{ "id": 8527867, "name": "SUE A. MINNEMAN, D.D.S., Plaintiff v. JAMES G. MARTIN, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES of the State of North Carolina, DAVID T. FLAHERTY, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Human Resources of the State of North Carolina, DON TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Director of the Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Services of the State of North Carolina, DR. WALTER W. STELLE, Ph.D., in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Services of the State of North Carolina, B. GENE BARRETT, individually and in his official capacity as Director of John Umstead Hospital, DR. P. J. IRIGARAY, individually and in his official capacity as Clinical Director, John Umstead Hospital, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Minneman v. Martin", "decision_date": "1994-05-03", "docket_number": "No. 9310SC291", "first_page": "616", "last_page": "621", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 N.C. App. 616" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 58", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6210401 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283", "parenthetical": "quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771", "parenthetical": "quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2495648, 2499943, 2496788, 2493082, 2500123 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0634-02", "/nc/327/0634-03", "/nc/327/0634-04", "/nc/327/0634-05", "/nc/327/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524694 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-87", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-85", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5304682, 5306445 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0488-02", "/nc/326/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306084 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523272 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624863 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525730 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522165 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 666, "char_count": 12417, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.396371450778524e-07, "percentile": 0.6438402393344168 }, "sha256": "a7ba635e005c6461c63d34f1682cf46bc19fbfa7a5f7a809715888ad9cb90482", "simhash": "1:3d3180645ef7e66e", "word_count": 1902 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:59.295429+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and MARTIN concur." ], "parties": [ "SUE A. MINNEMAN, D.D.S., Plaintiff v. JAMES G. MARTIN, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES of the State of North Carolina, DAVID T. FLAHERTY, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Human Resources of the State of North Carolina, DON TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Director of the Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Services of the State of North Carolina, DR. WALTER W. STELLE, Ph.D., in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Services of the State of North Carolina, B. GENE BARRETT, individually and in his official capacity as Director of John Umstead Hospital, DR. P. J. IRIGARAY, individually and in his official capacity as Clinical Director, John Umstead Hospital, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nDefendants first argue the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment for defendants Martin, Flaherty, Taylor, Stelle, and Barrett, all of whom were sued in their official capacity, on the basis of sovereign immunity.\nIn general, denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 108 N.C. App. 24, 422 S.E.2d 338 (1992). Despite this general rule, where sovereign immunity is raised as a defense, \u201ca substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable.\u201d Id. at 27, 422 S.E.2d at 340.\nSovereign immunity protects the State and its agents from suit, Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. 422, 429 S.E.2d 744 (1993), and the General Assembly determines \u201cwhen and under what circumstances the State may be sued.\u201d Insurance Co. v. Gold, Commissioner of Insurance, 254 N.C. 168, 173, 118 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1961). Sovereign immunity applies not only when the State is a named defendant but also when its agencies, departments, and institutions are named defendants. Jones v. Pitt County Mem. Hospital, 104 N.C. App. 613, 410 S.E.2d 513 (1991). Waiver will not be inferred lightly, and statutes waiving immunity will be strictly construed. Id.\nIn Harwood v. Johnson, our Supreme Court stated that \u201c[a] suit against defendants in their official capacities, as public officials or a public employee ... is a suit against the State.\u201d Harwood v. Johnson, 326 N.C. 231, 238, 388 S.E.2d 439, 443, reh\u2019g denied, 326 N.C. 488, 392 S.E.2d 90 (1990). Where immunity has not been waived, through consent or statutory waiver, these officials may not be sued in their official capacities. Id. Conversely, where sovereign immunity does not stand as a bar to suit, such defendants may be sued in their official capacities.\nThe policy of the Whistleblower Act, as it pertains to this case, is to encourage State employees to \u201creport . . . evidence of activity by a State agency or State employee constituting . . . (4) Substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84 (1993). It prohibits discrimination by the \u201chead of any State department, agency or institution or other State employee exercising supervisory authority\u201d after an employee reports activities described in G.S. \u00a7 126-84 and allows an employee to \u201cmaintain an action . . . against the person or agency who committed the violation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-85, to -86 (1993) (emphasis added). The Act goes beyond merely allowing suit, however, and provides various remedies for the injured employee, including injunctive relief, damages, attorney\u2019s fees, and, in some cases, treble damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-87 (1993).\nThe Whistleblower Act, in providing for specific remedies, represents a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity to redress violations of the nature proscribed in G.S. \u00a7 126-85. The question, then, becomes one of scope. Defendants contend that suit may be maintained under the statute solely against defendant DHR, the responsible agency, and defendant Irigaray, the responsible person. They argue that defendants Martin, Flaherty, Taylor, Stelle, and Barrett are protected by sovereign immunity because there is no showing that any of the above named defendants \u201cretaliated\u201d against plaintiff. Plaintiff, in fact, concedes that four defendants \u2014 . Martin, Flaherty, Taylor, and Stelle \u2014 did not discriminate against her. She argues, however, that their inclusion is necessary and permissible solely to effectuate any equitable relief awarded by the courts. Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, however, her complaint reveals that, in addition to the injunctive relief mentioned on appeal, she also seeks compensatory and treble damages from all defendants in their official capacities.\nWe will first address plaintiff\u2019s claims for compensatory and treble damages. In Hare v. Butler, this Court upheld the dismissal of a negligence claim against Mecklenburg County, the county DSS, and DSS personnel sued in their official capacity. Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 394 S.E.2d 231, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 634, 399 S.E.2d 121 (1990). While that decision was based in part on the complainant\u2019s failure to allege the purchase of liability insurance, this Court also noted that the complainant failed to allege negligence on the part of Mecklenburg County and three social workers. Id. Here, although plaintiff\u2019s complaint contains allegations of Whistleblower violations, plaintiff\u2019s concessions make it clear that defendants Martin, Flaherty, Taylor, and Stelle have committed no violations of the Whistleblower Act. Thus, the trial court should have granted summary judgment on these claims. We note, however, that the trial court properly denied summary judgment as to defendant Barrett since a factual question exists as to whether he committed Whistleblower violations.\nTurning to plaintiff\u2019s equitable claim, she urgently contends that defendants are subject to suit in their official capacities solely to ensure the enforcement of any prospective equitable relief granted by the courts. She further contends that this Court must use the reasoning employed in Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276, cert. denied, 506 U.S. ---, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992), a case involving a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim. That case states that \u201cofficial-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State\u201d and public officials are not protected by immunity. Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 771, 413 S.E.2d 276, 283 (1992) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)). We disagree with plaintiff\u2019s contention and choose to rely on Corum for a different reason.\nThe plaintiff in Corum sought equitable relief against ASU, UNC, President Spangler, and Chancellor Thomas in their official capacities. While the Court held that sovereign immunity did not bar the pursuit of equitable remedies under \u00a7 1983, the Corum Court also held that plaintiff failed to forecast evidence of wrongdoing by ASU, UNC, President Spangler, or Chancellor Thomas, and that summary judgment should have been entered for those defendants. Though not directly on point, we believe Corum is instructive because, here, as in Corum, plaintiff presented no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of defendants Martin, Flaherty, Taylor, and Stelle. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment as to defendants Martin, Flaherty, Taylor, and Stelle, none of whom had any part in the alleged Whistleblower violations. Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence, however, to withstand a motion for summary judgment as to defendant Barrett.\nIn conclusion, the trial court\u2019s denial of summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity is reversed as to defendants Martin, Flaherty, Taylor, and Stelle, and affirmed as to defendants Barrett and Irigaray. Moreover, in accord with our earlier rulings on the parties\u2019 motions, the rest of this appeal is dismissed as interlocutory.\nReversed in part, affirmed in part.\nJudges WYNN and MARTIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General David Roy Blackwell and Assistant Attorney General Victoria L. Voight, for the defendant appellants.", "Young, Moore, Henderson & Alvis, P.A., by Brian E. Clemmons and M. Lee Cheney, for the plaintiff appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SUE A. MINNEMAN, D.D.S., Plaintiff v. JAMES G. MARTIN, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES of the State of North Carolina, DAVID T. FLAHERTY, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Human Resources of the State of North Carolina, DON TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Director of the Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Services of the State of North Carolina, DR. WALTER W. STELLE, Ph.D., in his official capacity as Deputy Director of the Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Services of the State of North Carolina, B. GENE BARRETT, individually and in his official capacity as Director of John Umstead Hospital, DR. P. J. IRIGARAY, individually and in his official capacity as Clinical Director, John Umstead Hospital, Defendants\nNo. 9310SC291\n(Filed 3 May 1994)\nState \u00a7 19 (NCI4th)\u2014 whistleblower action \u2014mo wrongdoing by defendants \u2014summary judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity appropriate\nThe trial court in plaintiff\u2019s whistleblower action erred in denying summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity as to defendant governor, defendant Secretary of the Department of Human Resources, defendant Director of the Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Services, and defendant Deputy Director where it was clear that these defendants had no part in the alleged whistleblower violations. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 126-85, 126-86.\nAm Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability \u00a7 70; States, Territories, and Dependencies \u00a7\u00a7 104-107.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 2 December 1992 by Judge Wiley F. Bowen in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 January 1994.\nPlaintiff brought this action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84 et. seq. (1993), entitled \u201cProtection for Reporting Improper Government Activities\u201d (hereinafter \u201cWhistleblower Act\u201d). In her complaint, plaintiff challenged her nonselection as a Dentist III. She alleged discriminatory action, stemming from her involvement in the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners\u2019 (NCSBDE) investigation of Dr. Glenn Woodlief, her immediate supervisor.\nPlaintiff began working at John Umstead Hospital (JUH), a facility operated by the Department of Human Resources (DHR) to serve the mentally and emotionally ill, in 1985 as a Dentist I. Within two years, she was promoted to a Dentist II. Beginning in March of 1987 and ending in February 1988, she met approximately four times with defendant Irigaray, Dr. Woodliefs supervisor, to discuss concerns she had about Dr. Woodliefs treatment of patients. These concerns included what she considered inhumane use of restraints and treatment below the standard of care. Plaintiff alleged that defendant Irigaray never responded to her concerns.\nPlaintiff further alleged that in late February 1988, two patient advocates questioned her about Dr. Woodliefs treatment of patients. In March 1988, a patient advocate and an investigator for the NCSBDE questioned her further. Plaintiff provided them with an affidavit detailing her observations of Dr. Woodliefs mistreatment of patients and a complaint was filed against Dr. Woodlief with the NCSBDE in April 1988. Despite expectations of confidentiality, plaintiffs affidavit was provided to both Dr. Woodlief and defendant Irigaray. It was also given to the Internal Peer Review members of the Medical Staff Executive Committee, who questioned her at length about her role in the investigation and commented on her lack of loyalty due to her \u201cwhistle-blowing\u201d. Over time, plaintiff allegedly experienced general intimidation because of her role in the NCSBDE investigation. In September 1989, the NCSBDE suspended Dr. Woodliefs license.\nPlaintiff informally filled Dr. Woodliefs position, Director of Dental Services, since his first leave of absence in 1988. In fall of 1989, JUH advertised for the position. Plaintiff applied for the position and three applicants, including plaintiff, were seriously considered for the job. Plaintiff alleged that, during an interview for the position conducted by defendants Irigaray and Barrett, they questioned her at length about her \u201cwhistle-blowing\u201d and sought assurances that she would work within the institutional setting. Plaintiff was not selected, and the job was ultimately offered to and accepted by another dentist. Plaintiff alleged that the dentist chosen was given the job despite evidence of misappropriation of state funds and alleged neglect of patients at another state hospital.\nPlaintiff complained that her nonselection was discriminatory, in retaliation for her earlier participation in the NCSBDE investigation, and sought damages as well as injunctive relief. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis, among others, of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied their motion. From this denial, defendants appeal.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General David Roy Blackwell and Assistant Attorney General Victoria L. Voight, for the defendant appellants.\nYoung, Moore, Henderson & Alvis, P.A., by Brian E. Clemmons and M. Lee Cheney, for the plaintiff appellee." }, "file_name": "0616-01", "first_page_order": 644, "last_page_order": 649 }