{ "id": 8526136, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WELDON TAYLOR, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Taylor", "decision_date": "1995-02-07", "docket_number": "No. 933SC1190", "first_page": "644", "last_page": "654", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.C. App. 644" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "40 L. Ed. 2d 886", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "41 ALR Fed. 497", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "104 L. Ed. 2d 1046", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556466 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493012 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "879", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523431 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664-65", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500856 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575234 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" }, { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716341 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "628-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0411-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 820, "char_count": 23613, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1967415926350714e-07, "percentile": 0.592636095772379 }, "sha256": "aa2aa6737ac737ddb9a6b0b52c9043781620f1263d6a68a51b451ba0bfd2d20f", "simhash": "1:1fc1b23530c38cf2", "word_count": 3843 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:41.091249+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WALKER and MARTIN, MARK D., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WELDON TAYLOR, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nDefendant brings forward several assignments of error. After careful review of the record and briefs, we find no prejudicial error.\nI.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the drugs recovered from him. In a related assignment of error, defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the statements he made to Officer Wayman at the time of his arrest. We disagree and find no error.\nDefendant contends that the drugs and his statements should have been suppressed because he was illegally seized by Officer Wayman in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment\u2019s protection against unreasonable seizures applies to all seizures of the person including the brief detention or investigatory stop at issue here. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The Fourth Amendment requires that, considering the totality of the circumstances, detaining officers must have had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 417, 66 L.Ed.2d at 628-29. Defendant argues that Officer Wayman detained him without an objective and particularized basis for believing he was engaged in criminal activity. Defendant further argues that since his seizure was illegal, the contraband recovered from his person and the statements made to Officer Wayman should have been suppressed under the \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree\u201d doctrine.\nOfficer Wayman testified on voir dire that he had learned when he was working with the narcotics unit of the New Bern Police Department, that defendant had been arrested for possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine. Officer Wayman also testified that in speaking , with residents of the Craven Terrace community, he learned that defendant had a reputation in the community as a drug dealer. Officer Wayman further testified that on one previous occasion, he had unsuccessfully chased defendant near his home. Officer Wayman testified that in this incident, he saw defendant in the Craven Terrace area standing around five or six other people. Craven Terrace was an area known for drug trafficking. As the officers approached in their marked police car, defendant turned around and left the area. The officers momentarily lost sight of defendant but then spotted him at a nearby intersection. Defendant stopped as the police car approached him. As Officer Wayman got out of the car, defendant began walking toward him. As defendant was moving toward the police car, Officer Wayman saw defendant drop something on the ground. At that time, Officer Wayman approached defendant and brought him over to the patrol car.\nDefendant contends that his reputation as a drug dealer, his presence in an area known for drug use and sales, and Officer Wayman\u2019s previous encounters with defendant were insufficient to form an objective basis to believe that on this particular occasion defendant was or was about to be engaged in criminal activity. We need not decide here whether these factors standing alone are sufficient to warrant an investigatory stop. Even if we assume, without deciding, that these factors standing alone are' insufficient, when Officer Wayman observed defendant drop something on the ground, this additional factor, in view of the totality of the circumstances, provided an objective and particularized basis to justify an investigatory stop.\nIt is important to note that defendant dropped the marijuana before he was \u201cseized.\u201d \u201c[A] person is \u2018seized\u2019 only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.\u201d United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980). A seizure does not occur if the person does not yield to the show of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, 697 (1991). Here, when defendant first saw Officer Wayman\u2019s marked patrol car, he exercised his freedom to leave. He eluded the officers momentarily, but stopped as the patrol car approached him at a nearby intersection. As defendant walked towards the car, he dropped the marijuana on the ground. At this point, there was not yet any show of authority such that a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Accordingly, defendant was not seized at the time he dropped the marijuana. However, his actions in discarding the marijuana in front of Officer Wayman provided the objective basis for Officer Wayman to detain defendant pursuant to an investigatory stop. Since the marijuana was dropped prior to the seizure, the officers were free to recover it. Once Officer Wayman determined that the item that defendant dropped was marijuana, Officer Wayman arrested defendant. He then noticed that defendant was talking \u201cfunny\u201d and ordered him to spit out whatever was in his mouth or he would obtain a search warrant. Defendant spit out the individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine. Even if defendant had not voluntarily spit out the cocaine, the cocaine is admissible as a search incident to a legal arrest. State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 455, 263 S.E.2d 711, 718 (1980). Accordingly, Officer Wayman\u2019s detention of defendant was not unreasonable and was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the drug evidence seized was properly admitted.\nDefendant contends that the statements he made to Officer Wayman should have been suppressed because defendant\u2019s detention was unlawful. We have already concluded that his detention was lawful. Defendant also argues that his statements are excludable because they were made before he was advised of his Miranda rights. In fact, after defendant was arrested, defendant told Officer Wayman that he was not robbing or stealing, and that he was \u201cjust trying to make a living.\u201d Defendant made these statements voluntarily. The statements were not made in response to any question asked by Officer Wayman or any law enforcement officer. \u201cAny statement given freely and voluntarily ... is of course, admissible in evidence.\u201d Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s statements were properly admitted.\nII.\nDefendant further contends that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Wayman\u2019s testimony that he had unsuccessfully chased defendant in the past and that defendant had a reputation in the community as a drug dealer. Defendant characterizes Officer Wayman\u2019s testimony that he had unsuccessfully chased defendant on an earlier date as testimony of a prior bad act under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(b) provides:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment, or accident.\nG.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(b). We are not persuaded that testimony of defendant\u2019s flight from Officer Wayman on an earlier occasion, without more, is evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, within the purview of Rule 404(b). But even if we assume that the evidence of defendant\u2019s flight from Officer Wayman is a prior bad act under Rule 404(b), it is admissible to show identity. Officer Wayman testified that he knew defendant personally from previous dealings with defendant in a law enforcement capacity. Officer Wayman testified that on one of these occasions he had unsuccessfully chased defendant. This evidence was admissible to show that Officer Wayman was able to identify defendant. Assuming without deciding that the evidence was prejudicial and not admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence pursuant to Rule 403. The admissibility of this evidence depends on whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 403. \u201cWhether to exclude relevant but prejudicial evidence under Rule 403 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 532, 419 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1992). Accordingly, this assignment of error fails.\nWe agree that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Wayman\u2019s testimony regarding defendant\u2019s reputation as a drug dealer. Rule 404(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides that \u201c[ejvidence of a person\u2019s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . ...\u201d G.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(a). Character evidence, however, is admissible when offered by the accused and the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut such a showing by defendant. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1). In State v. Morgan, 111 N.C. App. 662, 432 S.E.2d 877 (1993), this court held that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant\u2019s reputation in the community as a drug dealer.\nAgain, Rule 404 prohibits the admission of character evidence for the purpose of showing that a person acted in conformity with that character trait, except that a criminal defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent character trait and the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut such a showing by a defendant. When evidence of that person\u2019s character is admissible, character may be shown by testimony as to the reputation of a person. However, until a defendant offers such evidence of his character, the State may not introduce evidence of his bad character. In this case, the State offered evidence as to defendant\u2019s reputation before defendant had put on any evidence, before he had \u201copened the door.\u201d Thus the State could not have offered the evidence of defendant\u2019s reputation as a drug dealer to rebut any claim of the defendant, and such evidence was clearly inadmissible.\nId. at 668, 432 S.E.2d at 881 (citations omitted).\nHere, as in Morgan, the State introduced evidence of defendant\u2019s reputation as a drug dealer before defendant had put on any evidence. Since defendant did not put his character in issue, the trial court erred in admitting this testimony.\nDefendant must also show, however, that he was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of this evidence. A defendant is prejudiced \u201cwhen there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached. ...\u201d G.S. 15A-1443(a). There was ample evidence here other than Officer Wayman\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s reputation from which a jury could find that defendant was guilty of the counts charged in the indictment. Most notably, defendant himself testified that he owned the marijuana that he dropped on the ground and that he also owned the cocaine that he spit out of his mouth. On cross-examination, defendant stated that although he had sold drugs before, he didn\u2019t know whether he was going to sell the drugs seized from his possession or use them himself. Defendant\u2019s testimony alone is enough from which a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant possessed the marijuana and cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver. We conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the character evidence against him.\nIII.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Lt. Michael Rice of the Craven County Sheriff\u2019s Department. Rice testified that about twenty days before defendant\u2019s arrest on the present charges, defendant approached him in his office and started a conversation. Rice testified that defendant told him that he had just been arrested on a drug round-up and had just gotten out of jail. Defendant also told Rice that:\n[H]e [defendant] was just a business man and he wasn\u2019t one of those terrorist who came in from out of town and ripped people off or shot people . . . and that he should be left alone and we should concentrate on those drug dealers who ripped people off and shoot people and things like that.\nHere again, the admissibility of this evidence depends on whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 403. The trial court in its discretion found that Lt. Rice\u2019s testimony was relevant and that its probative value substantially outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. Defendant\u2019s statements were probative on the issue of defendant\u2019s intent to sell and deliver drugs. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s decision.\nrv.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence and in denying defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial. We disagree.\nThe long-standing test of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding of each element of the offense charged and a finding that defendant committed the offense. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\nState v. Morgan, 111 N.C. App. 662, 664-65, 432 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1993) (citations omitted). Defendant contends that the small quantities of drugs found in his possession were insufficient to support a finding that he had an intent to sell and deliver drugs. Defendant argues that Officer Wayman admitted on cross-examination that although the drugs were packaged in the manner in which they are commonly sold, he could not determine from the packaging whether defendant had packaged it for sale or had recently purchased it. Defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had sold drugs before and had not decided whether he was going to sell the drugs in his possession before he was arrested. Although he had been unemployed for six years, defendant possessed $261 in cash at the time of his arrest. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it is clear that a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant had the requisite intent to sell and deliver the drugs in his possession.\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial is also without merit. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that defendant\u2019s attorney was a good lawyer but that he \u201cdid not pick this case and did not pick this client. He had no choice but to represent [defendant] in this case because he was appointed to do so by the Court.\u201d A mistrial should only be granted \u201cwhen there are improprieties ... so serious that they substantially and irreparably prejudice the defendant\u2019s case and make it impossible for the defendant to receive a fair and impartial verdict.\u201d State v. Warren, 327 N.C. 364, 376, 395 S.E.2d 116, 123 (1990). The decision to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 73, 405 S.E.2d 145, 152 (1991). Here, the trial court gav\u00e9 a curative instruction to the jury immediately after the prosecutor made these inappropriate remarks. We find no abuse of discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial.\nIn sum, we hold that defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges WALKER and MARTIN, MARK D., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Thomas 0. Lawton, III, for the State.", "Ward, Ward, Willey & Ward, by Joshua W. Willey, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WELDON TAYLOR, Defendant\nNo. 933SC1190\n(Filed 7 February 1995)\n1. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 80 (NCI4th)\u2014 lawfulness of investigatory stop\nAn officer had a particularized and objective basis to detain defendant pursuant to an investigatory stop where he saw defendant drop some items on the ground as the officer approached defendant in an area known for drug use and sales; the officer knew that defendant had a reputation in the community as a drug dealer; and the officer had unsuccessfully chased defendant on an earlier occasion.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 51, 78.\nLaw enforcement officer\u2019s authority, under Federal Constitution\u2019s Fourth Amendment, to stop and briefly detain, and to conduct limited protective search of or \u201cfrisk,\u201d for investigative purposes, person suspected of criminal activity \u2014 Supreme Court cases. 104 L. Ed. 2d 1046.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 43 (NCI4th)\u2014 items in defendant\u2019s mouth \u2014 seizure as incident to lawful arrest\nWhen an officer determined that items dropped by defendant as the officer approached him were bags of marijuana, the officer lawfully arrested defendant, and individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine held in defendant\u2019s mouth, which the officer ordered defendant to spit out, were lawfully seized as incident to the arrest.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7 63.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1242 (NCI4th)\u2014 statement to officer \u2014 no custodial interrogation \u2014 Miranda warnings unnecessary\nDefendant\u2019s statement to an officer after his arrest for drug offenses that he was not robbing or stealing but was \u201cjust trying to make a living\u201d was admissible even though no Miranda warnings had been given where the statement was made voluntarily and not in response to any question by an officer.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 749.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 294, 302 (NCI4th)\u2014 defendant\u2019s earlier flight from officer \u2014 not inadmissible prior bad act \u2014 admissibility to show identity\nAn officer\u2019s testimony that a defendant charged with drug offenses had fled from him on an earlier occasion was not evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b). Even if defendant\u2019s flight from the officer was a prior bad act under Rule 404(b), this testimony was admissible to show that the officer was able to identify defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 404 et seq., 452 et seq.\nAdmissibility, under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts not similar to offense charged. 41 ALR Fed. 497.\n5. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 263 (NCI4th)\u2014 defendant\u2019s reputation as drug dealer \u2014 admission harmless error\nThe trial court erred by admitting testimony that a defendant on trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver had a reputation in the community as a drug dealer when defendant had not offered character evidence, but this error was not prejudicial where defendant\u2019s guilt of the offenses charged could be found from his own testimony that he owned the bags of marijuana that he dropped on the ground and individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine that he spit out of his mouth, and that although had sold drugs before, he didn\u2019t know whether he was going to sell the drugs seized from his possession or use them himself.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 365 et seq.\n6. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 183 (NCI4th)\u2014 defendant\u2019s pre-arrest statements to officer \u2014 relevancy to show intent\nStatements made by defendant to an officer prior to his arrest on the current drug charges that he was just a businessman who should be left alone and that officers \u201cshould concentrate on those drug dealers who ripped people off and shoot people\u201d were relevant on the issue of defendant\u2019s intent to sell and deliver drugs, and the trial court did not err by finding that the probative value of those statements outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 556 et seq.\n7. Narcotics, Controlled Substances, and Paraphernalia \u00a7 114 (NCI4th)\u2014 possession of drugs \u2014 intent to sell and deliver \u2014 sufficient evidence\nThe evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that defendant possessed marijuana and cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver, even though an officer admitted that he could not determine from the packaging whether defendant had packaged the drugs for sale or had recently purchased them, where the evidence tended to show that defendant dropped two \u201cdime bags\u201d of marijuana when officers approached him and had two or three individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine in his mouth; defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had sold drugs before and had not decided at the time of his arrest whether he was going to sell the drugs in his possession or use them himself; and although defendant had been unemployed for six years, he possessed $261 in cash when arrested.\nAm Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons \u00a7 47.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 546 (NCI4th)\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s remarks about appointed counsel \u2014 denial of mistrial\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial when the prosecutor stated during his closing argument that defendant\u2019s attorney did not pick this client and had no choice but to represent defendant because he was appointed by the court to do so where the trial court gave a curative instruction immediately after the prosecutor made these remarks.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 685.\nSupreme Court\u2019s views as to what courtroom statements made by prosecuting attorney during criminal trial violate due process or constitute denial of fair trial. 40 L. Ed. 2d 886.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 August 1993 by Judge Henry L. Stevens, III, in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 October 1994; reconsidered and heard without oral argument per order dated 24 January 1995.\nDefendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana and possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine. G.S. 90-95. These offenses were consolidated for judgment; defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: On 24 December 1992, Officer Allan C. Wayman, a police officer with the New Bern Police Department, was patrolling in a marked police car when he saw defendant in Craven Terrace, an area known for drug trafficking, sales and use. Officer Wayman testified that he had previously seen defendant in this area and had unsuccessfully chased him. When defendant saw Officer Wayman\u2019s patrol car, defendant turned and left the area. Officer Wayman and his partner drove through Craven Terrace until they spotted defendant on foot near an intersection and stopped their car near him. As Officer Wayman got out of the vehicle and approached defendant, Officer Wayman saw defendant drop some items on the ground. These items were recovered and later determined to be two \u201cdime bags\u201d of marijuana. As Officer Wayman escorted defendant to his patrol car, he noticed that defendant was speaking in an abnormal manner. Suspecting that defendant may have had controlled substances in his mouth, Officer Wayman had him spit out whatever was in his mouth or he would obtain a search warrant. Defendant spit out two or three small bags which Officer Wayman identified as individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine.\nDefendant testified that it was his marijuana that was dropped on the ground. Defendant also admitted that he possessed crack cocaine in his mouth. On cross-examination, defendant stated that he did not deny that the drugs recovered from him at the time of his arrest were his drugs. Defendant also admitted that he had sold drugs before.\nFrom judgment entered and sentence imposed, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Thomas 0. Lawton, III, for the State.\nWard, Ward, Willey & Ward, by Joshua W. Willey, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0644-01", "first_page_order": 676, "last_page_order": 686 }