{ "id": 8526324, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN GEORGE RITCHIE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ritchie", "decision_date": "1995-02-07", "docket_number": "No. 9324SC954", "first_page": "728", "last_page": "730", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.C. App. 728" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "127 L.Ed.2d 583", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1147397 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" }, { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Bryant I" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530961 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Bryant I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6217574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Bryant II" }, { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550995 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Bryant II" }, { "page": "306-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0298-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 312, "char_count": 4395, "ocr_confidence": 0.722, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20556951389830064 }, "sha256": "91d048018090b22fad82fec71455582c8a722716441f6aaa8a6d2bc0fe7fe74d", "simhash": "1:9d0cfb2ad708257f", "word_count": 721 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:41.091249+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN GEORGE RITCHIE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER CURIAM.\nThis case has been remanded to our Court for our reconsideration in light of our Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in State v. Bryant, 337 N.C. 298, 446 S.E.2d 71 (1994) (Bryant II). Our initial opinion in this matter was reported at 115 N.C. App. 399, 445 S.E.2d 92 (1994) (unpublished). We briefly review the facts of this case.\nDefendant was observed by Highway Patrol Trooper Kevin Bray operating a motor vehicle and was subsequently pulled over. Trooper Bray placed defendant under arrest for driving while impaired and transported defendant to the Watauga County Law Enforcement Center. At the Center, defendant performed a number of sobriety tests unsatisfactorily. Defendant was ultimately convicted following a jury trial of driving while impaired and appealed to our Court.\nOn appeal, we found that the trial court erred in its comments regarding reasonable doubt, pursuant to Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) and State v. Bryant, 334 N.C. 333, 432 S.E.2d 291 (1993) (Bryant I). However, because of our Supreme Court\u2019s reconsideration of this issue in Bryant II in light of Victor v. Nebraska, -U.S. -, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), we now reconsider this matter.\nIn Bryant II, our Supreme Court noted that\nthe [U.S. Supreme] Court in Victor acknowledged the distinction drawn in Cage between \u201cmoral certainty\u201d and \u201cevidentiary certainty.\u201d Victor, 511 U.S. at -, 127 L.Ed.2d at 596. The Court stated] however, that in Cage, \u201cthe jurors were simply told that they had to be morally certain of the defendant\u2019s guilt; there was nothing else in the instruction to lend meaning to the phrase.\u201d Id. In Victor, the jury was explicitly told to base its conclusion on the evidence in the case, and there were other instructions which reinforced this message.\nLikewise, in the present case, the jury was instructed that a reasonable doubt existed \u201cif, after considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence, the minds of the jurors are left in such condition that they cannot say they have an abiding faith to a moral certainty in the defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d The jury was also instructed that a reasonable doubt is \u201ca sane, rational doubt arising out of the evidence or lack of evidence or from its deficiency\u201d and that it is \u201can honest substantial misgiving generated by the insufficiency of the proof\u201d We therefore conclude that, under Victor, \u201cthere is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood moral certainty to be disassociated from the evidence in the case.\u201d Victor, 511 U.S. at -, 127 L.Ed.2d at 597. Thus, on remand, we hold, contrary to our previous decision in this case, that there is no Cage error entitling defendant to a new trial. Id.\n337 N.C. at 306-07, 446 S.E.2d at 76.\nThe trial court in Bryant gave an instruction which was in pertinent part the exact language offered in the instant case. Therefore, as in Bryant II, on remand, we hold that there has been no Cage error in this matter entitling defendant to a new trial.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error all concern the trial court\u2019s comments to the jury during the instruction phase and the deliberation phase of the trial. We have carefully reviewed these assignments of error and have found them to be without merit.\nNo error.\nPanel consisting of:\nJOHNSON, EAGLES and COZORT", "type": "majority", "author": "PER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.", "Vincent L. Gable for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN GEORGE RITCHIE\nNo. 9324SC954\n(Filed 7 February 1995)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 762 (NCI4th)\u2014 reasonable doubt \u2014 instruction using moral certainty and substantial misgiving\nThe trial court\u2019s instruction on reasonable doubt which \u2022 included the terms \u201cmoral certainty\u201d and \u201chonest substantial misgiving\u201d did not violate due process.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 1385.\nAppealed by defendant from judgment entered 17 August 1993 by Judge Edward K. Washington in Watauga County Superior Court. Originally heard in the Court of Appeals 28 March 1994 and our Court first issued an opinion in this matter 21 June 1994. The State\u2019s petition for discretionary review pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 7A-31 (1989) was allowed by .the Supreme Court which by order dated 8 September 1994 vacated the opinion of this Court and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. Reconsidered in the Court' of Appeals 5 January 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.\nVincent L. Gable for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0728-01", "first_page_order": 760, "last_page_order": 762 }