{ "id": 11914394, "name": "BRANDE M. WEST (MINOR) THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, WILLIAM C. FARRIS, Plaintiff v. TONI GRAY TILLEY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "West ex rel. Farris v. Tilley", "decision_date": "1995-09-05", "docket_number": "No. 947DC334", "first_page": "145", "last_page": "154", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.C. App. 145" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "32 ALR2d 1060", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "77 L. Ed 2d 1540", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "201 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "results obtained by attorney in excess of prior proposals are a legitimate consideration in determining the amount of his fee" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551397 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "results obtained by attorney in excess of prior proposals are a legitimate consideration in determining the amount of his fee" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court's award of one-third of total recovery for attorneys' fee error where judgment contained no findings regarding time and labor expended, skill required to perform services, customary fee, or experience and ability of attorney" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131711 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387", "parenthetical": "court's award of one-third of total recovery for attorneys' fee error where judgment contained no findings regarding time and labor expended, skill required to perform services, customary fee, or experience and ability of attorney" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529224 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524827 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562449 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757614, 4751602, 4754239, 4750583, 4751711 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0621-04", "/nc/312/0621-02", "/nc/312/0621-01", "/nc/312/0621-05", "/nc/312/0621-03" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521343 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565706, 8565678, 8565647, 8565744, 8565627 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0240-04", "/nc/288/0240-03", "/nc/288/0240-02", "/nc/288/0240-05", "/nc/288/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550315 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571777, 8571747, 8571852, 8571821, 8571886 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0727-02", "/nc/301/0727-01", "/nc/301/0727-04", "/nc/301/0727-03", "/nc/301/0727-05" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564338 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "citing Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980), reh'g denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528090 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "citing Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980), reh'g denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365-66", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571110 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "courts \"must adhere to the intent of the legislature\" in matters of statutory interpretation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547754 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "courts \"must adhere to the intent of the legislature\" in matters of statutory interpretation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "phrase \"litigant obtaining a judgment\" includes defendants prevailing on counterclaims for less than statutory amount" }, { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "trial court \"having carefully reviewed the petitioner's hours,\" showed no abuse of discretion in awarding $5,000.00 in attorneys' fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519458 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58", "parenthetical": "phrase \"litigant obtaining a judgment\" includes defendants prevailing on counterclaims for less than statutory amount" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790194 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12139558 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508082 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 935, "char_count": 19716, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.7107155544235584e-07, "percentile": 0.829303175590546 }, "sha256": "7cd59ad87de73484e2daf5141397d2859fceef394532453cfbefd7197b6db82c", "simhash": "1:d322e508f46c0c56", "word_count": 3138 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ARNOLD and GREENE concur." ], "parties": [ "BRANDE M. WEST (MINOR) THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, WILLIAM C. FARRIS, Plaintiff v. TONI GRAY TILLEY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals the trial court\u2019s judgment granting plaintiffs request for attorneys\u2019 fees. He contends the award is barred because the court\u2019s judgment is in excess of $10,000.00, the limit imposed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1 (1986). Defendant further argues the trial court erred by basing its judgment upon insufficient evidence, by failing to make necessary findings of fact, and by allowing an \u201cexcessive, unreasonable, arbitrary, [and] capricious\u201d award. For the reasons set forth herein, we believe defendant\u2019s assignments of error are unfounded.\nPertinent facts and procedural information are as follows: On 22 July 1992, Brande West (plaintiff) was injured in an automobile collision involving defendant\u2019s 1986 Ford vehicle. On 7 December 1992, plaintiff instituted the instant action by and through her guardian ad litem alleging defendant was negligent in the operation of his automobile thereby proximately causing injury to plaintiff. Defendant answered denying liability and further alleged plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence as an affirmative defense.\nThe parties stipulated at trial that \u201c[t]he medical expenses incurred on behalf of the minor Plaintiff . . . will be allowed into evidence and the jury will be able to consider these expenses as part of the damages to be considered in addition to the amount prayed for in the Complaint for personal injury.\u201d\nThe issues submitted by the trial court to the jury were answered as follows:\nIssue 1: Was the minor Plaintiff, Brande M. West, injured as a result of the negligence of the Defendant, Toni Gray Tilley?\nAnswer: Yes.\nIssue 2: Did the minor Plaintiff, Brande M. West, by her own negligence, contribute to her injury?\nAnswer: No.\nIssue 3: What amount is the minor Plaintiff, Brande M. West, entitled to recover for personal injury?\nAnswer: $9,000.00.\nIssue 4: What amount, if any, is Gloria Williams, mother of the minor Plaintiff, entitled to recover for medical expenses?\nAnswer: $1,301.00.\nThe trial court subsequently entered judgment stating \u201cPlaintiff is hereby awarded a Judgment against the Defendant, Toni Gray Tilley, in the sum of $9,000.00,\u201d and further awarded plaintiff attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $8,400.00.\nDefendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions, but subsequently entered an amended judgment to reflect the receipt by plaintiff\u2019s mother of $1,301.00 for medical expenses incurred as a result of plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Defendant gave notice of appeal to this Court 16 November 1993 and 18 November 1993.\nI.\nAlthough the court\u2019s amended judgment provided separately for recovery by plaintiff of $9,000.00 and by Gloria Williams (plaintiff\u2019s mother; Ms. Williams) of $1,301.00, defendant contends the trial court \u201centered one judgment in the total amount of $10,301.00.\u201d Because the \u201cjudgment\u201d intended by G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 must necessarily include plaintiff\u2019s damages and the mother\u2019s award for medical expenses, defendant continues, the court erred by allowing attorneys\u2019 fees upon a judgment in excess of the statutory limit. We find defendant\u2019s argument unpersuasive.\nG.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 states in pertinent part:\nIn any personal injury or property damage suit, . . . where the judgment for recovery of damages is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or less, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant obtaining a judgment for damages in said suit, said attorney\u2019s fee to be taxed as a part of the court costs.\nThe statute, an exception to the general rule that counsel fees may not be included in costs recoverable by a successful party to an action or proceeding, is remedial and should be construed liberally to accomplish the legislative purpose and to bring within it all cases fairly falling within its scope. Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 239, 200 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1973) (citations omitted).\n\u201cStatutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute.\u201d Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992) (citation omitted). The plain language of the statute at issue allows counsel fees to \u201cthe duly licensed attorney representing the litigant obtaining a judgment for damages . . . .\u201d G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 (emphasis added). \u201cA party entitled to recover attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1 is so entitled based upon his status as \u2018the litigant obtaining a judgment.\u2019 \u201d Mishoe v. Sikes, 115 N.C. App. 697, 699, 446 S.E.2d 114, 115 (1994), aff'd, 340 N.C. 256, 456 S.E.2d 308 (1995) (citation omitted). The dispositive issue therefore becomes whether plaintiff\u2019s mother was indeed a \u201clitigant\u201d in the case sub judice.\nA \u201clitigant\u201d is defined as \u201c[a] party to a lawsuit; one engaged in litigation; usually spoken of active parties, not of nominal ones.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 841 (5th ed. 1979). Although counsel herein stipulated to jury consideration of the child\u2019s medical expenses so as to prevent multiplicity of suits related to the same incident, the record reflects no formal motion by either plaintiff or defendant to add Gloria Williams as a party. She did not therefore function as a \u201clitigant\u201d herein. Accordingly, the recovery attributed to her for plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses may not be incorporated with that of plaintiff in determining eligibility for attorneys\u2019 fees under G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1. Cf. Mickens v. Robinson, 103 N.C. App. 52, 58, 404 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1991) (phrase \u201clitigant obtaining a judgment\u201d includes defendants prevailing on counterclaims for less than statutory amount).\nThe foregoing conclusion is consistent with the policies underlying G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1:\nThe obvious purpose of this statute is to provide relief for a person who has sustained injury or property damage in an amount so small that, if he must pay his attorney out of his recovery, he may well conclude that is not economically feasible to bring suit on his claim. In such a situation the Legislature apparently concluded that the defendant, though at fault, would have an unjustly superior bargaining power in settlement negotiations.\nHicks, 284 N.C. at 239, 200 S.E.2d at 42.\nIn Hicks, defendant argued plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees in a case settled prior to trial because the language of the statute mandates that a \u201cpresiding judge\u201d must enter the award. Id. Therefore, defendant continued, the case must proceed to trial to qualify under the statute for an award of counsel fees. Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed observing that \u201c[t]o hold, as the defendant . . . contends, that this use of the adjective \u2018presiding\u2019 shows the Legislature intended that no fee be allowed in any case settled without actual trial is, in our opinion, to give this word an unreasonably strict construction.\u201d Id. at 240, 200 S.E.2d at 42.\nSimilarly, we believe defendant\u2019s argument insisting that the court\u2019s \u201cjudgment\u201d herein (for purposes of determining eligibility for attorneys\u2019 fees) must necessarily include medical expenses obtained by a non-party requires an unnecessarily restrictive application of G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1. Absent the court\u2019s award of attorneys\u2019 fees, the minor plaintiff\u2019s recovery in the prosecution of her claim would be expended nearly in toto to compensate counsel. Such a result certainly would not be that intended by the General Assembly, and is one we are required to reject under the instant facts. See State ex rel. Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1992) (courts \u201cmust adhere to the intent of the legislature\u201d in matters of statutory interpretation) (citation omitted).\nDefendant nonetheless suggests the claim of Williams as plaintiff\u2019s mother is \u201cderivative\u201d of her child\u2019s claim, \u201crendering the child a necessary party to the parent\u2019s claim and requiring the child and parent to be joined as plaintiffs in one action resulting in one judgment . . . .\u201d This contention fails.\nOur Rules of Civil Procedure state that \u201cthose who are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 19(a) (1990). A necessary party is one \u201cso vitally interested in the controversy involved in the action that a valid judgment cannot be rendered in the action completely and finally determining the controversy\u201d without the presence of that party. Booker v. Everhart, 294 N.C. 146, 156, 240 S.E.2d 360, 365-66 (1978) (citations omitted). \u201cWhen a complete determination of the matter cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court must cause them to be brought in.\u201d Id. at 156, 240 S.E.2d at 366 (citations omitted).\nIn North Carolina, two independent causes of action arise when an unemancipated minor is injured through the negligence of another: 1) a claim on behalf of the parent for medical expenses reasonably necessary to treat the injury and for loss of services during the child\u2019s minority, and 2) a claim on behalf of the minor child to recover damages caused by the injury including, inter alia, pain and suffering and impairment of earning capacity following majority. Brown v. Lyons, 93 N.C. App. 453, 458, 378 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1989) (citing Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980), reh\u2019g denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981)). The parents\u2019 right of action is based upon their duty to care for and maintain the child. Flippin, 301 N.C. at 120, 270 S.E.2d at 490 (citation omitted).\nOnly the minor child pursued her separate claim as a named plaintiff in the action sub judice. The participation of plaintiff\u2019s mother at trial was not essential to a determination of plaintiff\u2019s personal injury claim against defendant, and judgment therein was properly rendered \u201ccompletely and finally determining the controversy,\u201d Booker, 294 N.C. at 156, 240 S.E.2d at 366 (citations omitted), without the presence as a party of Gloria Williams. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the interests of plaintiff and her mother were not so united as to require joinder of Ms. Williams under Rule 19(a).\nII.\nIn addition, defendant submits the trial court erred by awarding attorneys\u2019 fees without either sufficient evidence or findings of fact and conclusions of law that such award was reasonable. This contention is unfounded.\nG.S. \u00a7 6-21.1 accords the trial court considerable discretion in affixing the amount of reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees. Hill v. Jones, 26 N.C. App. 168, 170, 215 S.E.2d 168, 170, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 664 (1975) (citation omitted). \u201cReasonableness, not arbitrary classification of attorney activity, is the key factor under all our attorneys\u2019 fees statutes.\u201d Coastal Production v. Goodson Farms, 70 N.C. App. 221, 228, 319 S.E.2d 650, 656, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 621, 323 S.E.2d 922 (1984) (citations omitted). Therefore, the trial court\u2019s award will not be disturbed on appeal without a showing of manifest abuse of its discretion. Lea Co. v. N.C. Board of Transportation, 323 N.C. 691, 694-95, 374 S.E.2d 868, 870 (1989).\nFor the appellate court to determine if an award of counsel fees is reasonable, \u201cthe record must contain findings of fact as to the time and labor expended, the skill required, the customary fee for like work, and the experience or ability of the attorney\u201d based on competent evidence. United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 494, 403 S.E.2d 104, 111 (1991), aff\u2019d, 335 N.C. 183, 437 S.E.2d 374 (1993) (citations omitted).\nCounsel for plaintiff herein submitted an affidavit to the trial court itemizing the services provided. Defendant\u2019s attorney professed not to have \u201cany problem\u201d with the affidavit being presented and indicated she did not question \u201cwhether he\u2019s done those things . . . that directly apply to me.\u201d The trial court observed, \u201c[t]here\u2019s no question in my mind that based on the affidavit that the attorneys have the time in it that they say they have,\u201d at which point defense counsel interjected, \u201cI\u2019m not disputing anything you\u2019re saying.\u201d Following defense counsel\u2019s complaint that two attorneys represented plaintiff at trial, the court agreed it would base its computation of attorneys\u2019 fees for plaintiff on a total of fifty-six hours so as to \u201celiminate[] any duplication of hours\u201d between plaintiff\u2019s two trial attorneys. Counsel for defendant then replied:\nWell, I like that better. And as far as the rate, you\u2019re just going to have to use your discretion about that....\nThereafter, the court entered its award as follows:\nThe court has considered the affidavits of the attorneys and finds that, and the statements of the attorneys, and finds that they have unduplicated hours totataling [sic] 56 hours and that the reasonable and customary fee that has been awarded in this district for attorneys with this experience and for this type of work is $150 per hour and sets an attorney fee at $8,400.\nThe court then asked counsel, \u201cAnything further?\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney merely made inquiry regarding a matter unrelated to the matter of attorneys\u2019 fees and the case then concluded.\nWe do not believe the foregoing sufficiently constitutes preservation for our review of those questions relating to the sufficiency of the court\u2019s findings or to the reasonableness of its award of counsel fees. See N.C.R. App. R 10(b)(1) (\u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make . . . .\u201d). We therefore reject defendant\u2019s second argument.\nMoreover, assuming arguendo defendant properly preserved the issue of the court\u2019s failure to find based upon competent evidence that the fee awarded was \u201creasonable,\u201d we nonetheless conclude, considering the record and the cases cited hereinabove, that the trial court\u2019s stated determination as to reasonableness was sufficient. See also Mickens, 103 N.C. App. at 59, 404 S.E.2d at 363 (trial court \u201chaving carefully reviewed the petitioner\u2019s hours,\u201d showed no abuse of discretion in awarding $5,000.00 in attorneys\u2019 fees); cf. Morris v. Bailey, 86 N.C. App. 378, 387, 358 S.E.2d 120, - (1987) (court\u2019s award of one-third of total recovery for attorneys\u2019 fee error where judgment contained no findings regarding time and labor expended, skill required to perform services, customary fee, or experience and ability of attorney).\nIII.\nLastly, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding $8,400.00 in counsel fees because \u201cthe fees were excessive, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.\u201d As noted above, this assignment of error has not been properly preserved for our review, see N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1), and is thus without merit. Moreover, again assuming arguendo proper preservation for appellate review, defendant\u2019s argument cannot be sustained.\n\u201cA fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence experienced in the area of law involved would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.\u201d N.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon II, Rule 2.6(b) (1995). The Rule sets out factors to be considered in determining whether the fee claimed is reasonable. Id. Among those factors are \u201cthe time and labor required,\u201d Rule 2.6(b)(1), \u201cthe fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services,\u201d Rule 2.6(b)(3), \u201cthe amount involved and the results obtained,\u201d Rule 2.6(b)(4), and \u201cthe experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services,\u201d Rule 2.6(b)(7).\nApplying these factors to the record herein, we perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court. It carefully considered the time expended by counsel, exercising particular caution in omitting duplicitous services, as well as the fees normally charged in the area for attorneys with similar experience and expertise. The record further suggests that plaintiff\u2019s recovery was well in excess of the amount originally offered as settlement, a circumstance properly compensated by attorneys\u2019 fees. See Redevelopment Comm. v. Hyder, 20 N.C. App. 241, 245, 201 S.E.2d 236, 239 (1973) (results obtained by attorney in excess of prior proposals are a legitimate consideration in determining the amount of his fee).\nBased upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges ARNOLD and GREENE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Connor, Bunn, Rogerson & Woodard, P.A., by James F. Rogerson, for 'plaintiff-appellee.", "Thomas, Farris and Tamer, P.A., by Allen G. Thomas and Page Thomas Smith, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Wallace, Morris, Barwick & Rochelle, P.A., by Elizabeth A. Heath and Elizabeth H. McCullough, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRANDE M. WEST (MINOR) THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, WILLIAM C. FARRIS, Plaintiff v. TONI GRAY TILLEY, Defendant\nNo. 947DC334\n(Filed 5 September 1995)\n1. Costs \u00a7 30 (NCI4th)\u2014 injured child \u2014 mother awarded medical expenses \u2014 mother not a party \u2014 judgment not over $10,000 \u2014 recovery of attorney fees not barred\nAlthough counsel stipulated to jury consideration of plaintiff child\u2019s medical expenses so as to prevent multiplicity of suits related to the same incident, the record reflected no formal motion by either plaintiff or defendant to add plaintiff\u2019s mother as a party; therefore, plaintiff\u2019s mother did not function as a \u201clitigant,\u201d and the recovery attributed to her for plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses could not be incorporated with that of plaintiff in determining eligibility for attorneys\u2019 fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.1. Hence, there was no merit to defendant\u2019s' contention that the court erred by allowing attorneys\u2019 fees upon a judgment in excess of the statutory limit.\nAm Jur 2d, Costs \u00a7 64.\nSupreme Court\u2019s views as to requisites for award of attorneys\u2019 fees. 77 L. Ed 2d 1540.\n2. Parent and Child \u00a7 8 (NCI4th)\u2014 injured minor \u2014 parent\u2019s claim for medical expenses independent of child\u2019s claim\u2014 joinder not required\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the claim of plaintiffs mother for medical expenses was \u201cderivative\u201d of plaintiff child\u2019s claim, rendering the child a necessary party to the parent\u2019s claim and requiring the child and parent to be joined as plaintiffs in one action resulting in one judgment, since, in North Carolina, two independent causes of action arise when an une-mancipated minor is injured through the negligence of another.\nAm Jur 2d, Parent and Child \u00a7 97.\nWhat items of damages on account of personal injury to infant belong to him, and what to parent. 32 ALR2d 1060.\n3. Appeal and Error \u00a7 147 (NCI4th)\u2014 award of counsel fees\u2014 questions not properly preserved for review\nDefendant did not properly preserve for review questions relating to the sufficiency of the trial court\u2019s findings and the reasonableness of its award of counsel fees.\nAm Jur 2d, Appellate Review \u00a7\u00a7 614, 690.\n4. Costs \u00a7 32 (NCI4th)\u2014 award of attorney\u2019s fees \u2014 amount reasonable\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney\u2019s fees of $8,400 on a $10,000 judgment where the court carefully considered the time expended by counsel, exercising particular caution in omitting duplicate services, as well as the fees normally charged in the area for attorneys with similar experience and expertise, and plaintiff\u2019s recovery was well in excess of the amount originally offered as settlement, a circumstance properly compensated by attorney\u2019s fees.\nAm Jur 2d, Costs \u00a7 62.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment filed 18 August 1993, amended judgment filed 1 November 1993, and order entered 12 November 1993 by Judge Joseph J. Harper, Jr. in Wilson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 October 1994.\nConnor, Bunn, Rogerson & Woodard, P.A., by James F. Rogerson, for 'plaintiff-appellee.\nThomas, Farris and Tamer, P.A., by Allen G. Thomas and Page Thomas Smith, for plaintiff-appellee.\nWallace, Morris, Barwick & Rochelle, P.A., by Elizabeth A. Heath and Elizabeth H. McCullough, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0145-01", "first_page_order": 179, "last_page_order": 188 }