{ "id": 12127010, "name": "BETTY M. McLEOD, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. and ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "McLeod v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.", "decision_date": "1994-06-21", "docket_number": "No. 9211SC756", "first_page": "283", "last_page": "293", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "115 N.C. App. 283" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "93 ALR2d 1047", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "769 P.2d 1152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 8586396 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1155-56", "parenthetical": "uses of vehicle covered under garage operations provision include only those \"germane to the attending, servicing, repairing, parking or storage of the vehicle\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/115/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138-40", "parenthetical": "even though vehicle used occasionally in garage business, no coverage under garage policy for garage owner's use of vehicle to attend unrelated social function" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619355 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583-85", "parenthetical": "even though vehicle used occasionally in garage business, no coverage under garage policy for garage owner's use of vehicle to attend unrelated social function" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503233 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" }, { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519484 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530124, 2527663, 2530706, 2532308, 2528798 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0771-01", "/nc/335/0771-03", "/nc/335/0771-04", "/nc/335/0771-02", "/nc/335/0771-05" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520822 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1032, "char_count": 22928, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.311563422581603e-07, "percentile": 0.9684946883003603 }, "sha256": "d4b7f40a80e98f0b5feff0c19f2980c32dadae81c2010bedc644d2f9e194e71e", "simhash": "1:0143d062203f30cd", "word_count": 3661 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:18.676868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and COZORT concur." ], "parties": [ "BETTY M. McLEOD, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. and ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant Nationwide contends the trial court erred by: (1) granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment; and (2) denying Nationwide\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Defendant\u2019s arguments are persuasive, and we therefore reverse the trial court and remand with direction that summary judgment be entered in favor of defendant Nationwide.\nThe parties have stipulated there are no factual issues and the questions to be decided are purely legal in nature. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: In May 1987, John Green was an employee of P.M. Concepts, Inc. d/b/a Toyota Sanford (Sanford Toyota). Green\u2019s employer permitted him to use dealership license tags. He was attempting to sell a 1977 Pontiac (the Pontiac) automobile which he personally owned and which did not have a license plate. Green affixed one of Sanford Toyota\u2019s dealership tags to the Pontiac.\nAlthough the exact date and reason for the use are unclear, at some point Green began allowing Tom Skinner to drive his Pontiac while the dealership tags were attached to the vehicle. On 10 May 1987, Skinner crossed the centerline of a highway and struck a van, injuring plaintiff Betty McLeod who was a passenger in the van. Prior to the collision, officers of Sanford Toyota had witnessed Skinner operating the Pontiac on Toyota\u2019s premises with dealership tags attached.\nPlaintiff sued Skinner\u2019s estate, John Green, and Sanford Toyota alleging negligence. On 20 September 1991, a jury found Skinner negligent and awarded plaintiff $95,000; however, the jury absolved Green and Sanford Toyota of liability. Thereafter, plaintiff sought recovery of the $95,000 pursuant to: (1) a Nationwide garage policy issued to Sanford Toyota (the garage policy); and (2) the uninsured motorist (UM) coverage provided by her Allstate policy. Both insurance companies denied coverage and plaintiff therefore filed the present lawsuit against Nationwide and Allstate.\nAll parties moved for summary judgment. On 5 May 1992, the trial court entered an order which granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment against Nationwide \u2014 thereby ordering Nationwide to pay $95,000 under the garage policy. By means of this same order, the trial court ruled that Allstate was secondarily liable in the amount of $25,000. On 5 June 1992, nunc pro tunc 5 May 1992, the trial court entered an order denying Nationwide\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nI.\nBefore examining the merits of defendant Nationwide\u2019s appeal, we deem it appropriate to address several collateral matters.\nFirst, the automobile collision which resulted in plaintiff\u2019s injuries has been the subject of a previous appeal. In Johnson v. Skinner, 99 N.C. App. 1, 392 S.E.2d 634, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 429, 395 S.E.2d 680 (1990), we reviewed a judgment which awarded plaintiff John Johnson $750,000 based upon the negligent acts of defendants Skinner, Green, and Sanford Toyota. Betsy McLeod, the plaintiff in the case sub judice, was a passenger in John Johnson\u2019s vehicle.\nSecond, we note plaintiff originally appealed that portion of the trial court\u2019s 5 May 1992 order which limited Allstate\u2019s liability to $25,000. Plaintiff\u2019s appeal presented questions concerning the \u201cstacking\u201d of UM coverage under her Allstate coverage. After our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lanning v. Allstate Insurance Co., 332 N.C. 309, 420 S.E.2d 180 (1992), plaintiff moved to dismiss her appeal against defendant Allstate; on 4 May 1993, this motion was allowed. Consequently, only defendant Nationwide\u2019s appeal is at issue.\nThird, Nationwide has argued in its appellate brief that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment. Denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order from which there is ordinarily no right to appeal. DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp., 312 N.C. 749, 758, 325 S.E.2d 223, 230 (1985). After reviewing the parties\u2019 briefs and the nature of the issues presented, we conclude that our review of the trial court\u2019s order will expedite a decision in the public interest and serve the interests of judicial economy. Accordingly, we treat Nationwide\u2019s attempted appeal of the court\u2019s denial of its motion for summary judgment as a petition for writ of certiorari, which we grant. See National Fruit Product Co. v. Justus, 112 N.C. App. 495, 498, 436 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1993), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 771, 442 S.E.2d 519 (1994).\nOnly one question is presented herein: Did the garage policy provide liability coverage for Tom Skinner\u2019s negligent use of the Pontiac? The answer is \u201cno,\u201d and therefore the trial court should have allowed defendant Nationwide\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nII. The Financial Responsibility Act\nOur review necessarily begins with an examination of the applicable statutes relating to liability insurance coverage, i.e., the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act (the FRA), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.1 to -279.39 (1983) (current version at G.S. \u00a7 20-279.1 to -279.39 (1993)). This analysis is required since the minimum FRA coverage is written into every automobile liability policy as a matter of law, and the statute controls if policy provisions conflict with provisions of the FRA. Brown v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 103 N.C. App. 59, 64, 404 S.E.2d 172, 175, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 515 (1991). Stated otherwise, every automobile liability policy in North Carolina must provide the minimum liability coverage required by the FRA, and any policy language which attempts less coverage is ineffective. Although garage policies are not specifically addressed within the FRA, such policies must nevertheless furnish the minimum liability coverage mandated by G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21. See United Services Auto. Assn. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 333, 338, 420 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1992).\nG.S. \u00a7 20-279.21 provides for two types of liability policies: owner\u2019s and operator\u2019s. G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(a); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 59 N.C. App. 621, 622, 298 S.E.2d 56, 57 (1982), disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 698, 301 S.E.2d 101 (1983). Garage policies, such as the one sub judice, are generally viewed as owner policies and consequently must satisfy the minimum requirements of G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b). See United Services, 332 N.C. at 338, 420 S.E.2d at 158; Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co., 269 N.C. 341, 352, 152 S.E.2d 436, 444 (1967). In pertinent part, this statutory provision provides:\n(b) Such owner\u2019s policy of liability insurance:\n(1) Shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted;\n(2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, or any other persons in lawful possession, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages ....\nG.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b).\nThe proper interpretation of G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b), as with any statute, presents a question of law. See Brooks, Com\u2019r. of Labor v. Rebarco, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 459, 464, 372 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1988). The cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to ensure that legislative intent is accomplished. Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 191, 420 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1992). Accordingly, \u201ca court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish.\u201d Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital, 318 N.C. 76, 81-82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986).\nApplying these principles to the case subjudice, we conclude the FRA does not mandate that the garage policy provide liability coverage for Skinner\u2019s use of the Pontiac. In making this determination, our focus is upon section (b)(2) of the statute which states an owner\u2019s policy \u201c[s]hall insure the person named therein ... using any [designated] motor vehicle . . . against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages . . . .\u201d [emphasis added]. Viewed in isolation, this sub-section arguably requires liability coverage for any vehicle named in the policy \u2014 including even non-owned vehicles over which the named insured exercises only tenuous control. However, individual sections of a statute \u201cmust be interpreted in the context of the whole],]\u201d Overcash v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 83 N.C. App. 21, 24, 348 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1986), and \u201cshould be construed contextually and harmonized if possible to avoid absurd . . . consequences.\u201d In re King, 79 N.C. App. 139, 142, 339 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1986). Thus, the phraseology \u201cany [designated] motor vehicle\u201d must be construed with reference to the subject-matter of G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b), which is: \u201can owner\u2019s policy.\u201d\nThe term \u201cowner,\u201d for purposes of the mandatory provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act, is defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(26) (1983) (current version at G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(26) (1993)). Jenkins v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 324 N.C. 394, 397, 378 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1989). \u201cUnless the context requires otherwise,\u201d G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01, an \u201cowner\u201d is a \u201cperson holding the legal title to a vehicle . . . .\u201d G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(26); see also Jenkins, 324 N.C. at 397-401, 378 S.E.2d at 775.\nIn the case sub judice, it is undisputed that Sanford Toyota (the named insured) did not hold legal title to the Pontiac which was involved in the collision; rather the automobile was owned by one of its employees. There is no evidence indicating the dealership actively promoted the sale of this Pontiac, or otherwise used the vehicle for its business purposes. Instead, dealer plates affixed thereto constituted the sole relationship between the Pontiac and the dealership. Standing alone, this attenuated connection is simply too weak to impose mandatory liability coverage on the basis of the \u201cowner\u2019s policy\u201d provisions of the FRA.\nIII. The Policy\nOur analysis, however, does not terminate with the FRA. Liability coverage which is not statutorily mandated is voluntary in nature, Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Younts, 84 N.C. App. 399, 406, 352 S.E.2d 850, 853-54, disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 671, 356 S.E.2d 774 (1987), and must therefore accrue under the terms of the insurance policy in question. Younts v. Insurance Co., 281 N.C. 582, 585, 189 S.E.2d 137, 139 (1972). The burden is on the person claiming coverage to show the collision is covered under provisions of the policy. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 68 N.C. App. 184, 188, 314 S.E.2d 552, 554, disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E.2d 142 (1984).\nAn insurance policy is a contract, and its provisions, where not contrary to the law, govern the distribution of any insurance proceeds. Barber v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 88 N.C. App. 666, 672, 364 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1988). \u201cWhen reviewing an insurance policy, this Court must examine the contract as a whole and effectuate the intent of the parties.\u201d N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walton, 107 N.C. App. 207, 209, 418 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1992). Any question as to the meaning of the language used in a policy is a question of law for the court to resolve. Guyther v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 109 N.C. App. 506, 512, 428 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1993).\nBecause the intention of the parties is paramount, the court must use definitions contained in the policy to determine the meaning of words or phrases detailing the scope of coverage. Durham City Bd. of Education v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 109 N.C. App. 152, 156, 426 S.E.2d 451, 453, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 790, 431 S.E.2d 22 (1993). In the absence of policy definitions, the court must define a term or phrase \u201cconsistent with the context in which it is used and the meaning accorded it in ordinary speech.\u201d Maddox v. Insurance Co., 303 N.C. 648, 652, 280 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1981). In doing so, courts are encouraged to use \u201cstandard, nonlegal dictionaries\u201d as a guide. See C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng. Co., 326 N.C. 133, 152, 388 S.E.2d 557, 569 (1990).\nAny ambiguities, however, as to the definition of policy terms or the scope of coverage are to be resolved in favor of coverage. Maddox, 303 N.C. at 650, 280 S.E.2d at 908. This is because the insurance company prepared the policy and chose the language contained therein. West American Insurance Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, 104 N.C. App. 312, 320, 409 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1991), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 479, 420 S.E.2d 826 (1992). An ambiguity exists when the language used in the policy is susceptible to different, and perhaps conflicting, interpretations. Id. at 320, 409 S.E.2d at 697. However, the aforementioned rules of construction cannot be used to rewrite an unambiguous policy, i.e., the court cannot extend coverage to collisions not bargained for in the agreement. See C.D. Spangler, 326 N.C. at 142, 388 S.E.2d at 563. (Citations omitted).\nIn addition, we are examining herein both plaintiff\u2019s and defendant Nationwide\u2019s motions for summary judgment. Our rules of civil procedure direct that summary judgment should be granted only where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C.R. Civ. R 56(c). The burden of establishing a lack of any triable issue resides with the movant, and all inferences of fact will be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985).\nMindful of these principles of civil procedure and insurance policy construction, we turn now to an examination of the garage policy in order to determine whether plaintiff\u2019s injuries were covered.\nIn pertinent part, the Nationwide garage policy provides:\nWe will pay all sums the insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by an accident and resulting from garage operations.\nAccording to Nationwide, there are two reasons no coverage exists for plaintiffs injuries. First, the collision which caused plaintiffs injuries was not the result of \u201cgarage operations.\u201d Second, the policy provides coverage only if the auto accident is with an \u201cinsured\u201d \u2014 and Skinner (the driver of the Pontiac at the time of the accident) was not an insured under the policy.\nRegarding Nationwide\u2019s first argument, the term \u201cgarage operations\u201d is defined in the garage policy as:\n[T]he ownership, maintenance or use of locations for garage business and that portion of the roads or other accesses that adjoin these locations. Garage operations includes the ownership, maintenance or use of the autos indicated in Part II as covered autos. Garage operations also include all operations necessary or incidental to a garage business.\nAs to the first sentence of this definition, the American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed. 1982) defines \u201cbusiness\u201d as: \u201c[c]ommer-cial, industrial, or professional dealings . . . .\u201d This definition is consistent with both ordinary speech and the context in which the term is used in the garage policy. However, under any view of the evidence, there is simply no indication the Pontiac was being used in Sanford Toyota\u2019s \u201cbusiness.\u201d The record shows at best only that dealer tags were placed on Green\u2019s Pontiac for Green\u2019s personal use, and in order to facilitate its sale. Green\u2019s status as an employee of Sanford Toyota, standing alone, does not raise a question of fact as to whether the Pontiac was being used in Sanford Toyota\u2019s business. See, e.g., Peirson v. Insurance Co., 249 N.C. 580, 583-85, 107 S.E.2d 137, 138-40 (1959) (even though vehicle used occasionally in garage business, no coverage under garage policy for garage owner\u2019s use of vehicle to attend unrelated social function).\nUnder the second sentence of the definition, \u201cgarage operations\u201d includes Sanford Toyota\u2019s \u201cownership, maintenance or use\u201d of the vehicles designated as \u201ccovered autos\u201d in the policy. The policy defines \u201ccovered auto\u201d as \u201cany auto\u201d; for purposes of summary judgment, this broad definition encompasses Green\u2019s Pontiac. Accordingly, we turn to the phraseology \u201cownership, maintenance or use\u201d to determine whether plaintiff\u2019s collision resulted from garage operations as defined in the second sentence.\nIt cannot reasonably be asserted that \u201cownership\u201d and \u201cuse\u201d have any application since Sanford Toyota neither owned nor used the Pontiac. Concerning \u201cmaintenance,\u201d we note plaintiff has made no contention that Sanford Toyota was \u201cmaintaining\u201d the vehicle. Moreover, even construing the evidence in plaintiff\u2019s favor, we determine Sanford Toyota did not conduct any \u201cmaintenance\u201d on the Pontiac.\nThe American Heritage Dictionary defines maintenance as \u201cthe work of keeping something in proper condition.\u201d There is no evidence Sanford Toyota was involved in inspecting or repairing the vehicle at the time of the collision \u2014 activities ordinarily associated with maintenance of an automobile by a garage. Plaintiff has produced nothing to indicate the dealership expended any labor to keep the Pontiac operable; rather, the record discloses at most that Sanford Toyota permitted its dealer tags to be affixed to the Pontiac. This isolated act, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute \u201cmaintenance.\u201d\nBecause the first two sentences of the definition have no application, we consider the third and final sentence which designates \u201cgarage operations\u201d as \u201call operations necessary or incidental to a garage business.\u201d Permitting dealer tags to be affixed to an employee\u2019s vehicle was in no way \u201cnecessary\u201d to Sanford Toyota\u2019s business; indeed, at the time of the collision in question, doing so constituted a criminal misdemeanor. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-79(d) (1983) (amended 1989 and 1993). Further, such use was not \u201cincidental\u201d to dealership business. For example, there is no evidence Green required the dealer tag on the Pontiac in order to travel to and from work. Nor is there any indication Skinner was a prospective dealership customer such that his use of the tag furthered customer goodwill. In the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence shows only that dealership officers, for no apparent reason, acquiesced in dealership tags being placed on the Pontiac. From the evidence presented, we can conceive of no incidental business purpose furthered by Sanford Toyota\u2019s permissive action. See, e.g., Lambert v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 769 P.2d 1152, 1155-56 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (uses of vehicle covered under garage operations provision include only those \u201cgermane to the attending, servicing, repairing, parking or storage of the vehicle\u201d).\nIn summary, we conclude that the term \u201cgarage operations\u201d as used in the garage policy is unambiguous both as to definition and scope of coverage, and that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs injuries were not the result of Sanford Toyota\u2019s \u201cgarage operations.\u201d Thus, the garage policy did not provide coverage for plaintiffs injuries, and defendant Nationwide is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nSince plaintiffs collision was not the result of \u201cgarage operations\u201d (and was therefore not covered under the garage policy), we need not examine whether Skinner was an \u201cinsured\u201d at the time of the collision.\nBased on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court and remand with instruction that summary judgment be entered in favor of defendant Nationwide.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges WELLS and COZORT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Douglas Moretz, P.A., by Beverly D. Basden, for plaintiff - appellee.", "Bryan, Jones, Johnson & Snow, by Robert C. Bryan and Dwight W. Snow, for defendant-appellant Nationwide." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BETTY M. McLEOD, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. and ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Defendants\nNo. 9211SC756\n(Filed 21 June 1994)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 496 (NCI4th)\u2014 garage policy \u2014 employee owned vehicle with dealer tags \u2014 coverage not mandated by Financial Responsibility Act\nThe Financial Responsibility Act did not mandate that a garage policy provide liability coverage where Sanford Toyota permitted an employee to use dealer tags while attempting to sell an. automobile which he personally owned and which did not have tags, the employee allowed someone else to drive the vehicle, an accident occurred when that person crossed the center line, a jury absolved Sanford Toyota and the employee of responsibility but returned a verdict against the driver, plaintiff sought recovery under a garage policy issued to Sanford Toyota by defendant Nationwide and under uninsured coverage provided by Allstate, and summary judgment for Nationwide was denied. It is undisputed that Sanford Toyota did not hold legal title to the auto involved in the collision and there is no evidence indicating the dealership promoted the sale of the vehicle or otherwise used the vehicle for its business purposes. Dealer plates constituted the sole relationship between the car and the dealership; standing alone, this connection is too weak to impose mandatory liability coverage on the basis of the owner\u2019s policy provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 20 et seq.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 536 (NCI4th)\u2014 garage policy \u2014 employee owned vehicle with dealer tags \u2014 no coverage\nThere was no coverage under a garage policy for an automobile accident where Sanford Toyota permitted an employee to use dealer tags while attempting to sell an automobile which he personally owned and which did not have tags, the employee allowed someone else to drive the vehicle, an accident occurred when that person crossed the center line, a jury absolved Sanford Toyota and the employee of responsibility but returned a verdict against the driver, plaintiff sought recovery under a garage policy issued to Sanford Toyota by defendant Nationwide, and summary judgment was granted for plaintiff. The term \u201cgarage operations\u201d as used in the policy is unambiguous both as to definition and scope of coverage. There is no indication that the automobile was being used in Sanford Toyota\u2019s business, it cannot reasonably be asserted that \u201cownership\u201d and \u201cuse\u201d have any application since Sanford Toyota neither owned nor used the automobile, plaintiff has made no contention that Sanford Toyota was maintaining the vehicle, permitting dealer tags to be affixed to an employee\u2019s vehicle was in no way necessary to Sanford Toyota\u2019s business, and there was no incidental business purpose furthered by the permissive use of the tags. Nationwide is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 225-228.\nLiability insurance of garages, motor vehicle repair shops and sales agencies, and the like. 93 ALR2d 1047.\nAppeal by defendant Nationwide from order entered 5 May 1992 by Judge Wiley F. Bowen in Lee County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 June 1993.\nJ. Douglas Moretz, P.A., by Beverly D. Basden, for plaintiff - appellee.\nBryan, Jones, Johnson & Snow, by Robert C. Bryan and Dwight W. Snow, for defendant-appellant Nationwide." }, "file_name": "0283-01", "first_page_order": 315, "last_page_order": 325 }