{ "id": 8527887, "name": "SHEILA LEDWELL, Petitioner/Appellee v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Respondent/Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Ledwell v. N.C. Department of Human Resources", "decision_date": "1994-05-03", "docket_number": "No. 9318SC449", "first_page": "626", "last_page": "632", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 N.C. App. 626" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2012", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(i)" }, { "page": "(i)" }, { "page": "(i)" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "933 F.2d 13", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10541611 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "\"Despite the Secretary's assertion [in 7 C.F.R. 273.9(c)(7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/933/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "849 F.2d 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 12026535 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/849/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 F. Supp. 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7396970 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/683/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 F.Supp. 228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3481715 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/358/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 F.Supp. 1081", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1454116 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/434/1081-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 So.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7531499 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "\"state policies must accord with federal eligibility standards, see Levy v. Toia, 434 F.Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1977" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/561/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 L.Ed.2d 921", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 1227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11353027, 11353288, 11352937, 11353642, 11353134, 11353422, 11353529 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/1227-02", "/us/468/1227-04", "/us/468/1227-01", "/us/468/1227-07", "/us/468/1227-03", "/us/468/1227-05", "/us/468/1227-06" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6209106 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "843" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "842-43" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "843" }, { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216290 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "291-92" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "291" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "291-92" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526219 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0680-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 612, "char_count": 12318, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.774394187111447e-07, "percentile": 0.8962725239965728 }, "sha256": "c4cb288fd531bf5c42462fd893ebe1442e5a10b20b593b4947f9c9ea867c7168", "simhash": "1:8cd46839af5a4ed7", "word_count": 1984 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:59.295429+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and LEWIS concur." ], "parties": [ "SHEILA LEDWELL, Petitioner/Appellee v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Respondent/Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nIn its sole assignment of error, respondent argues that \u201c[t]he trial court erred in reversing the decision of the state hearing officer and in declaring that the \u2018parental control\u2019 provision in 7 C.F.R. 273.1(a)(2)(i) and in the North Carolina Food Stamp Manual, Section 6100, conflicts with the definition of a food stamp \u2018household\u2019 in 7 U.S.C. 2012(i).\u201d We disagree.\nThe federal Food Stamp Act provides that:\n\u201cHousehold\u201d means (1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily purchases food and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, (2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption, or (3) a parent of minor children and that parent\u2019s children (notwithstanding the presence in the home of any other persons, including parents and siblings of the parent with minor children) who customarily purchase food and prepare meals for home consumption separate from other persons, except that the certification of a household as a separate household under this clause shall be reexamined no less frequently than once every 6 months; except that (other than as provided in clause (3)) parents and children, or siblings, who live together shall be treated as a group of individuals who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the parents, or siblings, is an elderly or disabled member.\n7 U.S.C. 2012(i) (emphasis added). The federal regulation interpreting this statute, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 2013(c), provides as follows:\n(a) Household definition- (1) General definition. A household is composed of one of the following individuals or groups of individuals, provided they are not residents of an institution (except as otherwise specified in paragraph (e) of this section), are not residents, of a commercial boarding house, or are not boarders (except as otherwise specified in paragraph (c) of this section):\n(1) An individual living alone;\n(ii) An individual living with others, but customarily purchasing food and preparing meals for home consumption separate and apart from others;\n(iii) A group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption.\n(2) Special definition: (i) The following individuals living with others or groups of individuals living together shall be considered as customarily purchasing food and preparing meals together, even if they do not do so:\n(B) Children under 18 years of age under the parental control of an adult household member;\n7 C.F.R. 273.1 (emphasis in original). The North Carolina Food Stamp Certification Manual, Section 6100, mirrors the federal regulation in that it provides:\nIII. People who must.be included in the same household\nB. A child under 18 years of age when he is under the parental control of a household member. (The household member does not have to be a parent. He can be any member, i.e., uncle, aunt.)\nRespondent argues that the federal and state regulations regarding the definition of \u201chousehold,\u201d appearing in 7 CFR 273.1(a)(2)(i)(B) and N.C. Food Stamp Certification Manual, Section 6100, supra, do not fatally conflict with the definition of \u201chousehold\u201d set forth by the U.S. Congress in 7 U.S.C. 2012(i) and accordingly represent a permissible construction of Congress\u2019 intent. We disagree.\nIn another decision interpreting the Food Stamp Act, Anderson v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 109 N.C. App. 680, 682-83, 428 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1993), this Court stated:\nIn reviewing the validity of an agency\u2019s regulation, a court \u201cmust first determine if the regulation is consistent with the language of the statute.\u201d K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 100 L.Ed.2d 313, 324 (1988). Both the courts and the agencies \u201cmust give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.\u201d Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 703, reh\u2019g denied, 468 U.S. 1227, 82 L.Ed.2d 921 (1984)). Therefore, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and the regulation is contrary to that language, \u201cthat is the end of the matter\u201d and the regulation must be declared invalid. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291-92, 100 L.Ed.2d at 324; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703. While traditionally the courts pay deference to an agency regulation, such deference is inappropriate where the regulation alters the clearly expressed intent of Congress. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291, 100 L.Ed.2d at 324. Only where the language of the statute is unclear, ambiguous, or fails to answer the specific question at issue should deference be paid to a contested agency interpretation. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703.\nSee also Wilson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 561 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (\u201cstate policies must accord with federal eligibility standards, see Levy v. Toia, 434 F.Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and the federal regulations are valid insofar as they are consistent with the federal governing statute. See Knowles v. Butz, 358 F.Supp. 228 (NJD.Ca. 1973)\u201d). Accordingly, our inquiry proceeds by determining whether the regulations are consistent with the language of 7 U.S.C. 2012(i). We conclude that the regulations are not consistent with the statute.\nRegarding a household where minor children reside, the statute expressly refers to \u201ca parent of minor children and that parent\u2019s children\u201d as a single household unit when a certain condition is met. 7 U.S.C. 2012(i)(3). Contrasted against this specificity, there are no provisions authorizing the grouping of other relatives into a single household based upon one relative\u2019s (here the aunt\u2019s) exercise of \u201cparental control\u201d or acting as a parent among the other relatives (here the nephews). We find that the federal statute is clear and unambiguous and that the regulations impermissibly alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress. The statutory definition of \u201chousehold\u201d has undergone several changes since the original passage of the Food Stamp Act in 1964. See Foster v. Celani, 683 F. Supp. 84, 87-89 (D.Vt. 1987), aff\u2019d, 849 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1988). If Congress had intended to broaden the scope of the definition of \u201chousehold\u201d to extend to a relative having responsibility for exercising parental control or acting as a substitute for a minor child\u2019s parents, Congress could have written 7 U.S.C. 2012(i) to include appropriate language more broad than the term \u201cparent\u201d to connote such a meaning. Cf. Dion v. Com\u2019r, Maine Dept. of Human Services, 933 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1991) (\u201cDespite the Secretary\u2019s assertion [in 7 C.F.R. 273.9(c)(7) ] that \u2018child\u2019 in [7 U.S.C.] \u00a7 2014 should be read to embody the concept of parental control, nowhere in the statute has Congress explicitly used the concept of parental control to define the status of children under the Act\u201d). In the absence of more broad terminology in the statute, we discern an impermissible conflict between the regulations and the statute. Accordingly, the regulations are invalid. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291-92, 100 L.Ed.2d at 324; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703. Similarly, we conclude that the Secretary\u2019s rule-making authority, encompassing the power to \u201cissue such regulations consistent with this chapter as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate for the effective and efficient administration of the food stamp program,\u201d 7 U.S.C. 2013(c) (emphasis added), is inapposite here because the regulations are not consistent with the express provisions of 7 U.S.C. 201(i).\nFor the reasons stated, the trial court\u2019s 22 February 1993 order is affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nAffirmed and remanded.\nJudges JOHNSON and LEWIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Central Carolina Legal Services, Inc., by Stanley B. Sprague, for petitioner-appellee.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Marilyn A. Bair, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHEILA LEDWELL, Petitioner/Appellee v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Respondent/Appellant\nNo. 9318SC449\n(Filed 3 May 1994)\nSocial Services and Public Welfare \u00a7 20 (NCI4th)\u2014 food stamps \u2014 definition of household \u2014inclusion of child \u2014parental control provision \u2014definition in conflict with statute\nThe definition of \u201chousehold\u201d appearing in 7 CFR 273.1(a)(2)(i)(B) and North Carolina Food Stamp Certification Manual, Section 1600, which requires inclusion of any child under 18 who is under the parental control of a household member, fatally conflicts with the definition of \u201chousehold\u201d set forth by the United States Congress in 7 U.S.C. 2012(i). Therefore, even though petitioner and her two fifteen-year-old nephews lived in the same household and petitioner exercised parental control over her nephews, petitioner and her nephews constituted separate households for food stamp purposes where petitioner purchased and prepared her food separately from that of her nephews.\nAm Jur 2d, Welfare Laws \u00a7\u00a7 26 et seq.\nAppeal by respondent from order filed 22 February 1993 by Judge W. Douglas Albright in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 1994.\nOn 22 February 1993, the trial court filed the following order which is the subject of this appeal:\nTHIS cause being heard before the undersigned Judge Presiding on February 2, 1993, during the February 1, 1993 Civil Non-Jury Session of the Superior Court for Guilford County, and the Court upon reviewing the record and listening to oral argument by counsel, finds the following as facts:\n1. Sheila Ledwell lived with her two 15-year old twin nephews. She purchased and prepared her food separately from her nephews.\n2. Ms. Ledwell asked her food stamp caseworker to certify her as a one-person household and her two nephews as a two-person household.\n3. However, the Guilford County Department of Social Services (DSS) refused to certify the family other than as a three-person household. DSS reasoned that separate household status was not permissible because the nephews were under Ms. Ledwell\u2019s \u201cparental control.\u201d\n4. DSS based its decision on the North Carolina Food Stamp Manual, Section 6100, which states that \u201c[a] child under 18 years of age when he is under the parental control of a household member\u201d must be included in the same household as the adult custodian, regardless of the family\u2019s eating arrangements.\u201d This Manual section followed the federal regulation\u2019s \u201cparental control\u201d provision at 7 C.F.R. 273.1(a)(2)(i).\n5. Ms. Ledwell appealed the DSS decision, and on September 21, 1992, a state hearing officer issued a decision affirming the County\u2019s denial of separate household status to Ms. Ledwell and her nephews. On October 1, 1993, this became the final decision of the N.C. Department of Human Resources.\n6. 7 U.S.C. 2012(i) provides in part that the term food stamp \u201chousehold\u201d means \u201ca group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption. . .\u201d\n7. While 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2012(i) contains additional language requiring parents and siblings sometimes to be in the same \u201chousehold\u201d even if they eat separately, the statute has no \u201cparental control\u201d provision.\nBased upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court MAKES THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:\nThe North Carolina Food Stamp Manual Section 6100, and 7 C.F.R. 273.1(a)(2)(i) impermissibly conflict with the \u201chousehold\u201d definition in 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2012(i), and thereby are invalid.\nIt IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:\n1. The September 21, 1992, decision of the state hearing officer, is hereby reversed.\n2. The Guilford County DSS officer review the food stamp applications of Sheila Ledwell and her nephews, and if eligible, award food stamp benefits to her and her nephews as separate households, commencing on July 2, 1991, and for as long as she and her nephews lived together and were otherwise eligible.\n3. The \u201cparental control\u201d provision in 7 C.F.R. 273.1(a)(2)(i), and in North Carolina Food Stamp Manual Section 6100, are declared invalid as conflicting with the definition of a food stamp \u201chousehold\u201d in 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2012(i).\nRespondent appeals.\nCentral Carolina Legal Services, Inc., by Stanley B. Sprague, for petitioner-appellee.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Marilyn A. Bair, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0626-01", "first_page_order": 654, "last_page_order": 660 }