{ "id": 11916106, "name": "KIRK C. AUNE v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, DR. STUART BONDURANT, WILLIAM D. MATTERN, and EDWIN CAPEL", "name_abbreviation": "Aune v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill", "decision_date": "1995-10-17", "docket_number": "No. COA94-1350", "first_page": "430", "last_page": "437", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.C. App. 430" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "21 ALR5th 1", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "20 ALR5th 677", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572-73", "parenthetical": "discussing burdens of parties in summary judgment hearing" }, { "page": "572-73", "parenthetical": "evidence used to meet a party's burden at summary judgment must be admissible at trial" }, { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate where an essential element of plaintiffs case is lacking" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff cannot surmount defendant's affirmative defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff cannot surmount defendant's affirmative defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515", "parenthetical": "all tort claims against UNC and its constituent institutions must be brought before the Industrial Commission" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523272 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "all tort claims against UNC and its constituent institutions must be brought before the Industrial Commission" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558916 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535471 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523032 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" }, { "page": "607-08" }, { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 L. Ed. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "493 U.S. 808", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336832, 11337474, 11337027, 11337289, 11337100, 11337389, 11337554 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/493/0808-01", "/us/493/0808-06", "/us/493/0808-02", "/us/493/0808-04", "/us/493/0808-03", "/us/493/0808-05", "/us/493/0808-07" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562472, 2561738, 2562828 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0706-02", "/nc/323/0706-03", "/nc/323/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 S.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs case at summary judgment must be based on allegations in complaint" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525025 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs case at summary judgment must be based on allegations in complaint" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 S.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526800 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556141, 2554769, 2554037, 2555223, 2554975 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0266-03", "/nc/329/0266-05", "/nc/329/0266-02", "/nc/329/0266-04", "/nc/329/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524236 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524731 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "discussing burdens of parties in summary judgment hearing" }, { "page": "625" }, { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527867 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8150 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "retaliation claim based on first and fourteenth amendments requires proof that protected conduct was a \"substantial or motivating factor\" in adverse action" }, { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "retaliation claim based on first and fourteenth amendments requires proof that protected conduct was a \"substantial or motivating factor\" in adverse action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2489121, 2489031, 2489556, 2491254, 2492535 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0704-05", "/nc/325/0704-02", "/nc/325/0704-04", "/nc/325/0704-03", "/nc/325/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520293 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12136994 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-84", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 886, "char_count": 18656, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.131397513528681e-07, "percentile": 0.861296932755539 }, "sha256": "681ad61933448729afcdfed1731d787cef2dd1c48b67dc810f4e859b5cb4d7e4", "simhash": "1:0793cdd01c7eee6e", "word_count": 2820 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "KIRK C. AUNE v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, DR. STUART BONDURANT, WILLIAM D. MATTERN, and EDWIN CAPEL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nKirk C. Aune (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (University), Dr. Stuart Bondurant (Bondurant), William D. Mattern (Mattern), and Edwin Capel (Capel) (collectively defendants) on plaintiffs \u201cWhistleblower,\u201d intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress and misrepresentation claims.\nOh 7 July 1993, plaintiff filed this action against defendants, alleging that in 1991, while he was employed by the University School of Medicine as the Associate Dean for Information Systems and Director of the Office of Information Systems (OIS), he reported to Mattern (Associate Dean of Academic Affairs) and Bondurant (Dean of the School of Medicine) \u201cthe existence of an apparent conflict of interest among some employees of the School of Medicine.\u201d In 1992 he reported the \u201cpotential conflicts of interest as well as the possible appropriation of state resources by some employees of the School of Medicine for their own private commercial gain\u201d to Capel (University\u2019s internal auditor). He further alleges that \u201cthe decision to terminate [his] employment. . . was made in retaliation for the aforesaid reports\u201d and in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 126-84, -85. Plaintiff also alleged that the defendants \u201cacted willfully, wantonly and intentionally and/or were negligent in their handling of the performance review and [his] attempt to report suspected misbehavior and conflicts of interest\u201d and that he suffered severe emotional distress as a consequence. The plaintiff finally alleged that the University misrepresented \u201cthe fairness with which decisions about his continued employment would be made,\u201d that Capel and the University misrepresented that \u201can appropriate investigation would be conducted\u201d into his 18 June 1992 report and that Bondurant misrepresented \u201cthat there would be no negative repercussions from making a report of suspected misappropriation of state resources.\u201d Plaintiffs suit is captioned against Bondurant, Mattern and Capel in both their official and individual capacities.\nIn support of the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment they presented an affidavit by Bondurant in which he recalled only one time, \u201cin early 1992, or possibly 1991,\u201d that plaintiff asserted the possibility of a conflict of interest among employees of the School of Medicine. After Bondurant had Mattern conduct an investigation, which revealed no conflict, Bondurant told plaintiff, who was not satisfied with the outcome, that he could report his concerns to Capel. Bondurant heard nothing else of plaintiffs complaints and therefore \u201cconsidered the matter to be resolved.\u201d Furthermore, Bondurant did not know of plaintiffs reports to Capel until after the nonrenewal of plaintiffs appointment. In 1992, Bondurant appointed a committee to review plaintiffs performance. Bondurant further states, in his affidavit, that he did not ask Mattern to influence the 1992 review committee\u2019s decision, although he did request that Mattern discuss candidates to serve as committee members. Dr. David Ontjes (Ontjes), who served as chair of the 1992 review committee, and another committee member interviewed Mattern, as a witness, before the committee formally convened to hear from witnesses and write its report. During his interview, Mattern expressed his opinion that plaintiff should not be reappointed. Although Ontjes questioned Bondurant regarding the necessity of a review after hearing Mattern\u2019s opinion, Bondurant \u201cassured [Ontjes] that a review was quite necessary, and that [he] wanted the committee to conduct an impartial and thorough examination of [plaintiff\u2019s] leadership of OIS, on the basis of which [Bondurant] would then make a decision.\u201d Bondurant stressed that Mattern\u2019s opinion was just one person\u2019s and that the committee should consider all sources before making a recommendation. Bondurant gave no indications of his personal views regarding plaintiff to the committee and asked for a thorough and objective review. The 1992 review committee issued a report on 22 April 1993 and \u201cstrongly advise[d] that [plaintiff] not be reappointed.\u201d In support of its recommendation it determined that plaintiff\u2019s style of interaction had decreased his effectiveness, citing specifically the perception that he was rigid and uncompromising and his failure to provide a functional long-term plan or to address the microcomputer evolution. Bondurant \u201cdecided to accept the [c]ommitte\u2019s recommendation\u201d and not reappoint the plaintiff.\nIn Mattem\u2019s affidavit in support of the motion, he stated that he only remembers a general statement by plaintiff regarding the conflict of interest charge in the fall of 1991. After plaintiffs mention of a potential problem, Mattem carefully questioned the faculty member involved and was satisfied by the faculty member\u2019s explanation that there was no conflict of interest. Mattem reported his satisfaction to plaintiff. Plaintiff never mentioned that conflict issue again. Plaintiff also brought forth a potential conflict of interest held by a programmer, regarding a previous dual employment contract held by the programmer. When Mattern investigated, he determined that the programmer was no longer working on the project which would have given rise to the conflict of interest. Furthermore, Mattern was only limitedly involved in plaintiff\u2019s 1992 review. Mattern worked to appoint the committee members, but members to whom plaintiff objected were removed from the committee and the final committee contained no member to which plaintiff did not agree. Mattem also submitted a list of names to the committee of people they might contact, \u201cspecifically omitt[ing] . . . people whose views [he] thought were uniformly negative.\u201d The undisputed evidence also reveals that the committee had numerous sources from which to collect witnesses, including an open request to anyone interested in the hearing to testify either for or against plaintiff\u2019s reappointment. Mattem\u2019s only other involvement with the review was his testimony as a witness. Furthermore, Mattern did not know of plaintiff\u2019s reports to Capel.\nDefendants also presented affidavits from members of the 1992 review committee. Each member gave specific facts establishing the unbiased nature of plaintiff\u2019s 1992 review. All stated their opinion that the committee conducted a fair, unbiased review of plaintiff\u2019s performance, and none had any preconceived notions regarding plaintiffs reappointment. Additionally, the administrative assistant who staffed the 1992 review committee submitted an affidavit stating that the review was ordinary and conducted as others at the University had been conducted.\nIn response to defendants\u2019 evidence, plaintiff presented an affidavit containing the specific facts relating to his reports to Bondurant, Mattern and Capel. Plaintiff had earlier stated in his complaint his own belief that his appointment was not renewed because of his reports. The plaintiff also presented an affidavit by John Gullo (Gullo), a former OIS employee, which included his statements that Dr. James Wrenn \u201ctold top level computer people in the Hospital that [plaintiff] was \u2018going to be cut down to size\u2019 and they didn\u2019t have to worry about [plaintiff\u2019s] OIS.\u201d Gullo also saw a budget request by plaintiff, on which Bondurant\u2019s \u201cmain administrator\u201d had commented \u201cI don\u2019t think its going to help.\u201d\nThe issues are whether (I) the evidence supports summary judgment for the defendants on the \u201cWhistleblower\u201d claim; and (II) Bondurant, Mattern and Capel have been sued only in their official capacity, rendering them immune from plaintiff\u2019s claims for emotional distress and misrepresentation.\nI\nNorth Carolina General Statute \u00a7 126-85, known as the \u201cWhistleblower\u201d Act (the Act) protects State employees who make reports of certain activities described in section 126-84 from retaliation by heads of \u201cany State department, agency, or institution\u201d or retaliation by any other State employee \u201cexercising supervisory authority\u201d over the employee. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-85 (1993). The Act is violated if the report is a substantial causative factor in any \u201cdischarge,\u201d threat or discrimination \u201cregarding the State employee\u2019s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment.\u201d Id.; Kennedy v. Guilford Tech. Community College, 115 N.C. App. 581, 584, 448 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1994); see Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 230, 382 S.E.2d 874, 878 (applying substantial factor test to retaliatory discharge claim under Occupational Safety and Health Act), disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 704, 388 S.E.2d 449 (1989); see also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471, 484 (1977) (retaliation claim based on first and fourteenth amendments requires proof that protected conduct was a \u201csubstantial or motivating factor\u201d in adverse action). Upon a showing of retaliation the employee is entitled to \u201cdamages, an injunction, or other remedies.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-86 (1993); Minneman v. Martin, 114 N.C. App. 616, 618-19, 442 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1994).\nIn the context of summary judgment in this type of action, once a defendant, moving for summary judgment, presents evidence that the adverse employment action is based' on a legitimate non-retaliatory motive, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence, raising a genuine issue of fact, that his actions under the Act were a substantial causative factor in the adverse employment action, see Taylor v. Taylor Prods., Inc., 105 N.C. App. 620, 625, 414 S.E.2d 568, 572-73 (1992) (discussing burdens of parties in summary judgment hearing), or provide an excuse for not doing so. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(f) (1990). In determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all conflicts in plaintiff\u2019s favor, giving plaintiff all reasonable inferences. Broyhill v. Aycock & Spence, 102 N.C. App. 382, 389, 402 S.E.2d 167, 172, disc. rev. denied, 329 N.C. 266, 407 S.E.2d 831 (1991). A genuine issue of material fact exists if plaintiff\u2019s evidence is substantial. Martin v. Ray Lackey Enters., 100 N.C. App. 349, 353, 396 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1990).\nIn support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that the nonrenewal of plaintiff\u2019s appointment was not a result of his reports regarding any conflicts of interest or the possible misappropriation of State resources and instead was based on legitimate non-retaliatory reasons. We agree that the defendants\u2019 evidence supports their argument. In support of their argument, defendants presented the undisputed evidence that plaintiff\u2019s performance was scrutinized in compliance with University policy. Defendant\u2019s evidence also specifically reveals that the final committee review, which recommended that plaintiff not be reappointed, was conducted fairly and without bias. Moreover, the evidence is that there were questions regarding the adequacy of plaintiff\u2019s performance, of which plaintiff had knowledge, even before his reports to Bondurant and Mattern. Finally, the evidence reveals the nonappointment was based on the plaintiff\u2019s inability to \u201ccollaborate with others.\u201d\nIn response to defendants\u2019 motion, plaintiff argues that the 1992 review committee was biased by Bondurant and Mattern and that the reasons cited by defendants for the nonrenewal of plaintiff\u2019s appointment are pretextual. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint contains his own belief that his appointment was not renewed because of his reports. Other than the facts relating to the reports made by plaintiff to Bondurant, Mattern and Capel, which are set forth in his affidavit, plaintiff brings forward an affidavit containing a statement by Gullo that a former student stated that plaintiff would \u201cbe cut down to size\u201d and that hospital computer employees \u201cdidn\u2019t have to worry about [plaintiff\u2019s] OIS,\u201d and that Bondurant\u2019s administrator commented that plaintiff\u2019s budget request would not help. Even assuming that these statements would be admissible at trial, Taylor, 105 N.C. App. at 625, 414 S.E.2d at 572-73 (evidence used to meet a party\u2019s burden at summary judgment must be admissible at trial), these statements do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the plaintiffs reports were a substantial factor in the nonrenewal of his contract, even viewing all the other evidence in plaintiffs favor and giving him all reasonable inferences. The evidence is simply too speculative to support a finding that the plaintiffs nonrenewal was in any way related to the report.\nPlaintiff also argues that even if the reasons that defendants give for not renewing his appointment are legitimate, the defendants also retaliated against plaintiff by \u201cundercutting\u201d his authority, \u201cstonewalling\u201d the promised investigation, \u201csetting up oppositional centers of power,\u201d and \u201ccreating a self-fulfilling review process.\u201d Without determining whether these acts \u201cotherwise discriminate\u201d against plaintiff within the meaning of the statute, we reject this argument because these acts of retaliation were not alleged in plaintiffs complaint. Truesdale v. University of North Carolina, 91 N.C. App. 186, 190, 371 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1988) (plaintiffs case at summary judgment must be based on allegations in complaint), disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 706, 377 S.E.2d 229, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 808, 107 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1989).\nFor an additional reason, summary judgment for Capel was correct. This record reveals that he had no supervisory authority over plaintiff and was not the head of any State department, agency or institution. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-85(a); Taylor, 105 N.C. App. at 625, 414 S.E.2d at 572 (summary judgment appropriate where an essential element of plaintiffs case is lacking).\nII\nDefendants argue that summary judgment for them on the emotional distress and misrepresentation claims was also appropriate because they are protected from these claims by sovereign immunity. We agree.\nA governmental entity and its officers or employees when sued in their official capacity are immune from suits based on tort claims, unless there has been some waiver. Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C. App. 604, 607, 436 S.E.2d 276, 278-79 (1993), disc. rev. denied, 336 N.C. 77, 445 S.E.2d 46 (1994). In determining whether a plaintiff has brought an action against a defendant in his official or individual capacity, it is important to consider both the \u201cnature of the conduct giving rise to the action\u201d and the \u201cnature of the relief sought.\u201d 1 Shepard\u2019s Editorial Staff, Civil Actions Against State and Local Government, Its Divisions, Agencies and Officers \u00a7 1.16 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Civil Actions]; see Taylor, 112 N.C. App. at 607-08, 436 S.E.2d at 279. The nature of the conduct determines in what capacity one can be sued, General Elec. Co. v. Turner, 275 N.C. 493, 498, 168 S.E.2d 385, 389 (1969), and the nature of the relief sought reveals how a defendant has been sued. Civil Actions \u00a7\u00a7 1.17-.18. The designations made in the caption of the complaint are not determinative. Taylor, 112 N.C. App. at 607, 436 S.E.2d at 279.\nIn this case the allegations in the complaint with respect to the tort claims involve acts of the defendants performed within the bounds of their official duties and in their capacities as representatives of the State. Therefore the individual defendants can only be sued in their official capacity and as such share the governmental immunity enjoyed by the University, an agency of the State. See Jones v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., 104 N.C. App. 613, 617, 410 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1991) (all tort claims against UNC and its constituent institutions must be brought before the Industrial Commission). This immunity supports the summary judgment on these claims. See Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 453, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981) (summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff cannot surmount defendant\u2019s affirmative defense).\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHNSON and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "McSurely & Dorosin, by Mark Dorosin and Alan McSurely, and Levine Stewart & Davis, by John T. Stewart, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas J. Ziko, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KIRK C. AUNE v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, DR. STUART BONDURANT, WILLIAM D. MATTERN, and EDWIN CAPEL\nNo. COA94-1350\n(Filed 17 October 1995)\n1. Public Officers and Employees \u00a7 58 (NCI4th)\u2014 whistle-blowing claim \u2014 nonreappointment unrelated to whistle-blowing \u2014 summary judgment for defendants proper\nThe evidence was sufficient to support summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs whistleblower claim where plaintiff was not reappointed as an associate dean at a state university; defendants presented undisputed evidence that plaintiffs performance was scrutinized in compliance with university policy; defendants\u2019 evidence specifically revealed that the final committee review, which recommended that plaintiff not be reappointed, was conducted fairly and without bias; the evidence was that there were questions regarding the adequacy of plaintiffs performance, of which plaintiff had knowledge, even before his whistleblowing to defendants; defendants\u2019 evidence revealed that plaintiff\u2019s nonappointment was based on his inability to collaborate with others; and plaintiff failed to show that his reports of conflicts of interest and possible misappropriation of state resources were a substantial factor in the nonrenewal of his appointment N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-85.\nAm Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees \u00a7\u00a7 236-239, 261, 262, 288.\nPre-emption by workers\u2019 compensation statute of employee\u2019s remedy under state \u201cwhistleblower\u201d statute. 20 ALR5th 677.\nPre-emption of wrongful discharge cause of action by civil rights laws. 21 ALR5th 1.\n2. State \u00a7 23 (NCI4th)\u2014 emotional distress and misrepresentation \u2014 claims barred by sovereign immunity\nSummary judgment for defendant state university administrators on plaintiff\u2019s emotional distress and misrepresentation claims was appropriate based on defendants\u2019 claims of sovereign immunity, since allegations in the complaint involved acts of defendants performed within the bounds of their official duties and in their capacities as representatives of the state.\nAm Jur 2d, Damages \u00a7\u00a7 41, 251-262; Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability \u00a7 70; States, Territories and Dependencies \u00a7\u00a7 104-111.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 26 September 1994 in Orange County Superior Court by Judge Anthony M. Brannon. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September 1995.\nMcSurely & Dorosin, by Mark Dorosin and Alan McSurely, and Levine Stewart & Davis, by John T. Stewart, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas J. Ziko, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0430-01", "first_page_order": 464, "last_page_order": 471 }