{
  "id": 11917915,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, ON RELATION OF JAMES E. LONG, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. INTERSTATE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant v. NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Intervenor",
  "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Long v. Interstate Casualty Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1995-11-21",
  "docket_number": "No. COA95-38",
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      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, ON RELATION OF JAMES E. LONG, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. INTERSTATE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant v. NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Intervenor"
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      {
        "text": "MARTIN, MARK D., Judge.\nPetitioners, Attorney-Claimants (Attorneys) and Eastern Appraisal Services Incorporated (Eastern), appeal from order entered by the trial court affirming the Liquidator\u2019s Report and Recommendation. We affirm.\nOn 16 December 1989, Interstate Casualty Insurance Company (Interstate) and Commissioner of Insurance James E. Long (Commissioner) agreed to a voluntary supervision agreement (Agreement). The Agreement provides, in pertinent part:\n2. [Interstate] will continue to conduct operations in the normal course of business during the pendency of the examination, under the supervision of a representative of the Department [of Insurance].... Such supervision shall be upon the terms and conditions hereinafter described.\n7. [Interstate] will not incur any debt, obligation, or liability without the prior approval of the Department. Department specifically agrees that it will not unreasonably withhold approval of the utilization and payment by [Interstate] of specialized consultants or service providers, such as legal counsel, accountants, actuaries, or other insurance experts.\n16. This Agreement is to be held confidential under G.S. 58-16.2 and is to be shared only with legal counsel and Department personnel directly involved. [Interstate] reserves whatever rights it may have to seek civil redress for breach of this Agreement.\nParagraphs 3-6 further divested Interstate of any authority to make payments or otherwise transfer assets without the prior approval of the Department of Insurance, the supervising authority.\nOn 5 February 1990 the Commissioner instituted this delinquency proceeding against Interstate. On 5 March 1990 the trial court entered an Order of Rehabilitation and appointed the Commissioner as Rehabilitator. On 9 April 1990 the trial court converted the rehabilitation proceeding into a liquidation proceeding and appointed the Commissioner as Liquidator. After the determination of insolvency and Order of Liquidation, the North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty Association) initiated its obligations under the Insurance Guaranty Association Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-48-1, et seq. (1994).\nAttorneys include claimants within the law firms of Poyner & Spruill; Teague & Rotenstreich; Jenkins & Hinton; Arthurs & Foltz; and Henson, Henson, Bayliss & Sue. Attorneys represented insureds of Interstate prior to the delinquency proceeding. Attorneys filed a Petition for Payment of Counsel Fees alleging: (1) they were \u201cretained as counsel by [Interstate] for the purpose of defending its insureds;\u201d and (2) they were entitled to \u201creasonable counsel fees for legal services and expenses incurred in connection with the defense of [Interstate\u2019s] insureds prior to the entry of the Order of Rehabilitation on March 5, 1990.\u201d Attorneys next filed a Petition to Determine Priority of Distribution of Counsel Fees contending their fees were costs for the \u201cadministration or conservation of assets of [Interstate]\u201d entitled to Class 1 priority. On 8 April 1993 Eastern served its Proof of Claim on the Liquidator.\nOn 17 February 1994 the Liquidator filed its Domiciliary Liquidator\u2019s Report and Recommendations in the trial court. The Liquidator\u2019s Report allowed the claims of Attorneys and Eastern. Both claims were categorized as general unsecured creditors, a Class 5 claim. Attorneys objected to this classification on 3 March 1994 and Eastern objected on 12 April 1994. On 5 October 1994 the trial court approved the report.\nWe review two issues on appeal: (1) whether Attorneys are entitled to Class 1 priority in distribution; and (2) whether Eastern is entitled to Class 1 or, in the alternative, Class 3 priority.\nI.\nAttorneys contend they are entitled to Class 1 priority because: (1) the Commissioner breached the Agreement by failing to pay for legal services rendered; (2) the \u201ccommon fund\u201d doctrine entitles Attorneys to Class 1 priority distribution; and (3) the distribution scheme of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220 requires that Attorneys\u2019 claims be afforded Class 1 status.\nAlthough Attorneys present several compelling public policy arguments, we note at the outset that our final decision is ultimately constrained by prior precedent and the comprehensive statutory framework of Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\nA.\nWe first turn to Attorneys\u2019 allegation the Commissioner breached the Agreement between the Department of Insurance and Interstate.\n\u201cTo assert a claim for breach of contract, defendant must be either a party to the contract or a third-party beneficiary.\u201d Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 110 N.C. App. 194, 205, 429 S.E.2d 583, 589, disc. review allowed and cert. allowed, 334 N.C. 434, 433 S.E.2d 176 (1993), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 336 N.C. 49, 442 S.E.2d 316 (1994). Attorneys are not parties to the Agreement and, therefore, must assert standing as third-party beneficiaries.\nIt is well-settled a claimant is a third-party beneficiary if he can establish, \u201c \u2018(1) the existence of a contract between two other persons; (2) that the contract was valid and enforceable; [and] (3) that the contract was entered into for his direct, and not incidental, benefit.\u2019 \u201d Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 408, 417 S.E.2d 269, 276 (quoting Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 405-406, 263 S.E.2d 313, 317, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980)), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 545, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992). In the present case, the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the Commissioner and Interstate is undisputed.\nA claimant is a direct beneficiary if \u201c \u2018the contracting parties intended that a third party should receive a benefit which might be enforced in the courts. It is not sufficient that the contract does benefit him if in fact it was not intended for his direct benefit.\u2019 \u201d Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 329 N.C. 646, 651, 407 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991) (quoting Snyder v. Freeman, 300 N.C. 204, 220, 266 S.E.2d 593, 603-604 (1980)) (citations omitted). The court, in determining the contracting parties intent, \u201cshould consider [the] circumstances surrounding the transaction as well as the actual language of the contract.\u201d Id. at 652, 407 S.E.2d at 182. Specifically, \u201c \u2018[w]hen a third person seeks enforcement of a contract made between other parties, the contract must be construed strictly against the party seeking enforcement.\u2019 \u201d Chemical Realty Corp. v. Home Fed\u2019l Savings & Loan, 84 N.C. App. 27, 34, 351 S.E.2d 786, 791 (1987) (quot ing Lane v. Surety Co., 48 N.C. App. 634, 638, 269 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1980), disc. review denied, 302 N.C. 219, 276 S.E.2d 916 (1981)).\nIn the present case, Attorneys rely on Trust Co. v. Processing Co., 242 N.C. 370, 88 S.E.2d 233 (1965), to support the proposition they are direct and intended beneficiaries of the Agreement. In Trust Company Wilson sold one-half of his majority share in Bowling Green Spinning to Catawba Processing. On the same day, the parties entered into two other contracts: (1) Catawba agreed to sell Bowling Green\u2019s product at a 5% commission so long as Wilson and Catawba owned the majority of Bowling Green stock; and (2) Catawba agreed to pay Wilson 30% of its 5% commission for the life of the sales agreement. The Supreme Court noted Wilson was specifically included in the other contracts, and the contracts were all part of a common plan. Relying on these facts, the Court found Wilson was a third-party beneficiary of the sales contract. Trust Co., 242 N.C. at 378-379, 88 S.E.2d at 239-240.\nWe find the present case distinguishable from Trust Company because the Agreement does not specifically mention Attorneys. The only reference to retained counsel is found in the generic phraseology of paragraph 7 of the Agreement. Application of the rule in Chemical Realty to the language of paragraph 7 indicates, in our view, that Attorneys were not specifically contemplated by Interstate or the Commissioner as beneficiaries of the Agreement. Thus, we believe Trust Company does not support the proposition Attorneys are third-party beneficiaries of the Agreement.\nFurther, after careful review of the present record, we are not persuaded by Attorneys\u2019 contention they are intended, direct beneficiaries of the Agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of Attorneys\u2019 claim for breach of the Agreement.\nB.\nWe next address the Attorneys\u2019 argument the \u201ccommon fund doctrine\u201d entitles them to Class 1 priority distribution.\nThe common fund doctrine is an equitable exception to the general rule attorney fees are not awarded without statutory authority. Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority v. Howard, 88 N.C. App. 207, 211-212, 363 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1987), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 113, 367 S.E.2d 916 (1988). The common fund doctrine allows \u201c \u2018a court of equity, or a court in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, [] in its discretion, and without statutory authorization, [to] order an allowance for attorney fees to a litigant who at his own expense has maintained a successful suit for the preservation, protection, or increase of a common fund or of common property . . . .\u201d Id. (quoting Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N.C. 96, 97-98, 72 S.E.2d 21, 22 (1962)).\nThe common fund doctrine, as with all equitable doctrines,\n\u201csupplements the law.... Its character as the complement merely of legal jurisdiction rests in the fact that it seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of the case, are incompetent to do. It was never intended that it should, and it will never be permitted to, override or set at naught a positive statutory provision. ...\u201d\nJones Cooling & Heating v. Booth, 99 N.C. App. 757, 759, 394 S.E.2d 292, 294 (1990) (quoting Zebulon v. Dawson, 216 N.C. 520, 522, 5 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1939) (plaintiffs could not use an equitable theory to reduce the post-judgment interest rate mandated by statute)), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 732, 404 S.E.2d 869 (1991). In other words, \u201c[e]quity will not lend its aid in any case when the party seeking it has a full and complete remedy at law.\u201d Development Co. v. County of Wilson, 44 N.C. App. 469, 470, 261 S.E.2d 275, 276, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 299 N.C. 735, 267 S.E.2d 660 (1980) (plaintiff could not use an injunction to prevent the county\u2019s use of eminent domain when plaintiff had a statutory remedy).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220 provides the comprehensive statutory scheme for determination of claim priority in the present context. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220 (1994). Thus, under Development Company, the equitable common fund doctrine may be used only to secure a right to payment, not alter priority of payment, under Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\nAttorneys\u2019 right to their fees is not, and never has been, contested. Rather, Attorneys\u2019 objection goes to the level of priority their claim was afforded by the Liquidator and the trial court. Thus, under our interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220, Attorneys\u2019 contention their claims are entitled to higher priority under the common fund doctrine must fail.\nAccordingly, we conclude the comprehensive nature of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220 precludes the application of any equitable doctrine\u2014 including the common fund doctrine \u2014 to alter the Class 5 priority assigned to Attorneys\u2019 claims.\nC.\nFinally, we turn to Attorneys\u2019 contention their fees constitute \u201ccostfs] of administration and conservation of assets\u201d entitled to Class 1 priority.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-225(b) provides the trial court with broad discretionary powers to approve, disapprove, or modify the Liquidator\u2019s report. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-225(b) (1994). Such broad discretion is clearly consistent with other cases arising under Chapter 58. See State ex rel. Long v. American Security Life Assurance Co., 109 N.C. App. 530, 533, 428 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1993) (the trial court has been granted broad discretion to award the fees and costs incurred in defending against a petition for liquidation); Ingram, Comr. of Insurance v. Assurance Co., 34 N.C. App. 517, 523, 239 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1977) (trial court has broad ministerial and initiative authority in rehabilitation proceedings).\nBecause of the discretionary nature of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-225(b), we believe the trial court\u2019s decision should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See American Security, 109 N.C. App. at 534, 428 S.E.2d at 202. The trial court abuses its discretion when it makes \u201ca patently arbitrary decision, manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d Buford v. General Motors Corp., 339 N.C. 396, 406, 451 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1994) (citing State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 248-249, 415 S.E.2d 726, 732 (1992)). Absent an abuse of discretion, we are bound by the trial court\u2019s findings of fact if they are supported by competent evidence. Nobles v. First Carolina Communications, 108 N.C. App. 127, 132, 423 S.E.2d 312, 315 (1992), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 463, 427 S.E.2d 623 (1993).\nAttorneys allege the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220(1) does not limit Class 1 priority solely to actions taken to conserve assets after the creation of a Chapter 58 estate. Rather, Attorneys contend, under the plain language of the statute, any action that conserves assets which are ultimately incorporated into the estate also merits Class 1 priority. This allegation must necessarily be resolved by recourse to principles of statutory interpretation.\n\u201c \u2018Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute.\u2019 \u201d Hyler v. GTE Products Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993) (quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)). If the language of the statute is clear, this Court must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its terms, id., \u201c \u2018unless the context . . . of the statute requires otherwise,\u2019 \u201d In Re Appeal of Medical Center, 91 N.C. App. 107, 110, 370 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1988) (quoting State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 153, 158 S.E.2d 37, 42 (1967), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 1028, 20 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1968)).\nThe first sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220 plainly states, \u201cThe priority of distribution of claims from the insurer\u2019s estate shall be in accordance with the order in which each class of claims is set forth in this section.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220 (1994) (emphasis added). In our view, \u201cassets,\u201d as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220(1), must refer to items listed by the Liquidator which become part of the \u201cinsurer\u2019s estate.\u201d Class 1 priority, therefore, is awarded only to entities which conserve or administer assets of the insurer after the items have become part of the \u201cinsurer\u2019s estate.\u201d\nThe trial court here found, and we agree, that Attorneys\u2019 claims are not \u201ccosts for administration or conservation of assets of the insurer\u201d because no estate existed when Attorneys\u2019 claims arose.\nAccordingly, we conclude the trial court\u2019s interpretation and application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-220 was not an abuse of discretion and therefore affirm the trial court\u2019s approval of the Liquidator\u2019s Report under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-30-225(b).\nII.\nEastern alleges its claim for services rendered should be accorded Class 1 priority or, in the alternative, Class 3 priority.\nInitially, we note Eastern did not raise its contention concerning Class 3 priority in the trial court. Accordingly, we dismiss Eastern\u2019s alternative claim for Class 3 priority. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1).\nEastern next alleges it aided in the \u201cadministration\u201d or \u201cconservation\u201d of the \u201cassets of the insurer\u201d because the files it collected for Interstate prior to entry of the Order of Liquidation were made available after entry of the Order of Liquidation.\nWe believe the files seized from Eastern by the Liquidator and the Guaranty Association relate to the \u201cinsurer\u2019s estate\u201d in the same way as Attorneys\u2019 claims for counsel fees \u2014 both sets of claims accrued prior to the delinquency proceeding. Thus, for the reasons we previously stated, Eastern did not directly \u201cconserve\u201d or \u201cadminister\u201d the assets of the insurer after establishment of the \u201cinsurer\u2019s estate.\u201d\nAccordingly, we find no merit in Eastern\u2019s claim of Class 1 priority and affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and WALKER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, MARK D., Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Poyner and Spruill, L.L.P, by Benjamin P. Dean and James T. Cheatham, for petitioner-appellant Attorney-Claimants.",
      "Yeargan, Thompson & Mitchiner, by W. Hugh Thompson, for petitioner-appellant Eastern Appraisal Services, Inc.",
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Sue Y. Little and Special Deputy Attorney General",
      "Thomas D. Zweigart, for plaintiff-appellee State of North Carolina.",
      "Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, by Christopher J. Blake, for defendant-intervenor North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, ON RELATION OF JAMES E. LONG, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. INTERSTATE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant v. NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Intervenor\nNo. COA95-38\n(Filed 21 November 1995)\n1. Contracts \u00a7 118 (NCI4th)\u2014 attorneys\u2019 claims for breach of agreement \u2014 attorneys not third-party beneficiaries\nThe trial court properly dismissed attorneys\u2019 claim for breach of an agreement between the Department of Insurance and Interstate Insurance Company since attorneys were not parties to the. agreement nor were they third-party beneficiaries, as the agreement was a voluntary supervision agreement; the attorneys represented insureds of Interstate prior to the delinquency proceeding; the agreement did not specifically mention attorneys; and the attorneys were not specifically contemplated by Interstate or the Commissioner as beneficiaries of the agreement.\nAm Jur 2d, Contracts \u00a7\u00a7 426, 435 et seq.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 37 (NCI4th)\u2014 attorneys\u2019 representation of insureds \u2014 claims assigned Class 5 priority \u2014 no application of common fund doctrine\nIn a liquidation proceeding where attorneys who had represented Interstate\u2019s insureds sought reimbursement, the comprehensive nature of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-30-220 precluded the application of any equitable doctrine, including the common fund doctrine, to alter the Class 5 priority assigned to attorneys\u2019 claims.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 98 et seq.\n3. Insurance \u00a7 37 (NCI4th)\u2014 attorneys\u2019 representations of insureds \u2014 no conservation or administration of assets\u2014 claims not entitled to Class 1 priority\nClaims of attorneys who represented Interstate\u2019s insureds were not \u201ccosts for administration or conservation of assets of the insurer\u201d entitled to Class 1 priority since Class 1 priority is awarded only to entities which conserve or administer assets of the insurer after the items have become part of the \u201cinsurer\u2019s estate,\u201d and no estate existed when the attorneys\u2019 claims arose.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 98 et seq.\n4. Insurance \u00a7 37 (NCI4th)\u2014 collection of files prior to liquidation \u2014 no conservation or administration of assets\u2014 claims not entitled to Class 1 priority\nCollection of files by Eastern Appraisal Services did not amount to conservation or administration of the assets after the establishment of the \u201cinsurer\u2019s estate,\u201d so that Eastern\u2019s claim was not entitled to Class 1 priority.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 98 et seq.\nAppeal by petitioners from order entered 3 October 1994 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 October 1995.\nPoyner and Spruill, L.L.P, by Benjamin P. Dean and James T. Cheatham, for petitioner-appellant Attorney-Claimants.\nYeargan, Thompson & Mitchiner, by W. Hugh Thompson, for petitioner-appellant Eastern Appraisal Services, Inc.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Sue Y. Little and Special Deputy Attorney General\nThomas D. Zweigart, for plaintiff-appellee State of North Carolina.\nMoore & Van Allen, PLLC, by Christopher J. Blake, for defendant-intervenor North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association."
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