{ "id": 8527465, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: SAMUEL ARMANIA DAVIS", "name_abbreviation": "In re Davis", "decision_date": "1994-04-05", "docket_number": "No. 9318DC639", "first_page": "253", "last_page": "256", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 N.C. App. 253" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "17 ALR3d 1181", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "61 L. Ed. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531938, 1532133, 1531912, 1532202, 1532170, 1532010, 1532021, 1531990, 1532122, 1532092, 1531806 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0929-02", "/us/442/0929-01", "/us/442/0929-10", "/us/442/0929-03", "/us/442/0929-08", "/us/442/0929-11", "/us/442/0929-04", "/us/442/0929-09", "/us/442/0929-05", "/us/442/0929-06", "/us/442/0929-07" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565310 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8595186 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646793 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-59", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-66", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 448, "char_count": 7543, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.184823365966873e-07, "percentile": 0.8647737763861909 }, "sha256": "c7d85d5b008f7d940da1dfeb9cce2c5d27230abba7d402335e8680e3a5822ff6", "simhash": "1:ec15b677e22155f2", "word_count": 1245 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:59.295429+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: SAMUEL ARMANIA DAVIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nSamuel Armania Davis (respondent) appeals from an 8 October 1992 adjudication of him as a delinquent juvenile under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-517(12) in that he \u201cunlawfully, willfully and feloniously set fire to personal property located in a building owned by Harris Teeter.\u201d\nRodney Stuart Blackwell (Blackwell) testified for the State that on 26 March 1992, he was employed as a cashier at Harris Teeter (the store), Summit Avenue location, in Greensboro, North Carolina. Around 10:00 p.m., after he observed respondent enter the store, Blackwell left his register and went into the bathroom. While he was washing his hands, respondent entered the bathroom and proceeded to the stall nearest the wall. Blackwell left the bathroom, but poked his head back in and observed respondent \u201cjust walking around standing there\u201d with his head \u201chung down.\u201d Blackwell then proceeded to his register. He \u201cnoticed that [respondent] had already left the bathroom and proceeded to exit the store.\u201d Blackwell did not see anyone enter the bathroom after that point. When he looked again, he noticed that after respondent \u201chad exited the store nearest to the bathroom, he had then again reentered the store from the far end.\u201d When he \u201clooked back around, the bag boy was yelling \u2018fire,\u2019 and smoke and flames were already coming out from the bathroom door.\u201d Blackwell heard someone yelling \u201cfire\u201d only a moment after respondent reappeared back into the building.\nDennis Franklin Pennix (Captain Pennix), an employee with the City of Greensboro Fire Department, Fire Prevention Bureau, testified for the State that he investigated the fire at the store. In the bathroom, \u201cthere was, of course, smoke damage. The garbage can itself, the trash can that was in the corner, was melted down completely.\u201d He observed in the back stall a \u201cbig round toilet paper holder that\u2019s plastic\u201d and \u201ctwo places on that toilet paper holder where it looked like someone had taken a lighter and tried to ignite it.\u201d He could not, however, find the ignition source to the fire, but the origin was the trash can in the men\u2019s bathroom. At the end of the State\u2019s evidence, respondent moved to dismiss.\nAfter the trial judge expressed his opinion that he did not \u201cbelieve that there\u2019s been any evidence of any burning of a building,\u201d he allowed both parties to argue whether \u201cthe burning of personal property is alleged by burning a building.\u201d The State argued that \u201cpersonal property would be a lesser included offense of the building\u201d while defense counsel stated \u201c[i]f your honor rules that it is not a lesser included offense, they can rebring another petition and have another trial. There\u2019s no point in doing that. We\u2019d agree to proceed on both charges regardless of the court\u2019s technical ruling.\u201d The court responded:\nWell, I would allow the motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence as it relates to the charge of willfully and wantonly setting fire to a building, and I\u2019m going to allow the State to proceed on the theory of willfully and wantonly setting fire to personal property.\nAfter hearing from defense counsel, the trial court found that respondent \u201cdid unlawfully, willfully and feloniously set fire to personal property located in a building owned by Harris Teeter.\u201d\nThe issue presented by this appeal is whether a juvenile can be adjudicated delinquent on the grounds he set fire to personal property in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-66 when the juvenile petition only alleged the unlawful setting of fire to a public building in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-59.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-523(a) provides that \u201c[t]he court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent, undisciplined, abused, neglected, or dependent.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-523(a) (1989). The petition alleging delinquency may be amended \u201cwhen the amendment does not change the nature of the offense alleged or the conditions upon which the petition is based.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-627 (1989).\nAlthough our Courts have not extensively addressed Section 7A-627, our Courts have interpreted Section 15A-922(f), which allows for amendment of a criminal warrant \u201cwhen the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged,\u201d to permit amendments \u201cas long as the amended warrant does not charge the defendant with a different offense.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-922(f) (1988); State v. Clements, 51 N.C. App. 113, 117, 275 S.E.2d 222, 225 (1981). Because juveniles are afforded certain due process protections guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions, including the right to \u201cbe notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing,\u201d In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 549 (1967), we construe Section 7A-627 to permit a juvenile petition to be amended only if the amended petition does not charge the juvenile with a different offense.\nIn this case, the burning of personal property in violation of Section 14-66 is not a lesser included offense of burning a public building in violation of Section 14-59. State v. Pierce, 208 N.C. 47, 49, 179 S.E. 8, 9 (1935). The trial court essentially amended the juvenile petition by allowing the State to proceed on a theory of burning of personal property. Therefore, because amending the juvenile petition in this case would charge respondent with a different offense, the trial court erred by allowing the State to proceed on a theory of burning of personal property and by adjudicating respondent delinquent on the grounds he had set fire to personal property in violation of Section 14-66.\nThe State argues that respondent waived the benefit of this due process protection by \u201cconsenting to be tried for a slightly different offense arising out of the same operative facts\u201d; however, we reject this argument because jurisdiction over the subject matter of a proceeding cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 144, 250 S.E.2d 890, 910 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).\nVacated.\nJudges JOHNSON and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by T. Lane Mallonee, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: SAMUEL ARMANIA DAVIS\nNo. 9318DC639\n(Filed 5 April 1994)\nInfants or Minors \u00a7 80 (NCI4th) \u2014 amendment of juvenile petition \u2014 charge of different crime \u2014violation of due process and statute\nWhere a juvenile petition alleged that respondent unlawfully set fire to a public building in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-59, the trial court erred by permitting the State to proceed on the theory that respondent unlawfully set fire to personal property in the building in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-66 and by adjudicating respondent a juvenile delinquent on that ground since the trial court in effect amended the petition; the burning of personal property in violation of \u00a7 14-66 is not a lesser included offense of burning a public building in violation of \u00a7 14-59; and the amended petition charged defendant with a different offense in violation of due process and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-627.\nAm Jur 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children \u00a7\u00a7 41, 42.\nComment Note. \u2014 Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment. 17 ALR3d 1181.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 8 October 1992 in Guilford County District Court by Judge Joseph E. Turner. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 March 1994.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by T. Lane Mallonee, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0253-01", "first_page_order": 281, "last_page_order": 284 }