{ "id": 11913633, "name": "JOHN M. SOLES, Petitioner-Appellee v. THE CITY OF RALEIGH CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent and THE CITY OF RALEIGH, Intervenor-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Soles v. City of Raleigh Civil Service Commission", "decision_date": "1995-06-06", "docket_number": "No. 9310SC235", "first_page": "88", "last_page": "97", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 N.C. App. 88" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 L. Ed. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 U.S. 860", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3657539, 3654909, 3658982, 3660663 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/358/0860-04", "/us/358/0860-03", "/us/358/0860-02", "/us/358/0860-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6164109 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "1472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754", "parenthetical": ".Mathews balancing test applied in context of determining whether statutory allocation of standard of proof violates due process" }, { "page": "607", "parenthetical": ".Mathews balancing test applied in context of determining whether statutory allocation of standard of proof violates due process" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026449 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2559537, 2558968, 2557785, 2556540, 2558045 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0613-02", "/nc/339/0613-01", "/nc/339/0613-03", "/nc/339/0613-04", "/nc/339/0613-05" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "\"In resolving any claimed violation of procedural due process, a balance must be struck between the respective interests of the individual and the governmental entity seeking a remedy.\"" }, { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524139 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "\"In resolving any claimed violation of procedural due process, a balance must be struck between the respective interests of the individual and the governmental entity seeking a remedy.\"" }, { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 L. Ed. 2d 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 927", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11729144, 11729066, 11729020 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0927-03", "/us/453/0927-02", "/us/453/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1313768 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "652-53" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/452/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 U.S. 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 84512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "40-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/416/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522950 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "\"The Town's ordinance, in effect, is comparable to rights given State employees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-35.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313316 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "\"The Town's ordinance, in effect, is comparable to rights given State employees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-35.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736704, 4734882, 4738767, 4739771, 4732061 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0507-03", "/nc/318/0507-02", "/nc/318/0507-01", "/nc/318/0507-05", "/nc/318/0507-04" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "921" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523825 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313455 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "666" }, { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520521 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299646 ], "weight": 17, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "538-39" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "542-45" }, { "page": "504-06", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0532-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 930, "char_count": 21922, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.442044367939393e-08, "percentile": 0.48462149723786985 }, "sha256": "d6ae82ec7f70ae31c3b1c5567f1a2c9965fb3ee1d865bc18f70da07beffd5ce7", "simhash": "1:d983e19cb3c914d2", "word_count": 3398 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:59.579385+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges COZORT and GREENE concur." ], "parties": [ "JOHN M. SOLES, Petitioner-Appellee v. THE CITY OF RALEIGH CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent and THE CITY OF RALEIGH, Intervenor-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nIntervenor-appellant City of Raleigh (the City) appeals a judgment of the superior court finding Raleigh Civil Service Act Rule .0504 (Rule .0504) unconstitutional in having placed upon petitioner-appellee John M. Soles (Soles) the burden of proving his termination from employment with the City was \u201cwithout justifiable cause.\u201d Based upon that determination, the trial court remanded the matter to respondent Raleigh Civil Service Commission (the Commission) for further proceedings consistent with the court\u2019s order. The City\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court\u2019s ruling with respect to Rule .0504 constitutes reversible error. We disagree.\nPertinent factual and procedural information is as follows: Soles was initially hired by the City on 5 April 1984 as an Engineering Aide I. On 13 August 1986, he was promoted to Engineering Aide II, a position he held until 2 December 1990 when the City terminated his employment for \u201cpersonal conduct detrimental to City service\u201d pursuant to City of Raleigh Standard Procedure 300-14, Rev. B, Section 4.2(k) (1984).\nAccording to the City\u2019s Standard Procedures, \u201c[a]n employee . . . may be . . . dismissed for just cause[,]\u201d and \u201c[t]he causes for . . . dismissal fall into two categories [including] . . . causes relating to personal conduct detrimental to City service.\u201d See Standard Procedure 300-14, Rev. B, \u00a7\u00a7 3.1, 3.2 (1984). Among the examples of unsatisfactory personal conduct justifying dismissal listed in section 4.2 is the following:\nReport[ing] to work under the influence of alcohol or illegal use of drugs . . . where such would adversely reflect upon ability to perform assigned duties, or possession of or partaking of such items on the job.\nStandard Procedure 300-14, Rev. B, \u00a7 4.2(k). Soles was discharged when the City Engineer\u2019s investigation produced corroboration of a co-employee\u2019s accusation that Soles had violated the foregoing provision.\nFollowing written notification of his termination, Soles appealed unsuccessfully to the City Manager. He thereafter petitioned for an administrative hearing with the Commission on 12 April 1991. Soles alleged he had been \u201cdismissed without justifiable cause\u201d and requested reinstatement to his former position as Engineering Aide II, back pay and counsel fees.\nHearing on Soles\u2019 petition was conducted 17 and 31 July 1991. The Commission\u2019s proposed decision, entered 16 August 1991, included the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:\n27. Mr. Soles was terminated on December 2, 1990, in accordance with City of Raleigh Standard Procedure 300-14, Rev. B, Sec. 4.2(k).\nCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\nThe petitioner failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that he was terminated without justifiable cause.\nThe City of Raleigh adequately complied with its policies, procedures, and regulations regarding drug use by City employees and in the terminating of the employee in this case.\nThere was just cause sufficient to warrant the employees\u2019 [sic] termination from employment.\n(Emphasis added). On 19 September 1991, the Commission issued its Final Decision, adopting verbatim the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the proposed decision.\nOn 11 October 1991, Soles appealed the Commission\u2019s Final Decision by filing a petition for judicial review with the Wake County Superior Court pursuant to \u201cSection .0605 of the Rules of the City of Raleigh Civil Service Commission and N.C. General Statute Section 150B-43.\u201d Inter alia, Soles alleged the Commission\u2019s conclusion that he had \u201cfailed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that he was terminated without justifiable cause\u201d (based upon the Commission\u2019s application of the \u201cburden of proof\u2019 set forth in Rule .0504) was \u201cin violation of constitutional provisions.\u201d On 8 November 1991, the City moved to intervene as of right in the matter of Soles\u2019 petition, see N.C.R. Civ. P. 24(a) (1990), which motion was allowed.\nAfter hearing arguments, the superior court entered judgment 16 December 1992, which included the following relevant language:\nIt further appearing to the Court that at the hearing before the City of Raleigh Civil Service Commission the Petitioner was required to establish, under Rule .0504 of the Rules of the Raleigh Civil Service Commission, that he was terminated without justifiable cause, the Court concludes that . . . requiring him to prove that his dismissal was unjustified is a violation of constitutional provisions of procedural due process.\nIt therefore is Ordered that Rule .0504 of the Rules of the Raleigh Civil Service Commission shifting the burden of proof to Petitioner in these proceedings is a violation of constitutional' provisions and this matter is remanded to the Raleigh Civil Service Commission for further proceedings consistent with the Court\u2019s determination that Rule .0504 of the Rules of the Civil Service Commission is unconstitutional.\nThe City\u2019s four assignments of error have been condensed in its appellate brief into one argument. Specifically, the City contends the court committed prejudicial error by ruling that the burden of proof established in Rule .0504 violated Soles\u2019 procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We are not persuaded by the City\u2019s argument.\nIt is uncontroverted that the threshold question in determining whether an individual is entitled to due process protection with respect to an occupation is whether that individual possesses a property interest or right in continued employment. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 501 (1985) (citations omitted). \u201cA [constitutionally] protected property interest arises when one has a legitimate claim of entitlement as decided by reference to state law.\u201d Dyer v. Bradshaw, 54 N.C. App. 136, 139, 282 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1981) (citation omitted). If such an interest exists, a person cannot be deprived of employment unless the employer \u201cfirst complies] with appropriate procedural safeguards.\u201d Nix v. Dept. of Administration, 106 N.C. App. 664, 666, 417 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1992) (citation omitted).\nSoles emphasizes that the Raleigh Civil Service Act (the Civil Service Act) and personnel policies enacted pursuant thereto establish that \u201cjust cause\u201d must be shown before a City employee may be discharged. Because of such provisions, Soles continues, he indeed possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment as an Engineering Aide II. Soles\u2019 reasoning is valid.\nAn examination of North Carolina law, see, e.g., id., reveals our courts have previously established that the \u201cjust cause\u201d provision contained in the State Personnel Act, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35 (1993), creates a \u201cproperty interest of continued employment. . . protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.\u201d Leiphart v. N.C. School of the Arts, 80 N.C. App. 339, 348, 342 S.E.2d 914, 921 (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 507, 349 S.E.2d 862 (1986); see also Nix, 106 N.C. App. at 666, 417 S.E.2d at 825; see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 501.\nThe Civil Service Act and related personnel policies governing Soles\u2019 employment likewise establish that \u201cjust cause\u201d must be shown in order for a City employee to be terminated. See, e.g., Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1992) (\u201cThe Town\u2019s ordinance, in effect, is comparable to rights given State employees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-35.\u201d)\nFor example, Raleigh Standard Procedure 300-14 (upon which Soles\u2019 discharge was based) in pertinent part provides that:\n3.1 An employee, regardless of occupation, position, profession or work performed, may be warned, reprimanded, placed on probation, demoted, transferred, suspended or dismissed/or just cause. The degree and kind of action to be taken will be based upon the sound and considered judgment of the appropriate authority in accordance with the provisions of this policy.\n3.2 The causes for suspension or dismissal fall into two categories: (1) Causes relating to performance of duties; (2) causes relating to personal conduct detrimental to City service.\n4.2Personal Conduct \u2014 The following are examples of unsatisfactory personal conduct. . . :\nk. Report to work under the influence of alcohol or illegal use of drugs, . . . where such would adversely reflect upon ability to perform assigned duties, or possession of or partaking of such items on the job.\n(Emphasis added).\nIn addition, the Commission itself expressly recognized the need for Soles\u2019 dismissal to be based upon \u201ccause.\u201d First, the Chairman stated at the close of Soles\u2019 hearing that the Commission would make findings on \u201cthe issues of whether or not there was justifiable cause to terminate Mr. Soles ....\u201d Further, the Commission included the following among the Conclusions of Law in its Final Decision: \u201c[Soles] failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that he was terminated without justifiable cause.\u201d (Emphasis added).\nWe therefore hold petitioner Soles possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in retaining his position as Engineering Aide II with the City. Consequently, the City \u201ccould not deprive [him] of [his job] without due process.\u201d Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 501; Nix, 106 N.C. App. at 666, 417 S.E.2d at 825 (\u201crespondent could not rightfully take away this interest without first complying with appropriate procedural safeguards\u201d).\nNotwithstanding, the City asserts that in adopting the Civil Service Act, our General Assembly permissibly narrowed the extent of the property interest granted City employees by providing limited procedures for termination of employment. In particular, the City maintains \u201c[t]he North Carolina legislature gave the City a presumption of correctness by placing the burden of proof on the employee ... to show \u2018by the greater weight\u2019 of the evidence that the administration\u2019s actions were wrong and that the City\u2019s discharge procedures were not properly followed.\u201d See Civil Service Act Rule .0504.\nAs support for its argument, the City relies upon the principle that employment relationships in North Carolina are generally \u201cterminable at will.\u201d See, e.g., Kearney v. County of Durham, 99 N.C. App. 349, 351, 393 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1990) (citations omitted). Absent enactment of the Civil Service Act, the City explains, Soles would have had no property interest in continued employment and thus could have been dismissed at the will of his employer. Since the General Assembly by enacting the statute conferred upon Soles greater protection than \u201cemployment at will,\u201d the argument continues, the legislature was free in its discretion to tailor procedural safeguards associated with loss of his employment as it deemed appropriate.\nHowever, Soles correctly responds that the United States Supreme Court has stated:\n\u201cProperty\u201d cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process \u201cis conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.\u201d\nLoudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 503 (alteration in original) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, 40-41 (1974)). Therefore, following the directive of Loudermill, we reject this portion of the City\u2019s argument.\nGiven Soles\u2019 constitutionally protected property interest in retaining his position with the City, the question remains as to the nature and composition of the procedural methodology which would satisfy due process guarantees. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 503 (citation omitted). Rather than attempting to draft a rule for the municipality, we believe our proper role, see, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 32, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 652-53 (citation omitted), reh\u2019g denied, 453 U.S. 927, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1981), is rather to address the narrower issue of whether the procedures followed in the case sub judice comported with the requirements of due process.\nRaleigh Civil Service Act Rule .0504 provides:\n.0504 Burden of Proof\n(a) The employee has the burd\u00e9n to prove that the action taken against him was unjustified.\n(c) The employee must prove his case by the greater weight of the evidence; that is, over fifty percent of the evidence must favor the employee\u2019s position in the matter.\nThe parties agree that determining the composition of adequate process involves a balancing test. See In re Lamm, 116 N.C. App. 382, 385, 448 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1994) (\u201cIn resolving any claimed violation of procedural due process, a balance must be struck between the respective interests of the individual and the governmental entity seeking a remedy.\u201d) (citation omitted), disc. review allowed, 339 N.C. 613, 454 S.E.2d 253 (1995); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976) (citations omitted); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 649 (citation omitted); Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-45, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 504-06 (citations omitted); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 607 (1982) (.Mathews balancing test applied in context of determining whether statutory allocation of standard of proof violates due process).\nThe Mathews case, frequently cited by our courts, provides the following specification of factors necessarily involved in the balancing process:\n[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.\nMathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33 (citation omitted).\nIn its suggested measurement of the foregoing factors, the City first asserts that Soles\u2019 interest is the \u201cdesire to have the presumption of correctness in his favor,\u201d and contends such interest \u201cwas no more at stake than [that of] any other employee.\u201d Further, the City argues Soles\u2019 interest was adequately protected because the \u201cnature of the misconduct was not disclosed to the publicf;] . . . [and Soles] was not faced with criminal sanctions. The City could not prosecute him for the alleged offense. And, he could not be put on probation, fined or incarcerated.\u201d\nAdditionally, the City claims its own \u201cinterest in insuring that employees were not using illegal drugs at work outweighed [Soles\u2019] desire to have the presumption of correctness in his favor.\u201d As a matter of policy, the City urges us to accord greater weight to its need \u201cto discipline and terminate employees who do not meet [its] standard . . . especially . . . when a question of drug use is involved.\u201d\nLastly, based upon the City Engineer\u2019s extensive investigation into the accusation against Soles and affording the latter two opportunities to respond, the City contends there was \u201csubstantial competent and material evidence\u201d before the Commission to support its findings and conclusions. Thus, the City concludes, requiring Soles to show at the hearing that he was wrongfully discharged did not in any event prevent the Commission from making an \u201cinformative and correct\u201d decision.\nHowever, our balancing of the three factors enunciated in Mathews produces a different result. First, the \u201cprivate interest\u201d affected by the challenged procedure in the case sub judice must be considered. In this context, we again find guidance in the Supreme Court\u2019s Loudermill decision:\n[T]he significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood. While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job.\nLoudermill, 470 U.S. at 543, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 504 (citations omitted). Substantial weight must therefore be accorded Soles\u2019 interest in retaining the employment in which he possessed a constitutionally protected property right.\nRegarding the second factor (\u201cthe risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards\u201d), we agree with Soles that requiring the dismissed employee to prove that the \u201caction taken against him was unjustified\u201d significantly increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the right to retain employment. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460, 1472 (\u201cwhere the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome\u201d), reh\u2019g denied, 358 U.S. 860, 3 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1958).\nIn addition, the risk of error would indisputably be minimized if the appropriate \u201csubstitute procedural safeguard\u201d was employed in circumstances such as these \u2014 i.e., the City was required to carry the burden of proving its employee was terminated based upon cause. Indeed, as with the \u201csignificance of the private interest in retaining employment,\u201d Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 504, the \u201cprobable value\u201d of such a substitute procedural safeguard \u201ccannot be gainsaid.\u201d Id.\nConcerning the third Mathews factor (the City\u2019s interest served by the particular procedures utilized), the City\u2019s legitimate interest in \u201cinsuring that employees [are] not using illegal drugs at work ... [and in] maintaining] good and efficient employees for the efficient operation of the government\u201d must be acknowledged. While the balancing test consequently becomes a much closer decision concerning this final factor, we nonetheless believe the scales tip in favor of an individual employee\u2019s right to retain constitutionally protected employment until the City proves cause exists for termination.\nMoreover, while the City asserts \u201cfiscal and administrative burdens\u201d would be required upon implementation of the appropriate \u201csubstitute procedural safeguard,\u201d we are convinced that should any additional difficulty or expense be incurred by the City, such would be minimal. Stated otherwise, because the City previously conducted an investigation and compiled evidence it believed sufficient to warrant Soles\u2019 dismissal, requiring it thereafter to show just cause for his discharge would add little, if any, \u201cfiscal and administrative burden.\u201d\nFinally, in reaching our decision we are mindful that \u201c[d]ue process of law formulates a, flexible concept, to insure fundamental fairness in judicial or administrative proceedings which may adversely affect the protected rights of an individual.\u201d Lamm, 116 N.C. App. at 386, 448 S.E.2d at 128 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). We also share the trial court\u2019s stated concern that the requirements of procedural due process are heightened when, as here, an \u201cemployee is accused of misconduct which amounts to a criminal offense against the laws of the State of North Carolina . . . .\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3) (1993).\nFor the reasons discussed hereinabove, we hold that the procedures utilized by the City and the Commission in terminating Soles\u2019 employment were constitutionally infirm. Specifically, requiring Soles to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that his termination was unjustified, see Rule .0504(a) and (c), violated his right to procedural due process. We therefore affirm the judgment of the superior court ordering that this matter be remanded to the Raleigh Civil Service Commission for further proceedings consistent with the court\u2019s determination that Rule .0504\u2019s allocation of the burden of proof is unconstitutional.\nAffirmed.\nJudges COZORT and GREENE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "City Attorney Thomas A. McCormick, by Associate City Attorney Lisa Harper Graham, for intervenor-appellant.", "Law Offices of Jack B. Crawley, Jr., by Jack B. Crawley, Jr., for petitioner-appellee.", "Edelstein & Payne, by M. Travis Payne, and North Carolina Civil Liberties Union, by William G. Simpson, Jr., appearing as amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN M. SOLES, Petitioner-Appellee v. THE CITY OF RALEIGH CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent and THE CITY OF RALEIGH, Intervenor-Appellant\nNo. 9310SC235\nFiled 6 June 1995\nConstitutional Law \u00a7 105 (NCI4th); Municipal Corporations \u00a7 380 (NCI4th)\u2014 termination of employee without justifiable cause \u2014 burden of proof on employee \u2014 violation of due process\nThe trial court did not err in holding that the burden of proof placed upon an employee to establish that he was terminated without justifiable cause as stated in the Rules of the Raleigh Civil Service Commission violated petitioner\u2019s procedural due process rights, since petitioner possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in retaining his position with the city; the city could not deprive him of his job without due process; and the procedures in this case did not satisfy due process guarantees when considered in light of a balancing test involving the private interest affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the government\u2019s interest including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional procedural requirement would entail.\nAm Jur 2d, Constitutional Law \u00a7\u00a7 804 et seq., 821, 822.\nAppeal by intervenor from judgment entered 21 December 1992 by Judge W. Stephen Allen, Sr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 1994.\nCity Attorney Thomas A. McCormick, by Associate City Attorney Lisa Harper Graham, for intervenor-appellant.\nLaw Offices of Jack B. Crawley, Jr., by Jack B. Crawley, Jr., for petitioner-appellee.\nEdelstein & Payne, by M. Travis Payne, and North Carolina Civil Liberties Union, by William G. Simpson, Jr., appearing as amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0088-01", "first_page_order": 122, "last_page_order": 131 }