{ "id": 11916655, "name": "CAROL GURLEY MASSEY, Plaintiff v. BEN FINCH MASSEY, JR., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Massey v. Massey", "decision_date": "1996-01-02", "docket_number": "No. 9410DC405", "first_page": "263", "last_page": "273", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 N.C. App. 263" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526762 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 ALR3d 1129", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554661 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551252 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 7 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Trial, \u00a7 8, p. 265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565667, 8565637, 8565574, 8565547, 8565612 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 7 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Trial, \u00a7 8, p. 265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0588-05", "/nc/285/0588-04", "/nc/285/0588-02", "/nc/285/0588-01", "/nc/285/0588-03" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901", "parenthetical": "quoting 7 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Trial, \u00a7 8, p. 265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556630 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "quoting 7 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Trial, \u00a7 8, p. 265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/21/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527516 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546896 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74-75" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520145 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521699 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757859, 4758663, 4750349, 4757427, 4754523 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0089-03", "/nc/312/0089-05", "/nc/312/0089-02", "/nc/312/0089-04", "/nc/312/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526934 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521907 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.10 does not apply until a \"final order\" of child support is entered" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510932 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.10 does not apply until a \"final order\" of child support is entered" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832", "parenthetical": "citing Dunlap" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313223 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "citing Dunlap" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737417, 4738602, 4733422, 4740368, 4733653 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0505-05", "/nc/318/0505-04", "/nc/318/0505-02", "/nc/318/0505-03", "/nc/318/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" }, { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525073 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" }, { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "873", "parenthetical": "\"final order\"" }, { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525110 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563081 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 L.Ed.2d 473", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 S.Ct. 1417", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205890, 6207714, 6205672, 6207466, 6206828, 6206573, 6206126, 6207065, 6207922, 6205497, 6206332 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0918-03", "/us/415/0918-10", "/us/415/0918-02", "/us/415/0918-09", "/us/415/0918-07", "/us/415/0918-06", "/us/415/0918-04", "/us/415/0918-08", "/us/415/0918-11", "/us/415/0918-01", "/us/415/0918-05" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560184 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "quoting Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 687, 198 S.E.2d 537, 547 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 1417, 39 L.Ed.2d 473 (1974); see also Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 75, 145 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1965" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "722-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526067 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "quoting Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 687, 198 S.E.2d 537, 547 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 1417, 39 L.Ed.2d 473 (1974); see also Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 75, 145 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1965" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "724-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 N.C. App. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550419 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/1/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527111 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "46-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "\"in divorce actions, . . . jurisdiction over custody of the unemancipated children of the parties .... continues even after divorce.\"" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559613 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "\"in divorce actions, . . . jurisdiction over custody of the unemancipated children of the parties .... continues even after divorce.\"" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566321 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "574-75" }, { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554093 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "283-84" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.C. App. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547090 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/18/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "citing Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508082 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144", "parenthetical": "citing Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574165 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526762 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0485-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 956, "char_count": 23308, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.667201073625713e-07, "percentile": 0.6953637065326974 }, "sha256": "5a083c948a14ab42cb95fdab6cd0f13506df69e04842c258195215d7f7105ae0", "simhash": "1:3bc8f43fe42f88d0", "word_count": 3810 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and MARTIN, MARK D. concur." ], "parties": [ "CAROL GURLEY MASSEY, Plaintiff v. BEN FINCH MASSEY, JR., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals the trial court\u2019s order voiding the parties\u2019 earlier Stipulation of Dismissal. He contends the court lacked authority to enter the order. We uphold the trial court.\nRelevant background information is as follows: Plaintiff -and defendant were married 30 November 1985 and separated 1 March 1991. Two children were bom of the marriage, Ben Finch Massey, III, bom 31 March 1986, and Brandon Clay Massey, bom 4 March 1988.\nOn 11 September 1991, plaintiff filed a complaint (91 CVD 9542) seeking temporary and permanent custody of the two minor children, temporary and permanent child support, counsel fees, divorce from bed and board, temporary and permanent alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, and a temporary restraining order and injunction enjoining the waste, transfer or disposition of marital assets. Defendant answered and counterclaimed for child custody, child support, and equitable distribution 18 October 1991.\nIn a detailed and extensive order filed 25 November 1991, Judge Anne B. Salisbury awarded \u201cexclusive care, custody and control of the minor children\u201d to plaintiff, subject to specified visitation by defendant, and ordered defendant to pay child support and plaintiff\u2019s counsel fees.\nHowever, in March 1992 when the parties reconciled, they signed and filed a \u201cStipulation of Dismissal,\u201d executed \u201cin accordance with Rule 41(a),\u201d which purportedly dismissed \u201call claims and counterclaims asserted by them\u201d in case 91 CVD 9542. Following a second separation, plaintiff filed a new action (93 CVD 10481), seeking custody of the minor children, child support, counsel fees, and absolute divorce from defendant. In her complaint, plaintiff acknowledged the stipulation of dismissal filed earlier in case 91 CVD 9542. Defendant answered and counterclaimed for child custody, child support, counsel fees, and absolute divorce.\nOn 4 March 1994, the trial court ruled sua sponte that the Stipulation of Dismissal in case 91 CVD 9542 was void, and further ordered as follows:\nThe new custody action, Case No. 93 CVD 10481, is hereby consolidated with Case No. 91 CVD 9542 and the Complaint filed therein is treated as a Motion for Custody based on changed circumstances, that being the subsequent re-separation of the parties.\nDefendant gave notice of appeal to this Court 15 March 1994.\nDefendant contends in his sole assignment of error that the trial court improperly voided the parties\u2019 stipulated dismissal of the court\u2019s previously entered child custody and support order. We disagree.\nRule 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:\n(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof\u2014\n(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. \u2014 Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c) and of any statute of this State, an action or any claim therein may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court ... (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.\n(c) Dismissal of counterclaim; crossclaim, or third-party claim. \u2014 The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41 (1990).\nWhen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses, \u201ckeeping in mind that nontechnical statutory words are to be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning.\u201d Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980) (citation omitted). Thus, \u201c[s]tatu-tory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plaih words of the statute.\u201d Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992) (citing Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991)).\nThe express language of Rule 41 states the parties may voluntarily dismiss an \u201caction\u201d or \u201cclaim\u201d by stipulation. An \u201caction\u201d is defined as \u201ca formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court of law.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 28 (6th ed. 1990). A \u201cclaim\u201d is a \u201cdemand for money or property\u201d or a \u201ccause of action.\u201d Id. at 247.\nBy contrast, an \u201corder\u201d is a \u201cdirection of a court or judge made or entered in writing\u201d which \u201cdecides some matter litigated by the parties,\u201d i.e., the claim or action brought by a party. Id. at 1096. In the case sub judice, an order of the trial court awarding plaintiff permanent custody and obligating defendant to pay $546.00 in permanent child support was rendered 25 November 1991. Nothing in Rule 41 grants authority to the parties to a lawsuit, without action by the trial court, to vacate by stipulation an order previously entered in the .action to which they are parties.\nMoreover, Collins v. Collins, 18 N.C. App. 45, 196 S.E.2d 282 (1973), relied upon heavily by defendant, likewise does not operate to invest such authority in the parties. Defendant points to the following language of this Court:\n[P]laintiff\u2019s voluntary dismissal of the prior action . . . was a final termination of that action and ... no valid order could be made thereafter in that cause.\nId. at 50, 196 S.E.2d at 286. While taking no quarrel with our previous holding, we point out that the decision in Collins indicated neither that the trial court\u2019s order was vacated nor that the action was dismissed, regardless of whatever phraseology may have been employed by the parties. Rather we determined the action to have been terminated, albeit the order remained intact, and that no valid subsequent orders might be entered therein, including adjudications of contempt for violation of the extant order. Id. at 51, 196 S.E.2d at 286. In addition, Collins is distinguishable on its facts.\nIn Collins, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking temporary and permanent alimony, child custody and support and counsel fees. Id. at 47, 196 S.E.2d at 284. Following a hearing on plaintiff\u2019s claim for temporary support, the trial court entered an order awarding her temporary custody and support for the minor child. Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed a voluntary dismissal of her action, but four days later initiated a new complaint again asserting claims to, inter alia, temporary and permanent alimony, and custody and support for the child. Following defendant\u2019s answer and a hearing, the court awarded plaintiff permanent child custody and support. Id. at 46-47, 196 S.E.2d at 283-84. Both parties appealed. Id. at 48, 196 S.E.2d at 284.\nThe issue before this Court concerned the validity of plaintiff\u2019s voluntary dismissal and the procedural effect of such dismissal. Id. at 49, 196 S.E.2d at 285. We stated that pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), \u201c \u2018plaintiff has an absolute right to a voluntary, non-prejudicial dismissal up to the time he rests his case.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 50, 196 S.E.2d at 285. Thus, the voluntary dismissal taken after the order awarding plaintiff temporary custody and support \u2014 but prior to plaintiff\u2019s \u201crest[ing her] case\u201d on the claim for permanent custody \u2014 constituted a \u201cfinal termination\u201d of the action and the court was without authority to enter further orders therein. Id. at 50, 196 S.E.2d at 286.\nOur decision in Wood v. Wood, 37 N.C. App. 570, 246 S.E.2d 549 (1978), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 297 N.C. 1, 252 S.E.2d 799 (1979). is instructive. Plaintiff therein filed notice of voluntary dismissal after judgment of divorce had been rendered in her favor. Id. at 571, 246 S.E.2d at 550. In holding the dismissal to be of \u201cno legal efficacy,\u201d id. at 575, 246 S.E.2d at 552, we emphasized that\na voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 will lie only prior to entry of final judgment. After final judgment, any correction, modification, amendment, or setting aside can only be done by the court.\nId. at 574-75, 246 S.E.2d at 552 (emphasis added); see N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 (amendment of judgments) and Rule 60 (relief from judgment or order).\nHowever, defendant insists the 25 November 1991 order was not a \u201cfinal\u201d judgment. Citing, inter alia, Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965) and Brooks v. Brooks, 107 N.C. App. 44, 418 S.E.2d 534 (1992), defendant maintains that \u201c[o]nce custody and support are brought to issue there can be \u2018no final judgment in that case, because the issue of custody and support remain in fieri until the children have become emancipated.\u2019 \u201d Brooks, 107 N.C. App. at 46, 418 S.E.2d at 536 (quoting In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 112, 160 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1968)).\nWe agree that our statement in Brooks accurately characterizes the law. Indeed, this Court has consistently upheld the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court over child custody and support actions and has often reiterated that the \u201cjurisdiction of the court \u2018to protect infants is broad, comprehensive and plenary.\u2019 \u201d Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 724, 329 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1985) (quoting Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 687, 198 S.E.2d 537, 547 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 1417, 39 L.Ed.2d 473 (1974); see also Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 75, 145 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1965) (\u201cin divorce actions, . . . jurisdiction over custody of the unemancipated children of the parties .... continues even after divorce.\u201d) However, defendant misapprehends the application of these principles to the issue sub judice.\nIn a subsequent case brought by the same parties to the earlier Stanback decision, Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 456, 215 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1975), for example, our Supreme Court explained that \u201c[a] judicial decree in a child custody and support matter is subject to alteration upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and, therefore, is not final in nature.\u201d (emphasis added.)\nOur later decision in Coleman v. Coleman, 74 N.C. App. 494, 328 S.E.2d 871 (1985), provides additional guidance. Defendant therein contended on appeal that the trial court had erred by denying his G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an order requiring him to pay child support, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees. Id. at 496, 328 S.E.2d at 872. Plaintiff responded that Rule 60(b) applies only to \u201c \u2018final\u2019 orders of judgments, and an order for payment of child support ... is not final since it may be subsequently modified . . . .\u201d Id. We held that\na custody order was a \u2018final\u2019 order within the meaning of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b) even though it could be modified subsequently upon a proper showing of change of circumstances under G.S. 50-13.7. The same rationale applies to orders for child support. Like custody orders, child support orders are not \u2018final\u2019 orders only in the sense that they may be modified subsequently upon a motion in the cause and a showing of change of circumstances as provided in G.S. 50-13.7.\nId. at 496, 328 S.E.2d at 872 (emphasis added).\nWe further observed that alimony pendente lite,\n[b]y definition!,] ... is a temporary award, made during the pen-dency of a judgment that will be final except for the possibility of modification for change of circumstances.\nId. at 497, 328 S.E.2d at 873. Concluding, this Court held the child support award to be a final order, there being no indication it was to provide for temporary child support during the pendency of the litigation; the order was therefore properly subject to defendant\u2019s Rule 60(b) motion. Id.\nIn a similar vein, our decision in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 81 N.C. App. 675, 676, 344 S.E.2d 806, 807, disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 505, 349 S.E.2d 859 (1986), held plaintiffs appeal to be interlocutory, as the trial court\u2019s order from which he appealed\ndoes not finally determine the issue involved, but only provides for temporary custody until an August hearing date for further proceedings preliminary to a. final decree.\n(emphasis added). See also Berkman v. Berkman, 106 N.C. App. 701, 702, 417 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1992) (citing Dunlap).\nWe also note numerous references by this Court and our Supreme Court to permanent \u2014 as distinguished from temporary \u2014 awards of child custody and child support as \u201cfinal judgments.\u201d See, e.g., Sikes v. Sikes, 330 N.C. 595, 599, 411 S.E.2d 588, 590 (1992) (N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.10 does not apply until a \u201cfinal order\u201d of child support is entered); Broyhill v. Broyhill, 81 N.C. App. 147, 148, 343 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1986); Stevens v. Stevens, 68 N.C. App. 234, 234, 314 S.E.2d 786, 787, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 89, 321 S.E.2d 908 (1984); Schrock v. Schrock, 89 N.C. App. 308, 309, 365 S.E.2d 657, 658 (1988); Brookshire v. Brookshire, 89 N.C. App. 48, 49, 365 S.E.2d 307, 308 (1988).\nWe conclude that for purposes of Rule 41(a), the trial court\u2019s 25 November 1991 order in case 91 CVD 9542, resolving the matters of permanent custody and support, constituted a \u201cfinal judgment.\u201d Wood, 37 N.C. App. at 574-75, 246 S.E.2d at 552; Coleman, 74 N.C. App. at 497, 328 S.E.2d at 873 (\u201cfinal order\u201d). While the court maintains continuing jurisdiction over these issues in order to \u201cprotect infants,\u201d Latham, 74 N.C. App. at 724, 329 S.E.2d at 722, the order was not \u201cinterlocutory,\u201d as would be a temporary order of custody and support, Dunlap, 81 N.C. App. at 676, 344 S.E.2d at 807, but was indeed \u201c \u2018final\u2019 . . . even though it could be modified subsequently upon a proper showing of change of circumstances under G.S. 50-13.7.\u201d Coleman, 74 N.C. App. at 496, 328 S.E.2d at 872. While the parties may have been at liberty to appeal the 25 November 1991 order, they were not free under Rule 41(a) to dismiss voluntarily the \u201cfinally determined\u201d issues of child custody and support. The trial court therefore did not err in ruling that the \u201cStipulation of Dismissal\u201d filed in case 91 CVD 9542 by the parties was void and of no effect as to the child custody and child support issues previously resolved by \u201cfinal judgment.\u201d Wood, 37 N.C. App. 574-75, 246 S.E.2d at 552. As defendant has not raised on appeal the effect of the stipulation upon his obligation to pay plaintiff\u2019s counsel fees under the 25 November 1991 order, we do not address this question. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(a).\nDefendant also objects that upholding the trial court\u2019s action herein\nwould be contrary to public policy of this State in that it would interpret this ruling to mean that married persons who are separated may not agree to dismiss a custody and support action after reconciling their differences. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the objective of re-establishment of the family for the benefit of both the children and the parents.\nWe disagree. Our holding provides that under Rule 41(a) and existing case law, parties may not voluntarily dismiss a final custody and child support order. This ruling neither prevents nor interferes with reconciliation following entry of a final order on the issues of child custody and child support. Instead, we have simply determined that voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a) is inappropriate in such instance.\nWe note in this context that the record herein reflects execution by the parties, prior to entry of the \u201cStipulation of Dismissal,\u201d of a notarized \u201cConsent Agreement\u201d [AOC Form No. 615] subsequently signed by a District Court Judge. This Agreement provided that the \u201cSupporting Parent [defendant] may temporarily suspend his support payments to the Clerk of Superior Court\u201d until action seeking reinstatement by the parent receiving support. The effect of the previous order was thus properly stayed and the case considered inactive for purposes of child support enforcement. Similarly, consent agreements approved by the Court might also address earlier custody orders.\nPlaintiff\u2019s final argument challenges the trial court\u2019s consolidation of the two actions (case no. 91 CVD 9542 and case no. 93 CVD 10481) and treatment of the second as a motion for modification based upon changed circumstances. The trial court did not err in taking this procedural stance.\nFirst, in Walker v. Walker, 59 N.C. App. 485, 488-89, 297 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1982), this court held that while reconciliation voids alimony provisions and terminates separation agreements,\nthis principle has not been applied to void, as a matter of law, a judgment ordering payment of child support .... \u201cIf, after the order . .. there was a reconciliation and the wife and . . . children resumed the family group and lived together with the defendant-husband, the necessity for the [child] support payments . . . ceased .... If thereafter there was a subsequent separation and need for [child] support payments . . ., the courts are open for whatever relief may be justified by the situation then existing. The original cause was at all times pending . . . .\u201d (quoting Jackson v. Jackson, 14 N.C. App. 71, 74-75, 187 S.E.2d 490, 493 (1972).)\nNext, because of the continuing jurisdiction of the court over child custody and support matters noted above, Stanback, 266 N.C. at 75, 145 S.E.2d at 334, any prior action in which a permanent order has been entered \u201cremains pending .... [and] works an abatement of a subsequent action . . . .\u201d Brooks, 107 N.C. App. at 46-47, 418 S.E.2d at 536 (citation omitted). See also Jackson v. Jackson, 68 N.C. App. 499, 501-02, 315 S.E.2d 90, 91 (jurisdiction of court over custody and support issues raised in pleadings continues \u201ceven when the issues are not determined by the judgment\u201d (emphasis added)), and Latham, 74 N.C. App. at 724-25, 329 S.E.2d at 722-23 (court in which divorce action is brought \u201cacquires jurisdiction over the custody of the une-mancipated children of the parties,\u201d and \u201c[i]n actions for custody and support only majority of the child or death of a party fully and completely determines the cause\u201d; therefore, remarriage of parties who subsequently again separate does not terminate continuing jurisdiction of earlier divorce court over minor child which court acquired in previous divorce proceeding.)\nAdditionally, Rule 42 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:\n(a) Consolidation. \u2014 When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending in one division of the court, the judge may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; he may order all the actions consolidated; and he may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.\n\u201c \u2018A trial court has the discretionary power, even ex memo motu, to consolidate actions for trial,\u2019 \u201d Board of Education v. Evans, 21 N.C. App. 493, 496, 204 S.E.2d 899, 901, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 588, 206 S.E.2d 862 (1974) (quoting 7 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Trial, \u00a7 8, p. 265-66), and actions of the trial judge within judicial discretion will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown, Whaley v. Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 109, 112, 177 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1970) (citation omitted). Moreover, when the consolidation of actions for the purpose of hearing is assigned as error on appeal, the appellant must show injury or prejudice arising therefrom. In re Moore, 11 N.C. App. 320, 322, 181 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1971) (citation omitted).\nIn view of our holding affirming the trial court\u2019s voiding of the parties\u2019 Stipulation of Dismissal and because of the court\u2019s continuing jurisdiction acquired in consequence of its rendering the original child custody and support order, i.e., 91 CVD 9542, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its order of consolidation and no injury or prejudice suffered by defendant. The only proper course for defendant in any event would have been a motion in the original cause, which course was effected by the court\u2019s order of consolidation. The trial court may thereafter \u201cgrant whatever relief might be justified by the situation then existing.\u201d Jackson, 14 N.C. App. at 75, 187 S.E.2d at 493. Defendant will have the opportunity to be heard and present evidence on plaintiff\u2019s motion to modify child custody and child support. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7 (1987).\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHNSON and MARTIN, MARK D. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.", "Ragsdale, Kirschbaum & Nanney, P.A., by William L. Ragsdale and Connie E. Carrigan, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROL GURLEY MASSEY, Plaintiff v. BEN FINCH MASSEY, JR., Defendant\nNo. 9410DC405\n(Filed 2 January 1996)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 548 (NCI4th); Trial \u00a7 227 (NCI4th)\u2014 separation, reconciliation, subsequent separation \u2014 child custody and support \u2014 voluntary dismissal\nThe trial court had the authority to enter an order voiding the parties\u2019 earlier Stipulation of Dismissal of all claims and counterclaims in a divorce and child custody action where an order was filed awarding child custody to plaintiff and ordering defendant to pay child support; the parties reconciled and filed a Stipulation of Dismissal executed in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(a); following a second separation plaintiff filed a new action which included claims for custody, child support, and divorce; and the trial court ruled that the Stipulation of Dismissal was void, consolidated the second custody action with the first, and treated the complaint as a motion for custody based on changed circumstances. Th\u00e9 express language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41 states the parties may voluntarily dismiss an \u201caction\u201d or \u201cclaim\u201d by stipulation; nothing in Rule 41 grants authority to the parties in a lawsuit, without action by the trial court, to vacate by stipulation an order previously entered in the action to which they are parties. For purposes of Rule 41(a), the trial court\u2019s first order resolving matters of permanent custody and support constituted a final judgment. The parties may have been at liberty to appeal the order, but were not free under Rule 41(a) to dismiss voluntarily the finally determined issues of child custody and support, even though the court maintains continuing jurisdiction over these issues and they could be modified subsequently upon a proper showing of change of circumstances.\nAm Jur 2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit \u00a7\u00a7 10, 19; Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 1016, 1079.\nValidity and effect, as between former spouses, of agreement releasing parent from payment of child support provided for in an earlier divorce decree. 100 ALR3d 1129.\n2. Trial \u00a7 115 (NCI4th)\u2014 child custody and support \u2014 actions before and after reconciliation \u2014 joinder\nThere was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in consolidating two divorce and child custody actions, one before a reconciliation and one after. It has been held in Walker v. Walker, 59 N.C. App. 485, that while reconciliation voids alimony provisions and terminates separation agreements, the courts are open after a reconciliation and second separation to whatever child support relief may be justified, the original cause at all times pending; because of the continuing jurisdiction of the court over child custody and support matters, any prior action in which a permanent order has been entered remains pending; a court has the discretionary power to consolidate actions for trial; when the consolidation of actions for the purpose of hearing is assigned as error, the appellant must show injury or prejudice arising therefrom; and no injury or prejudice by suffered by defendant could be discerned.\nAm Jur 2d, Actions \u00a7 132.\nAppeal by defendant from order filed 4 March 1994 by Judge Anne B. Salisbury in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 February 1995.\nNo brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.\nRagsdale, Kirschbaum & Nanney, P.A., by William L. Ragsdale and Connie E. Carrigan, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0263-01", "first_page_order": 297, "last_page_order": 307 }