{ "id": 11917804, "name": "NATHAN WAYNE ROBERTS, DERALD WAYNE ROBERTS, and wife, MARY JENENE ROBERTS v. RONALD CHARLES YOUNG and CAROLYN NELSON TUGGLE", "name_abbreviation": "Roberts v. Young", "decision_date": "1995-11-21", "docket_number": "No. COA95-120", "first_page": "720", "last_page": "732", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.C. App. 720" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531661 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696714, 4692435, 4691318, 4691867, 4690364 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0329-02", "/nc/314/0329-05", "/nc/314/0329-01", "/nc/314/0329-04", "/nc/314/0329-03" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526061 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "holding one panel of this Court is bound by the decision of another panel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "holding one panel of this Court is bound by the decision of another panel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208-209", "parenthetical": "holding a statute must be applied as previously construed even though it appears the former decisions may have liberalized the statute beyond the original intent" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625666 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "holding a statute must be applied as previously construed even though it appears the former decisions may have liberalized the statute beyond the original intent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2536933 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621661 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563323 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 F.2d 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 101339 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding admissions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, which is identical to N.C.R. Civ. P. 36, \"stand in the same relation to the case as sworn testimony.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/323/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622893 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572630 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625588 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2494113, 2497409, 2494669, 2495766, 2498655 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0637-03", "/nc/327/0637-02", "/nc/327/0637-05", "/nc/327/0637-01", "/nc/327/0637-04" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522018 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683614 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289-290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574-575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2396078 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "holding plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss his action is limited in duration by Rule 41(a)(1) to any time before plaintiff rests his case." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553310 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "holding plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss his action is limited in duration by Rule 41(a)(1) to any time before plaintiff rests his case." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498038 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248-249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 248-249, 415 S.E.2d 726, 732 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2559439 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 248-249, 415 S.E.2d 726, 732 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4727132 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741-742" }, { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 L. Ed. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 996", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11763540 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 F.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2224095 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/432/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568516, 8568556, 8568657, 8568690, 8568603 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0392-01", "/nc/304/0392-02", "/nc/304/0392-04", "/nc/304/0392-05", "/nc/304/0392-03" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520807 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508082 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547559 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0258-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1160, "char_count": 27817, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.047731945213356e-07, "percentile": 0.9076378584234062 }, "sha256": "a609bec7737a77be6fa013d618312f0b219e1e038111f237e75372736ebe4e40", "simhash": "1:1b2bc76e7f6e4c2c", "word_count": 4530 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "NATHAN WAYNE ROBERTS, DERALD WAYNE ROBERTS, and wife, MARY JENENE ROBERTS v. RONALD CHARLES YOUNG and CAROLYN NELSON TUGGLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, MARK D., Judge.\nUnnamed defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) appeals from jury verdict alleging 10 assignments of error. We find no error.\nState Farm contends the trial court erred by: (1) failing to bifurcate the damages issue; (2) admitting evidence relating to punitive damages; (3) allowing plaintiff, at the close of its evidence, to dismiss its claim for punitive damages; (4) instructing the jury on the effect of plaintiff\u2019s withdrawal of the punitive damages issue in a materially different way than proposed by State Farm; (5) instructing the jury on the effect of the withdrawal of the punitive damages issue prior to closing arguments; (6) failing to submit State Farm\u2019s proposed issue concerning the plaintiff\u2019s recovery of actual damages; (7) requiring State Farm, even though it offered no evidence, to present the first jury summation; (8) admitting into evidence plaintiff\u2019s exhibit 45, defendant\u2019s Answers to Request for Admissions, and permitting plaintiff\u2019s counsel to argue the same in summation; (9) denying State Farm\u2019s Motion for a New Trial; and (10) denying State Farm\u2019s Motion to Toll Prejudgment Interest.\nOn 28 October 1991 plaintiff Nathan Roberts (Roberts) filed his complaint for personal injuries and medical expenses. Roberts amended his complaint on 14 May 1993 t\u00f3 include an allegation of emotional distress and to add Deraid and Mary Roberts, Roberts\u2019 parents, as plaintiffs. Deraid and Mary Roberts ultimately dismissed their emotional distress claim without prejudice. Roberts also dismissed his claim against Carolyn Tuggle without prejudice.\nThe facts surrounding the accident are undisputed. On 11 October 1994 Young was driving a 1974 Oldsmobile. At around 9:30 or 10 p.m., Young drove into an apartment complex located on Erskine Street. After leaving the apartment complex, nearby police officers were suspicious of Young\u2019s activities and stopped his car. As the officers approached his vehicle, Young sped away and the ensuing chase eclipsed speeds of 75 miles per hour. In his efforts to elude the police, Young ran a red light at the intersection of Southside and Charlotte streets and struck Roberts\u2019 car. When the police officers arrived at the scene of the accident, Roberts was semi-conscious and bleeding extensively.\nAt trial Roberts presented evidence tending to show he suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident: (1) a broken right leg which required the insertion of a steel rod; (2) several broken teeth which will require future corrective surgery; (3) the initial symptoms of temporomandibular dysfunction; (4) lacerations on his chin, including a scar which plastic surgery will not completely erase, and lacerations on his right leg; (5) pain in his lower back and sciatic nerve; and (6) muscle damage to his right leg. At oral argument the parties stipulated that Roberts\u2019 present and future medical expenses total approximately $30,000.\nBeyond his observable physical injuries, medical and psychological experts testified Roberts suffered a \u201cclosed head injury\u201d \u2014 an injury which often results in personality changes, memory and attention deficits, irritability, and an overall slowing of mental functions. Roberts also called family and teachers who cited specific manifestations of Roberts\u2019 post-accident changes in personality and decreased mental capacity.\nAt trial Young stipulated: (1) he was negligent in operation of his vehicle; and (2) his negligence was the proximate cause of Roberts\u2019 injuries. Further, neither Young nor State Farm presented any evidence regarding the injuries Roberts suffered in the accident.\nAfter being charged solely on the issue of damages, the jury returned a verdict for Roberts in the amount of $450,000. Young and State Farm appealed. On 6 March 1995 Young voluntarily dismissed his appeal.\nA.\nState Farm contends, in its first and second assignments of error, that the trial court abused its discretion by failing: (1) to bifurcate the compensatory and punitive damages issues; and (2) to exclude evidence relating to punitive damages at trial.\nBifurcation is governed by N.C.R. Civ. P. 42(b), which provides:\nThe court mav in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice and shall for considerations of venue upon timely motion order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (1990) (emphasis added). State Farm contends the trial court was required, pursuant to Rule 42(b), to bifurcate the damages issue.\n\u201c \u2018Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute.\u2019 \u201d Hyler v. GTE Products Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993) (quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)). If the language of the statute is clear, this Court must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its terms. Id. Further, when according a statute its plain meaning, courts \u201cmay not interpolate or superimpose provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d Preston v. Thompson, 53 N.C. App. 290, 292, 280 S.E.2d 780, 783, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 304 N.C. 392, 285 S.E.2d 833 (1981).\nRule 42(b) provides the trial court \u201cmav . . . order a separate trial on any claim . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (1990) (emphasis added). The definition of \u201cmay\u201d is \u201chave liberty to \u2014 used nearly interchangeably with can.\" Websters New Collegiate Dictionary 523 (7th ed. 1969). The use of \u201cmay,\u201d as opposed to \u201cshall,\u201d is indicative of discretion or choice between two or more alternatives. See United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 996, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1971). Thus, we believe, contrary to State Farm\u2019s contentions, that the plain language of Rule 42(b) vests in the trial court broad discretionary authority to determine when bifurcation is appropriate.\nOur interpretation of Rule 42(b) is in complete accord with our Supreme Court\u2019s admonition the trial court must accept a broad supervisory role over the structure of a trial. In re Will of Hester, 320 N.C. 738, 741-742, 360 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1987). As our Supreme Court stated: '\nThe paramount duty of the trial judge is to supervise and control the course of the trial so as to prevent injustice. In discharging this duty, the court possesses broad discretionary powers sufficient to meet the circumstances of each case. This supervisory power encompasses the authority to structure the trial logically and to set the order of proof.\nId. (citations omitted). The legislative comment to Rule 42 also supports this view stating, \u201cthe power of severance is an indispensable safety valve to guard against the occasion where a suit of unmanageable size is thrust on the court. Whether or not there should be a severance rests in the sound discretion of the judge.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 42, official commentary (1990).\nBecause of its broad discretionary powers, the trial court\u2019s decisions regarding trial supervision and control will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of discretion. Hester, 320 N.C. at 742, 360 S.E.2d at 804. A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes \u201ca patently arbitrary decision, manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d Buford v. General Motors Corp., 339 N.C. 396, 406, 451 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1994) (citing State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 248-249, 415 S.E.2d 726, 732 (1992)).\nIn the present case, State Farm made its motion to bifurcate the punitive and compensatory damages issues after the case was called for trial. State Farm argued the jury would be confused and the compensatory award inflated if evidence relating to punitive damages was presented and thereafter dismissed. After careful review of the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying State Farm\u2019s motion to bifurcate the damages issue.\nFurther, in light of our decision upholding the trial court\u2019s denial of State Farm\u2019s motion to bifurcate, admission of evidence regarding the issue of punitive damages was proper. See N.C.R. Evid. 401, et seq.\nB.\nState Farm alleges, in its third assignment of error, that the trial court erred by allowing Roberts to dismiss his claim of punitive damages.\nN.C.R. Civ. R 41(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:\n[A]n action or any claim therein mav be dismissed bv the plaintiff without order of the court (i) bv filing a notice of dismissal at anv time before the plaintiff rests his case, or; (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1) (1990) (emphasis added). As previously indicated, where the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain language of the statute. See Hyler, 333 N.C. at 262, 425 S.E.2d at 701. Under the plain language of Rule 41(a)(1), we believe a plaintiff is vested with the authority to dismiss any of its claims prior to close of its case-in-chief. See Whitehurst v. Transportation Co., 19 N.C. App. 352, 355, 198 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1973) (holding plaintiff\u2019s absolute right to dismiss his action is limited in duration by Rule 41(a)(1) to any time before plaintiff rests his case.).\nIn the instant case, Roberts presented his Motion to Dismiss the issue of punitive damages under Rule 41(a) prior to the close of his case-in-chief. Accordingly, we find no merit in State Farm\u2019s contention the trial court misapplied Rule 41(a).\nC.\nState Farm asserts, in its fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error, that the trial court: (1) erroneously instructed the jury on the effect of Robert\u2019s withdrawal of the punitive damages issue; and (2) improperly failed to submit State Farm\u2019s proposed issue concerning the plaintiff\u2019s recovery of actual damages.\nAt the outset we note Roberts urges this Court to dismiss the above assignments of error under N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(2) for failure to contemporaneously object to the trial court\u2019s instruction. Our courts hold, however, that the policy of Rule 10(b)(2) is met when a request to alter an instruction has been submitted to the trial court at the charge conference. See Wall v. Stout, 310 N.C. 184, 189, 311 S.E.2d 571, 574-575 (1984); State v. Smith, 311 N.C. 287, 289-290, 316 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1984). Because State Farm submitted proposed jury instructions and a proposed damages issue to the trial court at the charge conference, we find, under Wall and Smith, that State Farm has satisfied the policy of Rule 10(b)(2) and, therefore, now consider the merits of State Farm\u2019s contentions.\nIt is well settled \u201c[t]he trial court must give the instructions requested, at least in substance, if they are proper and supported by evidence. However, the trial court may exercise discretion to refuse instructions based on erroneous statements of the law.\u201d Haymore v. Thew Shovel Co., 116 N.C. App. 40, 49, 446 S.E.2d 865, 871 (1994) (citations omitted). Further, the trial court is not required to provide a verbatim rendition of requested instructions which appropriately state the law \u2014 substantial compliance is sufficient. See Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. City of Winston-Salem, 100 N.C. App. 300, 305, 395 S.E.2d 705, 708, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 637, 399 S.E.2d 328 (1990); Dinkins v. Booe, 252 N.C. 731, 737, 114 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1960). In other words, \u201c \u2018[t]he [trial] court is not required to charge the jury in the precise language of [a] request [stating the correct legal standard] so long as the substance of the request is included in language which does not weaken its force.\u2019 \u201d Mut. Benefit, 100 N.C. App. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 270, 158 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1967) (per curiam)).\nIn the present case, the instruction proposed by State Farm informed the jury of the withdrawal of the punitive damages issue and emphasized that the jury must not consider evidence already presented at trial on the issue of punitive damages. We believe, after careful review, that the jury instruction given by the trial court regarding the withdrawal of the punitive damages issue sufficiently conveyed the substance of State Farm\u2019s concerns. Thus, under Mutual Benefit and Dinkins, we conclude the instruction provided by the trial court was proper.\nState Farm also contends it was prejudiced by the timing of the above referenced curative instruction, which was given prior to closing arguments. Although State Farm asserts this objection for the first time on appeal, we have carefully reviewed the record and conclude State Farm-did not suffer any prejudice due to the timing of the curative instruction.\nFurther, State Farm asserts the trial court\u2019s failure to submit its proposed damages issue to the jury prejudiced the ultimate verdict. The pattern jury instruction on personal injury damages reads, \u201cWhat amount is the plaintiff entitled to recover for personal iniurv?\u201d N.C.P.I., Civ. 810.10 (emphasis added). State Farm proposed an issue which read, \u201cWhat amount is the plaintiff entitled to recover for actual damages?\u201d (emphasis added). The trial court refused to present State Farm\u2019s proposed issue to the jury. The record reflects the trial court charged the jury on \u201cactual damages\u201d using language virtually identical to that of the pattern jury instructions. See N.C.P.I., Civ. 810.10 - 810.15. Accordingly, we find no merit in the contention State Farm was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to present its proposed issue.\nD.\nState Farm contends, in its seventh assignment of error, that the trial court erred by denying State Farm the right to make the final closing argument to the jury.\nIt is undisputed neither Young nor State Farm presented evidence at trial. Further, State Farm correctly asserts \u201c[i]n all civil cases, if no evidence is introduced by the defendant, the right to open and close the argument to the jury belongs to him.\u201d See General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts, Rule 10 (Michie 1995); Trust Co. v. Braznell, 227 N.C. 211, 215, 41 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1947).\nAt trial, the trial court ruled on the order of jury summations stating, \u201c[defendants are] entitled to the opening and closing, so [plaintiff will] have the middle.\u201d When State Farm continued to argue for the right to close, the trial court responded \u201cI\u2019m giving you the first and last [argument], and forcing [plaintiff] to take the middle [argument].\u201d The record does not disclose anything in the trial court\u2019s order which prevented State Farm from closing or State Farm and Young from splitting the time allotted for closing argument. Rather, State Farm and Young decided the order of argument \u2014 State Farm opened and Young closed \u2014 without direction from the trial court. Further, we believe State Farm suffered no prejudice in having to open as Young, a party with the similar interest of minimizing the jury award, was afforded the opportunity to rebut Roberts\u2019 summation.\nAccordingly, we find no merit in State Farm\u2019s contention the trial court erred by failing to provide State Farm with the final argument to the jury.\nE.\nState Farm next alleges, in assignment of error eight, that the trial court erred in admitting defendant\u2019s Answers to Requests for Admissions and allowing plaintiff\u2019s counsel to argue the same to the jury.\nIt is beyond question that \u201c[a]ny matter admitted [in a request for admission] is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, N.C.R. Civ. P. 36(b) (1990).\nIn the present action, defendants denied Young\u2019s negligence was the proximate cause of Roberts\u2019 injuries in response to written requests for admissions (Admissions) submitted by Roberts. Immediately prior to the start of trial, State Farm and Young stipulated, and the trial court accepted, that Young\u2019s negligence was the proximate cause of Roberts\u2019 injuries.\nDuring opening arguments Young\u2019s counsel implied, in direct contravention of their initial denial, that defendants have always admitted liability and were, even now, concerned with being fair to Roberts. Prior to closing arguments Roberts requested that defendant\u2019s initial denial be admitted into evidence to rebut the assertion in opening statements that defendants have always admitted liability. The trial court entered the Admissions into evidence. We conclude, after careful review of the record, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the Admissions into evidence. See 1 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure \u00a7 36-5 (1989); Williams v. Howard Johnson\u2019s Inc. of Washington, 323 F.2d 102, 105 n. 9 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding admissions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, which is identical to N.C.R. Civ. P. 36, \u201cstand in the same relation to the case as sworn testimony.\u201d). Accordingly, we dismiss State Farms\u2019 contention the trial court erred by entering the Admissions in evidence.\nState Farm also contends allowing Roberts to reference the Admissions during his closing argument was prejudicial and a new trial is merited. As a general rule, \u201ccounsel may argue all the evidence [admitted at trial] to the jury, with such inferences as may be drawn therefrom . . . .\u201d Crutcher v. Noel, 284 N.C. 568, 572, 201 S.E.2d 855, 857 (1974). Further, a new trial is inappropriate where:\nthe record discloses that the remarks of [plaintiff\u2019s counsel] were apparently invited by remarks of the attorney for defendant in addressing the jury. As to such matter, the control of arguments of [plaintiff\u2019s counsel] and of [defendant\u2019s] counsel to the jury must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court.\nState v. Seipel, 252 N.C. 335, 335, 113 S.E.2d 432, 433 (1960) (per curiam). We have already concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the Admissions into evidence and, therefore, under Crutcher and Seipel, dismiss State Farm\u2019s contention the trial court erred by allowing Roberts to reference defendants\u2019 initial denial of liability during closing argument.\nF.\nState Farm next claims, in assignment of error nine, the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial where the inclusion of evidence relating to punitive damages during Roberts\u2019 case-in-chief resulted in jury confusion and inflation of the damages award.\nAt trial Roberts presented evidence showing he suffered from a myriad of physical injuries \u2014 including a broken leg, lacerations on his chin and leg, and pain in his sciatic nerve. The parties stipulated, at oral argument, that Roberts\u2019 present and future medical expenses total approximately $30,000. Roberts also presented expert testimony concerning the nature and severity of his \u201cclosed head injury.\u201d Further, Roberts\u2019 family and teachers were called to cite specific manifestations of his alleged \u201cclosed head injury.\u201d During closing argument, Roberts requested $750,000 in damages for his injuries, the attendant pain and suffering, and any future complications for his life expectancy of 50.65 years.\nThe trial court charged the jury that \u201cthe total of all compensatory damages are to be awarded in one lump sum. Such damages may include medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, pain and suffering (physical and mental), scars or disfigurement, loss of use of a part of the body, and permanent injury.\u201d Permanent injury includes Roberts\u2019 \u201cfuture pain, suffering and diminished ability to work caused by the accident\u201d for his entire life expectancy. The jury returned a verdict awarding $450,000 in damages.\nWe believe the trial court\u2019s instructions properly charged the jury as to the evidence it could consider regarding the possible measures of damages. Further, we note, where there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict, this Court \u201cmust assume that the jury followed the court\u2019s instruction and based its verdicts on [the] evidence which supports the [compensatory award].\u201d State v. McCarroll, 336 N.C. 559, 567, 445 S.E.2d 18, 22 (1994). After careful review of the record, including the evidence of permanent injury, we cannot say the jury\u2019s award of $450,000 was, as a matter of law, excessive in the present case. Accordingly, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying State Farm\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nG.\nFinally, State Farm contends, in assignment of error ten, that the trial court erred by denying State Farm\u2019s motion to toll prejudgment interest under the facts of the present case.\nPrejudgment interest is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5, which provides in pertinent part:\nIn an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal rate.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5 (1991). Again we note this Court is bound by the plain meaning of a statute where its language is clear and unambiguous. See Hyler, 333 N.C. at 262, 425 S.E.2d at 701. Further, this Court must remain consistent with any previous interpretations of a statute. See Lowery v. Haithcock, 239 N.C. 67, 73, 79 S.E.2d 204, 208-209 (1953) (holding a statute must be applied as previously construed even though it appears the former decisions may have liberalized the statute beyond the original intent); See also Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (holding one panel of this Court is bound by the decision of another panel).\nThis Court has interpreted the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5 to allow prejudgment interest to accrue \u201cfrom the time the action is instituted.\u201d Harris v. Scotland Neck Rescue Squad, 75 N.C. App. 444, 452, 331 S.E.2d 695, 701, disc. review denied and stay denied, 314 N.C. 329, 333 S.E.2d 486-487 (1985). N.C.R. Civ. P. 3 provides, \u201c[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 3 (1990).\nIn Harris plaintiff filed his complaint on 4 June 1982. Appellants contended the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest for the period prior to the time they were served with a valid complaint. This Court held the action was instituted on 4 June 1982 and prejudgment interest accrued from that date. Harris, 75 N.C. App. at 452, 331 S.E.2d at 701.\nLikewise, Roberts commenced this civil action when he filed his complaint on 28 October 1991. Thus, under the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5 and this Court\u2019s decision in Harris, we conclude State Farm is responsible for interest dating from 28 October 1991.\nWe believe our interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-5 is consistent with our Supreme Court\u2019s admonition that,\n[requiring the [underinsured motorist (UIM)] carrier to pay prejudgment interest up to its policy limits is not a harsh result since the UIM carrier has had the opportunity to invest the money during the pendency of the suit. In addition, it is within the UIM carrier\u2019s power to stop the accrual of prejudgment interest by offering (or posting) its policy limit.\nBaxley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 334 N.C. 1, 9, 430 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1993).\nAccordingly, we conclude the trial court properly denied State Farm\u2019s Motion to Toll Pre-Judgment Interest.\nNo error.\nJudges LEWIS and WALKER concur.\n. Although State Farm\u2019s brief denotes this as assignment of error number nine, we note, in the present record, the listing of the assignments of error submitted by State Farm denominates this issue as assignment of error number ten.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, MARK D., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Long & Parker, P.A., by Robert B. Long, Jr., and W. Scott Jones, for plaintiff-appellee Nathan Wayne Roberts.", "Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Roy W. Davis, Jr., and Michelle Rippon, for unnamed defendant-appellant, State Farm Automobile Insurance Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATHAN WAYNE ROBERTS, DERALD WAYNE ROBERTS, and wife, MARY JENENE ROBERTS v. RONALD CHARLES YOUNG and CAROLYN NELSON TUGGLE\nNo. COA95-120\n(Filed 21 November 1995)\n1. Trial \u00a7 121 (NCI4th)\u2014 bifurcation of compensatory and punitive damages issues \u2014 trial court\u2019s discretion\nThe plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 42(b) vests in the trial court broad discretionary authority to determine when bifurcation of compensatory and punitive damages issues is appropriate.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 120, 121.\n2. Trial \u00a7 213 (NCX4th)\u2014 motion to dismiss own claim \u2014 time for making\nUnder the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff is vested with the authority to dismiss any of its claims prior to close of its case-in-chief; therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing plaintiff to dismiss his claim of punitive damages where plaintiff made his motion to dismiss prior to the close of his case-in-chief.\nAm Jur 2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit \u00a7\u00a7 9 et seq.\n3. Trial \u00a7 412 (NCI4th)\u2014 objection to instructions \u2014 time for objection\nThere was no merit to plaintiffs contention that the Court should dismiss State Farm\u2019s assignments of error to the trial court\u2019s instructions on damages for failure to contemporaneously object to the trial court\u2019s instructions, since State Farm submitted proposed jury instructions and a proposed damages issue to the trial court at the charge conference and thus satisfied the policy ofN.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(2).\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1465, 1466.\n4. Trial \u00a7 302 (NCI4th)\u2014 defendants\u2019 requested instruction\u2014 instruction given in substance\nState Farm\u2019s requested instruction informing the jury of the withdrawal of the punitive damages issue and emphasizing that the jury must not consider evidence already presented at trial was provided in substance by the trial court.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1092 et seq.\n5. Trial \u00a7 200 (NCI4th)\u2014 final jury argument \u2014 defendant not denied\nThere was no merit to unnamed defendant State Farm\u2019s contention that the trial court erred by failing to provide this defendant with the final argument to the jury where the court gave defendants the opening and closing arguments; the record did not indicate anything in the trial court\u2019s order which prevented the two defendants from splitting the time allotted for closing argument; the two defendants decided the order of argument; and State Farm suffered no prejudice in having to open while the other defendant, a party with the similar interest of minimizing the jury award, was afforded the opportunity to rebut plaintiff\u2019s summation.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 535 et seq.\n6. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1017 (NCI4th)\u2014 admissions properly admitted and argued\nThe trial court did not err in admitting defendant\u2019s admissions and allowing plaintiff\u2019s counsel to argue the same to the jury where, prior to closing arguments, plaintiff requested that defendant\u2019s initial denial of liability be admitted into evidence to rebut the assertion in opening statements that defendants had always admitted liability. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 36(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 754 et seq.\n7. Trial \u00a7 563 (NCI4th)\u2014 $450,000 award \u2014 evidence of injuries and medical expenses \u2014 motion for new trial\u2014 denial proper\nIn light of the evidence of plaintiff\u2019s physical injuries and medical expenses, the jury\u2019s award of $450,000 was not excessive as a matter of law and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants\u2019 motion for a new trial.\nAm Jur 2d, New Trial \u00a7\u00a7 393 et seq.\n8. Judgments \u00a7 652 (NCI4th)\u2014 prejudgment interest \u2014 interest not tolled\nThe trial court properly denied State Farm\u2019s motion to toll prejudgment interest in a personal injury action based on the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5.\nAm Jur 2d, Interest and Usury \u00a7\u00a7 87 et seq.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 October 1994 by Judge Claude S. Sitton in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 September 1995.\nLong & Parker, P.A., by Robert B. Long, Jr., and W. Scott Jones, for plaintiff-appellee Nathan Wayne Roberts.\nVan Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Roy W. Davis, Jr., and Michelle Rippon, for unnamed defendant-appellant, State Farm Automobile Insurance Company." }, "file_name": "0720-01", "first_page_order": 754, "last_page_order": 766 }