{ "id": 8527054, "name": "CLYDE E. ROWE, JR., and DONNA GRANT ROWE v. JOHN THOMAS WALKER, C. NORMAN WALKER, and SHIRLEY WALKER KENNEDY", "name_abbreviation": "Rowe v. Walker", "decision_date": "1994-03-15", "docket_number": "No. 929SC918", "first_page": "36", "last_page": "45", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 N.C. App. 36" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "36 ALR4th 769", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "24 ALR4th 1053", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "72 S.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622548 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549455 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613181 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564943 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596944 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630068 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570301 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565468 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.E. 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 N.C. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270249 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/171/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 S.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559581 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "quoting Jones v. Warren, 274 N.C. 166, 173, 161 S.E.2d 467, 472 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "4 N.C. App. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554860 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "quoting Jones v. Warren, 274 N.C. 166, 173, 161 S.E.2d 467, 472 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/4/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 A. 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441-42", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "441-42" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522113 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366-68" }, { "page": "366-67" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625745 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230-32" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E. 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "192 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621518 ], "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/192/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610637 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557890 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182, 183-85" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567516 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338, 340-42" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597127 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774211, 4774790, 4776588, 4780213, 4773560 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0714-04", "/nc/317/0714-01", "/nc/317/0714-02", "/nc/317/0714-05", "/nc/317/0714-03" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" }, { "page": "804", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "804" }, { "page": "805-06" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524701 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "620-21" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 S.E. 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783", "parenthetical": "N.C. recording statutes \"do[] not protect all purchasers, but only innocent purchasers for value\"" }, { "page": "783", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "783" }, { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565468 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "N.C. recording statutes \"do[] not protect all purchasers, but only innocent purchasers for value\"" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 969, "char_count": 20904, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8692338982685375e-07, "percentile": 0.8426730670398158 }, "sha256": "02e46eb18704b9e33fe3ac36fffed4e01fb9712a693791e8edf5b3ad387d2d40", "simhash": "1:437dd4f996f7d859", "word_count": 3388 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:59.295429+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge JOHNSON concurs.", "Judge JOHN dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "CLYDE E. ROWE, JR., and DONNA GRANT ROWE v. JOHN THOMAS WALKER, C. NORMAN WALKER, and SHIRLEY WALKER KENNEDY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nIn January 1970 Jack and Martha Chavis owned a 70.06 acre tract of farmland. Most of the tract lies in southern Person County, but approximately 7.7 acres lie in northern Orange County. On 19 January 1970, Clyde and Mary Walker (defendants\u2019 predecessors in title) acquired an approximately fifty-acre tract of property in Orange County, adjoining the Chavises\u2019 land to the south. Shortly thereafter, the Chavises granted the Walkers a twenty-foot wide easement across the Chavises\u2019 property to allow the Walkers to use a farm road providing access from the north through Person County to the Walkers\u2019 Orange County farmland. The easement was recorded in the Orange County Registry on 23 January 1970. Although a significant portion of the easement lies in Person County, it was not registered there at that time.\nOn 28 December 1979 the Chavises sold their land to Charles and Linda Hall. On 2 October 1987, plaintiffs purchased the land from the Halls. Plaintiffs promptly registered the deed in both Orange County and Person County.\nThe easement roadway passed over a dam in the vicinity of the Orange/Person county border. In October 1987, in order to drain a small pond, plaintiffs breached this dam, thereby destroying use of the road and use of the easement at that point. Defendants asked plaintiffs to rebuild the dam. Plaintiffs refused.\nOn 6 July 1988 defendants recorded their easement in Person County.\nOn 20 October 1988, defendant Norman Walker and others undertook reconstruction of the dam. On 21 December 1988, plaintiffs instituted this proceeding to enjoin defendants and their invitees from using the eas\u00e9ment. Plaintiffs also sought an order quieting title to the portion of the property covered by the easement. Defendants counterclaimed for costs expended in repairing the dam.\nThe trial court concluded that defendants had a valid easement across both the Orange County and Person County portions of plaintiffs\u2019 property and awarded defendants $1650.00 with interest in compensation for repairs to the dam.\nI.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47-27 provides that in order to be valid against a purchaser for valuable consideration, a deed of easement must be recorded in the county where the land affected is located:\nAll persons, firms, or corporations now owning or hereafter acquiring any deed or agreement for rights-of-way and easements of any character whatsoever shall record such deeds and agreements in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the land affected is situated.\nNo deed, agreement for right-of-way, or easement, of any character shall be valid as against any creditor or purchaser for a valuable consideration but from the registration thereof within the county where the land affected thereby lies.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47-27 (1984). See also Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr., Webster\u2019s Heal Estate Law in North Carolina \u00a7 369 (3d ed. 1988). Recordation in one county has \u201cno effect beyond the borders of that county.\u201d Allen v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 171 N.C. 339, 341, 88 S.E. 492, 493 (1916). Therefore, where a property interest spans more than one county, it is only effective against other claimants in the counties in which it has been recorded. Because defendants\u2019 easement was not duly recorded in Person County at the time plaintiffs recorded their deed there, the easement was not valid against plaintiffs in Person County. \u201cIf a conveyance is not recorded by a grantee, it is considered absolutely void with respect to purchasers for value or lien creditors of the same grantor who record their conveyances or docket their liens.\u201d Webster\u2019s Real Estate Law in North Carolina \u00a7 369.\nNorth Carolina is a \u201cpure race\u201d jurisdiction, in which the first to record an interest in land holds an interest superior to all other purchasers for value, regardless of actual or constructive notice as to other, unrecorded conveyances. \u201cWhere a grantor conveys the same property to two different purchasers, the first purchaser to record his deed wins the \u2018race to the Register of Deeds\u2019 Office\u2019 and thereby defeats the other\u2019s claim to the property, even if he has actual notice of the conveyance to the other purchaser.\u201d Hill v. Pinelawn Memorial Park, Inc., 304 N.C. 159, 163, 282 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1981); Bourne v. Lay & Co., 264 N.C. 33, 140 S.E.2d 769 (1965). Since defendants failed to register their grant of easement in Person County before plaintiffs registered their deed there, plaintiffs won the \u201crace to the courthouse,\u201d and their interest supersedes the later-recorded interest claimed by defendants.\nThe trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendants\u2019 easement was valid in Person County was based on an erroneous belief that our law requires a purchaser for valuable consideration to be an \u201cinnocent purchaser.\u201d The court reasoned that because there were references to the easement within plaintiffs\u2019 chain of title, plaintiffs were on constructive notice as to its course through their Person County property. The court stated that buyers with constructive notice did not hold the status of innocent purchasers for valuable consideration. It concluded that therefore, even though defendants\u2019 easement had not been recorded, it was valid against these plaintiffs.\nNorth Carolina does not require that a purchaser for valuable consideration be an \u201cinnocent purchaser.\u201d A \u201cpurchaser for value\u201d or a \u201cpurchaser for valuable consideration\u201d is defined by our case law simply as one who has paid a valuable consideration for the execution of an instrument of conveyance. Sansom v. Warren, 215 N.C. 432, 2 S.E.2d 459 (1939). Plaintiffs meet this definition and thus are purchasers for valuable consideration protected by \u00a7 47-27.\nConstructive notice is relevant in determining priority of interests where duly recorded. Once an interest has been recorded, future claimants are considered to have notice of it and to take subject to it. Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N.C. 26, 62 S.E.2d 512 (1950); Yount v. Lowe, 288 N.C. 90, 215 S.E.2d 563 (1975). Because defendants\u2019 easement was properly recorded in Orange County, plaintiffs had constructive notice of it over their Orange County property. We affirm the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the portion of defendants\u2019 easement over the Orange County property is valid against plaintiffs.\nAs for the portion of -the easement over the Person County property, we reverse the trial court as a matter of law and remand for an order instituting plaintiffs\u2019 requested injunctive relief and quieting title to the Person County property in favor of plaintiffs.\nII.\nPlaintiffs also contest the trial court\u2019s finding that defendants\u2019 easement ran over the dam that was breached, thus entitling defendants to $1650.00 for costs expended to repair the dam.\nThe trial court\u2019s finding relied on its conclusion that defendants\u2019 entire easement was valid. However, we hold that because the easement was valid only in Orange County, defendants can only be compensated if the dam lies in Orange County.\nThe parties in this action agree that it cannot be determined whether the dam in fact lies in Orange County. Although the dam is located in the vicinity of the Orange/Person county border, it cannot be determined which county it is in because the border has never been accurately surveyed.\nPerson County was created in 1791 when Caswell County was divided into two halves, Caswell County to the west, and Person County to the east. Caswell County itself had been created from Orange County in 1771. The General Assembly prescribed the Caswell County boundaries as follows:\n. . . North of a Point Twelve Miles due North of Hillsborough, and bounded as follows, to-wit, Beginning at the aforesaid Point, running thence due East to Granville County Line, thence North along Granville County Line to the Virginia Line, thence West along the Virginia Line to Guilford County Line, thence South along Guilford County Line to a Point due West of the Beginning, thence due East to the Beginning ....\nLaws of North Carolina 1777, ch. XVII, published in The State Records of North Carolina (Walter Clark ed., 1905). However, the Orange/Caswell dividing line was never surveyed or mapped. Thus, the Orange/Person line cannot be accurately determined. The legal dividing line between Orange and Caswell/P\u00e9rson still commences at a point twelve miles due north of Hillsborough, a point whose location may never be known because of the virtual impossibility of replicating survey conditions of 1777, but a point that nonetheless is the only one presently recognized at law. The power to create, abolish, enlarge or diminish the boundaries of a county is vested exclusively in the legislature. See Moore v. Board of Educ. of Iredell County, 212 N.C. 499, 193 S.E. 732 (1937); Swain County v. Sheppard, 35 N.C. App. 391, 241 S.E.2d 525 (1978); N.C. Const. art. VII, \u00a7 1. Until the legislature commissions an accurate survey of the boundary, we cannot determine which county the dam is in and therefore whether defendants\u2019 easement passes over it.\nAs the pleading party, defendants have the burden of establishing that their easement is valid at the point that it crosses over the dam. Wells v. Clayton, 236 N.C. 102, 72 S.E.2d 16 (1952). Defendants cannot prove that the dam lies in Orange County; in fact, they have stipulated that the county in which it is located cannot be determined. Defendants therefore fail to carry their eviden-tiary burden, and we reverse accordingly.\nFor the reasons discussed herein, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge JOHNSON concurs.\nJudge JOHN dissents in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge John\ndissenting.\nI believe the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs, as a result of recordation of the easement in Orange County, were chargeable with constructive notice of the existence and entire course of that easement. In addition, contrary to the majority\u2019s assertion, I also believe our law requires that \u201cpurchasers for value,\u201d in order to claim protection under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47-27 (1984), must indeed be \u201cinnocent.\u201d See Hill v. Memorial Park, 304 N.C. 159, 165, 282 S.E.2d 779, 783 (1981) (N.C. recording statutes \u201cdo[] not protect all purchasers, but only innocent purchasers for value\u201d) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Green v. Miller, 161 N.C. 25, 31, 76 S.E. 505, 508 (1912) (purchaser without notice of right or interest of third party, who pays full and fair price at time of purchase or before notice, takes property free from right of third party \u201cbecause he is regarded as an innocent purchaser .... It is a perfectly just rule, and it would be strange if the law were otherwise.\u201d) (Emphasis added). Thus plaintiffs, having constructive notice the easement was located in Orange and Person counties, were not \u201cinnocent\u201d purchasers of the land in question and therefore took title subject to the easement in both counties. Accordingly, I respectfully submit the trial court ruled properly and vote to affirm the court\u2019s order in its entirety.\nThe purpose of North Carolina\u2019s recording statutes is to \u201cprovide a single reliable means for purchasers to determine the state of the title to real estate,\u201d Stegall v. Robinson, 81 N.C. App. 617, 619, 344 S.E.2d 803, 804 (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 714, 347 S.E.2d 456 (1986), and to provide record notice \u201cupon the absence of which a prospective innocent purchaser may rely.\u201d Whitehurst v. Abbott, 225 N.C. 1, 5, 33 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1945). However, these statutes do \u201cnot protect all purchasers, but only innocent purchasers for value.\u201d Hill, 304 N.C. at 165, 282 S.E.2d at 783 (emphasis added); see also Morehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 338, 340-42, 137 S.E.2d 174, 182, 183-85 (1964).\nAs a consequence of the statutes:\n[a] purchaser of land is charged with notice of every description, recital, reference and reservation in deeds or muniments in his grantors\u2019 chain of title, and ... if the facts disclosed in such chain or [sic] title are sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry, he will be charged with notice of what a proper inquiry would have disclosed.\nHughes v. Highway Comm., 275 N.C. 121, 130, 165 S.E.2d 321, 327 (1969) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). \u201cA purchaser . . . has constructive notice of all duly recorded documents that a proper examination of the title should reveal,\u201d Stegall, 81 N.C. App. at 619, 344 S.E.2d at 804 (citation omitted), and such notice suffices to deprive a purchaser of \u201cinnocence\u201d with respect to such documents. See Hill, 304 N.C. at 165, 282 S.E.2d at 783; see also Butler v. Winston, 223 N.C. 421, 427, 27 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1943). This principle of constructive notice implied from proper registration has long been recognized and relied upon by our courts. See, e.g., Clark v. R.R., 192 N.C. 280, 283, 135 S.E. 26, 27 (1926).\nG.S. \u00a7 47-27, set out in the majority opinion, requires registration of easements in order for an interest in land claimed thereunder to be effective as against \u201cpurehaser[s] for a valuable consideration.\u201d To defeat defendants\u2019 claim to an easement, therefore, plaintiffs must be within the class of persons the registration statutes are designed to protect \u2014 \u201cinnocent purchasers for value,\u201d Hill, 304 N.C. at 165, 282 S.E.2d at 783; that is, purchasers whose proper examination of the appropriate chain of title would reveal no \u201cduly recorded documents\u201d evidencing interests in the property adverse to their own. Stegall, 81 N.C. App. at 619, 344 S.E.2d at 804. Unlike the majority, I do not believe plaintiffs meet the test.\nThe deeds from Jack and Martha Chavis to the Halls, and in turn from the Halls to plaintiffs, both specifically referred to the land as being located in Person and Orange counties. Plaintiffs properly registered their deed in both counties, signifying their awareness of two recorded chains of title.\nA proper, thorough title search by plaintiffs would have included \u201crunning the chain of title\u201d to ascertain all previous owners of the land, and thereafter investigating all the \u201cout\u201d conveyances by each owner. See generally Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr., Webster\u2019s Real Estate Law in North Carolina \u00a7\u00a7 458 to 463, at 601-23, \u00a7 490, at 670 (3d ed. 1988). This would have been accomplished by utilizing the Grantee and Grantor Indexes maintained in both counties. These indexes refer the title-searcher to specific pages of separate volumes wherein copies of documents reflecting the listed transactions may be found. Id. \u00a7 460, at 608. This is significant because checking a grantor\u2019s out-conveyances involves more than merely glancing at the brief description of the property in the Grantor Index \u2014 \u201c[t]he recorded instruments themselves should be looked at . . . Id. \u00a7 463 at 622-23.\nWhile this latter requirement of detailed examination of collateral deeds has been criticized, see Stegall, 81 N.C. App. at 620-21, 344 S.E.2d at 805-06, it is derived from admonitions adopted by our courts. See Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 230-32, 98 S.E.2d 360, 366-68 (1957). This Court followed and amplified Reed in Stegall v. Robinson, stating:\nReed stands for the rule that in title examination when checking the grantor\u2019s out conveyances it is not enough to merely insure that the subject property was not conveyed out previously. The title examiner must read the prior conveyances to determine that they do not contain restrictions applicable to the use of the subject property.\nStegall, 81 N.C. App. at 620, 344 S.E.2d at 805. In addition, we recently had occasion to observe that \u201cReed remains good law today.\u201d Gregory v. Floyd, 112 N.C. App. 470, 476, 435 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1993). Again, \u201c[t]he law contemplates that a purchaser of land will examine each recorded deed and other instrument in his chain of title and charges him with notice of every fact affecting his title which an accurate examination of the title would disclose.\u201d Waters v. Phosphate Corp., 310 N.C. 438, 441-42, 312 S.E.2d 428, 432 (1984) (citation omitted).\nPlaintiffs impliedly concede they were required to examine the record chain of title in both counties wherein the tract of land in question is located. They further concede that, by virtue of prior registration of the easement in Orange County, they were put on constructive notice of the existence of the easement as to that county. Under the foregoing authorities, I respectfully submit, plaintiffs are further charged with constructive notice of the duly recorded out-conveyance by which the easement was created including the contents thereof. \u201c \u2018The deed was notice to them of all it contained; otherwise, the purpose of the recording acts would be frustrated.\u2019 \u201d Stegall, 81 N.C. App. at 620, 344 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting with approval Finley v. Glenn, 154 A. 299, 301 (Pa. 1931)). If plaintiffs had properly conducted the required title examination in Orange County, they would have discovered not only conveyance of an easement to the Walkers. They would also have found the extent and course of that easement unambiguously described in the deed of conveyance and thus ascertained, at least upon \u201cprudent\u201d inquiry pursued \u201cwith reasonable diligence,\u201d Highway Comm. v. Wortman, 4 N.C. App. 546, 552, 167 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1969) (quoting Jones v. Warren, 274 N.C. 166, 173, 161 S.E.2d 467, 472 (1968)), its location in both Orange and Person counties.\nBecause plaintiffs had constructive notice of the entire course of the easement derived from the recorded instrument in Orange County, they took title subject to the easement in both counties, wherever the boundary line between them might be located. When a grantor burdens his property by written conveyance which appears in his chain of title, a subsequent purchaser from that grantor has constructive notice of that burden in the chain of title and takes subject thereto. Reed, 246 N.C. at 230, 98 S.E.2d at 366-67; Waters, 310 N.C. at 441-42, 312 S.E.2d at 432.\nUnder the limited circumstances of this case, therefore, I would approve the trial court\u2019s determination that \u201cplaintiffs\u2019 constructive notice of the existence and course of the Walker easement did not stop at the Person County line; constructive notice is notice for all purposes and not fictionally discontinued or suspended by a county line which intersects a single parcel of land.\u201d Therefore, I vote to affirm the court\u2019s ruling that plaintiffs, being chargeable with constructive notice of the existence and course of the easement in both Orange and Person counties, were thus not \u201cinnocent\u201d purchasers for a valuable consideration and were not entitled to rely upon G.S. \u00a7 47-27.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge John" } ], "attorneys": [ "Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by John I. Mabe, Jr. and Alison R. Cayton, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Brown & Bunch, by Charles Gordon Brown and Scott D. Zimmerman, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CLYDE E. ROWE, JR., and DONNA GRANT ROWE v. JOHN THOMAS WALKER, C. NORMAN WALKER, and SHIRLEY WALKER KENNEDY\nNo. 929SC918\n(Filed 15 March 1994)\n1. Registration and Probate \u00a7 88 (NCI4th)\u2014 superiority of interest in land \u2014N.C. as pure race state \u2014purchaser for value not required to be innocent purchaser\nNorth Carolina is a \u201cpure race\u201d jurisdiction in which the first to record an interest in land holds an interest superior to all other purchasers for value, regardless of actual or constructive notice as to other, unrecorded conveyances, and North Carolina does not require that a purchaser for valuable consideration be an \u201cinnocent purchaser\u201d; therefore, because defendants\u2019 easement which traversed both Orange and Person Counties was properly recorded in Orange County, plaintiffs had constructive notice of it over their Orange County property, but because the easement was not recorded in Person County, plaintiffs had no notice and the easement did not encumber their Person County property.\nAm Jur 2d, Records and Recording Laws \u00a7\u00a7 102 et seq.\n2. Easements \u00a7 40 (NCI4th)\u2014 easement across two counties \u2014 easement valid in one county \u2014inability to locate easement in one county or other\nBecause defendants\u2019 roadway easement was valid only in Orange and not in Person County, defendants could be compensated for breach of a dam over which the roadway passed only if the dam lay in Orange County; however, because the border between the counties has never been surveyed, defendants stipulated that it could not be determined in which county the easement was located, and defendants thus failed to carry their burden of establishing that their easement was valid at the point it crossed over the dam.\nAm Jur 2d, Easements and Licenses \u00a7\u00a7 64-67.\nLocation of easement of way created by grant which does not specify location. 24 ALR4th 1053.\nLocating easement of way created by necessity. 36 ALR4th 769.\nJudge JOHN dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 26 March 1992 by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Person County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 September 1993.\nManning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by John I. Mabe, Jr. and Alison R. Cayton, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nBrown & Bunch, by Charles Gordon Brown and Scott D. Zimmerman, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0036-01", "first_page_order": 64, "last_page_order": 73 }