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  "name": "VICKI HILL, PLAINTIFF v. R.W. MORTON, AREA DIRECTOR, FORSYTH-STOKES AREA MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL RETARDATION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AUTHORITY, Defendant",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges WYNN and MARTIN concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "VICKI HILL, PLAINTIFF v. R.W. MORTON, AREA DIRECTOR, FORSYTH-STOKES AREA MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL RETARDATION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AUTHORITY, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nDefendant argues, correctly in our view, that the superior court erred in conducting what amounted to a new trial on the propriety of plaintiffs dismissal.\nThis action was initiated and tried under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-37(b) (1990) which provides:\nAn action brought in superior court by an employee who is dissatisfied with an advisory decision of the State Personnel Commission or with the action taken by the local appointing authority pursuant to the decision shall be heard upon the record and not as a trial de novo. In such an action brought by a local employee under this section, the defendant shall be the local appointing authority. If superior court affirms the decision of the Commission, the decision of superior court shall be binding on the local appointing authority.\nJudging from the record, the superior court treated this section as creating a cause of action in which the court could make its own findings of fact and substitute its judgment for the Commission\u2019s. In doing so the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction over state employee grievances. This section does not create a cause of action but instead refers to judicial review provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 (1991). In particular, the language in G.S. \u00a7 126-37(b), which states that plaintiff \u201cshall be heard upon the record and not as a trial de novo,\u201d rings of judicial review, and is a reference to the \u201cwhole record test\u201d found in Chapter 150B. This section does not grant the superior court authority to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, or to charge one party with attorney fees, as the court did in this case. Allowing a new cause of action at this point, after prior administrative hearings have been conducted, is senseless in that it interrupts the logical progression of an employee\u2019s action from the administrative hearing level, G.S. \u00a7 126-37(a), to appellate review in the superior court pursuant to Chapter 150B.\nWe are aware of this Court\u2019s opinion in Mitchell v. Thornton, 94 N.C. App. 313, 380 S.E.2d 146 (1989), which holds that G.S. \u00a7 126-37(b) creates a cause of action. That opinion was implicitly overruled, however, by the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Harding v. North Carolina Dep\u2019t of Correction, 334 N.C. 414, 432 S.E.2d 298 (1993).\nIn Harding, the Supreme Court defined the boundaries of the superior court\u2019s jurisdiction over final decisions of the Commission. The Supreme Court held that \u201c[j]urisdiction of the superior courts over final decisions of the Commission derives not from Chapter 126, but from Chapters 7A and 150B.\u201d Id. at 418, 432 S.E.2d at 301. Chapters 7A and 150B \u201cconfer on the superior courts only appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the Commission on state employee grievances,\u201d id. at 419, 432 S.E.2d at 301, and moreover, these chapters constitute \u201cthe only authority to sue the State for an employee grievance.\u201d Id.\nWe conclude then that Mitchell is overruled and that plaintiff\u2019s only recourse is judicial review in the superior court pursuant to Chapter 150B. Therefore, the superior court\u2019s judgment is vacated in full, and the case is remanded to the superior court for review pursuant to Chapter 150B.\nSo that there will be no question on remand we address defendant\u2019s jurisdiction argument. We hold that the superior court did not lack personal jurisdiction over defendant. Even if service of the amended complaint was not properly executed, that leaves the court with jurisdiction over defendant via the original complaint, in which plaintiff included her petition for judicial review pursuant to Chapter 150B. See, e.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 54 L. Ed. 2d (1978); Beckham v. Grand Affair, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 415 (W.D.N.C. 1987).\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges WYNN and MARTIN concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Forsyth County Attorney, by Bruce E. Colvin, for defendant appellant.",
      "Robert E. Winfrey for plaintiff appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "VICKI HILL, PLAINTIFF v. R.W. MORTON, AREA DIRECTOR, FORSYTH-STOKES AREA MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL RETARDATION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AUTHORITY, Defendant\nNo. 9321SC397\n(Filed 21 June 1994)\nAdministrative Law and Procedure \u00a7 65 (NCI4th)\u2014 dismissal of state employee \u2014 State Personnel Commission decision \u2014 superior court review\nA superior court judgment was vacated and remanded where plaintiff was dismissed; had a hearing before an administrative law judge; another hearing before the State Personnel Commission, which adopted the administrative law judge\u2019s findings that the dismissal be left undisturbed; filed an action in superior court requesting a trial on the record developed before the administrative law judge pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-37(b); and the superior court conducted a hearing on the record and made its own findings and conclusions, deciding that plaintiff was not dismissed for just cause. The superior court treated the statute as creating a cause of action in which the court could make its own findings of fact and substitute its own judgment for the Commission\u2019s and, in doing so, exceeded its jurisdiction over state employee grievances. Allowing a new cause of action at this point, after prior administrative hearings have been conducted, is senseless in that it interrupts the logical progression on an employee\u2019s action from the administrative hearing to appellate review in the superior court. Mitchell v. Thornton, 94 N.C. App. 313, was implicitly overruled by Harding v. North Carolina Dept, of Correction, 334 N.C. 414.\nAm Jur 2d, Administrative Law \u00a7\u00a7 559, 582.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 January 1993 by Judge Joseph R. John, Sr. in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 February 1994.\nPlaintiff was employed by defendant from February 1982 until her dismissal in June 1988. After her dismissal plaintiff requested and received a hearing before an administrative law judge to determine if she was dismissed for just cause. The administrative law judge recommended that plaintiffs dismissal be left undisturbed. Afterwards, the State Personnel Commission (the Commission) held a hearing on the matter and adopted the administrative law judge\u2019s findings and conclusions.\nPlaintiff finally filed an action in superior court requesting (1) a trial on the record developed before the administrative law judge pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-37(b) or (2) judicial review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43. Using the record developed in the office of administrative hearings, the superior court conducted a hearing on the record as requested in plaintiffs first cause of action. The superior court made its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, decided that plaintiff was not dismissed for just cause, and ordered that she be reinstated. Plaintiffs claim for judicial review under Chapter 150B was dismissed. Defendant appeals from this judgment.\nForsyth County Attorney, by Bruce E. Colvin, for defendant appellant.\nRobert E. Winfrey for plaintiff appellee."
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