{ "id": 8525281, "name": "I. CARY NAILING, Appellee, v. UNC-CH, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Nailing v. UNC-CH", "decision_date": "1994-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 9315SC1299", "first_page": "318", "last_page": "329", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.C. App. 318" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "46 ALR4th 912", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "48 L. Ed. 2d 996", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-25", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of petition for a contested case involving a decision of the Department of Human Resources for failing to comply with the statutory deadline for filing the petition in the OAH" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525629 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of petition for a contested case involving a decision of the Department of Human Resources for failing to comply with the statutory deadline for filing the petition in the OAH" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-38", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305257 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "\"The right to appeal to an administrative agency is granted by statute, and compliance with statutory provisions is necessary to sustain the appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739", "parenthetical": "\"The right to appeal to an administrative agency is granted by statute, and compliance with statutory provisions is necessary to sustain the appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-35", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-37", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "\"[a]ppeals involving a disciplinary action, alleged discrimination, and any other contested case arising under this Chapter shall be conducted in the Office of Administrative Hearings as provided in Article 3 of Chapter 150B\"" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551286 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0569-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 819, "char_count": 25537, "ocr_confidence": 0.711, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9970537305966244e-07, "percentile": 0.7424849865764375 }, "sha256": "59c66bd87feaae537a41fa8001de36a8b8e1afb099e01d3b374126a5be2e023f", "simhash": "1:1a6838dffdb5985d", "word_count": 4027 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:41.091249+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges EAGLES and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "I. CARY NAILING, Appellee, v. UNC-CH, Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nThe issues raised by this appeal are whether the trial court erred in remanding this case to the OAH for a hearing on (1) whether respondent\u2019s termination of petitioner violated petitioner\u2019s substantive and procedural rights, and (2) the issues regarding respondent\u2019s warnings to petitioner. Because we find that OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s case regarding her dismissal, we conclude that as to this issue, the trial court erred. On the issue of respondent\u2019s warnings, however, we conclude that the trial court properly remanded this action for a hearing on whether the warnings should be removed from petitioner\u2019s file.\nPrior to this action, petitioner was employed by respondent as a Medical Laboratory Technologist III in the Department of Pediatrics in the Cytogenetics Laboratory of respondent\u2019s medical school. On 22 February 1991, petitioner received an oral warning regarding her conduct and work performance. Thereafter, on 6 March 1991, petitioner received a written warning concerning her work performance, which petitioner alleged was a result of her contacting the Human Resources Department \u201cto ask for guidance about how to deal with the Oral Warning.\u201d\nSubsequently, pursuant to respondent\u2019s internal grievance procedure, petitioner filed a grievance regarding these warnings with her supervisor. Petitioner\u2019s grievance was reviewed by the head of the Cytogenetics Laboratory and denied. Petitioner appealed the denial of her grievance to the Office of the Associate Vice Chancellor for Human Resources pursuant to Step 2 of respondent\u2019s internal grievance procedure, and it was denied again. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Office of the Associate Vice Chancellor for Human Resources to be heard by a panel of three Staff Grievance Committee members consisting of one faculty member and two staff employees appointed by the Chair of the Committee in accordance with Step 3 of the grievance procedure.\nSubsequently, on 19 September 1991, while her appeal was pending at Step 3, petitioner received two more written warnings, one warning regarding petitioner\u2019s work performance and the other warning regarding petitioner\u2019s unexcused absences from work. Petitioner\u2019s grievance regarding these two warnings was denied at Step 1 and 2, and petitioner appealed to Step 3.\nThe two grievances were consolidated at Step 3, and a hearing was held on these four warnings. Following the hearing, by letter dated 11 March 1992, Chancellor Hardin notified petitioner of his decision that the 22 February 1991 oral warning would be withdrawn; however, \u201c [i]f the supervisor chooses, a Report of Oral Warning for performance (the weekend rotation) and conduct (leaving work without permission) may be substituted.\u201d Further, Chancellor Hardin notified petitioner that he agreed with the panel\u2019s finding that the written warning of 6 March 1991 \u201cwas issued in retaliation for the earlier grievance\u201d and informed petitioner that this warning would be withdrawn from petitioner\u2019s file. Chancellor Hardin also notified petitioner that the 19 September 1991 warnings would remain in petitioner\u2019s file.\nOn 13 April 1992, petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing in the OAH for \u201c[u]njust [discipline and violation of UNC-CH Rules.\u201d Administrative Law Judge Becton entered an order directing the parties to each file a prehearing statement containing their positions with regard to the following:\n1. The issues to be resolved, and the statutes, rules, and legal precedent involved;\n2. A brief statement of the facts and reasons supporting the party\u2019s position on each matter in dispute;\n3. A list of proposed witnesses;\n4. Whether you wish to pursue discovery. If so, the length of time required;\n5. Requested location of hearing(s);\n6. Estimated length of hearing;\n7. If you do not have an attorney, your home and business addresses and telephone numbers;\n8. The date by which you will be ready to have a hearing in this case; and\n9. Other special matters.\nDuring the pendency of this action, by letter dated 29 September 1992, the Director of Cytogenetic Laboratory informed petitioner that she was terminated from her employment with respondent as of 28 September 1992 \u201cfor personal conduct reasons[.]\u201d The letter stated that the decision to terminate petitioner\u2019s employment was based on petitioner\u2019s conduct on 23 September 1992 and 24 September 1992 which the letter described as constituting \u201cverbal abuse,\u201d \u201cphysical intimidation,\u201d and \u201cinsubordination.\u201d\nSpecifically, the letter described petitioner\u2019s conduct upon which her termination was based as follows: In September 1992, petitioner switched a \u201crush\u201d case that was assigned to petitioner to Ms. Parker, a technologist who was out on sick leave, and assigned a routine case of Ms. Parker\u2019s to petitioner. Upon finding out that petitioner had switched these cases, on 23 September 1992, the Laboratory Lead Technologist and petitioner\u2019s direct supervisor approached petitioner about the switch. At first petitioner told these two supervisors that she had \u201cinitially made the switch because [she] had mistakenly picked up the wrong tube of patient cells and had prepared slides on Ms[.] Parker\u2019s case . . . rather than [petitioner\u2019s] own case.\u201d Petitioner then assigned herself back to the previous rush case, which had almost been completed, and assigned another rush case of petitioner\u2019s to Ms. Parker. At that time, one of the supervisors informed petitioner that a technologist out on sick leave could not be assigned a \u201crush\u201d case, and petitioner \u201cbecame progressively more hostile, more angry, and verbally abusive.\u201d Petitioner raised her \u201cassignment clip board over [her] head in a threating [sic] manner and screamed abusively at both of [the supervisors].\u201d\nThereafter, one supervisor left and the other supervisor \u201cchose to stay in the room and talk with [petitioner] until she was sure that [petitioner] understood exactly what [her] instructions were concerning the patient assignments.\u201d This supervisor \u201cmade it clear to [petitioner] that [she was] to start the rush case that [petitioner] had just reassigned to Ms. Parker] and at a minimum screen the case that day . . . .\u201d On 24 September 1992, petitioner came to work and approached Ms. Parker, who was back from her sick leave, and \u201crequested that she switch cases with [petitioner], accepting responsibility for . . . the rush case which was under discussion the day before, while [petitioner] took one of Ms[.] Parker\u2019s more routine cases.\u201d\nFurther, the letter stated:\nYou have the right to appeal this action through the University\u2019s Dispute Resolution and Staff Grievance Procedure. A copy of the procedure is attached for your reference. You may contact the Counseling Service Department for assistance in using this procedure or, if eligible, you may file a Step 4 Appeal with the State Personnel Commission.\nStep 4 of the Staff Grievance Procedure states, \u201c[i]f the Step 3 decision is unsatisfactory to the employee, the employee may appeal to Step 4, the State Personnel Commission, if eligible, according to State Personnel Commission rules.\u201d \u25a0\nPetitioner initiated a Step 2 grievance of her dismissal as allowed by respondent\u2019s internal grievance procedures. By letter dated 16 November 1992, respondent notified petitioner of the decision to uphold her dismissal and of the filing deadline for a Step 3 appeal. Petitioner did not, however, file a Step 3 appeal or file a petition for a contested case hearing in the OAH regarding her dismissal. Instead, petitioner moved to amend her prehearing statement in the contested case that was pending before Judge Becton in the OAH involving the four warnings to include the issue of her termination for review by the OAH. On appeal, respondent first contends that the OAH lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review petitioner\u2019s dismissal because petitioner failed to properly file a petition for a contested case hearing in the OAH with regards to her dismissal.\nPetitioner is a former employee of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The University of North Carolina is expressly exempt from the administrative hearings provisions of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (the \u201cNCAPA\u201d), see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-1(f); thus, \u201cunder the plain meaning of the NCAPA, [petitioner] can be entitled to an administrative hearing to appeal [her] grievance to the OAH only by virtue of another statute.\u201d Empire Power Co. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t, Health and Natural Resources, Div. of Envtl. Management, 337 N.C. 569, 579, 447 S.E.2d 768, 774 (1994).\nChapter 126 of the North Carolina General Statutes gives State employees the right to an administrative hearing in the OAH for actions arising under Chapter 126. Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-37(a) provides, \u201c[a]ppeals involving a disciplinary action, alleged discrimination, and any other contested case arising under this Chapter shall be conducted in the Office of Administrative Hearings as provided in Article 3 of Chapter 150B . . . .\u201d\nIn the present case, the only provisions under Chapter 126 that could possibly provide petitioner with an avenue of appeal from her dismissal to the OAH are N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-35, 126-36. At the time of this action, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35 stated, \u201c[n]o permanent employee subject to the State Personnel Act shall be discharged, suspended, or demoted for disciplinary reasons, except for just cause.\u201d Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36,\n[a]ny State employee or former State employee who has reason to believe that employment, promotion, training, or transfer was denied him or that demotion, layoff or termination of employment was forced upon him in retaliation for opposition to alleged discrimination or because of his age, sex, race, color, national origin, religion, creed, political affiliation, or handicapped [handicapping] condition as defined by G.S. 168A-3 . . . shall have the right to appeal directly to the State Personnel Commission.\nIn order for the OAH to have jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-35, -36 however, petitioner is required to follow the statutory requirements outlined in Chapter 126 for commencing a contested case. See Lewis v. North Carolina Dep\u2019t of Human Resources, 92 N.C. App. 737, 739, 375 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1989) (\u201cThe right to appeal to an administrative agency is granted by statute, and compliance with statutory provisions is necessary to sustain the appeal.\u201d).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-37(a) requires that appeals under Chapter 126 involving a contested case be conducted as provided in Article 3 of Chapter 150B. Article 3 of Chapter 150B provides:\nA contested case shall be commenced bv filing a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings .... The party who files the petition shall serve a copy of the petition on all other parties .... A party who files a petition shall file a certificate of service together with the petition. A petition shall be signed by a party or a representative of the party and, if filed by a party other than an agency, shall state facts tending to establish that the agency named as the respondent has deprived the petitioner of property, has ordered the petitioner to pay a fine or civil penalty, or has otherwise substantially prejudiced the petitioner\u2019s rights and that the agency:\n(1) Exceeded its authority or jurisdiction;'\n(2) Acted erroneously;\n(3) Failed to use proper procedure;\n(4) Acted arbitrarily or capriciously; or\n(5) Failed to act as required by law or rule.\nA local government employee, applicant for employment, or former employee to whom Chapter 126 of the General Statutes applies may commence a contested case under this Article in the same manner as any other, petitioner.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23 (emphasis added). Further, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-37(a) provides \u201cthat no grievance may be appealed unless the employee has complied with G.S. 126-34\u201d which, at the time of this action, stated,\n[a]ny permanent State employee having a grievance arising out of or due to his employment and who does not allege discrimination because of his age, sex, race, color, national origin, religion, creed, handicapping condition as defined by G.S. 168A-3, or political affiliation shall first discuss his problem or grievance with his supervisor and follow the grievance procedure established by his department or agency.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-34; See Batten v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Correction, 326 N.C. 338, 343, 389 S.E.2d 35, 38-39 (1990). In addition to these require-merits under Chapter 126, a petition for a contested case must be filed with the OAH \u201cas provided in G.S. 150B-23(a) no later than 30 days after receipt of notice of the decision or action which triggers the right of appeal.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-38.\nIn the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner did not follow respondent\u2019s grievance procedure regarding the appeal from her dismissal. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-37(a), -34, the OAH would not, therefore, have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeal from her dismissal under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35 for lack of \u201cjust cause\u201d that does not allege discrimination. Thus, we turn to the issue of whether the OAH had jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s case involving alleged discrimination for her alleged handicapping condition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36.\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36, petitioner has an automatic right to appeal her dismissal to the Commission without following respondent\u2019s internal grievance procedure. Petitioner is still, however, bound to follow the other requirements of Chapter 126 of filing a petition within thirty days after receipt of notice of \u201cthe decision or action which triggers the right of appeal\u201d to commence a contested case in the OAH.\nWith regard to petitioner\u2019s receipt of notice of her dismissal, Judge Becton found:\nOn September 29, 1992, the [Respondent sent a letter to the [petitioner notifying her of her dismissal from employment, effective September 28,1992, as a result of unacceptable personal conduct.\nThe [Respondent hand-delivered a copy of the September 29, 1992 letter of termination to the [petitioner on October 6, 1992.\nPetitioner did not, however, file a petition for a contested case hearing in the OAH regarding her dismissal within thirty days from either 29 September 1992 or 6 October 1992. Instead, in October 1992, petitioner filed a motion to amend her prehearing statement to add the issue of whether respondent violated her substantive and procedural rights by terminating her employment and to add N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-35 to the portion of the prehearing statement entitled \u201cStatutes, Rules and Legal Precedents Involved.\u201d As already discussed, petitioner could not proceed under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35 for a \u201cjust cause\u201d violation without first following respondent\u2019s internal grievance procedure.\nThereafter, in January, 1993, petitioner filed her second motion to amend her prehearing statement to add the issue of whether petitioner\u2019s termination violated her substantive and procedural rights \u201cincluding the right not to be discriminated against because of a handicapping condition\u201d and to add N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-36 to the section of the prehearing statement entitled \u201cStatutes, Rules and Legal Precedents Involved.\u201d Assuming arguendo that petitioner could properly amend her prehearing statement, we do not find such amendment equivalent to the filing of a petition as required under Article 3 of Chapter 150B to commence a contested case hearing in the OAH. In addition, we also find that this amendment was filed after the statutory thirty days.\nBecause Chapter 126 makes compliance with the procedures of Article 3 mandatory, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-37(a) (\u201c[a]ppeals involving a disciplinary action, alleged discrimination, and any other contested case arising under this Chapter shall be conducted in the Office of Administrative Hearings as provided in Article 3 of Chapter 150B\u201d), jurisdiction over a contested case hearing arising under Chapter 126 is not conferred upon the OAH unless petitioner follows such procedures. (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., Gummels v. North Carolina Dep\u2019t of Human Resources, 98 N.C. App. 675, 392 S.E.2d 113 (1990) (upholding dismissal of petition for a contested case involving a decision of the Department of Human Resources for failing to comply with the statutory deadline for filing the petition in the OAH); Lewis, 92 N.C. App. 737, 375 S.E.2d 712 (upholding dismissal of employee\u2019s grievance for failure to timely file grievance with employer as established by employer\u2019s internal grievance procedure when G.S. \u00a7 126-34 required the employee to follow such procedures). In the present case, petitioner has failed to follow the procedure outlined in Article 3 of Chapter 150B for commencing her contested case hearing; the OAH does not, therefore, have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s case regarding her dismissal.\nPetitioner argues, however, that amending her prehearing statement is equivalent to amending her petition. We disagree. Filing a petition in the OAH to commence a contested case hearing is a mandatory step for the OAH to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeal under Chapter 126. See. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-37(a), 150B-23. Whether a prehearing statement should be filed is within the discretion of the administrative law judge. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(a2) (\u201cAn administrative law judge assigned to a contested case mav require a party to the case to file a prehearing statement.\u201d (Emphasis added.)). If the administrative law judge requires a party to file a prehearing statement, the prehearing statement is filed after the contested case has already been commenced by filing the petition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23.\nWe note, however, that the issue of whether petitioner could have properly amended her petition for a contested case, as opposed to her prehearing statement, in a timely fashion to allege a claim for discrimination under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-36 in order to confer jurisdiction over her claim for discrimination due to a handicapping condition is not before us, and we do not decide that issue today.\nHaving determined that the OAH lacks subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeal from her dismissal, we turn to the question of whether the trial court erred in remanding this case for a hearing on respondent\u2019s warnings to petitioner.\nAgain, we look to Chapter 126 to determine whether petitioner had the right to maintain her appeal of these warnings in the OAH. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-25 provides:\nAn employee, former employee or applicant for employment who objects to material in his file because he considers it inaccurate or misleading may seek the removal of such material from his file in accordance with the grievance procedure of that department, including appeal to the State Personnel Commission.\nIn the present case, after receiving two warnings, petitioner filed a grievance with respondent alleging that her supervisor had \u201cgiven the lab [director . . . misleading reports of [petitioner\u2019s] actions.\u201d While this grievance was pending, petitioner received two more warnings, for which she filed another grievance with respondent. In response to these grievances, the Chancellor of the University removed one of the warnings from petitioner\u2019s file as being inappropriate and retaliatory, removed another warning from petitioner\u2019s file but informed the supervisor that he could replace this warning with a different warning, and left the other two warnings in petitioner\u2019s file. Our review of petitioner\u2019s first grievance filed with respondent and respondent\u2019s response to both grievances shows that petitioner sought to have these warnings removed from her personnel file as misleading.\nThereafter, petitioner filed her petition for a contested case hearing in the OAH for \u201c[u]njust [discipline and violation of UNC-CH Rules.\u201d In support of this petition, petitioner listed the following allegations:\n(1) At the agency level, I grieved [sic] a series of disciplinary warnings which were unjust and retaliatory.\n(2) The agency head [arbitrarily and in violation of [grievance rules, [a]dvised that one disciplinary action should be removed But something else could be put in its place.\nDuring the pendency of this appeal, petitioner was terminated.\nSubsequently, by the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-25, we conclude that petitioner had the right to appeal the respondent\u2019s action of not removing all the warnings from her file and the decision that another warning could be put in place of one that was removed to the OAH. Additionally, petitioner\u2019s status as a \u201cformer\u201d state employee does not render her petition- moot as N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-25 gives a former state employee the right to appeal under this provision.\nAccordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly remanded this action for a hearing on whether the warnings should be removed from petitioner\u2019s file; we reverse, however, the trial court\u2019s decision to remand this action for a hearing on petitioner\u2019s dismissal.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nJudges EAGLES and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Alan McSurely for petitioner-appellee.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Barbara A. Shaw, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "I. CARY NAILING, Appellee, v. UNC-CH, Appellant\nNo. 9315SC1299\n(Filed 20 December 1994)\n1. Public Officers and Employees \u00a7 63 (NCI4th)\u2014 appeal from dismissal \u2014 failure to file petition \u2014 no jurisdiction of OAH\nThe Office of Administrative Hearings did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s appeal from her dismissal as an employee of UNC-CH under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-35 for lack of \u201cjust cause\u201d or under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-36 since petitioner did not file a timely petition for a contested case hearing and thus did not follow respondent\u2019s grievance procedure regarding the appeal from her dismissal, nor did she file a petition within 30 days after receipt of notice of the decision or action which triggered the right of appeal to commence a contested case hearing. Further, petitioner\u2019s amendment of her prehearing statement in her original pending contested case hearing for removal of disciplinary warnings to include the issue of her termination was not equivalent to the filing of a petition as required under Article 3 of Chapter 150B to commence a contested case hearing in the OAH.\nAm Jur 2d, Civil Service \u00a7\u00a7 52 et seq.\nTermination of public employment: right to hearing under due process clause of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment \u2014 Supreme Court cases. 48 L. Ed. 2d 996.\n2. Public Officers and Employees \u00a7 63 (NCI4th)\u2014 warnings not removed from personnel file \u2014 right of employee to appeal \u2014 status as former employee irrelevant\n. Petitioner had the right to appeal respondent\u2019s action of not removing all the warnings from the personnel file and the decision that another warning could be put in place of one that was removed to the OAH, and petitioner\u2019s status as a \u201cformer\u201d State employee did not render her petition moot. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-25.\nAm Jur 2d, Civil Service \u00a7\u00a7 52 et seq.\nRights of state and municipal public employees in grievance proceedings. 46 ALR4th 912.\nOn writ of certiorari to review order entered 2 August 1993 by Judge George R. Greene in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 September 1994.\nPrior to this action, Petitioner I. Cary Nailing was an employee of Respondent University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. On 13 April 1992, while still employed by respondent, petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing in the Office of Administrative Hearings (the \u201cOAH\u201d) alleging that she had received from respondent \u201ca series of disciplinary warnings which were unjust and retaliatory.\u201d The parties filed prehearing statements, and a hearing in this action was scheduled for January 1993.\nThereafter, respondent notified petitioner that she had been terminated effective 28 September 1992, and petitioner attempted to amend her prehearing statement to include her termination as an issue for review. On 20 April 1993, Administrative Law Judge Becton entered a final decision finding that petitioner could not appeal her dismissal by attempting to amend her prehearing statement and that petitioner had failed to follow the proper procedure for appealing her dismissal. Judge Becton also found that since petitioner had been dismissed from employment, the issues involved in the contested' case regarding the warnings were moot. Based on these findings, Judge Becton dismissed petitioner\u2019s petition for a contested case hearing.\nOn 19 May 1993, petitioner filed a petition for judicial review in Orange County Superior Court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner\u2019s petition based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' On 2 August 1993, Judge George R. Greene filed an order finding that \u201c[t]here was a continuing sequence of actions in this Contested Case[,]\u201d the last being \u201cthe firing of [petitioner.\u201d Further, Judge Greene found that \u201cno earlier acts which were timely and properly contested could be \u2018moot\u2019 and no later continuing acts could be untimely nor [sic] improperly contested.\u201d Based on these findings, Judge Greene remanded the contested case to the OAH \u201cfor a full hearing on all of the issues in this case . . . .\u201d On 24 September 1993, respondent filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, and on 13 October 1993, this Court granted respondent\u2019s petition.\nAlan McSurely for petitioner-appellee.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Barbara A. Shaw, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0318-01", "first_page_order": 350, "last_page_order": 361 }