{ "id": 8524480, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: THE APPEAL OF JOEL HENRY DAVIS, JR. FROM THE APPRAISAL OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY BY THE CRAVEN COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW FOR 1991 AND THE CARTERET COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW FOR 1991", "name_abbreviation": "In re Appeal of Davis", "decision_date": "1994-03-01", "docket_number": "No. 9310PTC146", "first_page": "743", "last_page": "751", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.C. App. 743" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "203 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562562 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493879 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307491, 5309577, 5305754, 5307317, 5307610 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0482-02", "/nc/326/0482-01", "/nc/326/0482-05", "/nc/326/0482-04", "/nc/326/0482-03" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520326 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571777, 8571747, 8571852, 8571821, 8571886 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0727-02", "/nc/301/0727-01", "/nc/301/0727-04", "/nc/301/0727-03", "/nc/301/0727-05" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 636", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550094 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 105-277.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 30, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 17329, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.279034880960449e-07, "percentile": 0.7847660230384088 }, "sha256": "502451fd975cc5f04718a48a7c167419600806eaa56a0438de70ecb758584551", "simhash": "1:007524525a383b0e", "word_count": 2853 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:21:41.323369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: THE APPEAL OF JOEL HENRY DAVIS, JR. FROM THE APPRAISAL OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY BY THE CRAVEN COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW FOR 1991 AND THE CARTERET COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW FOR 1991" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nIn 1990, Taxpayer acquired property from the United States Forest Service (the \u201cUSFS\u201d) in exchange for other property Taxpayer owned individually. Prior to the exchange, the property Taxpayer conveyed to the USFS had been classified and carried as \u201cindividually owned forestland\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 105-277.2, -277.3 for ten or more years. Further, th\u00e9 property Taxpayer received from the USFS was sixty-two acres of land which had been held and used by the USFS for commercial growing of trees under the government\u2019s forest management program and was exempt from assessment and taxation by law.\nI.\nThe sole question before this Court is whether the Property Tax Commission erred in finding the property Taxpayer received from the USFS was eligible for \u201cpresent use\u201d tax valuation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c). For the reasons stated below, we find no error.\n\u201cProperty coming within one of the classes defined in G.S. 105-277.3 shall be eligible for taxation on the basis of the value of the property in its present use ....\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.4(a) (1992). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3 states:\n(a) The following classes of property are hereby designated special classes of property ....\n(3) Individually owned forestland consisting of one or more tracts, one of which consists of at least 20 acres that are in actual production and are not included in a farm unit.\nUnder this statute, \u201c[individually owned\u201d means owned by a natural person or a corporation as defined under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.2(4), and \u201c \u2018[fjorestland\u2019 means land that is a part of a forest unit that is actively engaged in the commercial growing of trees under a sound management program.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.2(2), (4).\nIf the forestland is owned by natural persons, the classification of such forestland for \u201cpresent use\u201d valuation is further limited by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(b) which states:\nIn order to come within a classification described in subdivision (a) . . . (3), above, the property must, if owned by natural persons, also:\n(1) Be the owner\u2019s place of residence; or\n(2) Have been owned by the current owner or a relative of the current owner for the four years preceding January 1 of the year for which the benefit of this section is claimed.\nThus, absent another statutory provision, in order to qualify for \u201cpresent use\u201d valuation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a)(3), property owned by a natural person must be forestland consisting of one or more tracts, one of which consists of at least twenty acres that are in actual production and are not included in a farm unit. Further, the forestland owned by a natural person must either be the owner\u2019s residence or have been owned by the current owner, or a relative of the owner, for four years preceding January 1 of the year the benefit is claimed.\nIn the present case, it is undisputed that the property that Taxpayer received from the USFS falls under the category of \u201cforestland\u201d and that Taxpayer is an \u201cindividual\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.2(4) in that he is a \u201cnatural person\u201d. It is also undisputed that the property consists of a sixty-two acre tract of land used for commercial growing of trees under a forest management program. The forestland in question is not, however, Taxpayer\u2019s residence, and neither Taxpayer nor a relative of Taxpayer has owned the property for four years. Thus, absent another provision, the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(b) prevent Taxpayer\u2019s property from qualifying for present use valuation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a)(3).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) provides an additional way, however, for taxpayers to qualify for present use valuation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) states:\nIn addition, property may come within one of the classifications described in subsection (a) above, if (i) it was appraised at its present use value or was eligible for appraisal at its present use value pursuant to that subsection at the time title to the property passed to the present owner, and (ii) at the time title to the property passed to the present owner he owned other property classified under subsection (a).\n(Emphasis added.) Thus, in order to qualify for present use valuation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c), Taxpayer must meet a two-part test: at the time title to the property passed to Taxpayer, (1) the property must have been appraised at its present use value or have been eligible for appraisal at its present use value under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a), and (2) Taxpayer must have owned other property classified under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a).\nIn the present case, the appellants concede that Taxpayer has satisfied the second prong of the test by owning other property classified under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a) at the time title to the property passed to him. Appellants contend, however, that Taxpayer has failed to meet the first prong of the test. It is undisputed that the property in question was not appraised at its present use valuation at the time title passed to Taxpayer. The sole issue before us is, therefore, whether the property was eligible for present use valuation at the time title passed to Taxpayer.\nAppellants argue that in order to determine this issue, we must view the property in the hands of the grantor, not the grantee. Based on this argument, appellants contend that the property was not eligible for present use valuation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a) at the time title passed to Taxpayer because the United States Forest Service owned the property and this governmental agency does not qualify as an \u201cindividual\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.2(4) and as required to qualify for present use valuation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a). We disagree.\nOn the issue of statutory construction, our Supreme Court recently stated in Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1993):\nIn construing a statute, the Court must first ascertain the legislative intent to assure that the purpose and intent of the legislation are carried out. ... To make this determination, we look first to the language of the statute itself. ... If the language used is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite meaning of the language.\n(Citations omitted.)\nThe statutory language at issue in the case sub judice is that the property must have been \u201celigible for appraisal at its present use value pursuant to [G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(a)] at the time title to the property passed to the present owner . . . .\u201d (Emphasis added.) The word \u201cpassed\u201d is the past tense form of the verb \u201cpass\u201d, which The American Heritage Dictionary defines, \u201c[t]o be transferred or conveyed to another by will, deed, or the like . . . .\u201d As the past tense of \u201cpass\u201d, the plain and definite meaning of the word \u201cpassed\u201d would be transferred or conveyed. In other words, the word \u201cpassed\u201d in this context means that the transference or conveyance has already occurred and that for purposes of this portion of the statute, the property should be viewed in the hands of the grantee.\nAdditionally, by requiring that the property be viewed in the hands of the grantee instead of the grantor, the first prong of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) is consistent with the second prong of this statute. The second prong of G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) that \u201cat the time title to the property passed to the present owner he owned other property classified under subsection (a)\u201d also focuses on the status of the owner of the land who is seeking present use valuation, not the grantor\u2019s status. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) (emphasis added). Further, by looking at the property in the hands of the grantee instead of the grantor, the first prong of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) is consistent with the other provisions and promotes the purpose behind G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3 permits \u201cpreferential assessment of agricultural, forest and horticultural lands which reduces the property tax burden of the landowner.\u201d W.R. Co. v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm\u2019n, 48 N.C. App. 245, 257, 269 S.E.2d 636, 643 (1980), disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 727, 276 S.E.2d 287 (1981); In re Appeal of ELE, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 253, 255, 388 S.E.2d 241, 243, disc. review on add\u2019l issues dismissed, 326 N.C. 482, 392 S.E.2d 92, aff\u2019d per curiam, 327 N.C. 468, 396 S.E.2d 325 (1990). In order to reduce the tax burden of the landowner, the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a) focus on the status of the property owner as an individual.\nUnder G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(a)(1), (2), and (3), certain \u201c[ijndividually owned agricultural land\u201d, \u201c/ijndividually owned horticultural land\u201d, and \u201c/ijndividually owned forestland\u201d qualify for present use valuation. (Emphasis added.) Each of these provisions focuses on the status of the owner of the property who is seeking the present use valuation to determine whether the property is eligible for such valuation.\nThus, we conclude that the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) requires that the relevant time for determining the property\u2019s eligibility for present use valuation under the first prong of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) is after the property has been transferred to the new owner. For purposes of qualifying under the first prong of G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c), therefore, the property should be viewed in the hands of the grantee, and not the grantor.\nIn the present case, when viewed in the hands of Taxpayer, at the time title passed to Taxpayer, he owned the property at issue individually. Further, at the time title passed to Taxpayer, the property was forestland which was actively engaged in commercial tree production under a sound management program. Thus, since appellants concede that Taxpayer also satisfied the second prong of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c), we conclude that the property at issue meets all of the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) and that the Property Tax Commission did not err, therefore, in concluding that the property qualified for present use valuation.\nII.\nAppellants contend, however, that even if Taxpayer met the two-prong requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c), the four-year ownership requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(b) still applies to preclude Taxpayer\u2019s property from qualifying for present use valuation. We disagree.\nSubsection (c) immediately follows subsection (b) and states, \u201cire addition, property may come within one of the classifications described in subsection (a) above, if\u201d at the time title to the property passed to the taxpayer, (1) the property was appraised at its present use value or was eligible for appraisal at its present use value under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a), and (2) the taxpayer owned other property classified under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(a). Thus, subsection (c) essentially requires that the property meet the requirements found in the language of subsection (a) with the additional requirement that taxpayer own other property already classified under subsection (a) to qualify for present use valuation under subsection (a).\nBecause subsection (c) states that it is an \u201cadditional\u201d method for property to qualify under subsection (a) for present use valuation, the requirements for qualifying under subsection (c) must be an alternative method from subsection (a) for qualifying for present use valuation; otherwise, there would be no need for subsection (c), and subsection (c) would be mere surplusage. \u201cThe presumption is that no part of a statute is mere surplusage, but each provision adds something which would not otherwise be included in its terms.\u201d Domestic Elec. Service, Inc. v. City of Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 143, 203 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1974).\nIn addition to the requirements found in the specific language of subsection (a), the language of subsection (b) requires that, in order for the property owned by \u201cnatural persons\u201d to qualify for present use valuation under subsection (a), the property must also be the residence of the owner or have been owned by the owner or his relative for four years. As already stated, the requirements found in the specific language of subsection (a) also apply to property qualifying under subsection (c). Thus, the only difference between the two sections that could make subsection (c) an alternative to subsection (a) must be the residential or four-year ownership requirement imposed by subsection (b).\nThus, we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(b) does not apply to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c). Our reading of the statute is bolstered by the fact that subsection (c) of G.S. 105-277.3(c) was ratified as Senate Bill 49 entitled, \u201cAN ACT TO ELIMINATE THE FOUR-YEAR OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR USE-VALUE FORESTLAND TRANSFERRED TO THE OWNER OF OTHER USE-VALUE FORESTLAND.\u201d\nAccordingly we find appellants\u2019 argument without merit.\nIII.\nFinally, appellants contend that the Property Tax Commission\u2019s decision to grant Taxpayer present use valuation for his property violates the \u201cgoals of uniformity and equality\u201d in taxation. In support of their contention, appellants argue that \u201callowing the taxpayer present use value of the property, in light of the failure to meet the requirements of G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3, would cause violence to the principle of uniformity and equality of taxation.\u201d In light of our holding that Taxpayer\u2019s property meets the requirements of G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) to qualify for present use valuation, appellants\u2019 argument is without merit.\nAccordingly, we affirm the order of the Property Tax Commission.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sumrell, Sugg, Carmichael & Ashton, P.A., by James R. Sugg and Jimmie B. Hicks, Jr., for appellants Craven County and the Craven County Board of Equalization and Review for 1991; and Hamilton, Bailey, Way & Brothers, by John Way, for appellants Carteret County and the Carteret County Board of Equalization and Review for 1991.", "Henderson, Baxter & Alford, P.A., by David S. Henderson, for appellee Joel Henry Davis, Jr." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: THE APPEAL OF JOEL HENRY DAVIS, JR. FROM THE APPRAISAL OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY BY THE CRAVEN COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW FOR 1991 AND THE CARTERET COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW FOR 1991\nNo. 9310PTC146\n(Filed 1 March 1994)\n1. Taxation \u00a7 83 (NCI4th)\u2014 property qualified for present use valuation \u2014time for determining eligibility\nThe plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) requires that the relevant time for determining the property\u2019s eligibility for present use valuation under the first prong of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c) is after the property has been transferred to the new owner; therefore, for the purposes of qualifying for present use valuation under the first prong of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c), the property should be viewed in the hands of the grantee and not the grantor. The Property Tax Commission did not err in concluding that the property in question qualified for present use valuation since, viewed in the hands of the taxpayer at the time title passed to taxpayer, he owned the property at issue individually; at the time title passed to taxpayer the property was forestland which was actively engaged in commercial tree production under a sound management program; and appellants conceded that taxpayer owned other property classified under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(a) at the time title to the property passed to him.\nAm Jur 2d, State and Local Taxation \u00a7\u00a7 759 et seq.\n2. Taxation \u00a7 83 (NCI4th)\u2014 property qualified for present use valuation \u2014four-year ownership requirement inapplicable\nThere was no merit to appellant\u2019s contention that even if taxpayer met the two-prong requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c), the four-year ownership requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(b) still applied to preclude taxpayer\u2019s property from qualifying for present use valuation, since the provisions of subsection (c) allow for an additional method for property to qualify under subsection (a) for present use valuation so that the requirements for qualifying under subsection (c) must be an alternative method from subsection (a); therefore, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(b) does not apply to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-277.3(c).\nAm Jur 2d, State and Local Taxation \u00a7\u00a7 759 et seq.\nAppeal by Craven County, the Craven County Board of Equalization and Review for 1991, Carteret County, and the Carteret County Board of Equalization and Review for 1991 from a final decision of the North Carolina Property Tax Commission entered 21 October 1992. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 December 1993.\nTaxpayer Joel Henry Davis, Jr. applied in Carteret and Craven Counties for \u201cpresent use\u201d tax valuation on certain forestland located in each of these counties. Both counties\u2019 Board of Equalization and Review for 1991 denied taxpayer\u2019s application. Taxpayer appealed the decision of both Boards to the North Carolina Property Tax Commission (the \u201cCommission\u201d), and the appeals were consolidated. On 21 October 1992, the Commission entered a final decision reversing both decisions and finding the forestland eligible for \u201cpresent use\u201d valuation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-277.3(c). From this decision, the Counties and their Boards of Equalization and Review for 1991 appeal.\nSumrell, Sugg, Carmichael & Ashton, P.A., by James R. Sugg and Jimmie B. Hicks, Jr., for appellants Craven County and the Craven County Board of Equalization and Review for 1991; and Hamilton, Bailey, Way & Brothers, by John Way, for appellants Carteret County and the Carteret County Board of Equalization and Review for 1991.\nHenderson, Baxter & Alford, P.A., by David S. Henderson, for appellee Joel Henry Davis, Jr." }, "file_name": "0743-01", "first_page_order": 773, "last_page_order": 781 }