{ "id": 8548164, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY M. WILLIAMS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williams", "decision_date": "1971-08-04", "docket_number": "No. 7129SC483", "first_page": "161", "last_page": "163", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "12 N.C. App. 161" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "195 S.E. 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626521 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0058-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 251, "char_count": 4222, "ocr_confidence": 0.541, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7530440963932646 }, "sha256": "500cd7c319440aac9bd2f57bc3379b29d630e89e16e3f101462e45ccadf6e29b", "simhash": "1:ce86c47634169db9", "word_count": 692 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:27.087613+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Brock and Vaughn concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY M. WILLIAMS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GRAHAM, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error: (1) \u201c[t]he action of the trial court in allowing the Solicitor to cross-examine his own witness,\u201d and (2) \u201cthe action of the Trial Judge in allowing and encouraging the Solicitor to take his own witness from the Courtroom for a 10 minute conference and return him to the stand for further testimony after the Solicitor had completed his initial examination. ...\u201d\nDefendant cites no authority in support of either assignment of error but argues generally that the court indicated its favoritism toward the State by allowing the solicitor to cross-examine the State\u2019s witness; that the court entered into the prosecution of the case by conferring with the solicitor; and that, the solicitor\u2019s conference with his witness during the trial constituted an \u201cimproper\u201d and \u201cunethical\u201d procedure.\nWe find these arguments unpersuasive. The allowance of leading questions is a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial judge and his rulings will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion. Stansbury, N. C. Evidence 2d, \u00a7 31. Defendant points to no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge and we find none.\nThe record does not show what was said during the conference between the court and the solicitor, nor does it show what, if anything, transpired between the deputy, the solicitor and the witness during their brief absence from the courtroom. A trial court is given large discretionary power as to the conduct of a trial, and in the exercise of this discretion may permit counsel to confer privately with a witness, even while the witness is on the stand. Rooks v. Bruce, 213 N.C. 58, 195 S.E. 26.\nBoth of defendant\u2019s assignments of error are overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges Brock and Vaughn concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GRAHAM, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan by Staff Attorney Davis for the State.", "George R. Morrow for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY M. WILLIAMS\nNo. 7129SC483\n(Filed 4 August 1971)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 87\u2014 allowance of leading questions by solicitor\nThe trial court did not err in allowing the solicitor to cross-examine by leading questions a State\u2019s witness whose testimony in court conflicted with his prior statements to a deputy sheriff.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 101\u2014 permitting solicitor to confer privately with witness \u2014 change in witness\u2019 testimony\nWhere the testimony of a State\u2019s witness conflicted with his prior statements to a deputy sheriff implicating defendant in the crimes charged, and the witness admitted in the absence of the jury that he had implicated defendant, but stated that \u201cnow he could not say for sure,\u201d the trial court did not err in calling the solicitor to the bench for a conference, and in allowing the solicitor to confer privately with the witness, after which the witness returned to the stand in the presence of the jury and testified consistently with the statements he had made before trial.\nAppeal by defendant from Beal, Special Judge, 15 March 1971 Session of Superior Court held in Rutherford County. \u25a0\nDefendant appeals from judgment of imprisonment imposed upon verdicts of guilty to charges of breaking and entering and larceny.\nIn statements made to a deputy sheriff before trial, a State\u2019s witness implicated defendant in the offenses charged. The witness\u2019 testimony in court conflicted with his prior statements and the solicitor requested permission to cross-examine him. The court excused the jury and permitted the solictor to cross-examine the witness in the absence of the jury. The witness admitted having previously implicated defendant, but stated that \u201cnow he could not say for sure.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the witness\u2019 testimony in the absence of the jury, the court called the solicitor to the bench for a conference. The solicitor then summoned the witness from the stand, and the witness, the solicitor, and the deputy left the courtroom for about ten minutes. Defendant objected. The court overruled the objection stating that in its discretion it would allow the solicitor to talk with his witness. The witness returned to the stand in the presence of the jury, contradicted his previous testimony, and testified consistently with the statements he made before trial.\nAttorney General Morgan by Staff Attorney Davis for the State.\nGeorge R. Morrow for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0161-01", "first_page_order": 187, "last_page_order": 189 }