{
  "id": 8527372,
  "name": "DATAFLOW COMPANIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. LISA HUTTO, LISA HUTTO d/b/a PALMETTO ALLERGY, P. A., and PALMETTO ALLERGY & ASTHMA, P. A., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dataflow Companies v. Hutto",
  "decision_date": "1994-04-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 9314SC322",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges EAGLES and LEWIS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "DATAFLOW COMPANIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. LISA HUTTO, LISA HUTTO d/b/a PALMETTO ALLERGY, P. A., and PALMETTO ALLERGY & ASTHMA, P. A., Defendants-Appellants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nPlaintiff, Dataflow Companies, Inc., is a North Carolina corporation, licensed to do business in the State of South Carolina, engaged in the sale and service of computer equipment and software for physicians and businesses. Defendant, Lisa Hutto, is a medical doctor in Columbia, South Carolina who conducts business in the name of Palmetto Allergy, P. A., and Palmetto Allergy and Asthma, P. A. Defendant Palmetto Allergy and Asthma, P. A. is a professional organization organized under the laws of South Carolina and with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina.\nIn the fall of 1990, plaintiff demonstrated the features and capabilities of its computer systems to defendants. Sometime after this demonstration, the parties, namely, Mr. Dickson as plaintiff\u2019s representative, and defendant Hutto and defendant\u2019s husband, Attorney Keith Hutto, as representatives of defendants, began negotiations for the purchase of a computer system by defendants. The negotiations ended in defendants purchasing a computer system, which consisted of hardware, software, and related items. In conjunction with the purchase of the computer system, defendants subscribed to one year maintenance agreements for the hardware and software components of the computer system. These agreements were renewable at the option of defendants for up to five years.\nAfter the installation of the computer system, in accordance with the hardware and software maintenance agreements, plaintiff\u2019s employees assisted defendants by making office visits, programming modifications, and providing telephone support via an 800 number. Even after defendants\u2019 hardware and software maintenance agreements expired, defendants called upon plaintiff to provide maintenance and support services, without renewing the maintenance agreements.\nIn addition to purchasing their computer system from plaintiff, defendants also purchased computer forms, supplies and customized forms from plaintiff. Between October 1990 and May 1992, defendants placed up to 28 orders for forms and computer supplies with plaintiff. All of the orders were processed in Durham, North Carolina, and many were shipped to defendants from Durham, North Carolina.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint against defendants on 10 June 1992 for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and failure to pay on an open account, in Durham County Superior Court. Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for improper division and lack of personal jurisdiction on 18 August 1992. On 3 September 1992, plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the case to the district court division in the event that the superior court determined that plaintiff\u2019s action was filed in the improper division. The motions were heard on 2 November 1992 in Durham County Superior Court before Judge Robert H. Hobgood. On 19 November 1992, Judge Hobgood issued an order denying defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, and declaring plaintiff\u2019s conditional motion to transfer moot.\nDefendants gave written notice of appeal to this Court on 2 December 1992, pursuant to North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 1-277(b) (1983), which states in pertinent part: \u201cAny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant. . . .\u201d\nDefendants\u2019 sole assignment of error is that the trial court committed reversible error in denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We disagree.\nCase law dictates that we apply a two step process in determining whether our state courts have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. \u201cFirst, the transaction must fall within the language of the State\u2019s \u2018long-arm\u2019 statute. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.\u201d Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Industries Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986).\nI\nLong-Arm Statute\nNorth Carolina\u2019s \u201clong-arm\u201d statute, North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 1-75.4(5) (1983), establishes the jurisdictional authority of the North Carolina courts with respect to plaintiffs causes of action and provides in pertinent part:\nA court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to Rule 4(j) of the Rules of Civil Procedure under any of the following circumstances:\n(5) Local Services, Goods or Contracts. \u2014In any action which:\nb. Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this State, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this State if such performance within this State was authorized or ratified by the defendant; or\nc. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff\u2019s benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this State, or to ship from this State goods, documents of title, or other things of value; or\nd. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction; or\nThe provisions of North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 1-75.4 are to be liberally construed in favor of finding personal jurisdiction, subject only to due process considerations. Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973). Accordingly, if the evidence supports a finding which comports with one of the above provisions, jurisdiction will follow under the long-arm statute.\nThe evidence in the instant case indicates that this case is governed by the above sections. The evidence indicates that defendants contacted plaintiff in Durham, North Carolina, for technical support, via an 800 number and that plaintiff modified software and computer programs for defendants\u2019 computer in Durham, North Carolina. Additionally, plaintiff shipped computers, forms, and computer supplies to defendants from its office in Durham, North Carolina. Since plaintiff\u2019s present actions for breach of contract, recovery in quantum meruit and failure to pay on an open account relate to the aforementioned goods and services provided by plaintiff, North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 1-75.4(5) plainly provides the statutory basis for this State\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants.\nII\nDue Process Requirements\nThe second part of the two-step inquiry, due process, prohibits our state courts from exercising jurisdiction unless defendants have had \u201ccertain minimum contacts\u201d with the forum state such that the \u201cmaintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d Tom Togs, Inc., 318 N.C. at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 786 (citations omitted). Although no single factor controls, factors for determining the existence of minimum contacts include, the quality and quantity of contacts, the source and connection of the cause of action with those contacts, convenience to the parties and the interest of the forum state. Sola Basic Industries v. Electric Membership Corp., 70 N.C. App. 737, 321 S.E.2d 28 (1984).\nIn the instant case, defendants entered into an agreement to purchase a computer system from plaintiff. All the components for the computer system were shipped from plaintiff\u2019s office in Durham, North Carolina, and plaintiff spent considerable time and energy in its Durham office engineering and designing defendants\u2019 computer system. On several occasions, plaintiff even sent installation specialists from its Durham office to service defendants\u2019 computer system and to assist defendants in the operation of the computer system. Additionally, defendants ordered forms and computer supplies from plaintiff, many of which were shipped from the Durham office. In fact, defendants even forwarded the payments for these items to plaintiff\u2019s Durham office.\nBased on this evidence, we conclude that defendants had sufficient minimum contacts to justify this State\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants without violating the due process clause. For this reason, the decision of the trial court denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges EAGLES and LEWIS concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JOHNSON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Faison & Fletcher, by Reginald B. Gillespie, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, by Robert 0. Meriwether, for defendants-appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DATAFLOW COMPANIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. LISA HUTTO, LISA HUTTO d/b/a PALMETTO ALLERGY, P. A., and PALMETTO ALLERGY & ASTHMA, P. A., Defendants-Appellants\nNo. 9314SC322\n(Filed 5 April 1994)\nCourts \u00a7 16 (NCI4th) \u2014 nonresident defendants \u2014 shipment of goods to another state \u2014long-arm jurisdiction \u2014minimum contacts\nThe \u201clong-arm\u201d statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(5), provided the statutory basis for this state\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants in plaintiffs action for breach of contract, recovery in quantum meruit, and failure to pay on an open account, and defendants had sufficient contacts with this state so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them did not violate due process, where defendants entered into an agreement to purchase a computer system from plaintiff; all of the computer components were shipped from plaintiff\u2019s office in Durham; plaintiff spent considerable time in its Durham office designing and engineering defendants\u2019 computer system; plaintiff sent installation specialists from Durham to service defendants\u2019 computer system and to assist defendants in the operation of the system; defendants contacted plaintiff in Durham for technical support; defendants ordered forms and computer supplies from plaintiff which were shipped from plaintiff\u2019s Durham office; and defendants sent payments for such items to plaintiff\u2019s Durham office.\nAm Jur 2d, Courts \u00a7 119; Process \u00a7\u00a7 184, 190.\nConstruction and application of state statutes or rules of court predicating in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign corporations on making or performing a contract within the state. 23 ALR3d 551.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 19 November 1992 by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 January 1994.\nFaison & Fletcher, by Reginald B. Gillespie, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.\nNelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, by Robert 0. Meriwether, for defendants-appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0209-01",
  "first_page_order": 237,
  "last_page_order": 242
}