Whether or not conduct constitutes extreme and outrageous behavior is initially a question of law for the court. Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 672, 676, 327 S.E.2d 308, 311, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 114, 332 S.E.2d 479 (1985). To meet the essential element of extreme and outrageous conduct, the conduct must go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and \u201cbe regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats.\u201d Daniel v. Carolina Sunrock Corp., 110 N.C. App. 376, 383, 430 S.E.2d 306, 310, rev\u2019d in part, 335 N.C. 233, 436 S.E.2d 835 (1993).\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Roumillat v. Simplistic Enterprises, Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 63, 414 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1992) (all inferences drawn in favor of non-movant in deciding motion for summary judgment), defendants\u2019 conduct of telling her to throw away her health and physical education materials because she would never need them again, removing her from her health and physical education teaching position to the job of ISS coordinator, placing her away from other faculty members in a small room with great humidity and high temperatures, returning a student that pushed plaintiff to her classroom, staring for \u201cminutes at a time\u201d at plaintiff while she taught, assigning her after school and Saturday work hours, asking her to accompany students on a skiing trip for a good evaluation, telling her she had the worst job in school, denying her the opportunity to attend workshops in her area, and asking \u201c[wjhich one of you is Phyllis Wagoner\u201d in front of the entire faculty may very well have \u201cinsulted\u201d plaintiff or caused her to suffer \u201cindignities\u201d; however, we do not regard this conduct \u201cas atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\u201d Even assuming that removing plaintiff from her teaching position and placing her in the job of ISS coordinator was not allowed under her contract with the Board or under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C, an issue we need not decide, her removal and placement in the ISS position does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Therefore, because plaintiff cannot forecast evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct, the trial court did not err in granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment as to that cause of action. Roumillat, 331 N.C. at 63, 414 S.E.2d at 342 (once summary judgment movant meets burden, burden is on non-movant to show she can make out prima facie case at trial).\nMalicious Interference With Contract\nThere are five essential elements for an action for malicious interference with contract: (1) a valid contract existed between plaintiff and a third person, (2) defendant knew of such contract, (3) defendant intentionally induced the third person not to perform his or her contract with plaintiff, (4) defendant had no justification for his or her actions, and (5) plaintiff suffered damage as a result. McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 308, 382 S.E.2d 836, 841, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989); Uzzell v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 78 N.C. App. 458, 463, 337 S.E.2d 639, 643 (1985), cert. denied, 317 N.C. 341, 346 S.E.2d 149 (1986). We initially note that plaintiff cannot maintain an action against the Board or Lassiter for malicious interference of contract because the Board and Lassiter, as superintendent of the Board, are parties to the contract. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 87, 221 S.E.2d 282, 292 (1976); Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 191 N.C. 182, 187, 131 S.E. 633, 636 (1926). Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Board or Lassiter on plaintiffs claim for malicious interference of contract.\nBecause Morton and Parsons are not parties to the contract between plaintiff and the Board, they may be liable for malicious interference with the contract if they have in fact interfered with the contract and the interference has no relation whatever \u201cto that legitimate business interest which is the source of the defendant\u2019s non-outsider status.\u201d Smith, 289 N.C. at 87, 221 S.E.2d at 292. Therefore, if the actions of Morton and Parsons have a basis related to their legitimate business interest in the contract between plaintiff and the Board, even though there may have also been some reasons for their actions unrelated to their legitimate business interest, plaintiff\u2019s action for malicious interference with contract cannot be sustained. Plaintiff, in her complaint, admits that Morton and Parsons had an interest in her performance at EHS under her contract with the Board by alleging that Morton \u201cwas an agent, servant, employee and Principal of Defendant Board\u201d and that Parsons \u201cwas and is an agent, servant, employee and Principal of Defendant Board.\u201d In their roles as principals at EHS, Morton and Parsons had a legitimate business interest in plaintiffs performance under her contract with the Board because they were responsible for overseeing, observing, and evaluating the faculty at EHS, and for assigning duties to the teachers. Because plaintiff admits on the face of her complaint that Morton and Parsons, by virtue of their positions as principals of EHS, had a proper motive for their actions of placing plaintiff in the position of ISS coordinator, plaintiff has failed to show that she can make out a prima facie case of malicious interference of contract at trial. See Privette v. University of North Carolina, 96 N.C. App. 124, 385 S.E.2d 185 (1989) (complaint admits defendants had proper motive by alleging they were directors of \u201cCenter\u201d and Center\u2019s \u201cLab\u201d thereby showing they had interest in insuring proper work procedures and legitimate professional interest in plaintiffs performance at Center); Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985) (complaint must admit of no other motive for interference other than malice). Thus, the trial court did not err in granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s claim for malicious interference of contract.\nConstructive Wrongful Discharge\nFor her third cause of action, plaintiff alleges in tort that she was wrongfully \u201cconstructively discharged by Defendants in violation of public policy.\" Assuming that plaintiff was wrongfully constructively discharged, she is nonetheless not entitled to assert the tort of wrongful discharge because the tort of wrongful discharge arises only in the context of employees at will. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989); Sides, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818. Breach of contract is the proper claim for a wrongfully discharged employee who is employed for a definite term or an employee subject to discharge only for \u201cjust cause.\u201d Elmore, 191 N.C. at 188, 131 S.E. at 636. Plaintiff is not an employee at will because she had attained the status of a career teacher under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(c) (Supp. 1993) and could not be dismissed or demoted except for reasons specified in Section 115C-325(e)(l). Therefore, plaintiff\u2019s claim based on the tort of wrongful discharge was correctly dismissed by the trial court.\nPunitive Damages\nBecause we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants on each of plaintiffs three causes of action, plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case for punitive damages because she cannot make out a prima facie case for the underlying torts. See Jones v. Gwynne, 312 N.C. 393, 405, 323 S.E.2d 9, 16 (1984). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s action, including her claim for punitive damages.\nAffirmed.\nJudges COZORT and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harold L. Kennedy, III and Harvey L. Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Ann L. Majestic, Alexis C. Pearce, and Jaye P. Meyer, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PHYLLIS WAGONER v. ELKIN CITY SCHOOLS\u2019 BOARD OF EDUCATION, BRUCE MORTON, DONALD T. LASSITER, and CHARLIE PARSONS\nNo. 9317SC241\n(Filed 15 February 1994)\n1. Discovery and Depositions \u00a7 7 (NCI4th)\u2014 wrongful discharge of teacher alleged \u2014discovery request for personnel and student records \u2014failure to show relevancy and necessity \u2014 request properly denied\nThe trial court did not err in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel discovery in her action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive wrongful discharge, malicious interference with contract, and punitive damages, since plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that her requests for information as to whether the teacher who replaced her had had a relationship with a high school student during his previous employment, the complete student records at her school, and school personnel records related to information both relevant and necessary to her claims.\nAm Jur 2d, Depositions and Discovery \u00a7\u00a7 21 et seq.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2152 (NCI4th)\u2014 expert witness-affidavit consisting of legal conclusions\nThe trial court did not err in sustaining defendants\u2019 objection to an expert witness\u2019s affidavit where the entire affidavit consisted of legal conclusions.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 136 et seq.\n3. Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress \u00a7 2 (NCI4th)\u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014principal\u2019s treatment of teacher \u2014summary judgment for defendants proper\nThe trial court did not err in granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, since evidence that defendants told plaintiff to throw away her health and physical education materials because she would never need them again, removed her from her health and physical education teaching position to the job of ISS coordinator, placed her away from other faculty members in a small room with great humidity and high temperatures, returned a student who had pushed plaintiff to her classroom, stared for \u201cminutes at a time\u201d at plaintiff while she taught, assigned her after school and Saturday work hours, asked her to accompany students on a skiing trip for a good evaluation, told her she had the worst job in school, and denied her the opportunity to attend workshops in her area may well have insulted plaintiff or caused her to suffer indignities, but such actions did not amount to conduct which was atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\nAm Jur 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance \u00a7\u00a7 4 et seq., 17.\nLiability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress. 52 ALR4th 853.\n4. Contracts \u00a7 180 (NCI4th|\u2014 malicious interference \u2014action by teacher against board and superintendent \u2014parties to contract\nPlaintiff teacher could not maintain an action against defendant board of education or defendant superintendent of schools for malicious interference with contract since the board and the superintendent were parties to the contract.\nAm Jur 2d, Interference \u00a7\u00a7 39-48.\n5. Contracts \u00a7 190 (NCI4th)\u2014 malicious interference \u2014motive of principals proper \u2014failure of plaintiff to make prima facie case\nBecause plaintiff teacher admitted on the face of her complaint that defendant principals, by virtue of their positions at her school, had a proper motive for their actions of placing plaintiff in the position of ISS coordinator, plaintiff failed to show that she could make out a prima facie case of malicious interference with contract.\nAm Jur 2d, Interference \u00a7\u00a7 49-48.\n6. Labor and Employment \u00a7 68 (NCI4th)\u2014 career teacher \u2014no employee at will \u2014 tort of wrongful discharge inapplicable\nPlaintiff teacher\u2019s claim based on the tort of wrongful discharge was correctly dismissed by the trial court, since that tort arises only in the context of employees at will, and plaintiff, as a career teacher under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-325(c), was not an employee at will.\nAm Jur 2d, Master and Servant \u00a7\u00a7 60-70.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 30 June 1992 in Surry County Superior Court by Judge James M. Long. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 1994.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, by Harold L. Kennedy, III and Harvey L. Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.\nTharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Ann L. Majestic, Alexis C. Pearce, and Jaye P. Meyer, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0579-01", "first_page_order": 609, "last_page_order": 619 }