{ "id": 11918308, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM DAVIS WATKINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Watkins", "decision_date": "1995-11-21", "docket_number": "No. COA95-258", "first_page": "804", "last_page": "809", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.C. App. 804" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520134 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769234 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "misstatements and material omissions by government employees cannot legally support a determination of probable cause" }, { "parenthetical": "misstatements and material omissions by government employees cannot legally support a determination of probable cause" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "310" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790252, 790192, 790073, 790170, 790238 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0362-04", "/nc/340/0362-05", "/nc/340/0362-01", "/nc/340/0362-03", "/nc/340/0362-02" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916879 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 12868, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.124187693409038e-07, "percentile": 0.9105432401657394 }, "sha256": "ac69972f69b25f84f8fb417dc82438994a49416e63e64b332b21ccb8a32a7f96", "simhash": "1:03ed94ae86cc8478", "word_count": 2064 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, Mark D., and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM DAVIS WATKINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nThe State appeals from the trial court\u2019s 9 November 1994 order which granted William Davis Watkins\u2019 (defendant) motion to suppress evidence in his trial for driving while impaired.\nDefendant was arrested and charged with driving while impaired on 11 February 1990. On 16 August 1991, defendant made a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during defendant\u2019s stop on the ground that the arresting officer did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion on 1 July 1992, but the trial court\u2019s order was reversed on appeal on 29 July 1994, after it was determined that an anonymous tip received by law enforcement and the arresting officer\u2019s subsequent observations supported a \u201creasonable articulable suspicion\u201d to stop defendant. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 446 S.E.2d 67 (1994). Subsequently, on 12 October 1994, the defendant made a \u201cSupplemental Motion to Suppress based on Newly Discovered Evidence.\u201d In support of his motion, the defendant submitted an affidavit by Teresa Hundley Carter (Carter) stating that the Chief of Police of Stoneville, Jerry Fowler (Fowler), whom Carter dated in 1990, \u201cset up\u201d the defendant on 11 February 1990.\nAfter a hearing on the supplemental motion to suppress, the trial court found that on 10 February 1990, defendant had been at the Virginia Carolina Well Drilling Company (Well Company) all day and at 11:30 p.m. called his wife to say that he had had too much to drink and would not be coming home. The Well Company was known by law enforcement to be a place where people in the community gathered to drink and Fowler \u201cwas having his department conduct a vigorous campaign to ferret out those motorists who drove while impaired in the Stoneville area\u201d and Fowler knew that \u201cdefendant hung out at the\u201d Well Company. On 10 February 1990, Fowler was \u201cout socially\u201d with Carter. Although Fowler was in his personal vehicle, he had his Stoneville Police walkie-talkie radio with him. After leaving Carter\u2019s home, and when the two were in the vicinity of the Well Company, Fowler \u201csaw and recognized\u201d defendant\u2019s vehicle, which did not have its lights on at the time. Defendant was not outside the building at any time that Fowler observed his vehicle at the Well Company. After telling Carter that the vehicle belonged to defendant, Fowler returned to Carter\u2019s home where he used the telephone and telephone book. Fowler asked Carter how the Well Company would be listed in the telephone book and then dialed and spoke into the phone, when Carter heard Fowler \u201ctell the person on the other end that there was an emergency.\u201d The trial court further found that Fowler\u2019s call from Carter\u2019s home was to the defendant, at the Well Company, and that Fowler \u201cwithout identifying himself, told the defendant there was an ambulance at the defendant\u2019s house.\u201d \u201cThis statement was false and was designed and intended to cause the defendant... to leave the [Well Company] and to get on the public road, so that he could be arrested for driving while impaired.\u201d After making the call to defendant, Fowler called Officer Shockley, of the Stoneville Police Department on his walkie-talkie and requested that he meet Fowler and Carter in Stoneville. During this meeting, Fowler instructed Shockley to report a suspicious vehicle behind the Well Company to the Sheriff\u2019s Department, which Shockley did. Meanwhile, defendant called home and was told by his wife that there was no ambulance, but was requested to return home. Deputy Robert Knight was dispatched by the Sheriff\u2019s Department, in response to Shockley\u2019s report, and because he was \u201ca good distance away, Stoneville Police Officer Harbour advised that he would assist.\u201d Defendant was stopped by Harbour, upon Harbour observing defendant\u2019s vehicle leave the Well Company parking lot. Fowler and Carter rode through the area where Harbour had stopped defendant and Fowler remarked to Carter that this was Harbour\u2019s second DWI arrest.\nThe trial court then found that \u201cdefendant left the inside of [the Well Company], started his car and drove it on the public highway because of the trickery of the Stoneville Chief of Police, Jerry Fowler\u201d and that \u201c[t]he act of the former Chief of Police saying there was a suspicious vehicle at the [Well Company] and to have Officer Shockley pass that on to the Sheriffs Department dispatcher was an act done with reckless disregard of the truth.\u201d\nThe trial court further found that this evidence was \u201cnot available to the defendant at the original suppression hearings in 1991\u201d and that Officer Harbour had no knowledge of Fowler\u2019s actions nor did he participate in Fowler\u2019s trickery. The trial court then concluded that:\n3. The very foundation of the reasonable suspicion here, the purported anonymous tip, was manufactured by law enforcement officers. It is inappropriate to make up, create, or fabricate an anonymous tip. Such trickery is not an appropriate police practice where Fourth Amendment seizures are involved.\n4. . . . [S]uch made-up tip cannot be an anonymous tip on which a warrantless stop and seizure can be made.\n5. The actions of Officer Harbour are tainted, not by Officer Harbour\u2019s actions, but by the recklessly published tip from Chief Fowler.\nThe trial court finally ordered that \u201cthe fruits of\u2019 defendant\u2019s seizure be suppressed.\nThe evidence which is relevant to these findings is testimony by Carter, defendant and Fowler. The testimony of Carter and defendant is in accord with the trial court\u2019s findings.\nFowler testified that he did not see defendant\u2019s car at the Well Company when he and Carter rode by, but she did and mentioned that she \u201csaw some tail lights.\u201d Fowler further testified that he never went back to Carter\u2019s mobile home to use the telephone, but that he did stop and ask Shockley to report a suspicious vehicle at the Well Company to the Sheriff\u2019s Department based upon Carter\u2019s statement. Fowler stated that he and Carter then went back to his apartment and never drove back by the area where Harbour had stopped defendant. Fowler testified that he did not mention to anyone in the District Attorney\u2019s office of his involvement in defendant\u2019s arrest until Carter came forward.\nThe issues are whether (I) the trial court had the authority to grant defendant\u2019s supplemental motion to suppress on the grounds of newly discovered evidence; (II) there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact; and (III) whether the facts support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cdefendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure has been violated\u201d and its resulting suppression of the evidence obtained by the seizure.\nI\nAlthough the State argues that there is no authority which allows \u201cdefendant to amend or supplement a motion to suppress where the question raised in the original motion has been adjudicated through the appellate process,\u201d our legislature has provided that \u201cafter a pretrial determination and denial of the motion\u201d a defendant may request a new suppression hearing to present \u201cadditional pertinent facts . . . which [defendant] could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-975 (1988). The original determination and denial of defendant\u2019s motion in the North Carolina Supreme Court relied upon the assumption that the tip to Harbour was anonymous. See Watkins, 337 N.C. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at 70. In his supplemental motion, defendant presented evidence that the \u201canonymous tip\u201d in this case was fabricated by police. Defendant\u2019s new evidence was pertinent and presented after a pretrial determination and denial of his motion to suppress, and the State\u2019s assignment is overruled.\nII\nAlthough there was testimony which would support contrary findings than those made by the trial court, we are bound by the trial court\u2019s determinations of credibility and the weight to be afforded the testimony, absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619-20 (1982). We see no abuse of discretion here, where there is competent evidence, testimony by Carter and defendant, which supports findings that Fowler made the call and arranged to meet Shockley so that he could radio the report to the Sheriff\u2019s Department. See State v. Smith, 118 N.C. App. 106, 111, 454 S.E.2d 680, 683 (question on appeal from suppression motion is whether findings are supported by competent evidence and whether findings support legally correct conclusions of law), cert. denied, 340 N.C. 362, 458 S.E.2d 196 (1995). This competent evidence also supports the trial court\u2019s findings that Fowler acted with \u201ctrickery\u201d and made a report based upon a situation which he orchestrated in reckless disregard for the truth.\nIll\nIn Watkins, our Supreme Court determined that Harbour\u2019s stop of defendant was justified by his reasonable suspicion, which was based upon an anonymous tip and his own observations, following the tip, of the defendant. Watkins, 337 N.C. at 442-43, 446 S.E.2d at 70-71. The question in the present case is, however, whether a \u201ctip\u201d which is fabricated by a police officer may serve as a basis for an officer\u2019s reasonable suspicion.\nAlthough reasonable suspicion is less stringent than probable cause, it nevertheless requires that statements from tipsters carry some \u201cindicia of reliability.\u201d Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 310 (1990). Because the evidence which supports a reasonable suspicion, like that supporting probable cause, must bear some-\u201cindicia of reliability,\u201d it follows that the evidence which will support reasonable suspicion, though it may be of a lesser \u201cquantity or content\u201d than that to support probable cause, White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309, must be genuine and not contrived misstatements by law enforcement officers. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978) (misstatements and material omissions by government employees cannot legally support a determination of probable cause). Furthermore, \u201cpolice [can]not insulate [one] officer\u2019s deliberate misstatement merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity.\u201d Franks, 438 U.S. at 163, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 677 n.6.\nIn this case, Fowler orchestrated a situation which, after alerting a second officer who knew nothing of Fowler\u2019s actions, gave rise to another officer\u2019s reasonable suspicion. The facts upon which Harbour\u2019s reasonable suspicion were grounded were not genuine and the fact that he had no knowledge of Fowler\u2019s \u201ctrickery\u201d does not attenuate his actions from Fowler\u2019s illegal actions. Franks, 438 U.S. at 163, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 677 n.6; see State v. Cooke, 54 N.C. App. 33, 45, 282 S.E.2d 800, 808 (1981), aff'd, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN, Mark D., and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey P. Gray, for the State.", "McNairy, Clifford & Clendenin, by Robert O\u2019Hale and Locke T. Clifford, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM DAVIS WATKINS\nNo. COA95-258\n(Filed 21 November 1995)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 621 (NCI4th)\u2014 motion to suppress adjudicated through appellate process \u2014 discovery of new facts \u2014 amendment of motion properly allowed\nThe trial court had the authority to grant defendant\u2019s supplemental motion to suppress on the ground of newly discovered evidence even though defendant\u2019s original motion to suppress had been adjudicated through the appellate process where it had been determined on appeal that an anonymous tip received by law enforcement and the arresting officer\u2019s observations supported a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant, and defendant presented subsequently discovered evidence that the \u201canonymous tip\u201d had been fabricated by the police. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-975(c).\nAm Jur 2d, Motions, Rules and Orders \u00a7 26.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 77 (NCI4th)\u2014 anonymous tip fabricated by police \u2014 unlawful seizure \u2014 suppression of evidence proper\nThe evidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact that an \u201canonymous tip\u201d was fabricated by the police chief and that through trickery he orchestrated an investigatory stop of defendant by another officer, and such findings were sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusions that the second officer did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop defendant and that evidence obtained during the stop of defendant must be suppressed in his trial for driving while impaired.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7 48.\nAppeal by State from order entered 9 November 1994 in Rockingham County Superior Court by Judge Melzer A. Morgan, Sr. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 October 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey P. Gray, for the State.\nMcNairy, Clifford & Clendenin, by Robert O\u2019Hale and Locke T. Clifford, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0804-01", "first_page_order": 838, "last_page_order": 843 }