{
  "id": 12124284,
  "name": "CUSTOM MOLDERS, INC., Plaintiff v. AMERICAN YARD PRODUCTS, INC., formerly known as ROPER CORPORATION, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Custom Molders, Inc. v. American Yard Products, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1994-06-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 9314SC392",
  "first_page": "156",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges WYNN and McCRODDEN concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "CUSTOM MOLDERS, INC., Plaintiff v. AMERICAN YARD PRODUCTS, INC., formerly known as ROPER CORPORATION, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiff\u2019s first assignment of error is that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for post-judgment interest on the treble damages portion of its judgment from the date of judgment until paid. Plaintiff bases its argument on an exhaustive review of the legislative history of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5(b) (1991). We, however, do not find it necessary to examine the statute in such detail because the plain language of G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b), as well as a recent decision of this Court, squarely rebut plaintiff\u2019s argument.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5, entitled Contracts, except penal bonds, and judgments to bear interest, provides in pertinent part:\n(b) Other Actions. \u2014 In an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal rate.\nThis Court addressed the application of G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) to verdicts trebled pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 75-16 in Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 383 S.E.2d 674 (1989). We held in Love:\nThe defendants finally argue the trial judge erred in imposing interest on the portion of the judgment in excess of $3,400. We agree. Since the defendants\u2019 conduct violated N.C.G.S. Sec. 75-1.1 et seq., the trial judge properly trebled the jury\u2019s $3,400 verdict. N.C.G.S. Sec. 75-16. The trial judge then ordered interest on the full $10,200. In this the trial judge erred since N.C.G.S. Sec. 24-5(b) (1986) only provides for interest on compensatory damages as designated by the fact finder. The fact finder here, the jury, specified compensatory damages of only $3,400. The plaintiffs may receive interest only on $3,400, calculated as specified in N.C.G.S. Sec. 24-5(b).\nId. at 557-58, 383 S.E.2d at 679 (emphasis added).\nThe applicable portion of G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) in effect when Love was decided is identical to the statutory language applicable in this case. Plaintiff argues that according to Section 2 of the 1985 Session Laws, the current language of the statute does not affect the law as it existed before the enactment of Chapter 327 of the 1981 Session Laws, which provided in pertinent part that \u201cthe amount of any judgment ... in any kind of action, . . . shall bear interest till paid . . . .\u201d G.S. \u00a7 24-5 (1965). Therefore, plaintiff contends, North Carolina law provides for post-judgment interest on any judgment, including a judgment for treble damages, in any kind of action until paid. We disagree.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court properly trebled the jury\u2019s $249,016 verdict pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 75-16. Under the plain language of G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b), and the holding in Love, only the portion of the judgment designated by the fact finder as \u201ccompensatory\u201d accrues post-judgment interest.\nPlaintiff next contends that in addition to its attorneys\u2019 fees of $49,000 for services rendered through the time of entry of the judgment, and $70,300 for services rendered by plaintiffs counsel in defending against the first appeal, plaintiff is entitled to additional attorneys\u2019 fees in bringing a motion to protect its judgment and in bringing the present appeal pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1. G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 states that \u201cthe presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the . . . attorney representing the prevailing party . . . .\u201d Although G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 includes fees for services rendered at all stages of litigation, including appeals, see Cotton v. Stanley, 94 N.C. App. 367, 380 S.E.2d 419 (1989), and should be constructed liberally, see City Finance Co. v. Boykin, 86 N.C. App. 446, 358 S.E.2d 83 (1987), plaintiff is not the prevailing party in this case. Therefore, it is not entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees with regards to its motion or this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and McCRODDEN concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Charles A. Bentley, Jr. & Associates, P.A., by Charles A. Bentley, Jr. and Susan B. Kilzer, for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Brown & Bunch, by M. LeAnn Nease, for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CUSTOM MOLDERS, INC., Plaintiff v. AMERICAN YARD PRODUCTS, INC., formerly known as ROPER CORPORATION, Defendant\nNo. 9314SC392\n(Filed 7 June 1994)\n1. Judgments \u00a7 651 (NCI4th)\u2014 treble damages awarded \u2014 no post-judgment interest\nPursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5(b) and Love v. Keith, 95 N.C.App. 549, plaintiff was not entitled to post-judgment interest on the treble damages portion of its judgment from the date of judgment until paid.\nAm Jur 2d, Interest and Usury \u00a7\u00a7 59 et seq.\n2. Costs \u00a7 7 (NCI4th)\u2014 plaintiff not prevailing party \u2014 no right to attorney\u2019s fees\nAlthough N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 includes fees for services rendered at all stages of litigation, including appeals, and should be construed liberally, plaintiff was not the prevailing party in this case and therefore was not entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees in bringing a motion to protect its judgment and in bringing the present appeal.\nAm Jur 2d, Costs \u00a7\u00a7 26 et seq.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 5 January 1993 by Judge Jack A. Thompson in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 February 1994.\nA trial on the matter of Custom Molders, Inc. v. Roper Corporation was held in February 1988. The jury awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $249,016 for breach of contract. The trial court thereafter concluded that defendant\u2019s actions were unfair and deceptive under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 (1988) and trebled the damages against defendant to $747,048 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16. The court also awarded plaintiff $49,000 as its reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees. The judgment provided in pertinent part as follows:\nIt is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff Custom Molders, Inc. shall have and recover from the defendant Roper Corporation the sum of $747,048, together with reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $49,000 and interest as provided by law from the date of entry of this judgment.\nTo stay execution of the judgment pending appeal, defendant\u2019s surety, The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, executed and filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of $1,003,020.48. On 19 February 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Custom Molders, Inc. v. Roper Corp., 101 N.C. App. 606, 401 S.E.2d 96 (1991). By order dated 7 November 1991, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Custom Molders, Inc. v. Roper Corp., 330 N.C. 191, 410 S.E.2d 55 (1991) (per curiam).\nOn 14 February 1992, defendant tendered payment in the amount of $940,447.53 to the Clerk of Durham County Superior Court as payment of the judgment. This sum was calculated as follows:\nJudgment of $249,016 Trebled $747,048.00\nPre-appeal Attorneys\u2019 Fees 49,000.00\nPost-judgment Attorneys\u2019 Fees 70,300.00\nPost-judgment Interest on Compensatory Award through 74,053.53 2-14-92 [54.58 per day]\nCourt Costs 46.00\n$940,447.53\nThe Clerk of Superior Court designated defendant\u2019s payment as a partial payment.\nBased on the calculation of the Clerk of Superior Court that the payment by defendant was a partial payment, plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment Against Defendant\u2019s Surety on 14 October 1992 for the remaining amount owed on plaintiff\u2019s judgment, plus additional attorneys\u2019 fees for protecting its judgment in these proceedings.\nA hearing was held on 16 November 1992 on plaintiff\u2019s motions. By order dated 4 January 1993, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion, finding that plaintiff was not entitled to post-judgment interest on the trebled portion of its judgment. The court accordingly denied plaintiffs motion for additional attorneys\u2019 fees in connection with its motion against the surety. Plaintiff appeals the denial of its motions.\nCharles A. Bentley, Jr. & Associates, P.A., by Charles A. Bentley, Jr. and Susan B. Kilzer, for plaintiff appellant.\nBrown & Bunch, by M. LeAnn Nease, for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0156-01",
  "first_page_order": 188,
  "last_page_order": 191
}