{ "id": 11914074, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL LYNN HOLMES and LAURA MARIE AUTRY HOLMES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Holmes", "decision_date": "1995-09-05", "docket_number": "No. 9412SC499", "first_page": "54", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.C. App. 54" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 ALR Fed. 497", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "22 ALR5th 1", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "59 ALR2d 841", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558880, 2559874, 2556271, 2558649, 2559737 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0620-05", "/nc/339/0620-02", "/nc/339/0620-03", "/nc/339/0620-04", "/nc/339/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529763 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 62, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2526731 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 62, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548914 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/16/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570109 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525759 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4701428 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774041 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696763 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524302 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22-23", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550577 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-74", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-57", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683223 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503651 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561808 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738537, 4731779, 4732868, 4731662 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0419-03", "/nc/318/0419-01", "/nc/318/0419-02", "/nc/318/0419-04" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523779 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-5.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567847 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531405 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" }, { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" }, { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531885 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2495744, 2500097, 2496514, 2493066, 2500301 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0143-02", "/nc/327/0143-05", "/nc/327/0143-01", "/nc/327/0143-04", "/nc/327/0143-03" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523391 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539346 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4766892 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525102 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524667 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565398 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 L. Ed. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 809", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6085, 7371, 6739, 5782, 5823 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0809-04", "/us/429/0809-01", "/us/429/0809-03", "/us/429/0809-05", "/us/429/0809-02" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570856 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Davis, 289 N.C. 500, 508, 223 S.E.2d 296, 301, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 50 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526033 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Davis, 289 N.C. 500, 508, 223 S.E.2d 296, 301, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 50 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548808, 2550033 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0541-01", "/nc/333/0541-02" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525063 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)(3)(c)" }, { "page": "(1)" }, { "page": "(1)" }, { "page": "(h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1466, "char_count": 42633, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.4102677143118235e-07, "percentile": 0.8779324586105213 }, "sha256": "aa8dafa229a8c10afc7ee3ba47443a361bbdc00470c25e7270939ffde2278545", "simhash": "1:47ab8126653a9e72", "word_count": 6962 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges EAGLES and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL LYNN HOLMES and LAURA MARIE AUTRY HOLMES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nIn 1992 defendant Michael Lynn Holmes (hereinafter Michael) was indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance by possession, by sale, by delivery, and by transportation in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3)(c). He was also indicted for conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 90-95(1) and 90-95(h)(3)(a). Defendant Laura Marie Autry Holmes (hereinafter Marie) was indicted for conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 90-95(1) and 90-95(h)(3)(a). The State\u2019s motions for joinder of defendants for trial and joinder of Michael\u2019s offenses were granted and a joint trial was held.\nDuring the trial the State first presented approximately eight days of testimony relating to Michael and Marie\u2019s joint conspiracy charge. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that the sale of cocaine was a family business in which Vinston Holmes (the father), Marie (the mother), and Michael (the son) participated. During the conspiracy period from 6 August 1988 through 18 August 1990, Vinston Holmes (hereinafter Vinston) was the central figure in the family drug business. Michael participated by retrieving cocaine and delivering it to the buyer for his father, and selling cocaine when Vinston was not available. Marie\u2019s participation was primarily collecting and counting the money from cocaine sales, although on occasion she also sold cocaine.\nCocaine transactions were generally conducted at Holmes Garage, where the family also ran an auto repair shop. Rosa Elaine Ashford, the bookkeeper for Holmes Garage, testified she assisted in the laundering of money from the Holmes family cocaine business by falsifying records for the garage, first at the direction of Vinston, and later as instructed by Michael and Marie. Ashford frequently purchased cocaine from Vinston until the end of 1989 when Vinston decided to stop selling smaller quantities and began selling kilograms (referred to as kilos) because there was \u201ctoo much traffic at the garage.\u201d She testified that from 1988 through 1990 she often observed the activities of drug dealers who came to the garage to purchase cocaine. She also testified about specific instances when she saw Michael sell cocaine and Marie handle the cocaine money.\nDrug dealers Russell Butler, Gloria Jones, Belinda Melvin and Darryl Jones testified about specific contact they had with Vinston, Michael and Marie during the conspiracy period. Their testimony tended to show that cocaine purchases were sometimes made directly from Michael and on at least one occasion from Marie. Michael often retrieved the cocaine for buyers at Vinston\u2019s direction. Each of the dealers testified about one or two occasions when they observed Marie handle the money from cocaine sales, either by collecting or counting it.\nKimberly Johnson, Michael\u2019s ex-wife, testified that on one occasion before the conspiracy period she helped Michael tape a large sum of money to his body before he flew to an unknown destination. On another occasion in the fall of 1988, she saw Michael and Marie counting large stacks of money.\nEzumer Palmer testified about his drug operation in Georgia and his dealings with Vinston and Michael. In the summer of 1988, Vinston, Michael and Ezumer Palmer met to discuss arrangements to purchase cocaine from Ezumer Palmer. During that .summer an unnamed man from Vinston\u2019s operation drove to Georgia on two occasions and picked up a total of ten kilos of cocaine, and on another occasion Michael personally went to Georgia and purchased eight kilos of cocaine.\nThe State next presented approximately two days of testimony relating to Michael\u2019s separate drug trafficking charges. Cleo Spears testified that in November 1990 he went to Fayetteville, North Carolina and purchased five kilos of cocaine from Michael at Holmes Garage.\nMark Francisco, an agent of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, testified that Cleo Spears had been under surveillance since his arrival in Fayetteville. Spears was stopped on his way out of town by SBI agents who discovered five kilos of cocaine in his truck. Upon his arrest Spears told the agents he had purchased the cocaine from Michael.\nNeither defendant offered any evidence.\nThe jury found defendant Michael Holmes guilty of the substantive trafficking charges and conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance. The jury also found defendant Marie Holmes guilty of conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance. Michael appeals from a judgment imposing a prison sentence of five consecutive forty-year terms and a fine of $250,000. Marie appeals from a judgment imposing a forty-year prison sentence and a $250,000 fine.\nMichael identifies 292 assignments of error within ten issues for this Court to consider. Marie sets forth 191 assignments of error within nine issues. A number of these issues are identical for both Michael and Marie, and where appropriate, we have combined discussion of both defendants\u2019 issues.\nI.Joinder of Defendants\nBoth defendants argue the trial judge\u2019s joinder for trial of Michael\u2019s substantive trafficking offenses with Marie\u2019s conspiracy offense deprived each of them of a fair trial. We disagree.\nJoinder of defendants for trial is provided for in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-926(b)(2) (1988):\nUpon written motion of the prosecutor, charges against two or more defendants may be joined for trial:\na. When each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense; or\nb. When, even if all of the defendants are not charged with accountability for each offense, the several offenses charged:\n1. Were part of a common scheme or plan; or\n2. Were part of the same act or transaction; or\n3. Were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others.\nAt trial defendant Marie conceded the propriety of joinder of the conspiracy charges. However, she argues that since she is not accountable for Michael\u2019s substantive trafficking offenses, her case does not comply with G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(b)(2). Joinder of defendants is within the trial court\u2019s discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing that joinder deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Wilson, 108 N.C. App. 575, 589, 424 S.E.2d 454, 462, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 541, 429 S.E.2d 562 (1993). \u201cA defendant may be deprived of a fair trial where evidence harmful to the defendant is admitted which would not have been admitted in a severed trial.\u201d Id. Marie contends she was prejudiced by having to sit through testimony relating to Michael\u2019s substantive trafficking charges at the close of presentation of evidence on her conspiracy charge. In support of her argument she cites Wilson in which this Court held that the joinder of charges for trial against the co-defendants was prejudicial and deprived one defendant of a fair trial. 108 N.C. App. at 589, 424 S.E.2d at 462. In so holding the Court noted that as a result of joinder, the defendant was \u201cforced to sit through the testimony of eleven witnesses and two and one-half days of trial before any evidence was received as against him.\u201d Id. Further, the trial court\u2019s limiting instructions \u201cdid not operate to dispel the resulting prejudice.\u201d Id.\nThe case before this Court is distinguishable from Wilson. Here, the structure of the trial and the trial court\u2019s limiting instructions did serve to minimize prejudice, if any, to Marie. The trial was structured so that the jury first heard approximately eight days of testimony relating to the defendants\u2019 common conspiracy charge, followed by approximately two days of testimony dealing almost exclusively with Michael\u2019s substantive trafficking charges. Of the twenty trial witnesses, fifteen testified only about the conspiracy, and two testified only as to the trafficking charges.\nThree witnesses, Agent Mark Francisco, J.D. Sparks, and Cleo Spears, were crossover witnesses who testified as to both issues. Agent Mark Francisco was called to the witness stand twice, first during the State\u2019s presentation of evidence about the conspiracy, and later to testify regarding Michael\u2019s trafficking charges. J.D. Sparks, the SBI forensic chemist, testified about the chemical analysis performed on drug evidence. The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury regarding the portion of J. D. Sparks\u2019 testimony dealing with evidence collected in Michael\u2019s separate trafficking charges:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, the evidence received on today\u2019s date, that being 66A through E, and the accompanying lab report contained in State\u2019s Exhibit 76, are offered and received against the defendant Michael Holmes only on the substantive charges of trafficking cocaine.\nThe trial court also clearly marked the dividing line between Cleo Spears\u2019 initial testimony relating to the conspiracy period and his subsequent testimony offered on the issue of Michael\u2019s separate offenses by providing the following limiting instructions to the jury:\nThe Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I think it would be fair to instruct you at this time that the defendant, Michael Holmes, as I\u2019ve already indicated, is charged with some separate offenses occurring on or about November 8, 1990, that being trafficking cocaine by possession of four hundred grams or more, by sale, delivery, by transportation.\nAnd Ms. Strickland, having met with me at the bench with the defendant\u2019s attorneys, this evidence is offered on that issue; is that correct?\nMs. Stkickland: That\u2019s correct, Judge.\nThe Court: All right. You may proceed. It\u2019s admissible as to the defendant Michael Holmes only.\nIn light of the structure of the trial and the limiting instructions given during testimony, we find that Marie was not prejudiced.\nMichael also has not demonstrated how joinder prejudiced him. He asserts misjoinder \u201cled to manifest unfairness because the jury, the Court and the prosecution were unnecessarily confused by the overlapping facts and legal principles.\u201d However, a defendant\u2019s \u201cunsupported statement of possible prejudice is not sufficient to show abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in allowing the motion to consolidate.\u201d State v. Ruffin, 90 N.C. App. 712, 714, 370 S.E.2d 279, 280 (1988) (quoting State v. Davis, 289 N.C. 500, 508, 223 S.E.2d 296, 301, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 50 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1976)). Since neither Michael nor Marie have shown how joinder of defendants deprived them of a fair trial, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining the defendants for trial.\nII. Joinder of Offenses\nMichael contends the consolidation of his conspiracy charge and his substantive trafficking charges in one trial was improper as a matter of law. We disagree.\nJoinder of offenses is provided for in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-926(a) (1988) which states that \u201c[t]wo or more offenses may be joined... for trial when the offenses . . . are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.\u201d If no transactional connection is found, the ruling is improper as a matter of law. State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 126, 282 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1981). As the State points out in its brief, \u201cdrug dealing by its very nature ordinarily involves a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a single scheme or plan.\u201d The specific sale of cocaine from which Michael\u2019s substantive trafficking charges arose was part of the overall \u201cbusiness\u201d plan by the Holmes family to sell drugs. In State v. Styles, 116 N.C. App. 479, 482, 448 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 620, 454 S.E.2d 265 (1995), this Court found that join-der of the charges of (1) knowingly keeping a dwelling for the purpose of keeping or selling controlled substances, and (2) possession of marijuana with intent to sell and deliver, with (3) selling marijuana to a minor, was proper. Despite the one month time gap between the offenses sought to be joined, the Court determined that a transactional connection existed, noting \u201c[t]he \u2018common thread\u2019 is the selling and distribution of marijuana. The \u2018scheme\u2019 was to sell the illegal substance for profit.\u201d Id. Similarly, Michael\u2019s conspiracy charge and his trafficking charges are \u201cacts connected together\u201d by the common thread of selling and distributing cocaine, and \u201cconstituting parts . . . of a single scheme\u201d to sell the illegal substance for profit within G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(a).\nSince a transactional connection has been found, the trial court\u2019s ruling on joinder of offenses will only be disturbed where it was \u201cso arbitrary that it could not have been the product of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Harding, 110 N.C. App. 155, 162, 429 S.E.2d 416, 421 (1993). Such an abuse of discretion may occur when the offenses are \u201cso separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render consolidation unjust and prejudicial to the defendant.\u201d State v. Corbett, 309 N.C. 382, 389, 307 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1983). Michael\u2019s conspiracy offense and his substantive trafficking offenses do not meet that criteria and, therefore, we find no error in their joinder for trial.\nIII. Opening Statement\nBoth defendants contend the State misstated the facts in its opening statement and the court committed reversible error in failing to provide a curative instruction. We find no error.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1221(a)(4) permits each party in a criminal jury trial to make an opening statement but does not define the scope of that statement. State v. Mash, 328 N.C. 61, 64-65, 399 S.E.2d 307, 310 (1991). However, wide latitude is generally allowed with respect to its scope. State v. Summerlin, 98 N.C. App. 167, 171, 390 S.E.2d 358, 360, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 143, 394 S.E.2d 183 (1990). \u201cControl of the parties\u2019 opening statements is within the discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 40, 436 S.E.2d 321, 343 (1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994).\nDuring her opening statement in this case, the prosecutor stated:\nThe evidence will show that Michael Holmes is guilty of selling those five kilograms of cocaine, as well as the agreement between him and his mother and the other testifying co-conspirators to do this act. The agreement is the crime. And there was an agreement between them.\nAt the close of the state\u2019s evidence, we ask that you return a verdict of guilty for both Michael Lynn Holmes for conspiracy to trafficking cocaine of four hundred grams or more, trafficking cocaine by possession, trafficking cocaine by sale, trafficking cocaine by delivery, and trafficking cocaine by transportation, as well as finding Marie Holmes guilty of conspiracy of trafficking cocaine of four hundred grams or more.\nIt was not until after the completion of all opening statements that an objection was raised to the prosecutor\u2019s remark which incorrectly indicated an overlap between the conspiracy charges and the substantive trafficking charges. At that time, counsel for the defendants requested the jury be given a curative instruction. The trial judge responded, \u201cI\u2019ll have to rule on the evidence as it comes in. And I\u2019ll give the jury the necessary instructions as I perceive them to be as the evidence is offered.\u201d The court later gave general clarifying instructions. In light of the trial judge\u2019s control of the opening statement, he did not abuse his discretion. We find no error.\nIV. Jury Instruction Before Testimony\nBoth Michael and Marie argue the trial court committed reversible error when it misinstructed the jury on conspiracy law prior to evidence being presented. We find no merit to their argument.\nAfter the jurors were sworn, and prior to the beginning of testimony, the trial court addressed the jury:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, the next stage of the trial process in just a few moments will be the right of the attorneys to make an opening statement to you. Prior to doing that and in view of the fact that the attorneys in the trial of this case have forecast the evidence phase consuming approximately three to four weeks, the Court feels it appropriate to give you some preliminary instructions in order to assist you in listening to the opening statements of counsel and the evidence.\nThe Court hastens to add that you\u2019ll receive at the conclusion of the case particularized instructions based upon the evidence produced in the case.\nEach of the separate defendants is charged with the offense of conspiracy to trafficking cocaine in an amount of four hundred grams or more. The general rules of conspiracy are as follows:\nA criminal conspiracy is the unlawful concurrence of two or more persons in a scheme or agreement to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful way, or by unlawful means. The unlawful agreement and not the execution of the agreement is the offense.\nTo constitute a conspiracy it is not necessary that the parties should have come together and agreed in express terms to unite for a common object. Rather, a mutual implied understanding is sufficient so far as the combination for conspiracy is concerned to constitute the offense.\nIf a number of parties conspire or agree to engage in an unlawful enterprise, each is liable for acts committed by any of them in furtherance of the common design, notwithstanding that such acts were not intended or contemplated as part of the original undertaking.\nWe note that defendants failed to raise an objection at the time the instruction was given, and thus, have not preserved the question for appellate review as required in N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Nevertheless, the question may be the basis of an assignment of error if it amounts to plain error. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4). \u201c[T]he plain error rule . . . is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where ... it can be said the claimed error is a \u2018fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done\u2019...State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)). To satisfy the requirements of the plain error rule, the Court must find error, and that if not for the error, the jury would likely have reached a different result. State v. Reid, 335 N.C. 647, 667, 440 S.E.2d 776, 787 (1994).\nCiting State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980), the defendants argue the Court misstated the law regarding conspiracy by suggesting that an act of one partner in furtherance of the conspiracy is attributable to all, and thereby prejudiced the defendants. However, in response to Small, the statute upon which that decision was based was repealed and replaced with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-5.2, \u201cwhich abolished the distinctions between accessories before the fact and principals and requires that the former be treated now as principals . . . .\u201d State v. Rowe, 81 N.C. App. 469, 472, 344 S.E.2d 574, 576, dismissal allowed, disc, review allowed in part, 318 N.C. 419, 349 S.E.2d 604 (1986). While the instruction might have been more exact, it does not constitute reversible error.\nAssuming, arguendo, that the court misstated the law on conspiracy, defendants have failed to demonstrate prejudicial impact on the jury. \u201cIn deciding whether a defect in the jury instruction constitutes \u2018plain error,\u2019 the appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt.\u201d Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79. The instruction in question was given to the jury before opening statements to assist the jury \u201cin listening to the opening statements of counsel and the evidence.\u201d The jury charge at the close of all evidence correctly stated the law on conspiracy and resolved any confusion that might have occurred as a result of the court\u2019s earlier statement. An improper instruction later corrected is \u201ccompletely lacking in prejudicial effect.\u201d Reid, 335 N.C. at 667, 440 S.E.2d at 787, (quoting State v. Wells, 290 N.C. 485, 498, 226 S.E.2d 325, 334 (1976)). After examining the record, we find no plain error.\nV. Evidentiary Issues\nBoth defendants identify numerous assignments of error in testimony admitted at trial which can be categorized into two evidentiary issues.\nA.\nDefendants argue the trial court erred by allowing into evidence testimony of the prior bad acts of witnesses in violation of N.C.R. Evid. 404. We find their argument without merit.\nWe first note that of the more than 100 questions at trial assigned as error by each defendant, Marie raised an objection to only eight, and Michael objected to only thirteen. \u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion . . . .\u201d N.C.R. App. R 10(b)(1). We confine our review to those questions objected to at trial because after examining the record, we find that the errors not objected to at trial are not so fundamental as to amount to plain error. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4).\nN.C.R. Evid. 402 states the general rule: \u201cAll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided [by constitution, by statute] ... or by these rules.\u201d An exception to the general rule of admissibility is set out in N.C.R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides \u201c[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.\u201d \u201cRule 404(b) has been interpreted as applicable only to parties and, in a criminal case, would usually be applicable only to a defendant.\u201d State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 636, 340 S.E.2d 84, 91 (1986). The testimony of \u201ccrimes, wrongs, or acts\u201d objected to in this case is that of the witnesses and not of the defendants. Therefore, Rule 404(b) is not applicable. Since the evidence is not excluded under an exception to the general rule, it is admissible if it is relevant. \u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.R. Evid. 401. As the State suggests, \u201cthe testimony in question was relevant in serving purposes like showing a witness\u2019s qualifications to discuss the drug trade generally or the circumstances of this case particularly.\u201d Since the evidence was relevant and thus admissible, the trial court properly overruled defendants\u2019 objections. We find no error.\nB.\nDefendants argue the trial court erred in allowing inadmissible hearsay which did not satisfy the co-conspirator exception of N.C.R. Evid. 801(d)(E). We find no prejudical error.\nAs a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible. N.C.R. Evid. 802. However, \u201c[t]he law is well established regarding the admissibility of statements by co-conspirators. A statement by one conspirator made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible against his co-conspirators.\u201d State v. Mahaley, 332 N.C. 583, 593, 423 S.E.2d 58, 64 (1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 130 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1995); N.C.R. Evid. 801(d)(E).\nDefendant Michael identifies ninety-five assignments of error, all of which he characterizes as inadmissible hearsay. We have reviewed the record and note that only eighteen assignments of error were objected to at trial and are properly preserved for this Court\u2019s review. See N.C.R. App. R 10(b)(1). Of those eighteen, eight fell within the co-conspirator exception of Rule 801(d)(E), four were admitted for non-hearsay purposes, and three were objected to on grounds other than hearsay. Our review of defendant Marie\u2019s sixty-eight assignments of error reveals that an objection was raised at trial to only twenty. Of those, three fell within the co-conspirator exception, seven were admitted for non-hearsay purposes, and two were objected to on grounds other than hearsay. In addition, Marie\u2019s objections were sustained three times. On one of the three occasions, the court gave a jury instruction and on another, allowed a motion to strike.\nAssuming, arguendo, that Michael and Marie\u2019s remaining objections were instances of inadmissible hearsay, we note that \u201cthe erroneous admission of hearsay, like the erroneous admission of other evidence, is not always so prejudicial as to require a new trial.\u201d State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 470, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986). Defendants must show they were \u201cprejudiced by the error and that there was a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial if the error had not been committed.\u201d State v. Sills, 311 N.C. 370, 378, 317 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1984). Defendants have failed to make the required showing. Further, we find none of the errors identified by defendants but not objected to at trial, rise to the level of plain error. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4). Therefore, we hold that any allegedly erroneous admission of hearsay was harmless.\nVI. Marital Privilege Instruction\nBoth Michael and Marie contend the trial court violated due process and deprived them of a fair trial by informing the jury that the marital privilege prohibited the jury from hearing relevant evidence. We disagree.\nThe trial court interrupted the testimony of Kimberly Johnson, Michael\u2019s ex-wife, and met with the attorneys out of the jury\u2019s presence. The judge asked the State \u201cto define for me the parameters [of Kimberly Johnson\u2019s testimony] as it relates to the marital period between Michael Holmes and Ms. Johnson as to what kind of information you\u2019re going to be eliciting.\u201d After a brief discussion, the judge explained to Kimberly Johnson that under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-57 she would be prohibited from \u201ctestifying as to those acts or declarations that were made during the time frame of the marriage to Michael Holmes that are one-on-one situations.\u201d Defendants\u2019 counsel asked for a jury instruction, and upon the jury\u2019s return to the courtroom, the trial court stated:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, we have in the State of North Carolina a statute designated as North Carolina General Statute eight dash fifty-seven, which in summary form is a confidential communication statute between husband and wife.\nTherefore, as a result of a review of that statute, I will prohibit the State of North Carolina from eliciting information of a confidential communication between Ms. Johnson, who was the former wife of Michael Holmes, from the date and time of July 11, 1987, through May of 1990, which as I understand to be the date and time of the- divorce, of eliciting information of a confidential communication made that occurred during that time frame. The State may proceed.\nDefendants made no objection to this instruction at trial.\nWe find nothing in the facts that supports defendants\u2019 contention that \u201cthe jury was told in effect that they were prohibited by the defendant\u2019s marital privilege from hearing relevant evidence.\u201d (emphasis added). The court merely instructed the jury on the law as requested by defendants. Therefore, we find no error.\nVII. Judicial Expression of Opinion\nDefendants argue the trial court committed reversible error by expressing an opinion in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1222. We find no merit to their argument.\nIn State v. Grogan, this Court summarized the law regarding the application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1222 prohibiting the judicial expression of opinion in a criminal trial:\nA trial judge is prohibited from expressing any opinion which is calculated to prejudice either of the parties at any time during the trial. The slightest intimation from the trial judge as to the weight or credibility to be given evidentiary matters will always have great weight with the jury, and great care must be exercised to insure that neither party is unduly prejudiced by any expression from the bench which is likely to prevent a fair and impartial trial. Not every indiscreet and improper remark by a trial judge is of such harmful effect as to require a new trial .... The probable effect upon the jury determines whether the conduct or language of the judge amounts to an expression of opinion which will entitle the defendant to a new trial.\nState v. Grogan, 40 N.C. App. 371, 373-74, 253 S.E.2d 20, 22-23 (1979) (citations omitted).\nBoth Michael and Marie raise the issue of the propriety of the trial court\u2019s remarks by (1) reading to the jury two witness immunity letters which had been received in evidence and published to the jury, (2) explaining the law regarding confidential communications between husband and wife in connection with the exclusion of certain testimony, (3) explaining its ruling on the introduction of a transcription of only a portion of a video tape, and (4) taking judicial notice of a sentence imposed on a witness for which the trial court judge had been the sentencing judge. In addition, Marie takes issue with the trial court\u2019s (1) response to defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of a witness regarding the transcription of a portion of video tape not offered in evidence, (2) repetition of a witness\u2019 answer regarding the time period to which his testimony related, (3) explanation of the court\u2019s ruling saying it was defense counsel\u2019s \u201cjury argument,\u201d and (4) interruption of defendants\u2019 closing argument and explanation to the jury of how substantial assistance is determined in relation to witness immunity.\nWe note that \u201c[generally, ordinary rulings by the court in the course of trial do not amount to an impermissible expression of opinion.\u201d State v. Welch, 65 N.C. App. 390, 393-94, 308 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1983). Defendants cite no authority to support their contention that a trial court\u2019s explanation of its ruling amounts to an impermissible expression of opinion. \u201cWhether the judge\u2019s comments, questions or actions constitute reversible error is a question to be considered in light of the factors and circumstances disclosed by the record, the burden of showing prejudice being upon the defendant.\u201d State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 236, 333 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1985). After a careful review of the record, we find that none of the trial court\u2019s remarks at issue violated the judge\u2019s required neutrality and resulted in an impermissible expression of opinion.\nVIII. Double Jeopardy\nMichael contends this trial violated due process by placing him in double jeopardy by sentencing him consecutively for trafficking by sale and trafficking by delivery. We disagree.\nThe double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution prohibits, among other things, multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451, 340 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986). However, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h), \u201c[s]ale, manufacture, delivery, transportation, and possession of . . . [cocaine] are separate trafficking offenses for which a defendant may be separately convicted and punished.\u201d State v. Diaz, 317 N.C. 545, 554, 346 S.E.2d 488, 494 (1986); see also State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 103-04, 340 S.E.2d 450, 461 (1986). Therefore, defendant\u2019s consecutive sentences for trafficking by sale and trafficking by delivery do not violate double jeopardy and we find no error.\nIX. Sentencing\nBoth defendants argue the court erred in sentencing them to the maximum allowable sentences by finding that each was a leader in the charged crimes. We disagree.\nThe trial court found as a factor in aggravation that both Michael and Marie \u201coccupied a position of leadership or dominance of other participants.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(a) (1988) (repealed effective October 1, 1994). In State v. Hayes, this Court noted:\nIn order to be valid, an aggravating factor must be supported by sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable judge to find its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court should be permitted wide latitude, however, in arriving at the truth as to the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, for it alone observes the demeanor of the witnesses and hears the testimony.\n102 N.C. App. 777, 781, 404 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1991) (citations omitted). Moreover, \u201c[e]vidence tending to show that a defendant occupied a position of leadership over one of the participants in the offense is sufficient to support this aggravating factor, regardless of whether the evidence also shows that others exercised leadership or control in the commission of an offense.\u201d Id. at 782, 404 S.E.2d at 15.\nWith respect to the conspiracy charge, the evidence tended to show that Michael assumed a leadership role and individually completed drug deals, particularly when Vinston Holmes was absent. He instructed Rosa Elaine Ashford to falsify garage records in order to launder money from cocaine sales. Michael and Vinston Holmes met with Ezumer Palmer and arranged to purchase large quantities of cocaine from him, and Michael personally purchased eight kilos of cocaine from Palmer on one occasion. In the substantive trafficking charges, Michael set up the cocaine sale to Cleo Spears. He agreed to the financial arrangements and contacted Spears when the pick-up was ready.\nWith respect to Marie\u2019s conspiracy charge, there was evidence tending to show she played a significant role with the money from cocaine sales. She picked up and counted the money, and on one occasion indicated the money received from Russell Butler was incorrect resulting in an additional payment to complete the transaction. Marie also instructed Rosa Elaine Ashford to falsify garage records. Belinda Melvin indicated to Gloria Jones that dealing directly with Marie meant that Gloria was now a trusted member of the organization. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s findings that each defendant occupied a position of leadership. We find no error.\nX. Jury Charge\nDefendant Marie contends the trial court deprived her of a fair trial and thus committed plain error by not adequately instructing the jury on the nature of her conspiracy charge. We disagree.\nThe primary purpose of a jury charge is to inform the jury of the law as it applies to the evidence \u201cin such manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.\u201d State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971). While the court must explain each essential element of the offense charged, the manner in which it chooses to do so is within its discretion. State v. Young, 16 N.C. App. 101, 106, 191 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1972).\nThe judge met with the attorneys outside the presence of the jury to discuss the jury charge. He proposed that he first give the instruction on Michael\u2019s substantive offenses and then instruct the jury as to Michael\u2019s conspiracy offense and the lesser-included offenses. He further proposed:\nBecause I am giving the lesser-included offenses in each case, as to Ms. Holmes and Mr. Holmes, I would ask permission of both sides not to have to redefine conspiracy at each time, that I can simply refer back to the first definition that I\u2019ve given. Because that would just be repeating. I will repeat it if you feel it adds anything to the instructions.\nDefendants\u2019 attorney responded, \u201cI think one description as to conspiracy will be sufficient.\u201d\nThe judge instructed the jury regarding Michael\u2019s trafficking offenses. He then turned to the conspiracy charge:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, each defendant is charged with conspiracy to trafficking cocaine in an amount of four hundred grams or more, I shall give you the lesser-included offenses as the charge relates to the defendant Michael Lynn Holmes. And thereafter I shall ask you to recall the instructions as to the defendant Laura Marie Autry Holmes without repeating the instructions as to the conspiracy charge.\nAfter giving instructions as to the general rules of conspiracy and the lesser-included offenses, he stated: \u201cLadies and gentlemen of the jury, I\u2019ve already given you the instructions on conspiracy and the lesser-included offenses as they related to the defendant, Michael Lynn Holmes. Those instructions are equally applicable to the defendant, Laura Marie Autry Holmes. And I ask you to recall them.\u201d\nDefendants made no objection after the completion of the jury charge when given the opportunity to do so, and as such are not entitled to relief unless the error, if any, constituted plain error. \u201c[T]o rise to the level of plain error, the error in the instructions must be \u2018so fundamental that it denied the defendant a fair trial and quite probably tilted the scales against him.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 696, 702, 441 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1994) (quoting State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 62, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993)). After reviewing the trial court\u2019s instruction on conspiracy, we find that defendant Marie was not deprived of a fair trial despite the court\u2019s decision not to repeat the entire instruction, having just given it for Michael. Therefore, the trial court did not commit plain error.\nWe have carefully considered all of defendants\u2019 assignments of error and find that both Michael Lynn Holmes and Laura Marie Autry Holmes received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges EAGLES and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General William B. Grumpier, for the State.", "Yurko & Cogbum, P.A. by Lyle J. Yurko and Max 0. Cogbum, Jr., and Cutter, Wells & Porter, P.A. by John H. Cutter III for defendant-appellants Michael Lynn Holmes and Laura Marie Autry Holmes." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL LYNN HOLMES and LAURA MARIE AUTRY HOLMES\nNo. 9412SC499\n(Filed 5 September 1995)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 326 (NCI4th)\u2014 joinder of cases against mother and son \u2014 defendants not prejudiced\nThe trial court\u2019s joinder for trial of defendant son\u2019s substantive trafficking offenses with defendant mother\u2019s conspiracy offense did not deprive each of them of a fair trial in light of the structure of the trial and the limiting instructions given during testimony. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(b)(2).\nAm Jur 2d, Actions \u00a7 137.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 304 (NCI4th)\u2014 one defendant \u2014 two charges involving drug dealing \u2014 consolidation proper\nThe trial court did not err in consolidating for trial the charge of conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances and the charge of substantive trafficking against one defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(a).\nAm Jur 2d, Actions \u00a7 137.\nConsolidated trial upon several indictments or infor-mations against same accused, over his objection. 59 ALR2d 841.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 412 (NCI4th)\u2014 facts misstated in opening statement \u2014 no curative instruction given \u2014 defendants not prejudiced\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give a curative instruction when the prosecutor in her opening statement incorrectly indicated an overlap between drug conspiracy charges against both defendants and a drug trafficking charge against one defendant since it was not until after the completion of all opening statements that an objection was raised to the prosecutor\u2019s remark; defense counsel requested a curative instruction at that time; the judge responded that he would have to rule on the evidence as it came in; and the court later gave general clarifying instructions.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 522.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 720 (NCI4th)\u2014 incorrect instruction on conspiracy given before opening statements \u2014 defendants not prejudiced\nThe trial court did not commit plain error when it misin-structed the jury on conspiracy law prior to evidence being presented, since the instruction in question was given to the jury before opening statements to assist the jury in listening to the opening statements of counsel and the evidence; neither defendant objected at the time the instruction was given; the jury charge at the close of all evidence correctly stated the law on conspiracy and resolved any confusion that might have occurred as a result of the court\u2019s earlier statement; and an improper instruction later corrected is completely lacking in prejudicial effect.\nAm Jur 2d, Appellate Review \u00a7 743.\n5. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2983 (NCI4th)\u2014 prior bad acts of witnesses \u2014 admission of evidence \u2014 no error\nThere was no merit to defendants\u2019 contention that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence testimony of the prior bad acts of witnesses in violation of N.C.R. Evidence 404, since that rule is applicable only to parties and not to witnesses. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7 969.\nAdmissibility of evidence of commission of similar crime by one other than accused. 22 ALR5th 1.\nAdmissibility, under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts not similar to offense charged. 41 ALR Fed. 497.\n6. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2618 (NCI4th)\u2014 instruction on marital privilege \u2014 defendants not prejudiced\nDefendants were not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s instruction with regard to the marital privilege where defendants requested the instruction and did not object at trial.\nAm Jur 2d, Witnesses \u00a7 309.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 374 (NCI4th)\u2014 explanation of evidentiary rulings \u2014 no expression of opinion\nThe trial court\u2019s explanations of its rulings on evidentiary matters did not constitute impermissible expressions of opinion on the evidence.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 284.\n8. Narcotics, Controlled Substances, and Paraphernalia \u00a7 220 (NCI4th)\u2014 trafficking by sale and trafficking by delivery\u2014 consecutive sentences \u2014 no double jeopardy\nDefendant\u2019s consecutive sentences for trafficking by sale and trafficking by delivery did not violate double jeopardy.\nAm Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons \u00a7\u00a7 27, 27.15.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 1133 (NCI4th)\u2014 aggravating factor of being leader in charged crimes \u2014 no error\nIn a prosecution of defendants for conspiracy to sell cocaine and trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendants to the maximum allowable sentences by finding that each was a leader in the charged crimes. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(a) (1988).\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 599.\n10.Criminal Law \u00a7 788 (NCI4th)\u2014 instructions not repeated for codefendant \u2014 codefendant not prejudiced\nDefendant mother was not deprived of a fair trial despite the court\u2019s decision not to repeat the entire instruction on conspiracy, having just given it for defendant\u2019s son.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 1144.\nAppeal by defendants Michael Lynn Holmes and Laura Marie Autry Holmes from judgments entered 13 October 1993 by Judge E. Lynn Johnson in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 January 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General William B. Grumpier, for the State.\nYurko & Cogbum, P.A. by Lyle J. Yurko and Max 0. Cogbum, Jr., and Cutter, Wells & Porter, P.A. by John H. Cutter III for defendant-appellants Michael Lynn Holmes and Laura Marie Autry Holmes." }, "file_name": "0054-01", "first_page_order": 88, "last_page_order": 106 }