{ "id": 11918512, "name": "METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. PAUL DAVID LINDQUIST, DARLA R. LINDQUIST and NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance v. Lindquist", "decision_date": "1995-11-21", "docket_number": "No. COA94-1445", "first_page": "847", "last_page": "852", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.C. App. 847" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526382 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 636", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640", "parenthetical": "quoting Cleland v. Children's Home, Inc., 64 N.C. App. 153, 156, 306 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525379 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367", "parenthetical": "quoting Cleland v. Children's Home, Inc., 64 N.C. App. 153, 156, 306 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521830 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(j)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563605 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557714 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521088 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779554, 4776469 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0715-01", "/nc/317/0715-02" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523953 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384-385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0383-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 552, "char_count": 11219, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5109838083711988e-07, "percentile": 0.6674560949306311 }, "sha256": "aa1c2d0fe8dc9c5710ab8835288d4f0b00164a8931ac3bd0cfa18c0c4a74e0f6", "simhash": "1:8f41cfe8107d7d67", "word_count": 1763 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:04.771230+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. PAUL DAVID LINDQUIST, DARLA R. LINDQUIST and NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, MARK D., Judge.\nDefendant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) appeals from summary judgment granted to plaintiff Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan). We affirm.\nThis appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action filed by Metropolitan to determine the amount, if any, of its liability for the 21 August 1991 automobile accident (Accident) between Paul D. Lindquist (Paul) and his then wife, Darla R. Lindquist (Darla).\nOn 21 August 1991 Paul, while driving a 1978 Plymouth automobile (Plymouth), collided with a 1984 Dodge automobile (Dodge) being driven by Darla on Rural Paved Road 2014. At all times pertinent to this case: (1) the Plymouth was owned by Paul\u2019s father, an Ohio resident; (2) the Dodge was jointly owned by Paul and Darla; (3) the Plymouth was insured by Metropolitan under policy no. [ XXX XX XXXX ] 0 (Metropolitan Policy) issued to Paul\u2019s father; and (4) the Dodge was insured by Farm Bureau under policy no. AP3825229 (Farm Bureau Policy) issued to Paul and Darla. Further, on 21 August 1991, Paul and Darla were still married and living together.\nOn 18 August 1992, Darla instituted a civil action against her then estranged husband to recover for personal and property damages arising out of the Accident. It is undisputed Paul is an insured under both policies. Metropolitan, however, denied coverage asserting Darla\u2019s claims fell within the general exclusions of its policy.\nOn 22 August 1994, Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment. The trial court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact and ruled the damages to property and person claimed by Darla were not covered by the Metropolitan Policy.\nOn appeal, Farm Bureau contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Metropolitan on the grounds: (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Paul and Darla resided in the same household; and (2) the Metropolitan Policy provided primary insurance coverage in this case.\nA trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment is fully reviewable by this Court because the trial court rules only on questions of law. Va. Electric and Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 N.C. App. 383, 384-385, 343 S.E.2d 188, 191, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 715, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986). Thus, this Court must determine whether on the basis of the materials presented to the trial court, there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Oliver v. Roberts, 49 N.C. App. 311, 314, 271 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1980), cert. denied,-N.C. -, 276 S.E.2d 283 (1981).\nInitially we note Farm Bureau has failed to offer any argument, precedent, or evidence to support its contention a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Paul and Darla resided in the same household. Accordingly, we deem this assignment of error abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5).\nWe now consider Farm Bureau\u2019s allegation that Metropolitan was not entitled to summary judgment.\nFarm Bureau contends the Metropolitan Policy must provide Paul with, at a minimum, the amount of coverage mandated by our Motor Vehicle and Financial Responsibility Act (Act), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.1, el seq. (1993). To support its argument, Farm Bureau correctly asserts:\nIt is well recognized in North Carolina that the provisions of a statute applicable to insurance policies are a part of the policy to the same extent as if therein written, and when the terms of the policy conflict with statutory provisions favorable to the insured, the provisions of the statute will prevail.\nInsurance Co. v. Casualty Co., 283 N.C. 87, 91, 194 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1973). We note, consistent with the above rule, that either the Metropolitan Policy or the Farm Bureau Policy would provide Paul with the coverage mandated by the Act had the other policy not been in existence. See Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(j) (1993).\nNevertheless, both policies are in effect and this Court must therefore determine whether the trial court erred in ruling the Farm Bureau Policy provides primary coverage for the damages Darla suffered in the Accident.\nFarm Bureau, seeking to impose the duty of primary coverage upon Metropolitan, cites James E. Snyder, Jr., North Carolina Automobile Insurance Law \u00a7 4-1 (2d ed. 1994), for the proposition that where, as here, two policies exist \u2014 driver and owner \u2014 \u201cprimary coverage in North Carolina is provided by the vehicle owner\u2019s policy.\u201d In jurisdictions which accept this proposition as law, courts ordinarily limit its application to actions involving the construction of opposing \u201cOther Insurance\u201d provisions where one of the policies contains an excess insurance clause pertaining to coverage of vehicles not owned by the insured and the other a pro rata clause. See George J. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law \u00a7\u00a7 62:60 and 62:73 (2d ed. 1983).\nWe note the instant action does not involve the construction of opposing \u201cOther Insurance\u201d clauses. Rather, our task is construction of Farm Bureau\u2019s \u201cOther Insurance\u201d provision and Metropolitan\u2019s \u201cOut of State Insurance\u201d provision. Further, while Farm Bureau\u2019s \u201cOther Insurance\u201d provision contains an excess clause pertaining to coverage of vehicles not owned by Paul, we believe Metropolitan\u2019s \u201cOut of State Insurance\u201d provision contains a no liability or escape clause, not a pro rata clause. Therefore, even assuming this Court adopted the proposition that the vehicle owner\u2019s policy provides primary coverage, see Snyder, North Carolina Automobile Insurance Law \u00a7 4-1, we nonetheless believe it is inapplicable to the present case.\nWe find instructive, however, our Supreme Court\u2019s ruling that where two policies satisfy the Act\u2019s coverage requirements, the driver\u2019s insurance carrier, depending on the language of the policies, provides primary coverage. See United Services Auto. Assn. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 333, 334, 420 S.E.2d 155, 156 (1992); Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co., 269 N.C. 341, 345, 152 S.E.2d 436, 440 (1967). As the Supreme Court stated, \u201can insurer by the terms of its policy could exclude liability coverage under [the owner\u2019s] policy if the driver of a vehicle . . . was covered under his own policy for the minimum amount of liability coverage required by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.1 et seq.\u201d United Services, 332 N.C. at 334, 420 S.E.2d at 156. Therefore, whether Metropolitan (owner\u2019s insurer) or Farm Bureau (driver\u2019s insurer) provides primary coverage for the Accident is controlled by the terms and exclusions within each policy.\nInsurance policies are considered contracts between two parties. Insurance Co., 269 N.C. at 346, 152 S.E.2d at 440. The court\u2019s main purpose in interpreting contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties. International Paper Co. v. Corporex Constructors, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 312, 317, 385 S.E.2d 553, 556 (1989). The plain language of the contract is the clearest indicator of the parties\u2019 intentions. Dunes South Homeowners Assn. v. First Flight Builders, 117 N.C. App. 360, 367, 451 S.E.2d 636, 640 (1994) (quoting Cleland v. Children\u2019s Home, Inc., 64 N.C. App. 153, 156, 306 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1983)). Further, \u201cit is the duty of the court to construe an insurance policy as it is written, not to rewrite it and thus make a new contract for the parties.\u201d Insurance Co., 269 N.C. at 346, 152 S.E.2d at 440.\nThe amount of Farm Bureau\u2019s present liability is governed by its \u201cOther Insurance\u201d provision which states, in pertinent part, \u201cany insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.\u201d (emphasis added). Absent coverage mandated by the Act, as already indicated, the Metropolitan Policy does not provide \u201ccollectible insurance,\u201d within the meaning of the Farm Bureau Policy, unless its \u201cOut of State Insurance\u201d provision acknowledges coverage under the present facts. We believe the plain language of the \u201cOut of State\u201d clause \u2014 \u201ccoverage [for another state\u2019s financial responsibility act] shall be reduced to the extent that other automobile liability insurance applies\u201d \u2014 excludes coverage where the out-of-state compulsory insurance law is satisfied by the driver\u2019s policy.\nIn the present action, Farm Bureau does not contest: (1) it covers Paul as mandated by the Act; and (2) the $20,000 settlement in this case is within the limits of the Farm Bureau Policy. Thus, we conclude the Farm Bureau Policy represents \u201cother automobile insurance\u201d as envisioned under the plain language of the Metropolitan Policy. Therefore, the Metropolitan Policy does not, until the limits of the Farm Bureau Policy are exhausted, provide coverage for the Accident. In other words, the Metropolitan Policy is not \u201ccollectible insurance\u201d for purposes of Farm Bureau\u2019s \u201cOther Insurance\u201d provision.\nFinally, we note our holding is not intended to imply the driver\u2019s policy should provide primary coverage in all factual settings. In the instant action, however, we believe our holding allocates responsibility to the party in the best position to avoid loss altogether \u2014 the driver.\nAccordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and Metropolitan was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, MARK D., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Anderson, Broadfoot, Johnson, Pittman, Lawrence & Butler, by Steven C. Lawrence and Suzanne M. Fenzel, for defendant-appellant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.", "Cansler, Lockhart, Campbell, Evans & Garlitz, P.A., by Thomas D. Garlitz, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. PAUL DAVID LINDQUIST, DARLA R. LINDQUIST and NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA94-1445\n(Filed 21 November 1995)\nInsurance \u00a7 516 (NCI4th)\u2014 out of state insurer of owner \u2014 in state insurer of driver \u2014 driver\u2019s coverage primary\u2014 owner\u2019s policy not \u201ccollectible insurance\u201d\nThe driver\u2019s in-state insurer, Farm Bureau, rather than the owner\u2019s out-of-state insurer, Metropolitan, provided primary coverage for an accident, since Farm Bureau\u2019s \u201cother insurance\u201d provision stated that \u201cany insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance\u201d; the \u201cout of state\u201d clause of Metropolitan\u2019s policy provided that \u201ccoverage [for another state\u2019s financial responsibility act] shall be reduced to the extent that other automobile liability insurance applies\u201d; this clause thus excluded coverage where the out-of-state compulsory insurance law was satisfied by the driver\u2019s policy; the Metropolitan policy did not, until the limits of the Farm Bureau policy were exhausted, provide coverage for the accident; and the Metropolitan policy thus was not \u201ccollectible insurance\u201d for purposes of Farm Bureau\u2019s \u201cother insurance\u201d provision.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 432.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 12 September 1994 by Judge Knox V. Jenkins in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 October 1995.\nAnderson, Broadfoot, Johnson, Pittman, Lawrence & Butler, by Steven C. Lawrence and Suzanne M. Fenzel, for defendant-appellant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.\nCansler, Lockhart, Campbell, Evans & Garlitz, P.A., by Thomas D. Garlitz, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0847-01", "first_page_order": 881, "last_page_order": 886 }