{ "id": 8523223, "name": "NANCY CRAVEN ALLEN, Daughter, BRENDA SIMBER, Guardian ad litem for WILLIAM SCOTT CRAVEN, Minor Son, of WILLIAM PEARL CRAVEN, Deceased, Employee-Plaintiff v. PIEDMONT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. OF NORTH CAROLINA d/b/a TRANSPERSONNEL/MANPOWER TEMPORARIES, Employer, AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carriers-Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Allen v. Piedmont Transport Services, Inc.", "decision_date": "1994-09-06", "docket_number": "No. 9310IC187", "first_page": "234", "last_page": "241", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 N.C. App. 234" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556772 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569704, 8569770, 8569794, 8569724 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0587-01", "/nc/304/0587-03", "/nc/304/0587-04", "/nc/304/0587-02" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523346 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568257 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522650 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142-43", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568216 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "279-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-39", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551082 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(12)" }, { "page": "(12)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-38", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 718, "char_count": 16507, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.066301357385637e-07, "percentile": 0.5584738724149555 }, "sha256": "91b2b82c50f0c28bbd39c549a2625f002ec076902b71d0ce485dae765cbf55c4", "simhash": "1:0175d77f5039679b", "word_count": 2696 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:55.005039+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "NANCY CRAVEN ALLEN, Daughter, BRENDA SIMBER, Guardian ad litem for WILLIAM SCOTT CRAVEN, Minor Son, of WILLIAM PEARL CRAVEN, Deceased, Employee-Plaintiff v. PIEDMONT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. OF NORTH CAROLINA d/b/a TRANSPERSONNEL/MANPOWER TEMPORARIES, Employer, AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carriers-Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nWilliam P. Craven died as a result of a work-related injury. The Industrial Commission ordered that all of the workers\u2019 compensation death benefits would go to Mr. Craven\u2019s minor son Scott, age 14, and none to Mr. Craven\u2019s adult daughter Nancy, age 25. We affirm. The procedural history follows. Appellant Nancy Craven Allen, adult daughter of the deceased, filed a Request that Claim Be Assigned for Hearing before a Deputy Commissioner (Form 33) on 9 April 1991. On 20 April 1991, Aetna Life & Casualty Company filed a Form 33R stating that the parties were unable to agree on the person or persons entitled to receive death benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The case came on for hearing before Deputy Commissioner W. Joey Barnes on 2 December 1991. The parties stipulated that the decedent, William P. Craven, suffered an injury by accident on 5 March 1991 while working for defendant-employer and that at the time of the injury defendant-employer and decedent were subject to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The only issue before the Commission at the hearing was what, if any, workers\u2019 compensation death benefits were decedent\u2019s surviving children, Nancy Michelle Craven (now Nancy Craven Allen) and William Scott Craven (Scott), eligible for under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-38(1) (1991). At the time of decedent\u2019s death, Scott was 14 years old and Nancy was 25 years old. In an Opinion and Award entered 27 January 1992, the Deputy Commissioner found, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-2(12), -38, -39, that Scott was the only minor child of the decedent at the time of his death and, being wholly dependent upon the decedent, was entitled to receive the entire workers\u2019 compensation death benefits.\nOn 30 January 1992, plaintiff Nancy Craven Allen filed a Notice of Appeal to the Full Commission, which heard the appeal on 19 November 1992. On 19 November 1992 the Full Commission entered an Opinion and Award which affirmed the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s award. Plaintiff Nancy Craven Allen appeals.\nAppellant contends that the Industrial Commission erred in finding and concluding that Scott, the only minor child of the decedent at the time of his death, was entitled to receive the entire compensation payable under \u00a7 97-38, even after Scott turns 18 years of age. Specifically, appellant contends that, as a matter of law under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, she is entitled to share in the death benefits after Scott turns age 18.\n\u201cOn appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission, [our] jurisdiction ... is limited to the questions of law, whether there was competent evidence before the commission to support its findings of fact and whether such findings justify the legal conclusions and decision of the commission.\u201d Gaines v. L.D. Swain & Son, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 575, 578, 235 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1977) (citations omitted). We find the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, that such findings justify the legal conclusions and decision of the Commission, and that the Commission made no error of law.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-38, which provides for payment of death benefits for dependents of an employee whose death proximately results from compensable injury or occupational disease, provides in pertinent part:\nIf death results proximately from a compensable injury . . . the employer shall pay or cause to be paid . . . weekly payments of compensation equal to . . . (66 2/3%) of the average weekly wages of the deceased employee at the time of the accident . . . and burial expenses not exceeding . . . ($2,000), to the person or persons entitled thereto as follows:\n(1) Persons wholly dependent for support upon the earnings of the deceased employee at the time of the accident shall be entitled to receive the entire compensation payable share and share alike to the exclusion of all other persons. If there be only one person wholly dependent, then that person shall receive the entire compensation payable.\n. .. Compensation payments due on account of death shall be paid for a period of 400 weeks from the date of the death of the employee; provided, however, after said 400-week period... compensation payments due a dependent child shall be continued until such child reaches the age of 18.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-38 (1991) (emphasis added).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-39 provides that \u201ca child shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(12) (Cum. Supp. 1993) defines \u201cchild\u201d to \u201cinclude only persons who at the time of the death of the deceased employee are under 18 years of age.\u201d Where there are no persons wholly dependent, \u201cthen any person partially dependent for support upon the earnings of the deceased employee at the time of the accident\u201d receives the weekly payments under \u00a7 97-38(2).\nThus Scott, the only minor child at the time of decedent\u2019s death, was conclusively presumed wholly dependent upon the decedent for support under \u00a7 97-39 and thus entitled to all of the compensation payable under \u00a7 97-38. Appellant, who was 25 at the time of decedent\u2019s death, was not entitled to any compensation under \u00a7 97-38. Scott will continue receiving payments after he reaches age 18 because he will turn 18 before the 400-week period expires.\nWhere the deceased employee leaves no persons wholly or partially dependent, \u00a7 97-40 provides that \u201cthe compensation which would be payable under G.S. 97-38 to whole dependents shall be commuted to its present value and paid in a lump sum to the next of kin as herein defined.\u201d \u201c \u2018[N]ext of kin\u2019 . . . include[s] . . . adult children . . of the deceased . ...\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-40. The order of priority among such next of kin who are neither wholly nor partially dependent upon the deceased employee and who take under \u00a7 97-40 is \u201cgoverned by the general law applicable to the distribution of the personal estate of persons dying intestate.\u201d Id.\nAppellant observes that, if both plaintiffs in this case were over age 18 at the time of decedent\u2019s death, they would be entitled to share the benefits equally as next of kin under \u00a7 97-40 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-16(a)(l) (1984), which provides that children of the deceased take in equal shares. Appellant argues that, when Scott turns 18 during the initial 400-week death benefit period, the remaining portion of the death benefit should be divided equally between the two children, since they are both next of kin under \u00a7 97-40 and since there is no longer any wholly dependent beneficiary under \u00a7 97-38. We disagree with appellant\u2019s construction of \u00a7\u00a7 97-38, -40.\nIn interpreting the statutory provisions of North Carolina\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation law, we are guided by the following rules of statutory construction:\nFirst, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be liberally construed, whenever appropriate, so that benefits will not be denied upon mere technicalities or strained and narrow interpretations of its provisions. Second, such liberality should, not, however, extend beyond the clearly expressed language of those provisions, and our courts may not enlarge the ordinary meaning of the terms used by the legislature or engage in any method of \u201cjudicial legislation. \u201d... Third, it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature would leave an important matter regarding the administration of the Act open to inference or speculation; consequently, the judiciary should avoid \u201cingrafting upon a law something that has been omitted, which [it] believes ought to have been embraced.\u201d Fourth, in all cases of doubt, the intent of the legislature regarding the operation or application of a particular provision is to be discerned from a consideration of the Act as a whole \u2014 its language, purposes and spirit. Fifth, and finally, the Industrial Commission\u2019s legal interpretation of a particular provision is persuasive, although not binding, and should be accorded some weight on appeal and not idly cast aside, since that administrative body hears and decides all questions arising under the Act in the first instance.\nDeese v. Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 277-78, 293 S.E.2d 140, 142-43 (1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).\nThe express language of \u00a7 97-38 fixes the rights and liabilities at the time of the employee\u2019s death, providing that where there is only one wholly dependent person at the time of decedent\u2019s death, all of the death benefits be paid to that person. Section 97-40 applies only where the deceased employee leaves no surviving whole or partial dependents. In Chinault v. Pike Electrical Contractors, 53 N.C. App. 604, 606-07, 281 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1981), aff\u2019d, 306 N.C. 286, 293 S.E.2d 147 (1982), the court noted that \u201cthe General Assembly intended to fix each recipient\u2019s share at the date of the decedent\u2019s death\u201d and that \u201c[a]ny anomaly in the statute is for the General Assembly and not [this Court] to resolve.\u201d Thus, we cannot construe the statute to divide benefits among claimants who were adult children at the time of decedent\u2019s death and the sole wholly dependent beneficiary when the latter turns 18 during the initial 400-week period.\nAppellant contends that Deese, 306 N.C. 275, 293 S.E.2d 140, and its companion case, Chinault, 306 N.C. 286, 293 S.E.2d 147, support the idea of apportionment where the wholly dependent beneficiary pool, as here, decreases during the initial 400 weeks from one to zero. Both cases, unlike the case at bar, dealt with the question of distributing death benefits after the initial 400 weeks, in cases where dependency continues. In discussion, the Court notes the following about cases arising during the initial 400 weeks:\n[I]f there is a decrease in the dependent beneficiary pool during the 400 weeks following the employee\u2019s death, there must be a corresponding reapportionment of the full award payable for that set period among the remaining eligible members of the pool.. . . That, we hold, is the only situation in which there will be an increase in the amount of the individual shares paid to the dependents still partaking of the compensation fund.\nDeese, 306 N.C. at 279-80, 293 S.E.2d at 144 (emphasis added). Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, appellant argues that when Scott turns 18, the wholly dependent beneficiary pool decreases from one to zero, putting the case squarely within N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-40, which requires that next of kin shall divide the death benefit equally. We disagree. The Deese ruling would allow a reapportionment of the full award among dependents still partaking of the compensation fund only where there is a decrease in the dependent beneficiary pool. In this case, Scott, being the only person wholly dependent, was entitled under \u00a7 97-38(1) to receive the entire compensation payable. Because we cannot deviate from the express language of \u00a7 97-38(1), we cannot extend the reasoning of Deese to this case.\nLastly, appellant contends that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its counterpart in the Constitution of North Carolina require reading \u00a7\u00a7 97-39, -40 in a way that treats Nancy and Scott equally once they are both independent, adult children. We disagree.\nIn Carpenter v. Tony E. Hawley Contractors, 53 N.C. App. 715, 721-22, 281 S.E.2d 783, 787, disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 587, 289 S.E.2d 564 (1981), this Court rejected plaintiff\u2019s argument that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-38, which awards full compensation to a wholly dependent person and denies compensation to plaintiff as a partially dependent person, violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. We stated that \u201c[t]o withstand an equal protection claim, a legislative classification must be reasonable, must not be arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation.\u201d Carpenter, 53 N.C. App. at 721-22, 281 S.E.2d at 787 (citing Association of Licensed Detectives v. Morgan, 17 N.C. App. 701, 705, 195 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1973)). \u201cThis is to insure that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.\u201d Id. We noted that \u201c[o]ne of the primary purposes of the [Workers\u2019 Compensation] Act is to grant certain and speedy relief to injured employees, or in the case of death, to their dependents,\u201d and we found \u201cthat it is reasonable to provide that those persons wholly dependent upon the decedent for support are entitled to the payments provided for in the Act to the exclusion of those who have another, albeit partial, source of support, and that this difference has a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.\u201d Id. at 722, 281 S.E.2d at 787 (citation omitted).\nAppellant argues that an application of the test set forth in Carpenter leads one to conclude that the statute as interpreted by the Full Commission violates the federal Equal Protection Clause and its North Carolina counterpart because there is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between two independent adult children, and such a distinction bears no fair or substantial relationship to any purpose of the Act. We disagree. By providing in \u00a7 97-38(1) that the sole wholly dependent person receive the entire compensation payable, the Legislature furthered one of the primary purposes of the Act \u2014 to grant certain and speedy relief to injured employees, or in the case of death, to their dependents. Thus, we find that it is reasonable to provide that the sole wholly dependent person receive the entire compensation payable after reaching age 18 until the expiration of the initial 400-week period to the exclusion of other adult children of the decedent. Such a distinction among adult children has a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.\nAppellant further argues that there is no policy which supports giving Scott, once he is an adult, all of the remaining death benefits, to the exclusion of his adult sister. Appellant points to this state\u2019s public policy for the support of minor children by their parents, as reflected in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) and our public policy that adult children be treated equally under the law, as reflected in North Carolina\u2019s Intestate Succession Act, which provides for equal division among members of the same class. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-16(a)(l) (1984). Appellant argues that once the sole wholly dependent person, Scott, reaches 18, the public policy for the support of minor children by their parents yields to the public policy that adult children be treated equally under the law would require Scott, as an adult, to share the award with other adult children such as appellant. We disagree. A minor child is likely to suffer more immediate and long term economic loss as a result of his or her parent\u2019s death than an adult child. Whereas a minor child must still finish his or her education and has yet to embark on his or her career, an adult child is likely to have finished or at least substantially completed his or her education and to have begun his or her career. Thus, \u00a7 97-38(1) promotes the public policy for the support of minor children by their parents.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GREENE and WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "COZORT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Coleman, Gledhill & Hargrave, by Kim K. Steffan, for plaintiff appellant Nancy Craven Allen.", "Charles N. Stedman, for plaintiff appellee Brenda Simber, guardian ad litem for William Scott Craven." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NANCY CRAVEN ALLEN, Daughter, BRENDA SIMBER, Guardian ad litem for WILLIAM SCOTT CRAVEN, Minor Son, of WILLIAM PEARL CRAVEN, Deceased, Employee-Plaintiff v. PIEDMONT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. OF NORTH CAROLINA d/b/a TRANSPERSONNEL/MANPOWER TEMPORARIES, Employer, AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carriers-Defendants\nNo. 9310IC187\n(Filed 6 September 1994)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 273 (NCI4th)\u2014 minor child of decedent \u2014 entitlement to entire compensation \u2014 adult child entitled to no compensation\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in finding and concluding that the only minor child of the decedent at the time of his work-related death was entitled to receive the entire compensation payable under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-38, even after the minor child turned 18, to the exclusion of an adult child of the decedent. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-40.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 207 et seq.\nAppeal by plaintiff Nancy Craven Allen from Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 19 November 1992. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 January 1994.\nColeman, Gledhill & Hargrave, by Kim K. Steffan, for plaintiff appellant Nancy Craven Allen.\nCharles N. Stedman, for plaintiff appellee Brenda Simber, guardian ad litem for William Scott Craven." }, "file_name": "0234-01", "first_page_order": 264, "last_page_order": 271 }