{ "id": 11917406, "name": "NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v. F. ROGER PAGE, JR., DORIS B. PAGE and PACE OIL CO., INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Page", "decision_date": "1995-08-15", "docket_number": "No. COA94-1085", "first_page": "730", "last_page": "738", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 N.C. App. 730" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131407 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "676-77" }, { "page": "677" }, { "page": "677-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572803 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Campbell L. Rev. 71", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Campbell L. Rev.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572343 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520808 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562211, 8562157, 8562127, 8562066, 8562100 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "subsequent history not reported in S.E.2d" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0092-05", "/nc/301/0092-04", "/nc/301/0092-03", "/nc/301/0092-01", "/nc/301/0092-02" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "subsequent history not reported in S.E.2d" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549625 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-172", "parenthetical": "subsequent history not reported in S.E.2d" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714861, 4717589, 4718136, 4718201, 4717178 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0183-03", "/nc/315/0183-05", "/nc/315/0183-02", "/nc/315/0183-04", "/nc/315/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "denial of summary judgment is not final judgment and is not immediately appealable" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526659 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "granting of partial summary judgment is interlocutory order from which there is ordinarily no right of appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129791 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521434 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0244-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 769, "char_count": 19309, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5982330038295557e-06, "percentile": 0.9926289138864852 }, "sha256": "73d278c3611b555e0288eb459079f810f225ed512498d98f33a6fb34397ae439", "simhash": "1:936854aacd4cbf72", "word_count": 3081 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:59.579385+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v. F. ROGER PAGE, JR., DORIS B. PAGE and PACE OIL CO., INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nThis appeal arises out of a contractual dispute between plaintiff North Carolina Department of Transportation (the Department) and defendant F. Roger Page, Jr. (Page) concerning the relocation of State Secondary Road 1568 (SR 1568) on Topsail Island, North Carolina. Page owned numerous properties on Topsail Island, including one tract which was under option to Resort Equities, Inc., who planned to build a condominium resort (Villa Capriani) on the site. Resort Equities\u2019 plans required the relocation of SR 1568, and Page agreed to assist Resort Equities in negotiating the relocation of the road. On 13 January 1987, Page and the Department executed an \u201cAgreement for Relocation of SR 1568\u201d (the 1987 agreement). Page agreed to construct the entire 4.0 mile portion of the new SR 1568 at his expense and to obtain the necessary right-of-ways. Page further agreed to deed the relocated SR 1568 and associated right-of-ways to the Department upon completion. The Department agreed to accept Page\u2019s tender of the road and to abandon the corresponding portion of the old SR 1568 upon completion of construction.\nConstruction of Phase I of the new SR 1568 began more than a year after the 1987 agreement was executed. This delay occasioned a corresponding delay in the construction of Villa Capriani. These delays, combined with overruns in construction costs for the road relocation, caused severe financial difficulties for Page, who had invested considerable funds into both the development of Villa Capriani and the road relocation.\nOn 20 September 1989, Page tendered Phase I of the new SR 1568 to the Department and requested that the Department accept it and abandon the corresponding section of the old road. The Department refused Page\u2019s tender. On 13 October 1989, the Board of Transportation passed a resolution which conditioned the Department\u2019s acceptance of Phase I and its abandonment of the corresponding section of the old road on, among other things, the execution of \u201ca supplemental agreement ensuring completion of the remainder of SR 1568\u201d and Page\u2019s provision of a \u201csurety or cash bond in an amount determined by the Secretary of Transportation ... to be adequate to cover the estimated cost of the right of way and construction of the uncompleted portion of SR 1568. ...\u201d On 19 October 1989, the parties executed a \u201cSupplemental Agreement for Relocation of SR 1568,\u201d and Page and his wife, Doris, signed a \u201cGuaranty of Performance\u201d individually and as officers of defendant Pace Oil Company, Inc. On the following day, the Department accepted Phase I and abandoned the corresponding portion of the old road. Page did not complete the remainder of the construction of the new SR 1568, and the Department completed the project.\nOn 29 April 1991, the Department filed suit alleging that Page breached the 1987 and 1989 agreements and that Doris Page and Pace Oil Company, Inc. had guaranteed his performance in the 1989 guaranty. Defendants answered and counterclaimed, alleging that the Department breached the 1987 agreement by conditioning its performance thereunder on the execution of the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty; that the agreements were void as illegal bargains; that the State interfered with Page\u2019s performance through a campaign of harassment, interference, and delay; and that the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty were obtained by coercion and duress.\nThe Department moved for summary judgment on all issues except damages, and defendants moved for summary judgment on all issues. On 13 May 1994, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion and granted the Department\u2019s motion as to defendants\u2019 first defense (alleging the State\u2019s interference with Page\u2019s performance), their third and fourth defenses (alleging that the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty were obtained through coercion and duress), their tenth defense (alleging illegality), and their eleventh defense (alleging frustration of purpose). The trial court denied the Department\u2019s motion as to the remaining defenses.\nDuring pretrial hearings, the Department moved that defendants be prevented from presenting any evidence which, but for the court\u2019s summary judgment order, might have been used to show that the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty were obtained by coercion and duress. Defendants argued that this evidence was necessary to show that the Department breached the 1987 agreement by conditioning its performance thereunder on defendants\u2019 execution of the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty. The trial court granted the Department\u2019s motion. After the jury was empaneled, but before opening statements began, defendants gave notice of appeal, and the trial court declared a mistrial.\nThe Department argues that the trial court\u2019s order and rulings are interlocutory and not immediately appealable. An order or judgment is interlocutory if it is made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the entire controversy. Cagle v. Teachy, 111 N.C. App. 244, 247, 431 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1993). There is generally no right to appeal an interlocutory order. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994). The purpose of this rule is \u201c \u2018to prevent fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial court to bring the case to final' judgment before it is presented to the appellate courts.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Fraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 655, 331 S.E.2d 217, 218, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985)).\nHowever, there are two avenues by which a party may immediately appeal an interlocutory order or judgment. First, if the order or judgment is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties, and the trial court certifies the case for appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b), an immediate appeal will lie. Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253. Second, an appeal is permitted under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 l-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(l) if the trial court\u2019s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. Id.\nDefendants appeal the trial court\u2019s order granting the Department\u2019s motion for summary judgment on defendants\u2019 third and fourth defenses, alleging coercion and duress, and denying defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on their second defense, alleging that the Department breached the 1987 agreement by conditioning its performance thereunder on defendants\u2019 signing the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty. The court\u2019s order did not completely dispose of the case and is therefore interlocutory. See Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253 (granting of partial summary judgment is interlocutory order from which there is ordinarily no right of appeal); Fraser, 75 N.C. App. at 655, 331 S.E.2d at 218 (denial of summary judgment is not final judgment and is not immediately appealable).\nIn the instant case, it appears that the trial court attempted to certify the case for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), stating,\n[T]he Court has ... no bases in law that I can determine to prevent the defendants from giving notice of appeal, and the law seems to be clear once notice of appeal is given, until the Court of Appeals or some Appellate Court determines this is an interlocutory appeal that does not affect a substantial right, that I have no way of precluding counsel from giving notice of appeal and have no way of causing this trial to go forward.\nThe court signed an appeal entry on 8 June 1994. This Court has held that \u201cthe signing of an appeal entry by the trial court cannot, in and of itself, be held to satisfy the affirmative act of certification required by Rule 54(b).\u201d Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 171-172, 265 S.E.2d 240, 247, appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 92, (1980) (subsequent history not reported in S.E.2d). Thus, the trial court\u2019s attempt to certify the case for appeal is ineffective.\nHowever, defendants may still pursue an immediate appeal of the trial court\u2019s order and rulings under the substantial right doctrine. This doctrine, derived from N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 l-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(l), provides in effect that \u201cno appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order or ruling of the trial judge unless such ruling or order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose if the ruling or order is not reviewed before final judgment.\u201d Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 333, 299 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1983). North Carolina courts have long acknowledged that the substantial right doctrine\nis more easily stated than applied. It is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered.\nWaters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978); see generally J. Brad Donovan, The Substantial Right Doctrine and Interlocutory Appeals, 17 Campbell L. Rev. 71 (1995). However, in dealing with the doctrine, our courts have developed certain general principles by which we are guided.\nIn Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the right to avoid a trial is generally not a substantial right, but the right to avoid two trials on the same issue may be. Id. at 608, 290 S.E.2d at 596. The Court stated that \u201cthe possibility of undergoing a second trial affects a substantial right only when the same issues are present in both trials, creating the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue.\u201d Id. In Liggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 437 S.E.2d 674 (1993), this Court expanded on the Green holding, stating that\n[a] substantial right... is considered affected if \u201cthere are overlapping factual issues between the claim determined and any claims which have not yet been determined\u201d because such overlap creates the potential for inconsistent verdicts resulting from two trials on the same factual issues.\nId. at 24, 437 S.E.2d at 677 (citation omitted). This Court has interpreted the language of Green and its progeny as creating a two-part test requiring a party to show that (1) the same factual issues would be present in both trials and (2) the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on those issues exists. Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, 115 N.C. App. 423, 426, 444 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1994).\nDefendants argue that under the holdings in Green, Liggett, and Moose, they are entitled to an immediate appeal because the trial court\u2019s order exposes them to the possibility of inconsistent verdicts upon the \u201coverlapping factual issues\u201d of their second, third, and fourth defenses. After carefully reviewing the pleadings and the procedural development of this case, we disagree.\nDefendants\u2019 second defense contains the following detailed factual allegations: Defendant Page tendered performance of Phase I of the relocated road to the Department in September 1989 and asked the Department to accept the new road and abandon the corresponding section of the old road as contemplated in the 1987 agreement. The Department wrongfully rejected the tender. Instead, the Department conditioned its performance on defendants\u2019 execution of the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty. At the time the Department made this demand, it knew that Page\u2019s ability to pay the construction loans for Villa Capriani depended upon his timely receipt of the Department\u2019s performance under the 1987 agreement and that Page\u2019s loans would go into default if this performance were withheld. The second defense then states,\n6. On or about October 19, 1989, and because of the DOT\u2019s wrongful refusal to accept his tender of SR 1568 with the resulting consequences discussed above, Page was coerced, into executing the second agreement for relocation of SR 1568, and defendants were also coerced into executing a purported guaranty of Page\u2019s performance of the new agreement.\n7. After the second agreement and guaranty were executed, the DOT finally agreed to perform under the first agreement, accepted Page\u2019s tender of 2.7 miles of new SR 1568 and abandoned all right, title, and interest in old SR 1568.\n8. Plaintiff breached the January 13, 1987 contract by its failure and refusal to accept Page\u2019s tender of the completed portion of SR 1568 and to abandon all right, title, and interest in old SR 1568, until defendants executed a new agreement and guaranty.\n(Emphasis added.) Defendants\u2019 third and fourth defenses seek rescission of the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty on the grounds that they were obtained by coercion and duress respectively.\nDefendants\u2019 central position in this case is that the Department\u2019s conduct in withholding its performance under the 1987 agreement unless and until defendants executed the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty amounted to coercion and duress. The only difference between defendants\u2019 second, third, and fourth defenses is that the second defense involves the effect of the Department\u2019s conduct on the 1987 agreement while the third and fourth defenses involve the effect of the conduct on the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty. By granting summary judgment for the Department on defendants\u2019 third and fourth defenses but leaving their second defense intact, the trial court left for the jury the questions of whether the Department coerced defendants into signing the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty and, if so, whether this conduct amounted to a breach of the 1987 agreement. Since the trial court\u2019s order does not preclude defendants from fully defending against the Department\u2019s claims, no substantial right has been affected.\nThe instant case is distinguishable from Liggett, upon which defendants rely. In that case, Liggett alleged that Sunas had patented a process in his own name which had been developed using information acquired while he was employed by Liggett. Liggett\u2019s action stated six claims, the first of which was a request for declaratory relief ordering Sunas to assign the patent to Liggett. Liggett, 113 N.C. App. at 22-23, 437 S.E.2d at 676-77. The trial court granted summary judgment for Liggett on its first claim and on all of Sunas\u2019 counterclaims, but expressly withheld determination regarding Liggett\u2019s remaining claims. Id. at 23, 437 S.E.2d at 677. This Court allowed Liggett\u2019s appeal, stating:\nBy granting summary judgment on Liggett\u2019s first claim, thereby ordering Sunas to assign the patent, the trial court effectively decided ownership of the patented . . . process rested with Liggett. This determination is fundamental to the disposition of Liggett\u2019s remaining claims. If Liggett prevailed at trial on those counts, and upon Sunas\u2019 subsequent appeal this Court held ownership of the process to be a jury question, Sunas would thereby likely be awarded a new trial on all . . . six of Liggett\u2019s claims. Requiring such adjudication of the same claims in two separate trials would result in needless expense to the parties as well as to our court system.\nId. at 24, 437 S.E.2d at 677-78. In the instant case, defendants\u2019 second defense did not depend on the third and fourth defenses; indeed, the third and fourth defenses were essentially duplicative of the second defense. As we have stated, the trial court\u2019s orders left for the jury the questions of whether the Department coerced defendants into signing the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty and, if so, whether this conduct amounted to a breach of the 1987 agreement, and we fail to see how defendants can now claim that they are exposed to the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.\nDefendants also assert that the trial court\u2019s pretrial ruling that defendants could not introduce evidence of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty rendered them incapable of fully presenting their second defense. However, at trial of the case, defendants will have the opportunity to fully develop their surviving claims in defense of this action, consistent with this opinion.\nIn sum, we hold that the trial court\u2019s order and rulings did not deprive defendants of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate appellate review. Defendants\u2019 appeal must therefore be dismissed.\nTo avoid \u201cfragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals,\u201d we encourage trial judges to carefully review the procedural posture of each case in which dispositive rulings have been made in order to determine whether those rulings prevent the parties from fully presenting their remaining claims and defenses. If not, the trial court should go forward with the trial of the action.\nDismissed.\nJudges WYNN and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Emmett B. Haywood, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robinson Maready Lawing & Comerford, L.L.P., by William F. Maready, Clifford Britt, and H. Stephen Robinson, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v. F. ROGER PAGE, JR., DORIS B. PAGE and PACE OIL CO., INC., Defendants\nNo. COA94-1085\n(Filed 15 August 1995)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 87 (NCX4th)\u2014 certification of case for appeal \u2014 signing of appeal entry ineffective\nThe trial court\u2019s attempt to certify an interlocutory order for appeal was ineffective, since the signing of an appeal entry by the trial court cannot, in and of itself, be held to satisfy the affirmative act of certification required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Appellate Review \u00a7\u00a7 84-87, 89, 117.\n2. Appeal and Error \u00a7 121 (NCI4th)\u2014 two of three defenses dismissed \u2014 no substantial right affected \u2014 appeal premature\nThe trial court\u2019s order dismissing two of defendants\u2019 defenses but leaving one defense intact did not subject defendants to the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, since defendants contended that plaintiff\u2019s conduct in withholding its performance under a 1987 agreement unless and until defendants executed the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty amounted to coercion and duress; the only difference between defendants\u2019 second, third, and fourth defenses was that the second defense involved the effect of plaintiff\u2019s conduct on the 1987 agreement while the third and fourth defenses involved the effect of the conduct on the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty; by granting summary judgment for plaintiff on defendants\u2019 third and fourth defenses but leaving their second defense intact, the trial court left for the jury the questions of whether plaintiff coerced defendants into signing the 1989 supplemental agreement and guaranty and, if so, whether this conduct amounted to a breach of the 1987 agreement; and the trial court\u2019s order thus did not preclude defendants from fully defending against plaintiff\u2019s claims, and thus affected no substantial right.\nAm Jur 2d, Appellate Review \u00a7\u00a7 300, 301.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 13 May 1994 by Judge Jerry R. Ullett and from rulings on 16 May 1994 by Judge Narley L. Cashwell in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 May 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Emmett B. Haywood, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobinson Maready Lawing & Comerford, L.L.P., by William F. Maready, Clifford Britt, and H. Stephen Robinson, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0730-01", "first_page_order": 764, "last_page_order": 772 }