{ "id": 11918412, "name": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. STEVE E. LANKFORD, LINDA LANKFORD, WALTER SCOTT LANKFORD and NANCY B. OLDHAM", "name_abbreviation": "Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Lankford", "decision_date": "1995-04-04", "docket_number": "No. 9310SC1143", "first_page": "368", "last_page": "378", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 N.C. App. 368" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "52 ALR4th 18", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "46 ALR3d 1024", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "discussing UIM coverage" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506105 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "discussing UIM coverage" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505670 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695400, 4696174, 4696632, 4699005, 4702879 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0731-02", "/nc/316/0731-05", "/nc/316/0731-04", "/nc/316/0731-03", "/nc/316/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 12132886 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 802", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552643, 2552388, 2552777, 2549330, 2551866 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0802-05", "/nc/337/0802-03", "/nc/337/0802-04", "/nc/337/0802-02", "/nc/337/0802-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" }, { "page": "670-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12125974 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "203-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 N.C. App. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548767 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/5/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act \"has always been to protect innocent motorists from financially irresponsible motorists\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523325 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act \"has always been to protect innocent motorists from financially irresponsible motorists\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557714 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564714 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358374 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523936 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "902", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571777, 8571747, 8571852, 8571821, 8571886 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0727-02", "/nc/301/0727-01", "/nc/301/0727-04", "/nc/301/0727-03", "/nc/301/0727-05" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564338 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550273, 2551874, 2552300, 2549108, 2550013 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0800-01", "/nc/337/0800-02", "/nc/337/0800-03", "/nc/337/0800-05", "/nc/337/0800-04" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537537, 2539785, 2542308, 2540999 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0577-01", "/nc/328/0577-02", "/nc/328/0577-03", "/nc/328/0577-04" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" }, { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131925 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "444" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529113 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527459 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354-56", "parenthetical": "intrapolicy stacking involves aggregating the limits of liability for different vehicles insured under a single policy; interpolicy stacking means aggregating the limits of coverage contained under two or more contracts of insurance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524590 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-25", "parenthetical": "intrapolicy stacking involves aggregating the limits of liability for different vehicles insured under a single policy; interpolicy stacking means aggregating the limits of coverage contained under two or more contracts of insurance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 978, "char_count": 24761, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0606915758194195e-07, "percentile": 0.7565066534767085 }, "sha256": "324b784c50718634fbe2ac089be712baaaecc0b0a38bcfc33b31e0459a09033e", "simhash": "1:0d615460c13c062c", "word_count": 3929 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:31.897721+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and McCRODDEN concur.", "Judge McCRODDEN concurred prior to 15 December 1994." ], "parties": [ "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. STEVE E. LANKFORD, LINDA LANKFORD, WALTER SCOTT LANKFORD and NANCY B. OLDHAM" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nIn this declaratory judgment action, defendants-appellants (defendants) argue the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide), thereby effectively barring defendants Steve and Linda Lankford (Mr. and Mrs. Lankford, the parents) and their son, defendant Walter Scott Lankford (Scott), from raising any claims for uninsured motorists (UM) coverage under the parents\u2019 insurance policy with Nationwide. We agree the parents were erroneously denied coverage by the court\u2019s ruling.\nPertinent factual and procedural information may be summarized as follows: On 19 March 1992, Scott (a minor child on that date) was operating a 1984 Chevrolet Camaro on Rural Paved Road 1001 in Sanford, North Carolina. Scott was seriously injured when a 1983 Dodge, operated by defendant Nancy B. Oldham (Oldham), crossed the center line and collided with his Camaro. It is undisputed that Oldham\u2019s vehicle was not covered by automobile liability insurance at the time of the collision, and that Scott\u2019s resultant medical expenses for his injuries totalled $19,229.41.\nNationwide had previously issued two personal automobile insurance policies to members of the Lankford family which were in effect on 19 March 1992 \u2014 Policy Number 61-32-J-586-038 (Scott\u2019s policy) and Policy Number 61-32-B-499-546 (the parents\u2019 policy). Scott\u2019s policy, providing coverage for his separately-owned Camaro, contained UM coverage of $50,000.00 per person and $100,000.00 per accident. The parents\u2019 policy, listing a 1990 Nissan and a 1985 Ford as covered vehicles, also afforded UM coverage in the amount of $50,000.00 per person and $100,000.00 per accident.\nScott and his parents subsequently filed claims with Nationwide under both policies to recover their damages. On 8 June 1992, Nationwide tendered a check for $50,000.00 to the attorney representing the three, contending that sum represented the total amount of UM coverage applicable to the claims of both Scott and his parents. Nationwide\u2019s tender was rejected, however, and on 23 June 1992, two separate civil actions against Oldham were filed in Lee County Superior Court. In their action, Mr. and Mrs. Lankford sought to recover expenses incurred for Scott\u2019s medical care. Scott\u2019s separate lawsuit, brought on his behalf by guardian ad litem Linda Lankford, included claims to recover damages for \u201cpermanent physical injuries, scarring and great pain and suffering [and] . . . severe emotional distress.\u201d\nOn 30 November 1992, Nationwide filed the instant action in Wake County Superior Court seeking declaratory relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253 (1983) as well as a directive that the parents and Scott interplead their respective claims within the policy limits of UM coverage provided in Scott\u2019s insurance policy Nationwide alleged \u201c[t]he parents\u2019 policy provides no coverage for claims arising out of [the 19 March 1992] [ac]cident,\u201d and that \u201c[a]ny and all claims asserted by [the parents] that arise out of the [ac]cident are derivative of Scott[\u2019s] . . . claim for bodily injury.\u201d Nationwide sought a declaration that the parents\u2019 policy provided \u201cno coverage . . . for any damages which Ms. Oldham is or may become legally responsible [for] because of injuries to Mr. Lankford, Ms. Lankford, or . . . Scott Lankford[.]\u201d Nationwide further requested a determination that its \u201cmaximum limit of liability is $50,000.00, the liability limit for Uninsured Motorist Coverage under the minor child\u2019s policy.\u201d As all parties had stipulated that the combined damages of Scott and his parents exceeded $50,000.00, Nationwide further suggested that the court \u201cadjudge which Defendant or Defendants is entitled to the sum of money or to any portion.\u201d\nThe parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment which were heard at the 28 June 1993 civil session of Wake County Superior Court. The court\u2019s order, entered 11 August 1993, denied defendants\u2019 motion and granted that of plaintiff, stating in pertinent part:\n3. The total amount of coverage under any policy issued by Nationwide available to the Lankfords as a result of the March 19, 1992 accident between . . . Scott . . . and Nancy B. Oldham is hereby declared to be $50,000.00;\n4. Nationwide, having previously deposited the sum of $50,000.00 with the Wake County Clerk of Superior Court, is hereby discharged from all liability under its Policy Number 61-32-B-499-546, issued to Steve E. Lankford and Linda Lankford, and Policy Number 61-32-J-586-038, issued to Walter Scott Lankford, including any obligation of any type arising out of the lawsuits pending in Lee County Superior Court. . . ;\n5. Each of the Defendants Steve E. Lankford, Linda Lankford, [and] Walter Scott Lankford . . . shall proceed to determine the amount of their claims and their interest in the $50,000.00 currently held by the Wake County Clerk of Superior Court;\n6. Defendants are restrained and enjoined from any and all further attempts to recover amounts in excess of $50,000.00 from Nationwide ....\nNationwide informs us that the monies held by the Clerk were disbursed to Scott following the court\u2019s ruling pursuant to the terms of a consent order signed by Scott, Mr. and Mrs. Lankford, the attorney representing both parents and Scott, and counsel for Nationwide.\nDefendants appeal summary judgment in favor of Nationwide on grounds that \u201cboth policies of automobile insurance issued by [Nationwide] afforded coverage for the injuries and damages sustained by the Lankford Defendants.\u201d\nIn their appellate brief, Scott and his parents expound upon the above contention by presenting two basic propositions: (A) that the parents are entitled to recover for Scott\u2019s medical expenses under the UM section of the insurance policy issued them individually by Nationwide; and (B) that Scott may also recover under the UM coverage portion of their policy as a \u201cperson insured,\u201d despite certain exclusions from coverage contained within Scott\u2019s own policy. We find merit in defendants\u2019 discussion relative to Part A and hold the parents\u2019 personal contract of insurance provides coverage for their separate claims in this instance. However, we decline to discuss in detail the contentions raised in Part B, which contain internal inconsistencies and which at times are irreconcilable with other assertions made in defendants\u2019 brief.\nA.\nWith respect to their first argument, defendants begin with the assurance that the parents \u201care simply seeking coverage they contracted for in their own policy for the injuries they sustained due to necessary medical treatment for their minor child caused by a negligent uninsured motorist.\u201d (Emphasis added). In other words, \u201c[Scott] is not claiming on his parents\u2019 policy and the parents\u2019 [sic] are not claiming on [Scott\u2019s] policy.\u201d That being so, defendants correctly observe that \u201cthis is neither an intrapolicy [n]or [an] interpolicy stacking case.\u201d See, e.g., Mitchell v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 110 N.C. App. 16, 23-25, 429 S.E.2d 351, 354-56 (1993) (intrapolicy stacking involves aggregating the limits of liability for different vehicles insured under a single policy; interpolicy stacking means aggregating the limits of coverage contained under two or more contracts of insurance), aff\u2019d, 335 N.C. 433, 439 S.E.2d 110 (1994); see also Proctor v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 335 N.C. 533, 534-35, 439 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1994).\nThe fundamental question herein, therefore, is whether the policy of insurance issued to the parents provides by its own terms UM coverage of their claim for reimbursement of Scott\u2019s medical expenses. Our consideration of this issue is guided by this Court\u2019s recent statement that, \u201c[i]n determining whether coverage is provided by a particular automobile liability insurance policy, \u2018careful attention must be given to [1] the type of coverage, [2] the relevant statutory provisions, and [3] the terms of the policy.\u2019 \u201d Bray v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 115 N.C. App. 438, 441, 445 S.E.2d 79, 81 (quoting Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 142, 400 S.E.2d 44, 47, reh\u2019g denied, 328 N.C. 577, 403 S.E.2d 514 (1991)), disc. review allowed, 337 N.C. 800, 449 S.E.2d 565 (1994).\nIn the case sub judice, because of Oldham\u2019s failure to have in effect bodily injury liability insurance at the time of the collision, we are concerned with UM coverage. The relevant statute on 19 March 1992 (and now) is N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b) (1993), which comprises a portion of the Financial Responsibility Act and provides in part as follows:\n(3) No policy of bodily injury liability insurance . . . shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this State with respect to any motor vehicle registered ... in this State unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . . because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom ....\nFor purposes of this section \u201cpersons insured\u201d means the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any named insured and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses with the consent, expressed or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applies and a guest in the motor vehicle to which the policy applies or the personal representative of any of the above or any other person or persons in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.\nLa accordance with G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3), beyond obtaining the standard liability and medical payments coverage, the parents also contracted in their Nationwide policy for the following UM coverage:\nInsuring Agreement. We will pay compensatory damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of:\n1. Bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by an accident;\n\u201cInsured\u201d as used in this Part means:\n1.You or any family member.\nLimit of Liability. The limit of bodily injury liability shown in the Declarations for \u201ceach person\u201d for Uninsured Motorists Coverage [$50,000.00] is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury, including damages for care, loss of services or death, sustained by any one person in any one auto accident.\nSubject to this limit for \u201ceach person,\u201d the limit of bodily injury liability shown in the Declarations for \u201ceach accident\u201d for Uninsured Motorists Coverage [$100,000.00] is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one accident. . . . This is the most we will pay for bodily injury . . . regardless of the number of:\n1. Insureds;\n2. Claims made;\n3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or\n4. Vehicles involved in the accident.\nThe parents individually filed suit against Oldham (the uninsured tortfeasor) seeking recovery of present and future expenses resulting from Scott\u2019s medical care. The declaratory judgment action herein arose to deal with the eventuality that a tort recovery against Oldham proved to be uncollectible and Mr. and Mrs. Lankford thereafter sought indemnity from Nationwide.\nBecause Scott was an unemancipated minor at the time of the events giving rise to the lawsuit filed by his parents, they allege an obligation to provide him support and necessary medical treatment. See, e.g., Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 120, 270 S.E.2d 482, 490 (1980), reh\u2019g denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981). The right to bring an independent cause of action for recovery of medical expenses is, they continue, concomitant with these parental duties. As our Supreme Court has stated:\nWhen an unemancipated minor is injured by the negligence of another, two claims may arise. The minor has a claim for his or her losses, and the parent has a claim for the loss of the child\u2019s services during minority and the medical expenses reasonably necessary for treatment of the minor\u2019s injuries.\nBolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 321 N.C. 706, 713, 365 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1988) (citations omitted); see also Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 566, 568, 366 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1988) (citation omitted).\nNationwide argues, however, that because any and all damages sustained by the parents arose out of the single accident for which Scott received compensation under his own policy, the parents\u2019 claim is entirely derivative in nature and barred by the terms of Scott\u2019s insurance policy. In making this assertion, Nationwide points to language in the Declarations section of Scott\u2019s policy designating $50,000.00 as \u201c[Nationwide\u2019s] maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury, including damages for care, loss of services or death, sustained by any one person in any one auto accident,\u201d coupled with its tender of $50,000.00 to the Clerk of Court when instituting the declaratory judgment action sub judice.\nHowever, we do not perceive the parents\u2019 claim as being \u201cderivative\u201d with respect to the provisions and terms of their individual policy. As noted above, our cases have established that the parents of an unemancipated minor injured by the negligence of another obtain an independent cause of action for the medical expenses reasonably necessary for treatment of the minor\u2019s injuries. See, e.g., Bolkhir, 321 N.C. at 713, 365 S.E.2d at 902 (citations omitted). Admittedly, the parents would have no claim absent bodily injury to Scott. See South Carolina Ins. Co. v. White, 82 N.C. App. 122, 126, 345 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1986). However, if the contract of insurance between Nationwide and Scott\u2019s parents may properly be construed so as to provide coverage for the claim grounded upon the parental support obligation, the language of Scott\u2019s policy (by happenstance also issued by Nationwide) has no bearing on the right of the parents to pursue that coverage under their separate policy.\nThus, bared to its essence, the sole issue before us is whether the provisions of the policy issued to Mr. and Mrs. Lankford provide coverage for the claim pursued, in their independent action against Oldham. We note in this context that when construing insurance policies:\nThe various terms of [an insurance] policy are to be harmoniously construed, and if possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect. If, however, the meaning of words or the effect of provisions is uncertain or capable of several reasonable interpretations, the doubts will be resolved against the insurance company and in favor of the policyholder.\nWoods v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C. 500, 506, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978).\nBearing the foregoing principles in mind, we focus on the language of the parents\u2019 policy, which expressly provides that Nationwide \u201cwill pay compensatory damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of: . . . Bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by an accident. ...\u201d In the section of the policy detailing the limits of Nationwide\u2019s liability, Nationwide defines \u201cbodily injury\u201d as including \u201cdamages for care, loss of services or death, sustained by any one person in any one auto accident.\u201d In addition, the policy defines \u201cinsured\u201d as \u201cYou [the named insured, i.e., Mr. and Mrs. Lankford] or any family member.\u201d\n\u2022 We hold the above language operates to provide coverage for the claim of Mr. and Mrs. Lankford for Scott\u2019s medical expenses. Both parents are \u201cinsureds\u201d (named insureds) seeking \u201ccompensatory damages\u201d (for medical expenses) from an uninsured motorist (Oldham) for \u201cbodily injury\u201d (\u201cdamages for care\u201d) sustained by \u201can insured\u201d (either Scott or his parents). In arriving at this conclusion, it is neither necessary nor pertinent to consider Scott\u2019s distinct claims and coverage, raised under his separate contract of insurance.\nNationwide responds by referring to certain exclusionary language also contained within the policy issued to the parents, to wit:\nEXCLUSIONS\nA. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for property damage or bodily injury sustained by any person:\n7. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy.\nNationwide maintains that because Scott was \u201coccupying\u201d a motor vehicle \u201cowned by... a[] family member [i.e., Scott]\u201d but \u201cnot insured for this coverage under this policy\u201d (which specifically listed only a 1990 Nissan and a 1985 Ford), these circumstances fall squarely within contemplation of Exclusion 7, and UM coverage is barred. We disagree.\nFirst, it is well-established that the primary purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act (including G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3)) \u201cis to compensate the innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists.\u201d Insurance Co. v. Guaranty Co., 283 N.C. 87, 90, 194 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1973); see also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Baer, 113 N.C. App. 517, 522, 439 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1994) (purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act \u201chas always been to protect innocent motorists from financially irresponsible motorists\u201d) (citation omitted). Thus, since G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) is \u201cremedial legislation,\u201d it is to be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. Hendricks v. Guaranty Co., 5 N.C. App. 181, 184, 167 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1969); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mabe, 115 N.C. App. 193, 206, 444 S.E.2d 664, 672, disc. review allowed, 337 N.C. 802, 449 S.E.2d 748, 450 S.E.2d 485 (1994).\nAs a consequence, this Court in a series of decisions has determined that although a \u201cfamily-owned vehicle\u201d (or \u201chousehold-owned vehicle\u201d) exclusion may be \u201cclear and unambiguous,\u201d it will not be upheld by our courts in the context of UM/UIM coverage. See Hussey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 N.C. App. 464, 468, 445 S.E.2d 63, 65-66, disc. review allowed, 338 N.C. 310, 450 S.E.2d 487 (1994); Bray, 115 N.C. App. at 444, 445 S.E.2d at 82; Mabe, 115 N.C. App. at 203-06, 444 S.E.2d at 670-72. Our rulings in these cases have turned on the premise that such exclusions \u201cwork[] to deny UM protection to Class I insureds [e.g., Mr. and Mrs. Lankford and Scott], thereby subverting the legislative policies articulated in the Financial Responsibility Act.\u201d Hussey, 115 N.C. App. at 468, 445 S.E.2d at 66; see Crowder v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129-30 (For purposes of UM/UIM coverage, there are two classes of \u201cinsured persons\u201d: \u201c(1) the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of the named insured and relatives of either and (2) any person who uses with the consent, express or implied, of the named insured, the insured vehicle .. . .\u201d), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986); see also G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3).\nIn the words of our Supreme Court: \u201c[w]hen one member of a household purchases first-party [UM/JUIM coverage, it may fairly be said that he or she intends to protect all members of the family unit within the household. The legislature recognized this family unit for purposes of [UM/]UIM coverage_\u201d Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 193, 420 S.E.2d 124, 130 (1992). Further, UM/UIM coverage has been described as being \u201cessentially person oriented.\u201d Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 148, 400 S.E.2d 44, 50 (1991). Therefore, \u201c[m]embers of the first class [here, both Scott and his parents] are \u2018persons insured\u2019 for the purposes of UM coverage regardless of whether the insured vehicle is involved in their injuries[;]\u201d Bray, 115 N.C. App. at 443, 445 S.E.2d at 82 (citation omitted), indeed even if \u201cjust walking down the street.\u201d Bass v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 109, 112, 418 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1992) (discussing UIM coverage).\nAs we concluded in Bray, the parents\u2019 policy\u2019s \u201c \u2018family member\u2019 exclusion for UM coverage is repugnant to the purpose of UM and UIM coverage and is therefore invalid.\u201d Bray, 115 N.C. App. at 444, 445 S.E.d at 82; Hussey, 115 N.C. App. at 468, 445 S.E.2d at 65 (although \u201cthe \u2018owned vehicle\u2019 exclusion is clear and unambiguous, . . . the exclusion\u2019s effect renders it void against public policy\u201d). Because the effect of Exclusion 7 in the case sub judice is \u201cto deny UM protection to Class I insureds, thereby subverting the legislative policies articulated in the Financial Responsibility Act,\u201d it is \u201cvoid against public policy.\u201d Hussey, 115 N.C. App. at 468, 445 S.E.2d at 65.\nAccordingly, we will not give effect to the \u201cfamily owned\u201d exclusion written into the policy issued to Mr. and Mrs. Lankford. As no other language contained within their insurance contract serves to preclude from coverage the claim for Scott\u2019s medical expenses, we hold coverage for such claim is provided by their independent insurance policy issued by Nationwide. The trial court therefore erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Nationwide.\nB.\nDefendants also argue that as a Class I insured Scott is entitled as well to UM coverage under the policy issued to the parents. We find this contention irreconcilable with defendants\u2019 earlier assertion that \u201cin this case, [Scott] is not claiming on his parents\u2019 policy and [Mr. and Mrs. Lankford] are not claiming on [Scott\u2019s] policy.\u201d Having ruled in defendants\u2019 favor at least partly on the basis of that assurance, we therefore decline to discuss this alternative argument in detail.\nHowever, we do note defendants\u2019 assertion of Scott\u2019s entitlement to recovery under his parents\u2019 policy relies in the main upon the notion that Scott\u2019s status as a minor when he contracted for insurance somehow renders unenforceable as to him certain contractual provisions included in the parents\u2019 policy. In particular, defendants allege that Exclusion 7 in the parents \u2019 insurance contract (determined to be contrary to public policy, see related discussion supra) should not be held to bar Scott\u2019s recovery under their policy. This argument surely misses the mark. As Scott was not a party to the insurance contract entered into between the parents and Nationwide, his minority would not appear to have any bearing upon the terms and enforceability thereof.\ni\nFor the reasons discussed in Part A., supra, we reverse the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and remand with instructions that summary judgment be entered in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Lankford on the issue of entitlement to coverage under their individual policy of insurance. As the consent judgmenjt apparently entered into by the parties subsequent to the trial courts ruling is not part of the record herein, we express no opinion as to the effect thereof, if any, upon the determination of the parents\u2019 claim following remand. Our opinion speaks only to the parents\u2019 entitlement to pursue a claim for Scott\u2019s medical expenses under the provision^ of their independent policy of insurance.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges GREENE and McCRODDEN concur.\nJudge McCRODDEN concurred prior to 15 December 1994.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey & Dixon, by Dorothy V. Kibler and Kenyann G. Brown, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Staton, Perkinson, Doster, Post, Silverman & Adcock, by Jonathan Silverman and Elizabeth Myrick, for defendants-appellants Steve E. Lankford, Linda Lankford, and Walter Scott Lankford." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. STEVE E. LANKFORD, LINDA LANKFORD, WALTER SCOTT LANKFORD and NANCY B. OLDHAM\nNo. 9310SC1143\n(Filed 4 April 1995)\nInsurance \u00a7 439 (NCI4th)\u2014 parental obligation to pay child\u2019s medical expenses \u2014 claim covered by parents\u2019 insurance policy \u2014 \u201cfamily member\u201d exclusion invalid\nThe contract of insurance between plaintiff and defendant parents could properly be construed so as to provide UM coverage for their claim for medical expenses incurred by their unemancipated minor son grounded upon the parental support obligation, and the language of defendant son\u2019s policy had no bearing on the right of the parents to pursue that coverage under their separate policy; furthermore, the parents\u2019 claim was not barred by the \u201cfamily member\u201d exclusion for UM coverage in their policy, since it was repugnant to the purpose of UM and UIM coverage and therefore invalid.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 287 et seq.\nValidity, construction, and application of provision of automobile liability policy excluding from coverage injury or death of member of family or household of insured. 46 ALR3d 1024.\nValidity, under insurance statutes, of coverage exclusion for injury to or death of insured\u2019s family or household members. 52 ALR4th 18.\nAppeal by defendants from summary judgment entered 11 August 1993 by Judge Jack A. Thompson in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 June 1994.\nBailey & Dixon, by Dorothy V. Kibler and Kenyann G. Brown, for plaintiff-appellee.\nStaton, Perkinson, Doster, Post, Silverman & Adcock, by Jonathan Silverman and Elizabeth Myrick, for defendants-appellants Steve E. Lankford, Linda Lankford, and Walter Scott Lankford." }, "file_name": "0368-01", "first_page_order": 400, "last_page_order": 410 }