{
  "id": 11917121,
  "name": "JOBY J. RICH v. R.L. CASEY, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rich v. R.L. Casey, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1995-03-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 9418SC301",
  "first_page": "156",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:31.897721+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges WALKER and MARTIN, MARK D., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "JOBY J. RICH v. R.L. CASEY, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. After careful review of the record and briefs, we affirm.\nWe note initially that this appeal is interlocutory since plaintiff amended his complaint on 10 November 1993 to include as a defendant, Guy M. Turner, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant but the claims against defendant Turner were not decided. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) deals with judgments involving multiple claims or parties. Under Rule 54(b), a judgment that is final as to one or more of the parties or claims, but not all, may be immediately appeal-able if the trial court makes an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. N.C. Railroad v. City of Charlotte, 112 N.C. App. 762, 769, 437 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1993). See also, Comment 1A-1, Rule 54(b). In its order granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, the trial court certified the judgment for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). Accordingly, we address the merits.\nThe following facts are undisputed. Defendant was the principal contractor for the construction of the Colonial Heritage Center. Plaintiff\u2019s employer, Mark Moore Construction Company, was a subcontractor on the project responsible for completing all rough carpentry, finish carpentry and truss erection. Although Moore\u2019s Construction Company was required by statute, G.S. 97-19, to furnish defendant with proof of the company\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurance, at the time of the accident, Moore\u2019s Construction Company had not furnished the required proof and did not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance for its employees. Pursuant to G.S. 97-19, plaintiff applied for and received workers\u2019 compensation benefits through defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier.\nThe sole issue before us is whether defendant, as a principal contractor, is plaintiff\u2019s \u201cstatutory employer\u201d pursuant to G.S. 97-19 and entitled to benefit from the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (hereinafter Act). G.S. 97-9, 97-10.1. We conclude that defendant is plaintiffs statutory employer and that the workers\u2019 compensation benefits available to plaintiff through defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier constitutes plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy against defendant for plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nThe \u201cstatutory employer\u201d statute, G.S. 97-19, provides in pertinent part:\nAny principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor who shall sublet any contract for the performance of any work without requiring from such subcontractor or obtaining from the Industrial Commission a certificate, issued by a workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier, or a certificate of compliance issued by the Department of Insurance to a self-insured subcontractor, stating that such subcontractor has complied with G.S. 97-93 hereof, shall be liable ... to the same extent as such subcontractor would be if he were subject to the provisions of this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits under this Article .... If the principal contractor, intermediate contractor or subcontractor shall obtain such certificate at the time of subletting such contract to subcontractor, he shall not thereafter be held liable to any such subcontractor, any principal or partner of such subcontractor, or any employee of such subcontractor for compensation or other benefits under this Article.\nAny principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor paying compensation or other benefits under this Article, under the foregoing provisions of this section, may recover the amount so paid from any person, persons or corporation who independently of such provision, would have been liable for the payment thereof.\nG.S. 97-19. G.S. 97-19 applies only when two conditions are met. First, the injured employee must be working for a subcontractor doing work which has been contracted to it by a principal Contractor. Second, the subcontractor does not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage covering the injured employee. Zocco v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 791 F.Supp. 595, 599 (E.D.N.C. 1992). When these two conditions are met, the principal contractor becomes liable to the subcontractor\u2019s employee for payment of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. It is undisputed that defendant was the principal contractor on the building project and that Moore\u2019s Construction Company was a subcontractor hired by defendant. Moore\u2019s Construction Company did not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage at the time of the accident. Defendant, pursuant to G.S. 97-19, submitted plaintiff\u2019s claims to its workers\u2019 compensation carrier. Plaintiff\u2019s request was approved and plaintiff received workers\u2019 compensation benefits from defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier. The issue is whether defendant is entitled to benefit from the exclusivity provisions of the Act since it has paid plaintiff his workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We conclude that defendant is so entitled.\nLarson on Workers\u2019 Compensation Law states:\nForty-four states now have \u201cstatutory-employer\u201d or \u201ccontractor-under\u201d statutes \u2014 i.e., statutes which provide that the general contractor shall be liable for compensation to the employee of a subcontractor under him, usually' when the subcontractor is uninsured . . . doing work which is part of the business, trade or occupation of the principal contractor. Since the general contractor is thereby, in effect, made the employer for purposes of the compensation statute, it is obvious that he should enjoy the regular immunity of an employer from third-party suit when the facts are such that he could be made liable for compensation; and the great majority of cases have so held.\n2A Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, \u00a7 72.31(a). In Zocco v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 791 F.Supp. 595 (E.D.N.C. 1992), plaintiff was injured while operating a ride at the 1988 fair at the Fort Bragg Army Base. Plaintiff was employed by subcontractor Lawrence Brawley who was hired by the principal contractor, Deggeller Attractions, Inc., to assemble and operate two rides at the fair. Plaintiff filed suit against the Army, Deggeller, and Brawley alleging negligence. Although plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claims were still pending before the Industrial Commission, plaintiff chose to first pursue the civil lawsuit against the defendants. The United States District Court held that since Brawley was Deggeller\u2019s subcontractor and Brawley did not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance, G.S. 97-19 applied making Deggeller plaintiff\u2019s statutory employer. \u201cAs a statutory employer, Deggeller is immunized from civil liability by the Act\u2019s exclusivity provisions.\u201d Id. at 603.\nThe rationale behind the district court\u2019s holding and the holdings of other states following this rule is that the principal contractor as statutory employer \u201csteps into the shoes\u201d of the subcontractor, plaintiff\u2019s immediate employer. Since the general contractor is subjected to no fault liability under G.S. 97-19 and is required to compensate the subcontractor\u2019s injured employee, the principal contractor becomes the injured employee\u2019s immediate employer for purposes of the Act and is entitled to the benefit of the Act\u2019s exclusivity provisions. The plaintiff is not harmed by this construction because he still receives the same workers\u2019 compensation benefits for his injuries, albeit, from the principal contractor or its carrier.\nEven though plaintiff arguably may have alleged in his complaint that defendant Casey knowingly violated its non-delegable duty to ensure that safety precautions were followed when undertaking an inherently dangerous activity, we do not find any forecast of evidence in the record and no argument in plaintiff\u2019s brief that any of the well-established exceptions to the exclusivity rule for intentional conduct are applicable to the facts of the case.\nAccordingly, we conclude that defendant contractor is entitled to the Act\u2019s exclusivity provisions for employers and may not be sued based on the subcontractor\u2019s employee\u2019s injuries. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WALKER and MARTIN, MARK D., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EAGLES, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Smith, Foll\u00edn & James, by Norman B. Smith and Seth R. Cohen, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Allan R. Gitter and Ellen M. Gregg, for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JOBY J. RICH v. R.L. CASEY, INC.\nNo. 9418SC301\n(Filed 7 March 1995)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 46, 52 (NCI4th)\u2014 no workers\u2019 compensation insurance carried by subcontractor \u2014 coverage through principal contractor \u2014 statutory employer \u2014 exclusivity of workers\u2019 compensation benefits\nWhere plaintiff\u2019s employer, a subcontractor, did not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance and did not furnish evidence of such to defendant principal contractor, and plaintiff sought and received workers\u2019 compensation benefits from defendant\u2019s carrier, defendant was plaintiff\u2019s statutory employer, and benefits available to plaintiff through defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier constituted plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy against defendant for plaintiff\u2019s injuries. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 62 et seq., 229.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 27 January 1994 by Judge Howard R. Greeson, Jr. in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 October 1994; reconsidered and heard without oral argument per order dated 24 January 1995.\nOn 4 September 1991, plaintiff was injured during the construction of the Colonial Heritage Center in Greensboro, North Carolina. Plaintiff was installing roof trusses on the morning of the accident. Plaintiff\u2019s employer and supervisor, Mark Moore, instructed plaintiff to place a bundle of plywood and some additional trusses on top of the trusses that were already installed. While Moore and his crew, including plaintiff, were leaving to take a lunch break, Moore was told by defendant\u2019s site superintendent that there was too much weight on the roof trusses. After lunch, Moore and plaintiff climbed up on the roof and began spreading the plywood over the roof. While Moore and plaintiff were on the roof, several of the trusses broke and the roof collapsed. Plaintiff\u2019s left foot was crushed between two trusses and a rod from the collapsing wall pierced plaintiff\u2019s back between his spine and his kidney. Moore was trapped under the falling trusses and killed.\nPlaintiff\u2019s employer, Mark Moore Construction Company (hereinafter Moore\u2019s Company), contracted with defendant as a subcontractor on the construction project. Moore\u2019s Company failed to furnish defendant with proof of workers\u2019 compensation insurance. In fact, Moore\u2019s Company did not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance for its employees. Defendant, the principal contractor of the building project, submitted plaintiff\u2019s claims for benefits to its workers\u2019 compensation carrier pursuant to G.S. 97-19. Plaintiff\u2019s claim for benefits was approved by defendant\u2019s carrier. Plaintiff accepted workers\u2019 compensation benefits from defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier.\nOn 25 November 1992, plaintiff filed suit against defendant seeking compensatory and punitive damages for his injuries. On 19 November 1993 defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedies were provided by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. On 27 January 1994, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals.\nSmith, Foll\u00edn & James, by Norman B. Smith and Seth R. Cohen, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Allan R. Gitter and Ellen M. Gregg, for defendant-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0156-01",
  "first_page_order": 188,
  "last_page_order": 193
}