{
  "id": 11916380,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLYDE GILBERT HODGE",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hodge",
  "decision_date": "1995-12-19",
  "docket_number": "No. COA95-100",
  "first_page": "209",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges JOHN and McGEE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLYDE GILBERT HODGE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, John C., Judge.\nDefendant was charged in a bill of indictment with second degree arson. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant and a co-defendant intentionally burned a 12\u2019 x 70\u2019 mobile home belonging to James Baity. The mobile home, which was not occupied at the time it was burned, was located near High Rock Lake in Davidson County and was used by Mr. Baity as a weekend vacation residence. A jury found defendant guilty as charged and a judgment was entered upon the verdict imposing an active twelve year prison sentence. Defendant appeals.\nThe sole question presented by this appeal is whether the intentional burning of an unoccupied mobile home constitutes the crime of second degree arson. Defendant argues that although G.S. \u00a7 14-58.2 provides that the willful and malicious burning of an occupied mobile home constitutes first degree arson, the Legislature has made no provision for the burning of an unoccupied mobile home to constitute second degree arson. Therefore, he argues, the common law definition of arson still applies to second degree arson and an unoccupied mobile home is not a dwelling house for the purposes of a charge of arson. We reject his argument and find no error in his trial.\nArson is defined at common law as the \u201cwillful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person.\u201d State v. Jones, 110 N.C. App. 289, 291, 429 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1993). In 1974, the Legislature enacted G.S. \u00a7 14-58.1, providing that, as used in the statutes relating to arson and other burnings, \u201cthe terms \u2018house\u2019 and \u2018building\u2019 shall be defined to include mobile and manufactured-type housing and recreational trailers,\u201d and G.S. \u00a7 14-58.2 providing that \u201c[i]f any person shall willfully and maliciously burn any mobile home or manufactured-type house or recreational trailer home which is the dwelling house of another and which is occupied at the time of the burning, the same shall constitute arson.\u201d\nIn 1979, in connection with the passage of G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.1 el seq., the Fair Sentencing Act (repealed by Session Laws 1993, c. 538, s. 14 effective 1 October 1994), the General Assembly amended G.S. \u00a7 14-58 to establish two degrees of arson:\nThere shall be two degrees of arson as defined at the common law. If the dwelling burned was occupied at the time of the burning, the offense is arson in the first degree .... If the dwelling burned was unoccupied at the time of the burning, the offense is arson in the second degree ....\nThus, second degree arson is defined as the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling of another which is unoccupied at the time of the burning. Jones, 110 N.C. App. 289, 429 S.E.2d 410.\nIn 1979, the General Assembly also amended G.S. \u00a7 14-58.2 to add the words \u201cin the first degree\u201d to the end of the statute. (Session Laws 1979, c. 760, s. 6). Defendant argues that because the General Assembly did not redefine \u201cdwelling,\u201d as used in the 1979 amendment to G.S. \u00a7 14-58, to include mobile homes, and expressly limited the 1979 amendment to G.S. \u00a7 14-58.2 to first degree arson, it clearly did not intend that the crime of second degree arson would include the burning of an unoccupied mobile home. We disagree.\nThe title of a bill may be considered in determining legislative intent. State ex rel Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 423 S.E.2d 759 (1992). Chapter 1374 of the 1973 Session Laws, enacting G.S. \u00a7 14-58.1 and G.S. \u00a7 14-58.2, was entitled \u201cAn Act to Define the Terms House and Building as Used in the Arson and Other Burnings Statutes to Include Mobile Homes and to Make the Crime of Arson Include the Burning of a Mobile Home.\u201d \u201cWhere possible, statutes should be given a construction which, when practically applied, will tend to suppress the evil which the Legislature intended to prevent.\u201d State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 98-99, 291 S.E.2d 599, 605 (1982) (quoting In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978)). \u201c[A]rson is an offense against the security of the habitation.\u201d Id. at 100, 291 S.E.2d at 606.\nIt is clear that the intent of the Legislature in enacting G.S. \u00a7 14-58.1 and G.S. \u00a7 14-58.2 was to extend protection against willful and malicious burning to mobile and manufactured housing, and it is equally clear that it did not intend to remove that protection when, in 1979, it amended G.S. \u00a7 14-58 and G.S. \u00a7 14-58.2 to classify the crime of arson in separate degrees for sentencing purposes. It is certainly common knowledge that many of our citizens inhabit mobile homes and manufactured housing and we hold the words \u201cdwelling\u201d and \u201cdwelling house\u201d apply to those structures as surely as those made of lumber and brick. Therefore, we hold that the malicious and willful burning of a mobile home which is used as. a dwelling and which is unoccupied at the time of the burning constitutes second degree arson. Defendant\u2019s assignments of error are overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges JOHN and McGEE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, John C., Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jemigan, for the State.",
      "Benjamin G. Philpottfor defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLYDE GILBERT HODGE\nNo. COA95-100\n(Filed 19 December 1995)\nArson and Other Burnings \u00a7 6 (NCI4th)\u2014 burning of unoccupied mobile home \u2014 second-degree arson\nThe malicious and willful burning of a mobile home which is used as a dwelling and which is unoccupied at the time of the burning constitutes second-degree arson. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 14-58.1, 14-58.2.\nAm Jur 2d, Arson and Related Offenses \u00a7\u00a7 32, 36.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 5 .October 1994 by Judge Thomas W. Ross in Davidson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court Of Appeals 17 October 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jemigan, for the State.\nBenjamin G. Philpottfor defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0209-01",
  "first_page_order": 243,
  "last_page_order": 245
}