{ "id": 11917335, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL THOMAS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Thomas", "decision_date": "1995-08-15", "docket_number": "No. 934SC1056", "first_page": "708", "last_page": "719", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 N.C. App. 708" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 ALR Fed. 451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "38 ALR4th 1237", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "89 ALR3d 102", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4688604 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "testimony properly excluded when record discloses notice requirement not satisfied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520311 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "testimony properly excluded when record discloses notice requirement not satisfied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.C.L. Rev. 1352", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720", "parenthetical": "\"The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction ....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564083 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "\"The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction ....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683223 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.W.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9968772 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14", "parenthetical": "testimony of neighbor recounting statement to her by victim's mother (defendant's wife" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/623/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 458462 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/177/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891-92", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570181 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 L. Ed. 2d 657", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1780096, 1780311, 1780273, 1779959, 1779866 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0929-05", "/us/441/0929-02", "/us/441/0929-01", "/us/441/0929-04", "/us/441/0929-03" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563082 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574927 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8580301 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "an admissible excited utterance must have been made by \"one who either participated in the transaction or witnessed the act or fact concerning which the declaration or statement was made.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/178/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568423, 2566509, 2572089, 2566972, 2570495 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0476-02", "/nc/321/0476-01", "/nc/321/0476-04", "/nc/321/0476-03", "/nc/321/0476-05" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465-66", "parenthetical": "between eight and fifteen minutes after the mattress upon which he was sleeping was intentionally set afire, out-of-court declarant escaped from a burning building and gave a statement to responding officers" }, { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "out-of-court declarant was \"very upset and excited\" and a police officer \"had to tell him to calm down and take a minute\" before he made a statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358157 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241-43", "parenthetical": "between eight and fifteen minutes after the mattress upon which he was sleeping was intentionally set afire, out-of-court declarant escaped from a burning building and gave a statement to responding officers" }, { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643-44", "parenthetical": "immediately after seeing defendant shoot a woman in the head, and while defendant remained bent over her holding the gun, out-of-court declarant made a statement which was overheard by others" }, { "page": "644", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4772035 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597-99", "parenthetical": "immediately after seeing defendant shoot a woman in the head, and while defendant remained bent over her holding the gun, out-of-court declarant made a statement which was overheard by others" }, { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "846 F.2d 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1788397 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947", "parenthetical": "recitation of factors to be considered in determining whether statement was offered while declarant remained under the stress of the startling event" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/846/0941-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" }, { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "out-of-court declarant was \"crying quite a bit, very upset[;] [hjysterical.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2504371 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748", "parenthetical": "\"The fact that the victim spoke in response to a question does not defeat the trustworthiness of her utterance.\"" }, { "page": "747-48", "parenthetical": "out-of-court declarant told a policeman a man had entered her home and raped her approximately ten minutes after the alleged attack occurred" }, { "page": "748", "parenthetical": "out-of-court declarant was \"crying and extremely upset\" when she gave a statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566386 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "\"The fact that the victim spoke in response to a question does not defeat the trustworthiness of her utterance.\"" }, { "page": "76-77" }, { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "statement of victim within ten hours of time she left her abuser's custody" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524160 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "statement of victim within ten hours of time she left her abuser's custody" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.W.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8674220 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/110/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562949 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "841", "parenthetical": "quoting with approval J. Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court Statement of Sexual Abuse at Trial, Child Sexual Abuse and the Law 153, 155 (1983)" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "843", "parenthetical": "child's statement to her grandmother between two and three days of being sexually abused held admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule" }, { "page": "843" }, { "page": "847" }, { "page": "843-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715827 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523508 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 L. Ed. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 L. Ed. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531234, 2531972, 2532363, 2530606, 2529022 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0625-02", "/nc/334/0625-03", "/nc/334/0625-01", "/nc/334/0625-04", "/nc/334/0625-05" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226", "parenthetical": "five-year-old told a playmate's mother she was sexually abused three days after the event" }, { "page": "226", "parenthetical": "circumstance that child's statements \"not in response to any questioning on the part of the adult to whom they were made\" a factor in determining admissibility" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525843 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0491-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1139, "char_count": 25889, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.63540348840754e-07, "percentile": 0.9269038465176928 }, "sha256": "7388685be6bb41e9c555ec0cb7cf9e1839370194f9015044c102195f4cbfd7b1", "simhash": "1:07b92c2ec571254c", "word_count": 4256 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:59.579385+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and MARTIN, Mark D. concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL THOMAS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals convictions on two counts of first degree sexual offense (by anal and genital penetration) and one count of taking indecent liberties with a minor child. By judgment entered 20 April 1993, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment on the first degree sexual offense counts and the presumptive three-year sentence on the indecent liberties charge, also to run concurrently.\nIn his appellate brief, defendant brings forth seven assignments of error for our consideration, six of which concern evidentiary rulings made by the court. In particular, defendant maintains the court erred to his prejudice by allowing the testimony of Teresa Meadows (Meadows) and Angela Eubanks (Eubanks) under the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d exception to the hearsay rule, thereby entitling him to a new trial. As we agree with this contention, we do not address defendant\u2019s remaining arguments.\nIn pertinent part, the evidence at trial tended to show the following: In the fall of 1990, Meadows\u2019 daughter L. attended the same kindergarten class as A. (defendant\u2019s five-year-old daughter, the alleged victim), and the two girls were good friends. According to Meadows, on the Wednesday evening after Thanksgiving 1990, L. was \u201cmoping around\u201d instead of being her normal \u201cactive\u201d self. When Meadows asked L. if she was sick, the latter replied that \u201cshe had something on her mind.\u201d Upon further questioning by her mother, L. related that A. was crying earlier that day on the playground because her \u201cpee pee hurt.\u201d When L. had asked A. what was wrong, A. explained that her father, defendant herein, had \u201cgot drunk over the weekend and was playing with her pee pee.\u201d L. also informed her mother that A. had exacted a promise from L. and another friend B. not to reveal to anyone what they had heard. Nevertheless, upon the suggestion of the girls\u2019 kindergarten teacher, Meadows subsequently reported the details of L.\u2019s account to the Jones County Department of Social Services (DSS). When Meadows asked L. about the incident shortly before trial, however, the latter did not remember it.\nEubanks testified that her five-year-old daughter B. was also in A.\u2019s kindergarten class. According to Eubanks, as she was putting B. to bed the Wednesday night after Thanksgiving 1990, B. told her A. had said her parents were getting a divorce. B. was \u201cnot upset or anything,\u201d but \u201cseemed to be concerned.\u201d Eubanks attempted to reassure her daughter, whereupon B. further related that A. had mentioned her father had been drinking a lot recently and that \u201cover the holidays . . . he had gotten drunk and played with her private parts.\u201d Eubanks testified that she advised B. to tell A. to report the matter to their kindergarten teacher. When B. came home from school the next day, however, she told her mother A. had not spoken with the teacher because she was afraid. Eubanks observed that when reporting A.\u2019s inaction, B. \u201cwas not upset.\u201d At that point, Eubanks herself called the teacher and later contacted DSS as well. Eubanks did not discuss the matter further with her daughter and believed at trial that \u201cwith the time frame . . . she wouldn\u2019t remember.\u201d\nA. did not testify at trial, nor did either of her two kindergarten classmates.\nDefendant\u2019s initial assignment of error is directed at the testimony of Meadows and Eubanks. He argues evidence elicited from each consisted of \u201cdouble hearsay\u201d not falling within the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d hearsay exception, and that its admission constituted prejudicial error. We agree.\nHearsay is \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C.R. Evid. 801(c) (1992). Any such statement is \u201cinadmissible except as provided by statute or the rules of evidence.\u201d State v. Rogers, 109 N.C. App. 491, 498, 428 S.E.2d 220, 224, disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 625, 435 S.E.2d 348 (1993), cert. denied, 128 L. Ed. 2d 54, reh\u2019g denied, 128 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1994); see also N.C.R. Evid. 802 (1992).\nIn the case sub judice, the challenged testimony by Meadows and Eubanks was offered to prove that defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged. With respect to the presentation by each woman, there were two out-of-court assertions involved \u2014 that is, A.\u2019s comments to L. and B., and the subsequent statements L. and B. made to their respective mothers. Because in each instance the\nout-of-court statements [were] offered for the truth of the matter, . . . this is a double hearsay situation. Each statement, therefore, must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule in order to [have] be[en] admissible.\nState v. Perry, 54 N.C. App. 479, 481, 283 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1981) (citation omitted).\nThe trial court proceeded in a most conscientious and thorough manner. After conducting an extensive voir dire hearing into the circumstances surrounding A.\u2019s statement to L. and B. and each child\u2019s respective report thereafter to her mother, it recited detailed findings, in support of its decision to allow the challenged testimony under the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d exception to the hearsay rule. See N.C.R. Evid. 803(2) (1992). Pertinent particulars of the trial court\u2019s rulings will be included herein as necessary.\nI.\nWe first consider A.\u2019s conversation with L. and B. As noted above, on the Wednesday following Thanksgiving 1990, L. and B. discovered A. in tears on the playground at kindergarten. Because they were concerned about A.\u2019s distress, the girls inquired of her what was wrong. A. related that her father had gotten drunk over the weekend and \u201cplay[ed] with her pee pee\u201d or \u201cplayed with her private parts.\u201d The trial court specifically found that A.\u2019s statement to L. and B. was a spontaneous response to their questions, made while A. was under \u201cobvious distress\u201d precipitated by events which occurred \u201cwithin a four to five day period at most.\u201d Reasoning that a child of five \u201cis characteristic [ally] free of conscious fabrication for longer periods [of time] including ... four or five days,\u201d the court concluded that A.\u2019s assertions to L. and B. fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See Rule 803(2).\nRule 803(2) provides:\nThe following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:\n(2) Excited Utterance. \u2014 A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.\nIt is well-established that in order for an assertion to come within the parameters of this particular exception, \u201cthere must be (1) a sufficiently startling experience suspending reflective thought and (2) a spontaneous reaction, not one resulting from reflection or fabrication.\u201d State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 86, 337 S.E.2d 833, 841 (1985) (citation omitted). While the period of time between the event and the statement is without doubt a relevant factor, the element of time is not always material. State v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 213-14, 203 S.E.2d 830, 833-34 (1974). \u201c \u2018[T]he modem trend is to consider whether the delay in making the statement provided an opportunity to manufacture or fabricate the statement.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 315 N.C. at 87, 337 S.E.2d at 841 (quoting with approval J. Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child\u2019s Out-of-Court Statement of Sexual Abuse at Trial, Child Sexual Abuse and the Law 153, 155 (1983)).\nIn addition, the requirements of a sufficiently stressful event and of spontaneity entail subjective standards. Rogers, 109 N.C. App. at 501, 428 S.E.2d at 226. For example,\n[w]ith regard to statements made by young children, our Courts have adopted \u201ca broad and liberal interpretation [of the requirements of Rule 803(2)],\u201d and in doing so recognize that \u201cthe stress and spontaneity upon which the exception is based is often present for longer periods of time in young children than in adults.\u201d\nId. (quoting Smith, 315 N.C. at 87, 337 S.E.2d at 841). Further,\n\u201cThis ascertainment of prolonged stress is born of three observations. First, a child is apt to repress the incident. Second, it is often unlikely that a child will report this kind of incident to anyone but the mother. Third, the characteristics of young children work to produce declarations \u2018free of conscious fabrication\u2019 for a longer period after the incident than with adults.\u201d\nSmith, 315 N.C. at 87-88, 337 S.E.2d at 841 (quoting State v. Padilla, 329 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)).\nWe hold the victim\u2019s conversation with L. and B. on the playground was of such a nature as to have been properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Although the precise date of the alleged assault is unclear from the record, A. told her friends on the Wednesday after Thanksgiving that it occurred sometime during the previous weekend. As the trial court found, therefore, A.\u2019s statement on the playground came \u201cwithin a four to five day period at most\u201d of the incident of which she spoke. In the circumstances of this case, we do not believe the passage of four or five days detracts from the \u201cspontaneity\u201d of A.\u2019s response. See Smith, 315 N.C. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843 (child\u2019s statement to her grandmother between two and three days of being sexually abused held admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule); see also Rogers, 109 N.C. App. at 501, 428 S.E.2d at 226 (five-year-old told a playmate\u2019s mother she was sexually abused three days after the event); see also State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 595, 367 S.E.2d 139, 146 (1988) (statement of victim within ten hours of time she left her abuser\u2019s custody).\nNor do we agree with defendant\u2019s suggestion that because A.\u2019s comments were made in response to questions posed by her friends, they necessarily lacked spontaneity. See State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 72, 77, 361 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1987) (\u201cThe fact that the victim spoke in response to a question does not defeat the trustworthiness of her utterance.\u201d) (citation omitted); but see Rogers, 109 N.C. App. at 501, 428 S.E.2d at 226 (circumstance that child\u2019s statements \u201cnot in response to any questioning on the part of the adult to whom they were made\u201d a factor in determining admissibility) (emphasis added).\nSignificantly, A. was crying and obviously upset when she confided in her little friends, an emotional state indicating she remained \u201cunder the . . . stress caused by the event\u201d at the time of her statement. State v. Jolly, 332 N.C. 351, 360, 420 S.E.2d 661, 667 (1992). In addition, the infliction of sexual abuse upon a five-year-old child by a parent indisputably constitutes a \u201csufficiently startling experience\u201d for purposes of the exception. See Rogers, 109 N.C. App. at 501, 428 S.E.2d at 226.\nAccordingly, although A.\u2019s out-of-court statements to L. and B. were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (i.e, that A. had been sexually abused by defendant), we hold the trial court properly concluded that the first level of the \u201cdouble hearsay\u201d testimony at issue fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.\nII.\nWe are faced with a more troubling circumstance, however, when considering the second level of hearsay contained in the testimony of Meadows and Eubanks, that is, the statements made by L. and B. to their mothers.\nOf the factors noted above \u2014 occurrence of a stressful event, passage of time between the event and statement, emotional state indicating declarant remained under stress of the event, and whether the statement came in response to interrogation, especially of a child by an adult \u2014 to be considered in ruling upon an \u201cexcited utterance,\u201d only the temporal aspect of the second hearsay level compares favorably with the first in terms of admissibility. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988) (recitation of factors to be considered in determining whether statement was offered while declarant remained under the stress of the startling event).\nFirst; it is at a minimum open to question whether receipt of a communication that one\u2019s friend has been the victim of sexual abuse (as opposed to being victimized oneself), while no doubt a shocking or disturbing revelation, constitutes a sufficiently startling or stressful event for purposes of the exception. See, e.g., State v. Wingard, 317 N.C. 590, 597-99, 346 S.E.2d 638, 643-44 (1986) (immediately after seeing defendant shoot a woman in the head, and while defendant remained bent over her holding the gun, out-of-court declarant made a statement which was overheard by others); see also State v. Kerley, 87 N.C. App. 240, 241-43, 360 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (1987) (between eight and fifteen minutes after the mattress upon which he was sleeping was intentionally set afire, out-of-court declarant escaped from a burning building and gave a statement to responding officers), disc. review denied, appeal dismissed, 321 N.C. 476, 364 S.E.2d 661 (1988); see also Murphy, 321 N.C. at 76-77, 361 S.E.2d at 747-48 (out-of-court declarant told a policeman a man had entered her home and raped her approximately ten minutes after the alleged attack occurred). Moreover, B.\u2019s first declaration to her mother, arguably the matter uppermost in her mind, was that A.\u2019s parents were getting a divorce, not that A. had revealed sexual abuse by her father.\nIn this context, we also note authority requiring that the stressful event giving rise to the excited utterance exception of Rule 803(2) must \u201crelate to the main event,\u201d State v. Jones, 362 S.E.2d 330, 333 (W. Va. 1987), or \u201clie at the heart of the suit.\u201d See 4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, \u00a7 435 (2d ed. 1994); see also Jones, 362 S.E.2d at 333 (an admissible excited utterance must have been made by \u201cone who either participated in the transaction or witnessed the act or fact concerning which the declaration or statement was made.\u201d) (citation omitted). The declarations of L. and B. to Meadows and Eubanks were not made in reaction to the central event at issue herein, that is, the alleged sexual abuse of A., nor did either child witness or participate in that alleged abuse. Under the reasoning adopted by the foregoing authorities, therefore, the statements of the two girls could not qualify as excited utterances. However, while such prerequisites for admissibility may have merit, our decision herein need not be grounded upon this analysis.\nNext, assuming arguendo that the passage of several hours between the receipt of A.\u2019s revelation by L. and B. and their subsequent reports to their mothers was insufficient to dilute the spontaneity of the children\u2019s comments, we consider the emotional state of L. and B. during the conversations at issue. In neither instance was the child\u2019s statement to her mother made under the influence of apparent distress caused by receipt of the information. Neither child was crying or appeared emotionally moved. L. was described by her mother as \u201cmoping around\u201d and explained simply that she had something on her mind. Meadows did not relate any trauma involved on the part of L. in recounting what was \u201con her mind.\u201d According to Eubanks, B. seemed \u201cconcerned,\u201d but \u201cnot upset,\u201d when she volunteered to her mother during their customary nighttime conversation that A.\u2019s parents were getting a divorce and that A. had stated her father had \u201cgotten drunk and played with her private parts.\u201d\nBy contrast, A. was crying and visibly disturbed at the time of her statement to her friends. See, e.g., Jolly, 332 N.C. at 360, 420 S.E.2d at 667 (out-of-court declarant was \u201ccrying quite a bit, very upset[;] [hjysterical.\u201d); see also Murphy, 321 N.C. at 77, 361 S.E.2d at 748 (out-of-court declarant was \u201ccrying and extremely upset\u201d when she gave a statement); see also Kerley, 87 N.C. App. at 243, 360 S.E.2d at 466 (out-of-court declarant was \u201cvery upset and excited\u201d and a police officer \u201chad to tell him to calm down and take a minute\u201d before he made a statement).\nAdditionally, in the case of L., she spoke of the incidents on the playground only in response to her mother\u2019s questioning whether she was sick. See Rogers, 109 N.C. App. at 501, 428 S.E.2d at 226.\nFinally, we note that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is a codification of the common law exception of \u201cspontaneous utterance.\u201d Wingard, 317 N.C. at 598, 346 S.E.2d at 644 (citation omitted). Pre-Rule cases used the term res gestae, meaning \u201cthings done,\u201d to describe spontaneous utterances. See 2 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 221 at 102-05 (4th ed. 1993). Under the res gestae rule, a statement made spontaneously and concurrently with an incident carries with it an inherent degree of credibility and will be admissible as a hearsay exception because of its spontaneous nature. See Carroll v. Guffey, 156 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ill. Ct. App. 1959). In other words, \u201c \u2018[a] statement made as part of the res gestae does not narrate a past event, \u25a0 but it is the event speaking through the person and therefore . . . precludes the idea of design.\u2019 \u201d State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 570, 280 S.E.2d 912, 925 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327, 342, 245 S.E.2d 663, 672 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 441 U.S. 929, 60 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1979)).\nThree requirements were established for admissibility as part of the res gestae:\n(a) The declaration must be of such spontaneous character as to be a sufficient safeguard of its trustworthiness; that is, preclude the likelihood of reflection and fabrication; instinctive rather than narrative; (b) it must be contemporaneous with the transaction, or so closely connected with the main fact as to be practically inseparable therefrom; and (c) must have some relevancy to the fact sought to be proved.\nLittle v. Brake Co., 255 N.C. 451, 455-56, 121 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (1961) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\n\u201cClosely scrutinized,\u201d see Brantley v. State, 338 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985), the remarks of L. and B. to their mothers appear to be of \u201cnarrative\u201d rather than \u201cinstinctive\u201d character. L. was described by her mother as \u201cmoping around\u201d and acting as if something was on her mind, prompting Meadows\u2019 inquiry into what was troubling her; B.\u2019s mother recalled her daughter seemed \u201cconcerned.\u201d The conversation between each girl and her mother was in the nature of reporting the day\u2019s events. L. related what she heard that day after questioning by her mother, and B. recounted her conversation with A. during a routine mother-daughter talk before bedtime. The girls\u2019 statements would thus not have been admissible as part of the res gestae, the precursor to the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d exception. See, e.g., Cannon v. State, 623 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (testimony of neighbor recounting statement to her by victim\u2019s mother (defendant\u2019s wife) of defendant\u2019s inculpatory remarks made twenty-four hours prior to conversation between neighbor and victim\u2019s mother constituted double hearsay not within either excited utter-' anee or res gestae exceptions to hearsay rule).\nBased on the foregoing, we hold the statements of out-of-court declarants L. and B. to their mothers \u2014 the second level of hearsay contained in the testimony of Meadows and Eubanks \u2014 do not fall within the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, admission of those statements into evidence as \u201cexcited utterances\u201d was improper.\nIII.\nAlthough the \u201c[e]rroneous admission of hearsay . . . evidence . . . is not always so prejudicial as to require a new trial,\u201d State v. Sills, 311 N.C. 370, 378, 317 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1984) (citations omitted), given the substantive importance of the testimony of Meadows and Eubanks as the only direct evidence pointing to defendant\u2019s guilt, such error was indeed prejudicial to defendant\u2019s case. Accordingly, we must award a new trial. State v. Milby and State v. Boyd, 302 N.C. 137, 142, 273 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1981) (\u201cTh\u00e9 test for prejudicial error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction ....\u201d)\nWe note in closing that during oral argument before this Court, counsel expressed the opinion that the hearsay statements of L. and B. to their mothers may have been admissible under the \u201ccatch-all\u201d hearsay exception. See N.C.R. Evid. 803(24) (1992); see also Susan K. Datesman, State v. Smith: Facilitating the Admissibility of Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1352 (1986). While the prosecutor at the voir dire hearing in the trial court suggested the evidence might be admissible under Rule 803(24), the State may seek admission of testimony pursuant to this exception only if it:\ngives written notice stating [its] intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it ... to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of offering the statement to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.\nSee Rule 803(24). No such notice appears of record herein. See In re Hayden, 96 N.C. App. 77, 82, 384 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1989) (testimony properly excluded when record discloses notice requirement not satisfied).\nBecause the trial court did not admit the evidence under Rule 803(24) and the State does not argue this position in its brief, moreover, the feasibility of this particular exception is not presented for our review. See N.C.R. App. R 28(a); see also Smith, 315 N.C. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843. In any event, admissibility of evidence under the \u201ccatch-all\u201d exception is proper only after the trial court undertakes a particularized analysis and thereafter \u201center[s] appropriate statements, rationale, or findings of fact and conclusions of law ... in the record to support his discretionary decision....\u201d Id. at 97, 337 S.E.2d at 847. While extensive, the trial court\u2019s analysis and findings herein were directed at the excited utterance exception and not the special requirements of Rule 803(24). See id. at 90-98, 337 S.E.2d at 843-48.\nBecause of our disposition of this matter, we decline to address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error (relating primarily to certain evidentiary rulings made by the court). See Akzona, Inc. v. Southern Railway Co., 314 N.C. 488, 497-98, 334 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1985). \u201cOur trial judges are eminently capable of ruling on eviden-tiary issues. We feel it is proper to defer these matters to the trial judge who presides over the continuation of this case.\u201d Id. at 498, 334 S.E.2d at 765.\nNew trial.\nJudges GREENE and MARTIN, Mark D. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Wanda G. Bryant, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defenders Mark D. Montgomery and Gordon Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL THOMAS\nNo. 934SC1056\n(Filed 15 August 1995)\nEvidence and Witnesses \u00a7 929 (NCI4th)\u2014 child sexual abuse\u2014 victim\u2019s statements to friends \u2014 friends\u2019 statements to mothers \u2014 admissibility of mothers\u2019 testimony\nThe trial court erred in a prosecution for first degree sexual, offense and taking indecent liberties with a child by admitting under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule the testimony of the mothers of two of the victim\u2019s kindergarten classmates as to what the daughters said that the victim had said to them about what her father had done. The testimony was offered to prove that defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged and was double hearsay because there were two out-of-court statements involved. The victim\u2019s conversation with her classmates was of such a nature as to have been properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; although the precise date of the alleged assault is unclear, the trial court found that it came within a four to five day period of the incident and, in the circumstances of this case, the passage of four or five days does not detract from the \u201cspontaneity\u201d of the response. However, as to the statements by the classmates to their mothers, it is open to question as to whether the receipt of a communication that one\u2019s friend has been the victim of sexual assault constitutes a sufficiently startling or stressful event for purposes of the exception; and, even so, the declarations were not made in reaction to the central event, nor did either child witness or participate in the alleged abuse; in neither instance was the child\u2019s statement to her mother made under the influence of apparent distress caused by receipt of the information; and the remarks of the classmates to their mothers appear to be of narrative rather than instinctive character and would not have been admissible as part of the res gestae, the precursor to the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d exception. Given the substantial importance of the testimony as the only direct evidence pointing to defendant\u2019s guilt, the error was prejudicial. It was noted that the trial court\u2019s analysis and findings herein were directed at the excited utterance exception and not the special requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(24).\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 865.\nTime element as affecting admissibility of statement or complaint made by victim of sex crime as res gestae, spontaneous exclamation, or excited utterance. 89 ALR3d 102.\nNecessity, in criminal prosecution, of independent evidence of principal act to aHow admission, under res gestae or excited utterance exception to hearsay rule, of statement made at time of, or subsequent to, principal act. 38 ALR4th 1237.\nWhen is hearsay statement an \u201cexcited utterance\u201d admissible under Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 48 ALR Fed. 451.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 April 1993 by Judge William C. Gore, Jr. in Jones County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 August 1994.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Wanda G. Bryant, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defenders Mark D. Montgomery and Gordon Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0708-01", "first_page_order": 742, "last_page_order": 753 }