{ "id": 8523180, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NATHANIEL WILLIAMS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williams", "decision_date": "1994-09-06", "docket_number": "No. 9312SC985", "first_page": "225", "last_page": "234", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 N.C. App. 225" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "19 ALR3d 727", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524732 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561485 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2397021 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695328 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477-78", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527705 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502501 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560540 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547016 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 U.S. 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180644 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406", "parenthetical": "Rehnquist, J., concurring" }, { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "Rehnquist, J., concurring" }, { "page": "392-93" }, { "page": "392-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/437/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 17", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11958263 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0017-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 902, "char_count": 21620, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3070842663084845e-07, "percentile": 0.7880260586621073 }, "sha256": "e7eda2062f200da39e7ee53e5376be57801a89e212ac5de6ba3927cd31591df8", "simhash": "1:d76cc22b5a0fddf4", "word_count": 3446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:55.005039+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and LEWIS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NATHANIEL WILLIAMS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nDefendant brings forward five assignments of error. After careful consideration, we find no error in the admission of evidence seized pursuant to an emergency warrantless search which closely followed an initial sweep by the first responding officers. We also find r\u00edo error in: 1) refusing to instruct the jury to consider diminished capacity in evaluating malice, 2) aggravating defendant\u2019s sentence because of the large quantity of drugs found at the crime scene, and 3) admitting victim impact statements as to sentence. We find the trial court erred in: 1) refusing to instruct the jury to consider defendant\u2019s diminished capacity in evaluating the specific intent element of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and 2) using evidence supporting a joined offense in aggravation of defendant\u2019s consolidated sentence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing on the second degree murder conviction.\nI. Propriety of Warrantless Search\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of evidence seized by law enforcement officers pursuant to warrantless searches of defendant\u2019s residence. Defendant argues that the searches violate his constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. We disagree.\nThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const. Amend. IV. See also N.C. Const. Art. I, \u00a7 19. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court require that the police obtain a search warrant before searching a home \u201csubject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.\u201d Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20, 83 L.Ed.2d 246, 250 (1984), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967). In creating exceptions to the general rule, the Court must consider the \u201cbalance between the public interest and the individual\u2019s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.\u201d Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 309 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 615 (1975).\nIn Mincey v. Arizona, supra, the United States Supreme Court refused to create a blanket \u201cmurder scene exception\u201d to the general rule requiring a search warrant. However, the Court reaffirmed the right of police to conduct a warrantless search and seizure when an emergency exists. The Mincey Court stated:\nWe do not question the right of police to respond to emergency situations .... The Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises .... And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.\nId. at 392-93, 57 L.Ed. at 300 (1978) (citations omitted).\nIn Thompson v. Louisiana, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court, citing Mincey, supra, reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Court had unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish Thompson from Mincey by noting that Mincey involved a four day search of the premises, while the search in Thompson began thirty-five minutes after the defendant was taken from her home and only lasted for two hours. The U.S Supreme Court held that the later warrantless search in Thompson was not justified by emergency circumstances.\nUnlike Thompson, the investigators here quickly responded to the dispatcher\u2019s call and arrived within fifteen minutes after the initial responding officers first reached the scene. During the time it took the investigators to arrive, the initial responding officers: 1) encountered the defendant in the front yard and a wounded victim on the front porch, 2) entered the house and conducted a thirty second inspection during which they found a deceased second victim in the den, and 3) secured the scene against intruders. The investigators arrived shortly after the initial thirty second sweep by the first responding officers. Responding to the ongoing emergency, the investigators conducted a more complete search of the premises which could have revealed additional victims or hiding suspects. In contrast to the ongoing police response here, the investigators in Thompson arrived thirty-five minutes after the first officers on the scene had already searched the home, secured the scene, and sent the defendant to the hospital.\nWe hold that the law enforcement officers\u2019 actions here comply with Mincey and Thompson which allow warrantless searches in emergency circumstances to determine if there are other victims or suspects still on the premises. To hold otherwise would result in a rule that once any law enforcement officer makes an initial sweep through a home no matter how hurried or brief it may be, no other officers may search the home until a search warrant is obtained. Such a rule ignores the fact that the first responding officers making a quick initial search of a home may overlook a victim or suspect located in less obvious places.\nDuring the course of their emergency activities, law enforcement officers may seize evidence in \u201cplain view.\u201d Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392-93, 57 L.Ed. at 300. Here, all of the seized evidence was in plain view during the ongoing emergency activities conducted by the law enforcement officers. It is irrelevant that some of the items seized were not noticed by the initial responding officers since all of the law enforcement officers acted pursuant to an emergency. Accordingly, this assignment of error fails.\nII. Jury Instructions\nA. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury to consider the principle of diminished capacity in evaluating the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (G.S. 14-32). We agree.\nDefendant requested the following instruction:\nIn order to convict the defendant of Assault with a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Kill Inflicting Serious Injury, the State is required to prove to the jury from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully assaulted Steven Montgomery and that he did so in execution of an actual, specific intent to kill.\nThus, before the jury may find the defendant guilty of Assault with a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Kill Inflicting Serious Injury, it must first find whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Nathaniel Williams was, first, capable of forming a specific intent to kill and, second, did form the specific intent to kill within the meaning of our law. The jury must consider, in determining the answer to these two questions, the evidence of the defendant with regard to his mental condition at the time of the alleged offense. In other words, the defendant\u2019s evidence with regard to his mental condition is a circumstance which must be considered in determining whether or not the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Nathaniel Williams was (1) capable of forming the specific intent to kill and (2) did form the specific intent to kill Steven Montgomery.\nThe defense of diminished capacity applies to the element of specific intent to kill which is an essential element of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. State v. Daniel, 333 N.C. 756, 429 S.E.2d 724 (1993). Our Supreme Court held in State v. Rose, 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988), that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury to consider the defendant\u2019s mental condition in connection with his ability to form a specific intent to kill. Instead, the trial judge gave the pattern instruction which explains intent as a state of mind or mental attitude which may be inferred from surrounding circumstances rather than by direct evidence. In ordering a new trial, the Rose Court stated:\n[T]he trial court properly allowed . . . testimony that. . . defendant could not form the specific intent to kill.... Defendant was entitled to have the jury consider this testimony in determining whether he in fact premeditated and deliberated the murder of the two victims. It follows, therefore, that since the testimony was before the jury, defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on this element of the crimes. See N.C.G.S. 15A-1232 (1987).\nId. at 458, 373 S.E.2d at 428 (1988).\nHere, as in Rose, experts testified that defendant was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill. The trial court then refused to instruct the jury that it should consider defendant\u2019s mental condition in determining whether he formed the specific intent to kill. Instead, the trial court gave the pattern jury instruction which defined intent to kill in the same way as the Rose trial court instructed the jury. Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it should consider the defendant\u2019s mental condition in determining whether he formed the specific intent to kill.\nThe State argues that flaws in defendant\u2019s proposed instruction relieved the trial court of the obligation to instruct the jury on diminished capacity. Specifically, the State objects to the use of the word \u201cmust\u201d in the proposed instruction. The State\u2019s argument is unpersuasive. A trial judge is not obliged to choose between using a jury instruction exactly as proposed or not at all. A judge is only required to instruct the jury in \u201csubstantial conformity to the requested instruction\u201d when the proposed instruction is supported by the evidence. Id.\nBecause defendant\u2019s state of mind was a crucial issue in the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, a reasonable possibility exists that absent the error the jury would have reached a different result. G.S. 15A-1443(a); see State v. Rose, supra. Accordingly defendant is entitled to a new trial on the. charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.\nB. Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury to consider the principle of diminished capacity with respect to the element of malice in second degree murder (G.S. 14-32). We disagree. In the single case cited, State v. Holder, 331 N.C. 462, 418 S.E.2d 197 (1992), the Court focused on the adequacy of the jury instruction regarding the impact of defendant\u2019s mental state on his ability to form a specific intent to kill and to premeditate, but did not discuss the need for an instruction on the defendant\u2019s mental state and the existence of malice. Accordingly, this assignment of error fails.\nHI. Sentencing\nA. Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by considering the unusually large amount of drug contraband found at the crime scene as an aggravating factor in sentencing defendant. We disagree.\nAn aggravating factor exists when the \u201coffense involved an unusually large quantity of contraband.\u201d G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(m). As this Court has noted, \u201cthe trial court must consider all circumstances that are both transactionally related to the offense and reasonably related to the purpose of sentencing . . . .\u201d State v. Flowe, 107 N.C. App. 468, 472, 420 S.E.2d 475, 477-78 (1992) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Defendant\u2019s own witness established that defendant and victim Steven Montgomery bagged up heroin at a motel in Wilmington, North Carolina, before returning to Fayetteville on the morning of the day of the shootings. The victim Montgomery\u2019s suitcase containing 5.2 grams of heroin was found in defendant\u2019s living room. Another 8.2 grams of heroin was found in a bag under a jacket. We hold this evidence meets the statutory criteria that defendant\u2019s offenses \u201cinvolved an unusually large quantity of contraband.\u201d Accordingly, this assignment of error fails.\nB. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in finding his \u201ccourse of conduct\u201d a nonstatutory aggravating factor. The State concedes that the trial court erred. We agree. The trial court stated:\n[T]he offenses for which the defendant stands convicted was [sic] part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against other person or persons.\nA sentencing judge may not use a joined or joinable offense in aggravation. State v. Rose, supra; State v. Westmoreland, 314 N.C. 442, 334 S.E.2d 223 (1985); State v. Lattimore, 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984). See G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(o) (1983). This prohibition applies to both convictions for joined offenses and to the acts which form the substance of those joined offenses. State v. Hayes, 323 N.C. 306, 372 S.E.2d 704 (1988). Our Supreme Court explained in Hayes:\n[T]he trial judge did not explicitly use defendant\u2019s convictions as aggravating factors. Rather he relied on defendant\u2019s murderous course of conduct in committing the offenses that support the convictions .... Whatever name is given to it, the effect of the trial judge\u2019s action was to use defendant\u2019s contemporaneous convictions of joined offenses as an aggravating factor in violation of Lattimore.\nId., 323 N.C. at 314, 372 S.E.2d at 709, quoting State v. Westmoreland, 314 N.C. at 449, 334 S.E.2d at 228. Accordingly, defendant must be resentenced.\nIV.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing prosecution witnesses who are members of the victim\u2019s family to advocate regarding the length of sentence which defendant should receive. We find no reversible error. While receiving victim impact statements advocating a sentence is \u201ca practice not to be encouraged,\u201d this Court has held that the practice does not constitute reversible error. State v. Jackson, 91 N.C. App. 124, 125, 370 S.E.2d 687, 688 (1988). Accordingly, this assignment of error fails.\nV.\nFor the reasons stated, we hold defendant is entitled to a new trial on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury on Steven Montgomery and a new sentencing hearing for the second-degree murder of Loretta Williams.\nNo error in part; vacated and remanded for resentencing in part; new trial in part.\nJudges COZORT and LEWIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General David M. Parker and Associate Attorney General Thomas 0. Lawton, III, for the State.", "Public Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Public Defender Benjamin Sendor, for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NATHANIEL WILLIAMS\nNo. 9312SC985\n(Filed 6 September 1994)\n1. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 48 (NCI4th)\u2014 warrantless search of crime scene \u2014 seized evidence admissible\nIn a prosecution for second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence seized from defendant\u2019s residence, where the crimes occurred, pursuant to an emergency warrantless search which closely followed an initial sweep by the first responding officers.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 174-179.\nModern status of rule as to validity of nonconsensnal search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by lapse of time between, or difference in places of, arrest and search. 19 ALR3d 727.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 767 (NCI4th); Homicide \u00a7 678 (NCI4th)\u2014 assault with deadly weapon \u2014 defendant\u2019s diminished capacity \u2014 refusal to instruct error\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s request to instruct the jury to consider the principle of diminished capacity in evaluating the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, since experts testified that defendant was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill, and defendant specifically requested such instruction; however, the court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s request to instruct the jury to consider the principle of diminished capacity with respect to the element of malice in second-degree murder.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 516; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1270 et seq.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 1171 (NCI4th)\u2014 drugs found at crime scene \u2014 aggravating sentencing factor\nThe trial court in a prosecution for second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon did not err by considering the unusually large amount of drag contraband found at the crime scene as an aggravating factor in sentencing defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 1189 (NCI4th)\u2014 aggravation of sentence\u2014 evidence supporting joined offense \u2014 consideration error\nThe trial court erred in using evidence supporting a joined offense in aggravation of defendant\u2019s consolidated sentence.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\nCourt\u2019s right, in imposing sentence, to hear evidence of, or to consider, other offenses committed by defendant. 96 ALR2D 768.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 1067 (NCI4th)\u2014 sentencing proceeding\u2014 consideration of victim impact statements not error\nThe trial court did not commit reversible error by allowing victim impact statements as to sentence.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598, 599.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment signed 2 May 1993 by Judge E. Lynn Johnson in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 1994.\nOn 1 February 1993, defendant was tried and convicted of second-degree murder (G.S. 14-17) and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (G.S. 14-32(a)). The trial court consolidated the charges for judgment and sentenced defendant to a thirty-five year prison term.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: On 11 October 1988, two Fayetteville Police Department officers responded to an emergency call at 3:39 p.m. directing them to defendant\u2019s residence. The officers found defendant pacing in the front yard and victim Steven Montgomery lying wounded in the doorway of the residence. Defendant told the officers that a man had shot his wife and was fleeing through the woods.\nThe officers radioed for emergency personnel and then entered the residence to check for other victims or suspects. They found the defendant\u2019s wife lying dead on a couch, with a gunshot wound above her left ear. The two officers then quickly conducted a sweep of the residence. Near the kitchen, they found a small pistol leaning against a wall. In the den where defendant\u2019s wife\u2019s body had been found, the officers found spent ammunition casings and a white, rock-like substance on top of a stereo. The initial responding officers then left the house but secured it against intruders. No one was allowed to enter the residence until the Police Department investigators arrived about fifteen minutes after the first two officers arrived. The investigators entered the house and continued to search the premises. They (the investigators) observed the items seen by the first two officers and in addition observed the following: an empty gun holster; a used condom on the floor; a bag containing 5.2 grams of heroin, victim Steven Montgomery\u2019s identification, and clothing; a denim jacket draped over a bag containing 8.2 grams of heroin; a live bullet; an ammunition clip; and a bullet hole in the wall. Two police identification officers made a videotape, took pictures, drew diagrams, and collected the evidence discovered by the other officers. Later, officers returned for another search after obtaining the consent of the defendant. All searches of defendant\u2019s residence were conducted without a search warrant.\nRegarding defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the murder, a psychiatrist from Dorothea Dix testified that defendant\u2019s actions on the day of the murder, as well as his medical examinations, produced no \u201cfindings that would indicate he (defendant) did not know that his alleged actions would be wrongful, or that he did not know the nature of his actions.\u201d The doctor did find that the defendant suffers from a mental illness he described as a mixed personality disorder with \u201cnarcissistic, histrionic features, as well as paranoid features.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s evidence did not contradict the State\u2019s evidence except regarding defendant\u2019s mental condition. Defendant\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: Defendant suffers from right brain damage resulting in impaired nonverbal skills including problem-solving ability, reasoning, and judgment. The brain damage could have resulted from a car wreck, two army parachuting accidents, or a chemical imbalance in defendant\u2019s brain. In addition, defendant suffers from a bipolar (manic-depressive) disorder. Defendant\u2019s medical experts testified that as a result of his mental dysfunctions, defendant did not have the ability to form the specific intent to kill on the day of the shootings.\nFollowing a hearing, the trial judge ruled on 15 November 1990 that defendant did not \u201cknowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly\u201d consent to the allegedly consensual search. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed evidence seized pursuant to the last search. However, the court allowed all evidence obtained during the earlier searches, concluding that \u201cthe officers had a legal right to sweep the premises and seize anything in plain view . . . .\u201d\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General David M. Parker and Associate Attorney General Thomas 0. Lawton, III, for the State.\nPublic Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Public Defender Benjamin Sendor, for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0225-01", "first_page_order": 255, "last_page_order": 264 }