{ "id": 11918823, "name": "GOLDIE V. LEACH, Plaintiff v. MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Leach v. Monumental Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1995-04-04", "docket_number": "No. 9427SC555", "first_page": "434", "last_page": "438", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 N.C. App. 434" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "143 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "use of word \"including\" in statutory delegation of authority does not necessarily restrict it to matters enumerated in the inclusion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574532 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "use of word \"including\" in statutory delegation of authority does not necessarily restrict it to matters enumerated in the inclusion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563771 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574532 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 459, "char_count": 9262, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7490471452196634 }, "sha256": "6481423767a00e55b485f809d5198655af79d099e8db4197f1c4294885981094", "simhash": "1:c812651334a121b0", "word_count": 1454 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:31.897721+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge COZORT concurs.", "Judge LEWIS dissents." ], "parties": [ "GOLDIE V. LEACH, Plaintiff v. MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nGoldie V. Leach (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment entered 5 April 1994 in Cleveland County Superior Court, granting Monumental Life Insurance Company\u2019s (defendant) motion for judgment on the pleadings in plaintiffs declaratory judgment action.\nPlaintiff is the maternal grandmother of Corey Demetrius Leach (Corey), born 28 March 1978 to plaintiffs natural daughter, Donna Leach Gingles, and Christopher Johnson. Corey\u2019s natural mother died on 10 September 1991. Prior to that date, Corey resided exclusively with plaintiff. On 3 October 1991, plaintiff filed a civil action seeking legal custody of Corey. On 8 November 1991, a consent judgment as to child custody was entered, awarding plaintiff the primary care, custody, control and supervision of Corey.\nDefendant issued plaintiff a life insurance policy effective 10 April 1992, insuring plaintiff and her family against accidental death in the principal sum of $25,000.00. Plaintiff listed Corey on the enrollment form, submitted in March of 1992 to defendant, as an additional child to be insured under the family plan. The Dependent Coverage Rider provision of plaintiff\u2019s policy with defendant provides in pertinent part:\nPersons . . . covered under this policy are you and your Dependents [named in the application for this policy or added at a later date on forms provided by us]. Dependent means your spouse ... your unmarried children under age 19; or under age 23, if enrolled as a full-time student. . . and children whose support is required by a court decree.\nChildren include natural children, stepchildren and legally adopted children. They must be primarily dependent on you for support and maintenance and must live in a parent-child relationship with yon. [Emphasis added.]\nOn 9 September 1992, Corey was accidentally killed by a gunshot wound. Plaintiff submitted a claim for benefits for Corey\u2019s death under her accidental death insurance policy issued to her by defendant. By letter dated 21 October 1992, defendant denied plaintiff\u2019s claim and refused to provide benefits because \u201cgrandchildren are not considered as eligible dependents under the terms of this policy.\u201d On 15 December 1993, plaintiff filed an action for declaratory judgment in Cleveland County Superior Court, requesting the court to enter an order \u201cthat determines Corey D. Leach to be a dependent of [plaintiff] within the meaning of the described insurance policy.\u201d On 26 January 1994, defendant served its answer stating that Corey is not a dependent within the meaning of the policy and further making a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\nOn 9 February 1994, plaintiff made a motion to amend her complaint. The parties entered a stipulation allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint to state that Corey was \u201cat all relevant times primarily dependent\u201d upon plaintiff \u201cfor his support and maintenance, including the date of the Application and his date of death\u201d and that Corey \u201clived in a parent-child relationship with [plaintiff] at all relevant times, including both the date of Application through and including his date of death.\u201d After a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court entered an order on 5 April 1994, granting defendant\u2019s motion because \u201cas a matter of law, there is no insurance coverage under the insurance policy issued by the defendant for the death of Corey D. Leach, as alleged by the plaintiff in this action for declaratory judgment.\u201d\nThe issue presented is whether the term \u201cchildren\u201d as used in defendant\u2019s accidental death insurance policy issued to plaintiff includes her grandchild who was in her custody pursuant to a court order, was primarily dependent on plaintiff for his support and maintenance, and lived in a parent-child relationship with plaintiff.\nA motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is proper when all the material allegations of fact are resolved in the pleadings and only questions of law remain. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974). In this case, the material facts are undisputed and the only question remaining, which is the meaning of the language in the insurance policy, is a question of law, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970); therefore, a Rule 12(c) motion is proper.\nDefendant argues that because the policy defines children by stating \u201c[cjhildren include natural children, stepchildren and legally adopted children,\u201d \u201c[a]s a grandchild, Corey D. Leach was by definition not within the class of persons\u201d who could be covered under the terms of the policy. We disagree.\nThe definition used by defendant in the insurance policy in this case to define \u201cchildren\u201d is not ambiguous, and we must therefore \u201cenforce the contract as the parties have made it.\u201d Id. The word \u201cinclude\u201d implies an incomplete listing and \u201cis used most appropriately before an incomplete list of components,\u201d The American Heritage Dictionary 651 (2d ed. 1982), and is \u201cordinarily a word of enlargement and not of limitation.\u201d Turnpike. Auth. v. Pine Island, 265 N.C. 109, 120, 143 S.E.2d 319, 327 (1965) (use of word \u201cincluding\u201d in statutory delegation of authority does not necessarily restrict it to matters enumerated in the inclusion). Therefore, by using the word include, defendant has unambiguously stated that \u201cchildren\u201d is not limited to \u201cnatural children, stepchildren and legally adopted children\u201d so long as the \u201cchild\u201d is \u201cprimarily dependent on [the policyholder] for support and maintenance\u201d and lives \u201cin a parent-child relationship\u201d with the policyholder. In this case, Corey was \u201cat all relevant times primarily dependent\u201d upon plaintiff for his \u201csupport and maintenance\u201d and \u201clived in a parent-child relationship with [plaintiff] at all relevant times,\u201d facts to which the parties stipulated, and plaintiff listed Corey on the enrollment form to the policy. Therefore, the term \u201cchildren\u201d in defendant\u2019s insurance policy issued to plaintiff provides coverage for the accidental death of Corey, plaintiffs grandchild. For these reasons, the decision of the trial court is\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge COZORT concurs.\nJudge LEWIS dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Lewis\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent. The majority\u2019s reliance on language in Turnpike is misplaced. Turnpike dealt with construction of a statute, not an insurance policy. See Turnpike, 265 N.C. at 120, 143 S.E.2d at 327. It has no application in this context.\nThe majority also cites Wachovia Bank, a case dealing with the construction of terms in an insurance policy. However, the majority fails to follow language in Wachovia Bank in which our Supreme Court set forth the proper method of construing a definition in an insurance policy. The Court stated:\nWhen the policy contains a definition of a term used in it, this is the meaning which must be given to that term wherever it appears in the policy, unless the context clearly requires otherwise.\nWachovia Bank, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522.\nPlaintiffs policy unambiguously defines \u201cchildren\u201d to include natural children, stepchildren and legally adopted children. Thus, we must uphold this definition as that intended by the parties. Since the definition of \u201cchildren\u201d is unambiguous, it is not our role to \u201cremake the contract and impose liability upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policyholder did not pay.\u201d See Id.\nThe majority\u2019s construction elevates the policy language on dependency over the actual definition of \u201cchildren.\u201d Yet, this dependency language, requiring that the children \u201cbe primarily dependent\u201d on the policyholder \u201cfor support and maintenance\u201d and that the child and policyholder \u201clive in a parent-child relationship\u201d operates as a limitation on which children are covered. As such, it should not be used to expand coverage to include any dependent minor.\nThe majority\u2019s approach would remake the contract and bestow coverage on any dependent minor including foster children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and minors who are no kin at all, so long as they are the children of someone. This result goes far beyond the contract made between the parties.\nThe order granting judgment on the pleadings to defendant should be affirmed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Lewis" } ], "attorneys": [ "Corry, Cerwin & Luptak, by Todd R. Cerwin, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by F. Lane Williamson, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GOLDIE V. LEACH, Plaintiff v. MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. 9427SC555\n(Filed 4 April 1995)\nInsurance \u00a7 353 (NCI4th)\u2014 accidental death policy \u2014 definition of children \u2014 grandchild included\nThe term \u201cchildren\u201d as used in defendant\u2019s accidental death insurance policy issued to plaintiff includes her grandchild who was in her custody pursuant to a court order, was primarily dependent on plaintiff for his support and maintenance, and lived in a parent-child relationship with plaintiff.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 559 et seq.\nJudge Lewis dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 5 April 1994 in Cleveland County Superior Court by Judge Robert R Johnston. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 1995.\nCorry, Cerwin & Luptak, by Todd R. Cerwin, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by F. Lane Williamson, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0434-01", "first_page_order": 466, "last_page_order": 470 }