{
  "id": 11915369,
  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: RONALD DOUGLAS COWLEY",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Cowley",
  "decision_date": "1995-09-19",
  "docket_number": "No. COA94-770",
  "first_page": "274",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges JOHNSON and McGEE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF: RONALD DOUGLAS COWLEY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nThe issue in this appeal is whether a gun must be operable in order for a student to be adjudicated delinquent under the statute prohibiting the possession of \u201cany gun\u201d on educational property. We hold the gun does not have to be operable, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nOn 7 December 1993, respondent, a fifteen-year-old student at Nash Central Junior High School, admitted to the school\u2019s principal that he was in possession of a handgun he had purchased from another student. Respondent showed the gun, a .38 caliber Iver Johnson, to the principal, Robert Spencer. Mr. Spencer testified that the gun was unloaded and that he found no bullets in the possession of respondent. Detective James Resh of the Nash County Sheriff\u2019s Department met with Mr. Spencer and respondent and testified that the gun was inoperable because the hammer had been filed down and would not strike the firing pin.\nRespondent was charged with a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-269.2(b) which makes it a felony to carry a firearm on educational property. Judge Sarah F. Patterson conducted the hearing in Juvenile Court. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the gun was inoperable. The trial court denied respondent\u2019s motion, and respondent presented no evidence. The court adjudicated respondent delinquent and placed him on intensive probation for twelve months. Respondent appealed.\nRespondent contends that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-269.2(b) requires that a gun be operable in order to constitute a violation of the statute. We disagree. The statute provides:\n(b) It shall be a Class I felony for any person to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind, or any dynamite cartridge, bomb, grenade, mine, or powerful explosive as defined in G.S. 14-284.1, on educational property. However, this subsection does not apply to a BB gun, stun gun, air rifle, or air pistol.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-269.2(b) (Cum. Supp. 1994). Respondent argues that the North Carolina courts have interpreted three other criminal firearm statutes as requiring operable weapons in order to constitute a violation. We find \u00a7 14-269.2(b) is distinguishable from these statutes and does not require that a gun be operable in order to establish a violation of the statute.\nThe three statutes respondent asks us to compare to \u00a7 14-269.2(b) are N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-87, 14-288.8, and 14-415.1. The armed robbery statute, \u00a7 14-87, makes it a crime to commit robbery with the use of a weapon \u201cwhereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87(a) (1993). That statute is distinguishable because the only way a person\u2019s life would be threatened is with the use of an operable gun. The armed robbery statute necessarily implies that the gun be operable. To the contrary, \u00a7 14-269.2(b) states it is illegal to carry any gun on school property. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.8(c) is markedly different because it deals with \u201cweapon[s] of mass death and destruction,\u201d going into great detail to define these weapons. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.8 (1993). The focus of \u00a7 14-288.8 is considerably different from the concept of any gun used in \u00a7 14-269.2(b). Finally, \u00a7 14-415.1(a) prevents a convicted felon from purchasing, owning, or possessing \u201cany handgun or other firearm with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches, or any weapon of mass death and destruction . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(a) (1993). We also find this statute encompasses a narrow range of guns, while \u00a7 14-269.2(b) prohibits any gun, excluding only \u201ca BB gun, stun gun, air rifle, or air pistol.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-269.2(b).\nPublic policy favors that \u00a7 14-269.2(b) be treated differently from the other firearm statutes. The other statutes are concerned with the increased risk of endangerment, while the purpose of \u00a7 14-269.2(b) is to deter students and others from bringing any type of gun onto school grounds. The question of operability is not relevant because the focus of the statute is the increased necessity for safety in our schools. The General Assembly has already established the types of guns not encompassed by the statute. It is unnecessary for the courts to add to that list.\nThe trial court properly adjudicated the respondent delinquent. The order of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHNSON and McGEE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "COZORT, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Elizabeth R. Bare and Investigative Law Clerk/Attomey Sondra G. P\u00e1nico, for the State.",
      "Terry W. Alford for respondent appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: RONALD DOUGLAS COWLEY\nNo. COA94-770\n(Filed 19 September 1995)\nWeapons and Firearms \u00a7 16 (NCI4th)\u2014 student with gun on school property \u2014 gnu not operable \u2014 adjudication of delinquency proper\nA gun need not be operable in order for a student to be adjudicated delinquent under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-269.2(b) which prohibits the possession of \u201cany gun\u201d on educational property.\nAm Jur 2d, Weapons and Firearms \u00a7 26, 27.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 26 April 1994 by Judge Sarah F. Patterson in Nash County District Juvenile Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Elizabeth R. Bare and Investigative Law Clerk/Attomey Sondra G. P\u00e1nico, for the State.\nTerry W. Alford for respondent appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0274-01",
  "first_page_order": 308,
  "last_page_order": 310
}