{ "id": 8525652, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM THOMAS WEAVER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Weaver", "decision_date": "1994-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 949SC388", "first_page": "434", "last_page": "440", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.C. App. 434" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "60 ALR4th 369", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558753 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560773 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505339 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571231 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4745368 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561067 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4702203 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2398536 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562782 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0515-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 597, "char_count": 11811, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2055563857197852 }, "sha256": "6c53e1f5402de4f868e6933b6d27e75d27d89e4f5224cdca6964e2390e09cfe0", "simhash": "1:873a0764763f8868", "word_count": 2004 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:41.091249+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHN and McCRODDEN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM THOMAS WEAVER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by excluding the mother of the victims from the courtroom during their testimony while not excluding social workers and therapists. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1225 (1988) provides:\nUpon motion of a party the judge may order all or some of the witnesses other than the defendant to remain outside of the courtroom until called to testify, except when a minor child is called as a witness the parent or guardian may be present while the child is testifying even though his parent or guardian is to be called subsequently.\nA motion to sequester witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reviewed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 268 S.E.2d 517 (1980). Because the statute allows the exclusion of \u201call or some of the witnesses,\u201d the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a social worker and a therapist to remain in the courtroom during the victims\u2019 testimony. See State v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 353, 312 S.E.2d 482 (1984). That a parent may be present while a child is testifying does not mean that such presence is required. Defendant\u2019s argument is meritless.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by permitting the victims to testify \u201cin light of their difficulty in understanding the importance of the oath.\u201d We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 601 (1992), provides that \u201c[e]very per- ' son is competent to be a witness except . . . when the court determines that he is . . . incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.\u201d \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 601(a), -(b). See State v. Gordon, 316 N.C. 497, 342 S.E.2d 509 (1986). Our Supreme Court has addressed the standard for determining whether a child is competent to testify:\nThere is no age below which one is incompetent, as a matter of law, to testify. The test of competency is the capacity of the proposed witness to understand and to relate under the obligation of an oath facts which will assist the jury in determining the truth of the matters as to which it is called upon to decide. This is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge in the light of his examination and observation of the particular witness.\nState v. Turner, 268 N.C. 225, 230, 150 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1966). Absent a showing that the ruling as to competency could not be the result of a reasoned decision, the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Hicks, 319 N.C. 84, 352 S.E.2d 424 (1987).\nDuring voir dire examination, the prosecutor questioned H. about her understanding of truthfulness:\nQ. [H.], do you know the difference betweenxt [sic] right and wrong?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you know what it is to tell a lie?\nA. Yes.\nQ. If I were to say it\u2019s Christmas Day, would that be the truth or a lie?\nA. A lie.\nQ. If I were to say that you were eleven years old, would that be the truth or a lie?\nA. A lie.\nQ. Is it right or wrong to tell a lie?\nA. Wrong.\nQ. And if you were to tell these people in the Courtroom, the people that would be in the Courtroom tomorrow or the people today a lie \u2014\nA. No.\nQ. Or something that wasn\u2019t true, what would happen to you?\nA. I don\u2019t know.\nQ. Would it be wrong to tell a lie?\nA. Yeah.\nQ. Do you promise to say only things that are true?\nA. Yes.\nQ. While you\u2019re in this Courtroom?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you understand the importance of doing that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you promise to tell only the truth?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you promise not to tell any lies?\nA. Yes. .\nOn cross-examination, H. could not answer why she raised one hand and placed the other on the Bible nor who wrote the Bible.\nDespite H.\u2019s lack of understanding of an obligation to tell the truth from a religious point of view, she stated on direct examination an understanding of the difference between the truth and lies and the importance of telling the truth. Having done so she exhibited a capacity to understand and relate facts that would assist the jury and a comprehension of the difference between truth and untruth. See Hicks, 319 N.C. at 88-89, 352 S.E.2d at 426. Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by finding H. competent to testify.\nD. likewise testified on voir dire that she understood the difference between the truth and lies. She testified that if she told a lie \u201csomething bad\u201d would happen, and she promised to tell the truth. In light of this testimony, defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in finding D. competent to testify. Defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nDefendant further argues that the trial court erred by allowing Jean Neimeyer to express an opinion as \u201cto the age at which the children began to understand dates.\u201d Specifically, defendant contends this testimony was beyond the scope of her expertise. We disagree.\nNeimeyer was accepted as an expert in clinical social work particularly in the area of child sexual abuse. Over defendant\u2019s objection, Neimeyer testified that until the age of eight \u201cwe certainly don\u2019t expect children ... to be able to name dates, or to give more than a general approximation of how many times something happened, you know, if it is more than, say, one time.\u201d\nExpert testimony is admissible pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (1992), when such testimony can assist the jury to draw inferences from facts because the expert is better qualified. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984). In this case, the testimony in question was within the realm of expertise of the witness and was of assistance to the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not err by allowing the testimony.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the rape charge as to D. Specifically, defendant contends there was a discrepancy between D.\u2019s testimony and the physical evidence.\nIn ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser-included offense of that charged, and of the defendant being the perpetrator. State v. Roseman, 279 N.C. 573, 184 S.E.2d 289 (1971). Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Bromfield, 332 N.C. 24, 418 S.E.2d 491 (1992). \u201cThe evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State; the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom ....\" State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980).\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1994), a person is guilty of first-degree rape if he \u201cengages in vaginal intercourse\u201d with a child under the age of thirteen and the defendant is at least twelve years old and four years older than the victim. The slightest penetration of the female sexual organ by the male sexual organ is all that is required to prove vaginal intercourse. State v. Sneeden, 274 N.C. 498, 164 S.E.2d 190 (1968). D. testified that defendant inserted his penis at least partially into her vagina. This evidence is sufficient to show that defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse with D. Assuming arguendo that there were discrepancies between the victim\u2019s testimony and the physical evidence, these discrepancies were for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal of the charge. State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 505, 231 S.E.2d 663 (1977). Defendant\u2019s argument is meritless.\nFinally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Sheriff Oakley to testify as follows: \u201cif [defendant] had any innocence, we would check it all. We would check every story. We would check everybody, every witness that he said check. ... I told [defendant\u2019s father], I said, if [defendant] is not guilty we will prove that he is not guilty.\u201d Specifically, defendant contends the testimony was not relevant, was prejudicial, and amounted to hearsay.\nThe record shows that various witnesses testified that the Sheriff and his deputies did not investigate other potential perpetrators in this case. In light of that evidence, the testimony of Sheriff Oakley was relevant. Even assuming arguendo that it should not have been admitted, defendant has failed to show a reasonable possibility that, absent the error, a different result would have been reached by the jury. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1988). Defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nWe hold defendant had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges JOHN and McCRODDEN concur.\nJudge McCRODDEN concurred prior to 15 December 1994.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson, for the State.", "Mark Galloway for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM THOMAS WEAVER\nNo. 949SC388\n(Filed 20 December 1994)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2482 (NCI4th)\u2014 victim\u2019s mother excluded from courtroom \u2014 social workers and therapists allowed to stay \u2014 no error\nIn a prosecution of defendant for first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense committed against seven- and nine-year-old girls, the trial court did not err by excluding the mother of the victims from the courtroom during their testimony while not excluding social workers and therapists. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1225.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 252 et seq.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2542 (NCI4th)\u2014 seven- and nine-year-old victims \u2014 ability to understand oath and truthfulness\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred by permitting the seven- and nine-year-old rape victims to testify \u201cin light of their difficulty in understanding the importance of the oath,\u201d since both exhibited a capacity to understand and relate facts that would assist the jury and a comprehension of the difference between truth and untruth. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 601(a) and (b).\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 90, 91.\nWitnesses: child competency statutes. 60 ALR4th 369.\n3. Rape and Allied Offenses \u00a7 83 (NCI4th)\u2014 rape of child\u2014 discrepancy between testimony and physical evidence\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nTestimony by a child that defendant inserted his penis at least partially into her vagina was sufficient to show that defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse with .the child, and any discrepancies between the victim\u2019s testimony and the physical evidence were for the jury to resolve.\nAm Jur 2d, Rape \u00a7\u00a7 88 et seq.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 868 (NCI4th)\u2014 sheriffs investigation \u2014 relevancy of testimony\nWhere various witnesses testified that the sheriff and his deputies did not investigate other potential perpetrators in a rape case involving children, it was relevant for the sheriff to testify that \u201cif [defendant] had any innocence, we would check it all\u201d and that he had told defendant\u2019s father that \u201cif [defendant] is not guilty we will prove that he is not guilty.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 307 et seq.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 4 October 1993 by Judge Richard B. Allsbrook in Person County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 1994.\nDefendant was charged with two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of first-degree sexual offense. Defendant was convicted on all charges and sentenced to two concurrent life sentences and two consecutive life sentences. Evidence by two girls, one nine and one seven, tended to show that the defendant committed acts sufficient to allow the jury to reach guilty verdicts. Several social workers and expert witnesses testified on behalf of the State.\nThe defendant testified on his own behalf, denying all acts alleged and indicating that the crimes were perpetrated by others. The jury found defendant guilty of all charges. The trial court entered judgment for four life terms from which defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson, for the State.\nMark Galloway for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0434-01", "first_page_order": 466, "last_page_order": 472 }