{ "id": 11918056, "name": "PAULA MICHELE McCASKILL, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "McCaskill v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance", "decision_date": "1995-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 9415SC447", "first_page": "320", "last_page": "324", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 N.C. App. 320" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "25 ALR4th 896", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "25 ALR4th 6", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519967 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545295 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313718 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500706, 2497604, 2502706, 2498932, 2500633 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0383-01", "/nc/331/0383-02", "/nc/331/0383-04", "/nc/331/0383-03", "/nc/331/0383-05" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524340 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491072, 2489257, 2490993, 2488279, 2491871 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0437-04", "/nc/325/0437-01", "/nc/325/0437-02", "/nc/325/0437-05", "/nc/325/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 523, "char_count": 9299, "ocr_confidence": 0.71, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3186085366366919 }, "sha256": "01a07daed751691214769960273c0a8bbeb59086137015266608d8af4675d860", "simhash": "1:cd22d02e34f528de", "word_count": 1469 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:31.897721+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and MARTIN, MARK D., concur." ], "parties": [ "PAULA MICHELE McCASKILL, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of defendant and denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Because the accident occurred in 1990, the disposition of this case is governed by the pre-1991 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4), which stated:\nIn any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant pursuant to the exhausted liability policy and the total limits of the owner\u2019s underinsured motorist coverages provided in the owner\u2019s policies of insurance; it being the intent of this paragraph to provide to the owner, in instances where more than one policy may apply, the benefit of all limits of liability of underinsured motorist coverage under all such policies: Provided that this paragraph shall apply only to nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle insurance as defined in G.S. 58-40-15(9) and (10) [sic].\nG.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989) (emphasis added). This provision has been interpreted to require both interpolicy and intrapolicy stacking of underinsured motorist coverages. Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759, reh\u2019g denied, 325 N.C. 437, 384 S.E.2d 546 (1989). An exception exists under the emphasized portion above, however, for fleet policies vis-a-vis intrapolicy stacking. Id. \u201cThe language of this statute makes it clear that intra-policy stacking is only available when the coverage is nonfleet and the vehicle covered is of the private passenger type.\u201d Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Fields, 105 N.C. App. 563, 567, 414 S.E.2d 69, 71, disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 383, 417 S.E.2d 788 (1992). The issue for this Court, therefore, is twofold: (1) whether the coverage at issue is nonfleet, and (2) whether the vehicles covered are private passenger motor vehicles.\nEach of these questions is answered by reference to definitions provided by G.S. \u00a7 58-131.35A, now codified as G.S. \u00a7 58-40-10, as well as our courts\u2019 interpretations of those definitions. \u201cNonfleet\u201d coverage is defined as \u201ca motor vehicle not eligible for classification as a fleet vehicle for the reason that the motor vehicle is one of four or less motor vehicles owned or hired under a long-term contract by the policy named insured.\u201d See G.S. \u00a7 58-40-10(2) (1989). Defendant argues that on the face of the statute, the McCaskill policy qualifies as a fleet policy because it covers five vehicles, and thus automatically falls within the stacking exception for nonfleet coverage under G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). Our Supreme Court, however, defined a fleet policy as \u201ca single policy designed to provide coverage for a multiple and changing number of motor vehicles used in an insured\u2019s business.\u201d Sutton, 325 N.C. at 266, 382 S.E.2d at 763; see also Watson v. American National Fire Insurance Co., 106 N.C. App. 681, 417 S.E.2d 814 (1992), aff\u2019d, 333 N.C. 338, 425 S.E.2d 696 (1993).\nAlthough the McCaskill policy covers five vehicles, we think, as evidenced by the Supreme Court\u2019s definition of \u201cfleet\u201d, that the purpose of excepting a fleet policy from intrapolicy stacking would not be furthered by strictly applying the statutory definition of \u201cnonfleet.\u201d Intrapolicy stacking within a fleet policy, where many vehicles are usually involved, gives the insured an amount of underinsured coverage conceivably far in excess of what the parties bargained for. Sutton, 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759. In the instant case, it makes far more sense to include the Court\u2019s definition of \u201cfleet\u201d in conjunction with the statutory definition of \u201cnonfleet\u201d where it is undisputed that the McCaskill vehicles were not used for the insured\u2019s business, and the unexpected dangers of intrapolicy stacking are not present. Therefore, plaintiffs policy is nonfleet.\nThe second prong of this issue is controlled by the applicable statute at the time of the accident which defined \u201cprivate passenger motor vehicle\u201d as\na. A motor vehicle of the private passenger or station wagon type that is owned or hired under a long-term contract by the policy named insured and that is neither used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others without a driver; or\nb. A motor vehicle that is a pickup truck or van that is owned by an individual or by husband and wife or individuals who are residents of the same household if it:\n1. Has a gross vehicle weight as specified by the manufacturer of less than 10,000 pounds; and\n2. Is not used for the delivery or transportation of goods or materials unless such use is (i) incidental to the insured\u2019s business of installing, maintaining, or repairing furnishings or equipment, or (ii) for farming or ranching.\nSuch vehicles owned by a family farm copartnership or a family farm corporation shall be considered owned by an individual for the purposes of this section; or\nc. A motorcycle, motorized scooter or other similar motorized vehicle not used for commercial purposes.\nG.S. \u00a7 58-40-10(1) (1989). From these definitions, and the undisputed deposed statements of the named insured and his wife, the five vehicles listed in the policy were private passenger motor vehicles.\nDefendant contends that the policy expressly prohibits intrapol-icy stacking and that the policy provisions should be enforced as written. The limit of liability clause in the McCaskill policy states in pertinent part, \u201cThis is the most we will pay for bodily injury and property damage regardless of the number of . . . vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations.\u201d Similar policy language has appeared in previous opinions in which the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently held that the relevant statute prevails over the limit of liability clause. Wiggins v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 112 N.C. App. 26, 434 S.E.2d 642 (1993). Furthermore, the insured\u2019s payment of separate premiums for each vehicle within underinsured coverage should be, and is, relevant to our consideration. See Sutton, 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759.\nBecause the policy at issue is a nonfleet policy covering only private passenger motor vehicles, the trial court erred by entering summary judgment for defendant and denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment should have been entered for plaintiff. The decision of the trial court is therefore reversed.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges JOHNSON and MARTIN, MARK D., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Duffus & Associates, P.A., by J. David Duffus, Jr. and R. Bailey Melvin, for plaintiff appellant.", "Nichols, Caffrey, Hill & Evans, L.L.R, by Joseph R. Beatty, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAULA MICHELE McCASKILL, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. 9415SC447\n(Filed 21 March 1995)\nInsurance \u00a7 528 (NCI4th)\u2014 nonfleet vehicle \u2014 policy covering private passenger vehicles \u2014 accident in 1990 \u2014 intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverages allowed\nBecause the policy at issue was a nonfleet policy covering only private passenger motor vehicles, even though it covered five vehicles owned by insured, and because the accident in question occurred in 1990, thus causing the disposition of this case to be governed by the pre-1991 version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4), the trial court erred in finding that intrapolicy stacking of under-insured motorist coverages was not allowed and in granting summary judgment for defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 322.\nCombining or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in separate policies issued by same insurer to same insured. 25 ALR4th 6, sec. 1.\nCombining or \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured motorist coverages provided in fleet policy. 25 ALR4th 896.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 4 March 1994 by Judge A. Leon Stanback, Jr. in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 January 1995.\nOn 16 August 1990, Paula McCaskill was driving a 1974 Volkswagen owned by her father, William McCaskill, and insured by defendant, Pennsylvania National. Christopher Todd Carter turned left directly in front of plaintiff, causing an accident in which plaintiff suffered injuries. At the time of the accident, Paula was living with her parents and was listed as a named driver on the insurance policy.\nPlaintiff filed an underlying tort suit against Carter and obtained a judgment against him in the amount of $85,000 on 8 May 1993. Prior to the underlying suit, Carter\u2019s insurance company tendered their policy limits of $50,000. Because plaintiffs damages exceeded Carter\u2019s limits, she attempted to pursue underinsured coverage through her father\u2019s personal automobile insurance policy. Mr. MeCaskill\u2019s policy had stated underinsured motorist coverage of $50,000 per claimant and $100,000 per accident. At the time of the accident there were five motor vehicles covered on the McCaskill policy, including the 1974 Volkswagen.\nOn 19 February 1993, Paula McCaskill filed a declaratory judgment action against defendant, asking the court to find that stacking was allowed under the policy and, therefore, the limits under her father\u2019s policy were $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. Both parties thereafter filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion and denied plaintiff\u2019s motion. Plaintiff appeals.\nDuffus & Associates, P.A., by J. David Duffus, Jr. and R. Bailey Melvin, for plaintiff appellant.\nNichols, Caffrey, Hill & Evans, L.L.R, by Joseph R. Beatty, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0320-01", "first_page_order": 352, "last_page_order": 356 }