{ "id": 8525936, "name": "HEATHER M. FAIN v. STATE RESIDENCE COMMITTEE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA", "name_abbreviation": "Fain v. State Residence Committee of the University of North Carolina", "decision_date": "1995-01-03", "docket_number": "No. 9310SC911", "first_page": "541", "last_page": "545", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.C. App. 541" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "83 ALR2d 497", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720", "parenthetical": "\"[w]hen the General Assembly legislates with respect to the subject matter of a common law rule, the legislation supplants the common law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526547 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "\"[w]hen the General Assembly legislates with respect to the subject matter of a common law rule, the legislation supplants the common law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654466 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/187/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 116-143.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547848, 2548041, 2548241, 2548471 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0466-02", "/nc/333/0466-01", "/nc/333/0466-04", "/nc/333/0466-03" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" }, { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525390 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525947 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539448, 2545427, 2542900 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0098-03", "/nc/328/0098-01", "/nc/328/0098-02" ] }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527049 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0498-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 550, "char_count": 10393, "ocr_confidence": 0.703, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.9336021414761646e-07, "percentile": 0.9031281360419082 }, "sha256": "18332ecc3e6e92ac9267b8468030eec369f17857997c636e76c146da385daf26", "simhash": "1:84ea5eb225cb3f73", "word_count": 1657 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:41.091249+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Arnold and Judge Greene concur." ], "parties": [ "HEATHER M. FAIN v. STATE RESIDENCE COMMITTEE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCRODDEN, Judge.\nRelying on three assignments of error, the Committee presents one argument for our consideration. The Committee contends that the superior court erred in reversing its decision because that decision was legally correct, was supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary or capricious.\nThe facts of the case are these. In September 1991, petitioner applied for admission for the fall 1992 term of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (the University) and for classification as a North Carolina resident for tuition purposes. Her application for instate residence status showed that she was born in Charlotte on 27 January 1974 and had lived in Charlotte her entire life. Although the application listed 2000 Dilworth Road East, Charlotte, as her family\u2019s permanent residence, it also indicated that her father would begin working for a power company in Vermont by the end of September 1991. In a supplementary statement, received by the admissions office on 8 October 1991, petitioner indicated that her parents were moving to Vermont by the end of 1991, and that she would remain in Charlotte at 3832 Sedgewood Circle and finish high school.\nOn 4 December 1991, petitioner\u2019s father executed a medical consent form authorizing Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Seagle, III to act in place of petitioner\u2019s parents in case of a medical emergency. The form indicated that petitioner\u2019s father had financial responsibility for petitioner and that petitioner was covered by a health plan that was based in Vermont and sponsored by the father\u2019s employer in Vermont. The form also listed a doctor in Vermont as petitioner\u2019s primary care physician.\nIn December 1991, petitioner submitted a second application, which listed 3832 Sedgewood Circle as her current mailing address and Shelburne, Vermont as her and her parents\u2019 permanent residence. The application stated that her parents had moved to their permanent residence in Vermont on 8 December 1991. According to this second application, petitioner\u2019s father would claim her as a dependent on 1992 tax returns for both North Carolina and Vermont. The application also indicated that petitioner had acquired a North Carolina driver\u2019s license in February 1990, drove a car registered in North Carolina, maintained 95% of her personal property in Charlotte, and worked at two summer jobs that provided her with 0.5% of her living expenses.\nIn January 1992, the Office of Undergraduate Admissions denied petitioner\u2019s application for resident status for tuition purposes. She appealed this decision to the Resident Status Committee and then to the State Residence Committee (Committee). Both upheld the decision classifying her as an out-of-state resident. Petitioner then appealed to the superior court, which reversed the agency decision.\nThis Court\u2019s review of a trial court\u2019s consideration of a final agency decision is to determine whether the trial court properly applied the review standard articulated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 (1991) of the Administrative Procedures Act. Walker v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 498, 502, 397 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 98, 402 S.E.2d 430 (1991). The superior court may reverse or modify an agency decision if:\n[T]he substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the agency\u2019s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:\n(1) In violation of constitutional provisions;\n(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;\n(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;\n(4) Affected by other error of law;\n(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence . . .\n(6) Arbitrary or capricious.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51(b).\nThe proper standard the trial court applies depends on the issues presented on appeal. Walker, 100 N.C. App. at 502, 397 S.E.2d at 354. A de novo review is required for allegations that error of law affected an agency decision. Brooks, Com\u2019r. of Labor v. Rebarco, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 459, 463, 372 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1988). The trial court reviews allegations that an agency decision is not supported by the evidence or is arbitrary or capricious under the whole record test. Id. That test requires the trial court to examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency\u2019s conclusions. Walker, 100 N.C. App. at 503, 397 S.E.2d at 354. Substantial evidence is evidence which a \u201creasonable mind would regard as adequately supporting a particular conclusion.\u201d Id.\nThe standard of review for administrative decisions is the same in the Court of Appeals as in superior court. Teague v. Western Carolina University, 108 N.C. App. 689, 691, 424 S.E.2d 684, 686, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 466, 427 S.E.2d 627 (1993). We do not defer to the superior court\u2019s decision. Id. at 691-92, 424 S.E.2d at 686.\nThe Committee first claims that there was no error of law in its classification of petitioner as an out-of-state resident for tuition purposes. \u201cTo qualify as a resident for tuition purposes, a person must have established legal residence (domicile) in North Carolina and maintained that legal residence for at least twelve months immediately prior to his or her classification as a resident for tuition purposes.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 116-143.1(b) (Supp. 1993). In asserting that petitioner does not qualify as a resident, the Committee relies upon the common law presumption that a minor\u2019s domicile is the same as that of the minor\u2019s parents, see Thayer v. Thayer, 187 N.C. 573, 122 S.E.2d 307 (1924), and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116.143.1.\nFor purposes of determining residence status for tuition purposes, the legislature has supplanted the common law presumption cited by the Committee by enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-143.1. See Biddix v. Henredon Furniture Industries, 76 N.C. App. 30, 34, 331 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1985) (\u201c[w]hen the General Assembly legislates with respect to the subject matter of a common law rule, the legislation supplants the common law\u201d). Thus, we must confine our analysis of the question on appeal to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-143.1.\nSections 116-143.1(e), (j), and (k) establish criteria whereby an applicant whose parent or parents do not live in this state may obtain residency status. Only section 116-143.1(e) is relevant, providing:\nWhen an individual presents evidence that the individual has living parent(s) or court-appointed guardian of the person, the legal residence of such parent(s) or guardian shall be prima facie evidence of the individual\u2019s legal residence, which may be reinforced or rebutted relative to the age and general circumstances of the individual by the other evidence of legal residence required of or presented by the individual; provided, that the legal residence of an individual whose parents are domiciled outside this State shall not be prima facie evidence of the individual\u2019s legal residence if the individual has lived in this State the five consecutive years prior to enrolling or reregistering at the institution of higher education at which resident status for tuition purposes is sought.\n(Emphasis added).\nThe Committee argues that, according to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-143.1(e), the residence of petitioner\u2019s parents is prima facie evidence of petitioner\u2019s own legal residence. This subsection, however, contains an exception for individuals whose parents are domiciled outside of the state but who, themselves, have lived in the state for five consecutive years prior to enrolling in an institution of higher education. Under this exception, the legal residence of the parents is not prima facie evidence of the individual\u2019s domicile, and the individual must then present evidence to \u201cestablish that his or her presence in the State ... is .. . for purposes of maintaining a bona fide domicile rather than . . . a . . . temporary residence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. 116-143.1(c). Here, although petitioner\u2019s parents are domiciled outside North Carolina, the legal residence of her parents is not prima facie evidence of her legal residence since she has lived in this state five consecutive years prior to enrolling at the University.\nWe conclude that error of law affected the Committee\u2019s reliance on the presumption that petitioner\u2019s domicile was that of her parents and on the prima facie case which N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-143.1(e) allows.\nAlthough the record contains evidence that bears on petitioner\u2019s legal residence, we believe that it is the duty of the Committee to determine petitioner\u2019s status based upon a correct understanding of the law. Consequently, we vacate the order of the Superior Court and remand the case to it with directions to remand to the Committee for a determination of petitioner\u2019s legal residence in light of the principles of this case.\nVacated and remanded.\nChief Judge Arnold and Judge Greene concur.\nOpinion written and concurred in prior to 16 December 1994.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCRODDEN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Thomas 0. Lawton III, for the State.", "Bailey & Dixon, by J. Ruffin Bailey and Alan J. Miles, for the plaintiff" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HEATHER M. FAIN v. STATE RESIDENCE COMMITTEE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA\nNo. 9310SC911\n(Filed 3 January 1995)\nColleges and Universities \u00a7 29 (NCI4th); Domicil and Residence \u00a7 7 (NCI4th)\u2014 residency status for tuition \u2014 residence of parents \u2014 no prima facie evidence of student\u2019s legal residence\nEven though a college student\u2019s parents live in Vermont, where the student had lived in North Carolina for five years preceding her enrollment in UNC-CH, the college could not rely on the presumption of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-143.1(e) that the residence of the student\u2019s parents was prima facie evidence of the student\u2019s own legal residence.\nAm Jur 2d, Colleges and Universities \u00a7 21; Domicil \u00a7 43.\nDetermination of residence or nonresidence for purpose of fixing tuition fees or the like in public school or college. 83 ALR2d 497.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 8 July 1993 by Judge Narley L. Cashwell in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 May 1994.\nOn 10 August 1992, petitioner Heather M. Fain sought judicial review of the decision by the State Residence Committee of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (the Committee) classifying her as an out-of-state resident for tuition purposes. On 8 July 1993, the Wake County Superior Court reversed the Committee\u2019s decision. From this order, the Committee appeals.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Thomas 0. Lawton III, for the State.\nBailey & Dixon, by J. Ruffin Bailey and Alan J. Miles, for the plaintiff" }, "file_name": "0541-01", "first_page_order": 573, "last_page_order": 577 }