{ "id": 12132886, "name": "GREGORY LEE HUSSEY, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Hussey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.", "decision_date": "1994-07-05", "docket_number": "No. 9310SC735", "first_page": "464", "last_page": "469", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "115 N.C. App. 464" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "25 ALR4th 6", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "28 ALR3d 551", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "23 ALR4th 12", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "37 ALR3d 1263", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549651, 2547252, 2544293, 2549483 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0537-04", "/nc/333/0537-01", "/nc/333/0537-03", "/nc/333/0537-02" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525108 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ariz. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1513966 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/144/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.W.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Mich. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1949218 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/409/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716667 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing American Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 341, 346, 338 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491072, 2489257, 2490993, 2488279, 2491871 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing American Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 341, 346, 338 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0437-04", "/nc/325/0437-01", "/nc/325/0437-02", "/nc/325/0437-05", "/nc/325/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "citing American Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 341, 346, 338 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265", "parenthetical": "citing American Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 341, 346, 338 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564714 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505733 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537537, 2539785, 2542308, 2540999 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0577-01", "/nc/328/0577-02", "/nc/328/0577-03", "/nc/328/0577-04" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542714 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(3) and (4)" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 548, "char_count": 11930, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.682778466256318e-07, "percentile": 0.826811910655795 }, "sha256": "02a76b0d2331304f146a054c02fac2000df73d73145591ca8e9ed7755949f1e7", "simhash": "1:8f6ad87b571705fd", "word_count": 1909 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:18.676868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ORR and MARTIN concur." ], "parties": [ "GREGORY LEE HUSSEY, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nPlaintiff and defendant appeal the trial court\u2019s judgment allowing plaintiff to interpolicy stack uninsured motorist coverage of one insurance policy with coverage in a second policy, but not permitting plaintiff to intrapolicy stack the coverage in the second policy. We affirm.\nOn 18 April 1991, plaintiff Gregory Lee Hussey was involved in a collision with an automobile while he was riding a motorcycle. The operator of the vehicle which struck plaintiff\u2019s motorcycle was uninsured. Plaintiff\u2019s motorcycle was insured by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) through a policy (\u201cPolicy A\u201d) having uninsured/underinsured motorist limits of $50,000.00 per person, and $100,000.00 per accident. Plaintiff owned a Ford Bronco and Ford Ranger also insured by State Farm under a separate policy (\u201cPolicy B\u201d). Policy B had coverage limits with uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage limits of $100,000.00 per person, and $300,000.00 per accident for each vehicle. Both policies were in effect prior to 1991, when amendments were made to the motorist insurance stacking statutory provisions, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) and (4). The parties have stipulated that the plaintiff\u2019s injuries exceed $250,000.00. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action on 7 April 1992 to determine the rights between the parties. The trial court entered a judgment on 29 April 1993 which concluded that plaintiff could aggregate the $50,000.00 uninsured motorist coverage in Policy A with the $100,000.00 limit of Policy B for a total of $150,000.00. The trial court disallowed intrapolicy stacking as to Policy B. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed.\nPlaintiff contends the trial court erred by failing to permit him to intrapolicy stack the uninsured motorist (UM) coverage of Policy B. The trial court\u2019s decision disallowing the aggregation was based on a section of the policy which reads: \u201cIf this policy and any other insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of liability for your or a family member\u2019s injuries shall be the sum of the limits of liability for this coverage under all such policies.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred in its interpretation of the policy language, contending the coverages in Policy B should have been stacked. Plaintiff cites Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 400 S.E.2d 44, reh\u2019g denied, 328 N.C. 577, 403 S.E.2d 514 (1991) to support his argument. In Smith, our Supreme Court held the plaintiff could intrapolicy stack underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Smith, however, applied to UIM rather than UM coverage, distinguishing that case from the case before us.\nWe find this case is instead controlled by Lanning v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 309, 420 S.E.2d 180 (1992). The Lanning case held that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21, prior to the 1991 amendments, does not require nor prohibit intrapolicy stacking of UM coverage. The Court in Lanning explained, \u201c[w]hen policies written before the 1991 amendments to the Act contain language that may be interpreted to allow stacking of UM coverages on more than one vehicle in a single policy, insureds are contractually entitled to stack.\u201d Id. at 316, 420 S.E.2d at 185.\nHere, a review of the \u201cLimit of Liability\u201d clause in Policy B issued by State Farm indicates clearly that stacking of UM coverage is prohibited. The provision states in pertinent part:\nThe limit of bodily injury liability shown in the Declarations for each person for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury, including damages for care, loss of service or death, sustained by any one person in any one auto accident.\nSubject to this limit for each person, the limit of bodily injury liability shown in the Declarations for each accident for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one accident. . . . This is the most we will pay for bodily injury . . . regardless of the number of:\n1. Insureds;\n2. Claims made;\n3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or\n4. Vehicles involved in the accident. (Emphasis in original).\nAccordingly, the trial court was correct in refusing to permit plaintiff to stack the UM coverage of the two vehicles covered by Policy B.\nWe next turn to the issues defendant raises on appeal. First, defendant claims the trial court erred in finding the \u201cOther Insurance\u201d clause in an amendment to Policy A is applicable only to under-insured vehicles. The amendment provides in pertinent part:\nWith respect to damages you or a family member are legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Section 5 of the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle, the first paragraph of the Other Insurance provision is replaced by the following:\nIf this policy and any other insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of liability for your or a family member\u2019s injuries shall be the sum of the limits of liability for this coverage under all such policies. (Emphasis in original.)\nThe trial court found that the policy language is ambiguous and rejected State Farm\u2019s interpretation that the clause applied only to underinsured vehicles. We agree with the trial court that the \u201cOther Insurance\u201d language is unclear as to whether the replacing paragraph was intended to apply solely to UIM coverages.\nThe various terms of the policy are to be harmoniously construed, and if possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect. If, however, the meaning of words or the effect of provisions is uncertain or capable of several reasonable interpretations, the doubts will be resolved against the insurance company and in favor of the policyholder.\nWoods v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C. 500, 506, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument as to this issue is overruled.\nNext, defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to hold that an exclusion in the UM coverage section of Policy B prohibited coverage and stacking under that policy. The exclusion reads:\nA. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for property damage or bodily injuries sustained by any person:\nM: * * *\n7. While occupying or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s argument and find coverage under Policy B.\nThe \u201cowned vehicle\u201d exclusion is clear and unambiguous, however, the exclusion\u2019s effect renders it void against public policy. The effect of the exclusion, to deny coverage to an injured person who is a named insured, is contrary to the purpose underlying the North Carolina Financial Responsibility Act. \u201cThe avowed purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act ... is to compensate the innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists.\u201d Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 325 N.C. 259, 265, 382 S.E.2d 759, 763, reh\u2019g denied, 325 N.C. 437, 384 S.E.2d 546 (1989) (citing American Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 341, 346, 338 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1986)). The exclusion works to deny UM protection to Class I insureds, thereby subverting the legislative policies articulated in the Financial Responsibility Act. Plaintiff, and other insureds, should not be penalized for being involved in an accident while operating their own vehicles.\nWe are persuaded in reaching this result by decisions in other jurisdictions which have found similar \u201cowned vehicle\u201d or \u201chomeowners vehicle\u201d exclusions null and void. See, e.g., Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141 (1980); and Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 144 Ariz. 291, 697 P.2d 684 (1985). If we were to allow the exclusion to apply, an insured who has paid premiums for UM coverage would be denied coverage completely under the policy. We therefore agree the trial court did not err in allowing coverage under Policy B, as the \u201cowned vehicle\u201d exclusion is void against public policy.\nFinally, defendant contends the trial court erred in determining that the \u201cOther Insurance\u201d clause in the endorsement was intended to replace the anti-stacking language in Section C of Policy A, thereby allowing interpolicy stacking of Policy A with Policy B. As noted earlier, the endorsement reads as follows: \u201cIf this policy and any other insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of liability for your or a family member\u2019s injuries shall be the sum of the limits of liability for this coverage under all such policies.\u201d This Court has held that if an \u201cOther Insurance\u201d clause in a policy prohibits stacking, the insured may not stack policies. Conversely, where an \u201cOther Insurance\u201d clause allows stacking, the insured may engage in interpolicy stacking. Dungee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 108 N.C. App. 599, 424 S.E.2d 234, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 537, 429 S.E.2d 555 (1993). Here, the \u201cOther Insurance\u201d clause was replaced by the endorsement which allows interpolicy stacking. The replacement paragraph applies to UM coverage, and thus supports interpolicy stacking between Policy A and Policy B. As a result, plaintiff is entitled to aggregate the $50,000.00 UM limits of Policy A with the $100,000.00 UM limits of Policy B for a total coverage of $150,000.00.\nThe trial court\u2019s judgment is\nAffirmed.\nJudges ORR and MARTIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "COZORT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Barrow, Redwine and Davis, by Paul D. Davis; and Kenneth C. Haywood, for plaintiff appellant-appellee.", "Frazier, Frazier & Mahler, by Torin L. Fury, for defendant appellant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GREGORY LEE HUSSEY, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. 9310SC735\n(Filed 5 July 1994)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 514 (NCI4th)\u2014 automobile insurance\u2014 intrapolicy stacking of UM coverages not allowed\nPlaintiff was not entitled to intrapolicy stack the uninsured motorist (UM) coverage of the two vehicles insured by an automobile policy issued prior to the 1991 amendments to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) and (4) where the \u201climit of liability\u201d clause in the policy clearly indicated that stacking of UM coverage was prohibited.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 326 et seq.\nLimitation of amount of coverage under automobile liability policy as affected by fact that policy covers more than one vehicle. 37 ALR3d 1263.\nCombining or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in single policy applicable to different vehicles of individual insured. 23 ALR4th 12.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 514 (NCI4th)\u2014 automobile insurance \u2014 separate policies \u2014 interpolicy stacking of UM coverages allowed\nWhere plaintiff was injured by an uninsured motorist while riding his motorcycle, insured by defendant under Policy A, plaintiff also owned two vehicles insured by defendant under Policy B, and both policies were issued prior to the 1991 amendments to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) and (4), plaintiff was entitled to inter-policy stack the UM coverages under both policies since (1) the \u201cother insurance\u201d clause in an amendment to Policy A was ambiguous and will not be interpreted as applicable only to underinsured vehicles; (2) the \u201cowned vehicle\u201d exclusion in the uninsured motorist section of Policy B is void as against public policy; and (3) the \u201cother insurance\u201d clause in Policy A was replaced by an endorsement which allows interpolicy stacking.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 326 et seq.\nUninsured motorist insurance: validity and construction of \u201cother insurance\u201d provisions. 28 ALR3d 551.\nCombining or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in separate policies issued by same insurer to same insured. 25 ALR4th 6.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendant from judgment entered 29 April 1993 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 1994.\nBarrow, Redwine and Davis, by Paul D. Davis; and Kenneth C. Haywood, for plaintiff appellant-appellee.\nFrazier, Frazier & Mahler, by Torin L. Fury, for defendant appellant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0464-01", "first_page_order": 496, "last_page_order": 501 }