{ "id": 11918192, "name": "WILLIAM A. BAKER, Employee/Plaintiff v. CITY OF SANFORD, Employer; SELF-INSURED (HEWITT, COLEMAN & ASSOCIATED, AGENT), Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Baker v. City of Sanford", "decision_date": "1995-11-21", "docket_number": "No. COA94-1455", "first_page": "783", "last_page": "790", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.C. App. 783" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724186 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2400416, 2404356, 2397747, 2398868, 2394174 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0309-03", "/nc/310/0309-01", "/nc/310/0309-02", "/nc/310/0309-05", "/nc/310/0309-04" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522027 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4747123 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554313 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "citing Starr v. Charlotte Paper Co., 8 N.C. App. 604, 611, 175 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524155 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "citing Starr v. Charlotte Paper Co., 8 N.C. App. 604, 611, 175 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917098 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718689, 4718243, 4721833, 4725486, 4720539 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0329-05", "/nc/313/0329-01", "/nc/313/0329-04", "/nc/313/0329-02", "/nc/313/0329-03" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561636 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "quoting Petty v. Transport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525367 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "quoting Petty v. Transport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Va. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2083604 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/222/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing depression as an occupational disease of police officers under the Workers' Compensation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723558, 4724691, 4730039, 4730552, 4729849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing depression as an occupational disease of police officers under the Workers' Compensation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0631-05", "/nc/320/0631-03", "/nc/320/0631-04", "/nc/320/0631-01", "/nc/320/0631-02" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing depression as an occupational disease of police officers under the Workers' Compensation Act" }, { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing depression as an occupational disease of police officers under the Workers' Compensation Act" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(13)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 S.E.2d 173", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599630 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8618886 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491752, 2490697, 2488168, 2489207, 2489951 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0706-02", "/nc/325/0706-03", "/nc/325/0706-05", "/nc/325/0706-01", "/nc/325/0706-04" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520030 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707972 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0085-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 749, "char_count": 16352, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.403478356808237e-07, "percentile": 0.8775845618798624 }, "sha256": "52915b2741a2ce09ec85d17e3e13dd56655936cf928661ce079fdb1e36325d78", "simhash": "1:72c754d228cf6144", "word_count": 2553 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "WILLIAM A. BAKER, Employee/Plaintiff v. CITY OF SANFORD, Employer; SELF-INSURED (HEWITT, COLEMAN & ASSOCIATED, AGENT), Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiffs first three arguments on appeal address the issue of causation, assigning as error the Commission\u2019s finding of fact that plaintiffs disability was not the direct and natural result of his work-related depression, and its conclusions of law that (1) his depression arose from an intervening event and (2) his occupational disease was not disabling.\nIn determining complex causation in workers\u2019 compensation cases, \u201cthe Commission may, of course, consider medical testimony, but its consideration is not limited to such testimony.\u201d Rutledge v. Cultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 105, 301 S.E.2d 359, 372 (1983). The Commission \u201cis not limited to the consideration of expert medical testimony in cases involving complex medical issues,\u201d Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dept., 96 N.C. App. 28, 35, 384 S.E.2d 549, 553, disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 706, 388 S.E.2d 454 (1989); contra Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 168, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980), and the Commission need not \u201cfind in accordance with plaintiff\u2019s expert medical testimony if the defendant does not offer expert medical testimony to the contrary.\u201d Harvey, 96 N.C. App. at 34, 384 S.E.2d at 552.\nHowever, the Commission must still base its findings of fact on competent evidence. See Click, 300 N.C. at 166, 265 S.E.2d at 390. It is settled that if there is any competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings, this Court is \u201cnot at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside the findings . . . simply because other . . . conclusions might have been reached.\u201d Rewis v. Insurance Co., 226 N.C. 325, 330, 38 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1946). \u201cThis is so, notwithstanding the evidence upon the entire record might support a contrary finding.\u201d Vause v. Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 93, 63 S.E.2d 173, 177 (1951).\nThe standard for identifying occupational diseases under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was set out in Rutledge. For a disease to be occupational under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13), it must be:\n(1) characteristic of persons engaged in the particular trade or occupation in which the claimant is engaged; (2) not an ordinary disease of life to which the public generally is equally exposed with those engaged in that particular trade or occupation; and (3) there must be \u201ca causal connection between the disease and the [claimant\u2019s] employment.\u201d\nRutledge, 308 N.C. at 93, 301 S.E.2d at 365. The Commission found as fact that plaintiff suffered from work-related depression and con-eluded as a matter of law that this depression was an occupational disease in October 1989. See, e.g., Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dept., 85 N.C. App. 540, 355 S.E.2d 147, disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 631, 360 S.E.2d 86 (1987) (recognizing depression as an occupational disease of police officers under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act). However, the Commission concluded that plaintiff\u2019s occupational disease was not compensable because it did not result in disability.\nThis conclusion does not account for the possibility that the occupational disease simply developed into a disabling, compensable disease due to aggravation by the death of plaintiff\u2019s brother. In the context of occupational diseases, the proper factual inquiry for determining causation is\nwhether the occupational exposure was such a significant factor in the disease\u2019s development that without it the disease would not have developed to such an extent that it caused the physical disability which resulted in claimant\u2019s incapacity for work.\nRutledge, 308 N.C. at 102, 301 S.E.2d at 370. In Rutledge, the Supreme Court adopted the principle that\nit was not necessary that the work-related injury be the sole cause of the worker\u2019s incapacity for work but that full benefits would be allowed when it is shown that \u201cthe employment is a contributing factor to the disability.\u201d\nId. at 104, 301 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Bergmann v. L. & W. Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 32, 278 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1981)). Under this significant contributing factor standard, therefore, the Commission should have determined, by examining competent evidence, whether but for the occupational disease, the depression would not have developed to the point of disability. The Commission failed to apply this causation standard and did not consider that the occupational disease may have been a significant contributing factor in plaintiff\u2019s disability. Instead, the Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s severe, disabling depression arose from an intervening event and was not a direct and natural result of his occupational disease indicates that the Commission found that plaintiff suffered from two separate and distinct depressions. We find no competent evidence, however, that the occupational depression, and the depression after the death of plaintiff\u2019s brother, were separate and distinct diseases.\nIn denying relief, the Commission failed to find that plaintiff\u2019s \u201coccupation was not a significant causal factor in the development of his [disease]. Therefore, the Commission failed to find the absence of the third element set out in Rutledge.\u201d Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dept., 85 N.C. App. 540, 544, 355 S.E.2d 147, 150, disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 631, 360 S.E.2d 86 (1987). We find that the Commission erred in making this conclusion as to causation without applying the Rutledge significant contributing factor analysis, and we remand for determination under the correct standard.\nIn his second assignment of error plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in concluding that his disabling depression arose from an intervening event. The Commission found that plaintiff\u2019s severe, disabling depression following his brother\u2019s death was noncompensable because it was \u201cnot a direct and natural result of his occupational disease.\u201d The Commission arrived at this conclusion by characterizing plaintiff\u2019s disabling depression as the result of \u201can intervening event\u201d \u2014 his brother\u2019s death. We find no support for this analysis.\nIn the context of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, an \u201cintervening cause\u201d is \u201can occurrence \u2018entirely independent of a prior cause. When a first cause produces a second cause that produces a result, the first cause is a cause of that result.\u2019 \u201d Heatherly v. Montgomery Components, Inc., 71 N.C. App. 377, 380, 323 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1984) (quoting Petty v. Transport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970)), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 329, 327 S.E.2d 890 (1985); see Home v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Processors, 119 N.C. App. 682, 459 S.E.2d 797 (1995). The application of an intervening cause standard has been limited to consideration of those intervening events that are the result of a claimant\u2019s own intentional conduct.\nSpecifically, an intervening event has been held to defeat recovery under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act only if it is \u201cattributable to claimant\u2019s own intentional conduct.\u201d Weaver v. Swedish Imports Maintenance, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 432, 435, 343 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1986) (citing Starr v. Charlotte Paper Co., 8 N.C. App. 604, 611, 175 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1970)), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 319 N.C. 243, 354 S.E.2d 477 (1987); see also Roper v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 65 N.C. App. 69, 308 S.E.2d 485 (1983), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 309, 312 S.E.2d 652 (1984); 1 Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a7 13.00 at 3-502 (1995). In this case, the death of plaintiff\u2019s brother was not attributable to plaintiff\u2019s own intentional conduct, and the Commission\u2019s analysis and denial of recovery based on the characterization of that event as \u201cintervening\u201d was erroneous.\nFinally, plaintiff assigns as error the Commission\u2019s denial of his motion to reopen the record to take additional expert medical testimony. The standard under Rule 701(7) of the Rules of the Industrial Commission is the same as the standard for the admissibility of newly discovered evidence. Under that standard, newly discovered evidence must be, among other things, newly discovered, not merely cumulative, and significant enough that a different result would be reached. State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 712-13, 360 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1987). Because we find that the evidence plaintiff wishes to present does not meet the admissibility requirements of newly discovered evidence, we affirm the Commission\u2019s decision to deny plaintiff\u2019s motion to take additional evidence.\nReversed in part and remanded for determination in accordance with the standards set out above.\nReversed in part and remanded.\nJudges GREENE and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Van Camp, West, Hayes & Meacham, P.A., by Stanley W. West, for plaintiff appellant.", "Maupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., by Jack S. Holmes and Julie A. Alagna, for defendant appellee City of Sanford." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM A. BAKER, Employee/Plaintiff v. CITY OF SANFORD, Employer; SELF-INSURED (HEWITT, COLEMAN & ASSOCIATED, AGENT), Defendant\nNo. COA94-1455\n(Filed 21 November 1995)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 208 (NCI4th)\u2014 work-related depression \u2014 occupational disease \u2014 failure of Commission to apply significant contributing factor standard\nWhere the industrial Commission found as fact that plaintiff suffered from work-related depression and concluded as a matter of law that this depression was an occupational disease, the Commission erred in concluding that plaintiff\u2019s severe, disabling depression arose from his brother\u2019s death and was not a direct and natural result of his occupational disease without first determining that, but for the occupational disease, the depression would not have developed to the point of disability.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 213 (NCI4th)\u2014 disabling depression \u2014 death of plaintiffs brother not intervening cause\nThe Industrial Commission erred in characterizing plaintiff\u2019s disabling depression as the result of \u201can intervening event\u201d \u2014 his brother\u2019s death, since the application of an intervening cause standard in Workers\u2019 Compensation cases has been limited to consideration of those intervening events that are the result of a claimant\u2019s own intentional conduct, and in this case the death of plaintiff\u2019s brother was not attributable to plaintiff\u2019s own intentional conduct.\nAppeal by plaintiff appellant from Opinion and Award entered 27 June 1994 by the Full Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 October 1995.\nPlaintiff was employed by defendant Sanford Police Department as a detective sergeant from 1981 until 16 February 1990, and was the lead investigator for all major crimes, including homicide cases. Plaintiff testified that one particular homicide trial in 1989, which he investigated and in which he had to testify, caused him fear and stress.\nOn 10 October 1989 he told his doctor, Dr. Peter Clemens, a family practitioner, that he was having many job stresses related to this trial, and Dr. Clemens testified that he suffered from an acute anxiety attack with \u201csome definite depressive features as well.\u201d Plaintiff testified that he spent most of his time in late 1989 at home and at work alone in locked rooms with the lights out. Dr. Clemens also testified that plaintiff reported this behavior to him. Plaintiff\u2019s supervisor testified that although he did not remember this specific behavior in the fall of 1989, plaintiff \u201cwas acting very strange.\u201d\nIn the fall of 1989 Dr. Clemens diagnosed plaintiff with agitated depression \u201crelated to his job and to his stresses at work,\u201d and scheduled an appointment with a clinical psychologist. He testified that \u201cdepression is something that builds over a long time,\u201d and that in the fall of 1989 \u201cthings reached a blowing point.... I don\u2019t think that that one trial alone caused him to be depressed. I think this was something that took a number of years.\u201d He testified that plaintiff\u2019s work stress was a significant factor in his development of depression. Dr. Clemens further testified that plaintiff\u2019s depression in the fall of 1989 was different from \u201csituational depression,\u201d which is caused by a traumatic experience and which, in most healthy people, lifts after a grieving period.\nPlaintiffs wife testified that in late 1989 plaintiff became withdrawn and wanted to be left alone. She testified that in January 1990 he attempted suicide because, although he loved his job, he had a lot invested in it, and it was \u201cgetting to him.\u201d On 15 February 1990, Dr. Clemens saw plaintiff again, and he assessed plaintiffs anxiety and depression as \u201cstable.\u201d However, he did not testify to the medical definition of this assessment.\nOn 17 February 1990, plaintiffs brother was found dead, and plaintiff believed he had been murdered, although no murder investigation occurred. Plaintiff did not return to work after his brother\u2019s death, and in March 1990 he was hospitalized with depression at Holly Hill Hospital until June 1990 when he was transferred to Cumberland Hospital until 23 July 1990. Dr. Antonio Cusi treated plaintiff at Cumberland and testified by deposition that he diagnosed plaintiff with \u201cmajor depression, severe, recurrent, with some psychotic features.\u201d He defined \u201cmajor depression\u201d as a disease that \u201cis not just brought about by a situation, but is also related to a possible chemical imbalance coupled with physical and psychological components.\u201d He testified further that major depression \u201ctakes awhile\u201d to develop, is \u201congoing and chronic,\u201d and is \u201cnot an overnight phenomenon.\u201d\nDr. Cusi further testified that although plaintiff\u2019s brother\u2019s death was one major contributing factor in his depression, \u201cwork stressors\u201d also contributed to his condition. He identified the death of plaintiff\u2019s brother as \u201cthe last straw that broke the camel\u2019s back,\u201d and he described it as \u201cjust the end of a process that has already begun even before his brother\u2019s death. That he was already having a lot of difficulties, and that his brother\u2019s death just brought it to a head where he needed to be hospitalized.\u201d He also testified that it would be difficult to quantify the factors that brought about his depression. After plaintiff\u2019s discharge from Cumberland Dr. Cusi continued to see him on an outpatient basis until 11 February 1991, at which time his diagnosis was the same as his initial one.\nBecause his depression left him unable to work, plaintiff filed for disability benefits with the Commission. On 8 May 1992, Deputy Commissioner Edward Garner, Jr., filed an Opinion and Award, concluding that plaintiff suffered depression as an occupational disease, that his work exposure significantly contributed to or was a significant causal factor in the disease\u2019s development, and that he was totally and permanently disabled, within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29.\nDefendants appealed to the Full Industrial Commission (the Commission), and the Commission reversed by majority opinion on 27 June 1994, denying plaintiff\u2019s claim. The Commission\u2019s findings of fact, in pertinent part were:\n12. As of October 1989 plaintiff was experiencing symptoms of anxiety and depression which were related in significant part to the stress associated with his job with defendant. He was placed at an increased risk of developing depression by virtue of his job duties as a detective with defendant\u2019s police department. However, there were multiple other factors involved, including endogenous changes within his brain. Nevertheless his condition improved with minimal treatment by February 15, 1990 when it was considered stable. Throughout that time his work related depression did not cause him to be unable to work.\n13. Following his brother\u2019s death on February 17, 1990, plaintiff developed severe, disabling depression which required inpatient treatment. The death of his brother was an intervening event which was unrelated to his employment. The severe depression developed as a result of this intervening event and was not shown to have been a direct and natural result of his work related depression. Consequently, the disability he suffered as a result of this severe depression arose from his brother\u2019s death.\nThe Commission concluded that as of October 1989 plaintiff had developed depression as an occupational disease, but that it was not disabling and thus noncompensable. The Commission further concluded that the death of plaintiff\u2019s brother was an \u201cintervening event,\u201d and plaintiff\u2019s subsequent depression arose from that event and was \u201cnot a direct and natural result of his occupational disease.\u201d Commissioner J. Randolph Ward filed a dissenting opinion.\nVan Camp, West, Hayes & Meacham, P.A., by Stanley W. West, for plaintiff appellant.\nMaupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., by Jack S. Holmes and Julie A. Alagna, for defendant appellee City of Sanford." }, "file_name": "0783-01", "first_page_order": 817, "last_page_order": 824 }