{ "id": 11916795, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEBORAH SUZANNE FLOWERS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Flowers", "decision_date": "1996-01-02", "docket_number": "No. COA94-993", "first_page": "299", "last_page": "306", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 N.C. App. 299" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "337 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "10 ALR3d 1054", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 1078", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "25 ALR4th 419", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550074 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 L.Ed.2d 1210", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 904", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6184738, 6185094, 6184392, 6185357, 6183598, 6183984, 6185553, 6184594, 6184179, 6183446, 6184922, 6183803 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0904-08", "/us/428/0904-10", "/us/428/0904-06", "/us/428/0904-11", "/us/428/0904-02", "/us/428/0904-04", "/us/428/0904-12", "/us/428/0904-07", "/us/428/0904-05", "/us/428/0904-01", "/us/428/0904-09", "/us/428/0904-03" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569555 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2401728 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753586 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 39, 320 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4703462 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598-99", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 39, 320 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" }, { "page": "720" }, { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540746 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548611 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0213-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 762, "char_count": 17298, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7490523578787798 }, "sha256": "f8e6b9baa86b6ad3946a15ca5d43bef41659fe4ba5d0460b40fff7c40a26aff5", "simhash": "1:872ec10e67068c4b", "word_count": 2649 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge ARNOLD and Judge GREENE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEBORAH SUZANNE FLOWERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nDefendant appeals her conviction for second degree murder on two grounds. First, defendant argues the trial court erred in its denial of a motion to suppress, based on an alleged wrongful police interrogation. Second, defendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s decision to limit the scope of testimony by defendant\u2019s expert witness. We find no error, and affirm defendant\u2019s conviction.\nEvidence presented at the suppression hearing tended to show the following facts. On 21 February 1991, police officers responded to a phone call reporting a shooting at the home of defendant and her husband, Forrest Flowers. Upon arrival at defendant\u2019s residence, Cleveland County Detective Jerry L. White observed defendant standing in the yard. Detective White entered the house and observed Forrest Flowers dead on the floor. Detective White also observed a hole in decedent\u2019s chest, and a shotgun in the bedroom of the house. Detective White surmised the hole must have come from a large caliber weapon or shotgun blast.\nDetective White then returned to the yard and spoke with defendant. Defendant told Detective White that she had been loading a shotgun across the room from decedent when an accidental discharge occurred. This discharge struck decedent, killing him. Defendant\u2019s demeanor at the time of this investigatory inquiry is a matter of dispute. Detective White described defendant\u2019s emotional state as \u201cupset,\u201d or \u201csomewhat upset,\u201d but not \u201chysterical or in tears.\u201d Other witnesses at the scene of the shooting observed the defendant as upset, but rational.\nDefendant was then transported to the Cleveland County Law Enforcement Center by Detective White. Once at the station, defendant was apprised of her Miranda rights. As defendant was read these rights, Detective White repeatedly paused and asked whether she understood those rights. Defendant responded by stating she understood her rights. Defendant then waived those rights and signed a written waiver. The waiver included the following statement:\nI understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promise or threats have been made to me ....\nThe waiver was signed by defendant at 7:38 P.M. on 21 February 1991, and was witnessed by Detective Brian Hawkins.\nAfter the waiver was signed and acknowledged, Detective White began questioning defendant. Shortly thereafter, Detective Raymond Hamrick arrived. With Detective Hamrick present, Detective White resumed the questioning of defendant. Detective White questioned the veracity of defendant\u2019s version of events surrounding the shooting. Specifically, Detective White found defendant\u2019s accidental discharge story inconsistent with the nature of the shotgun wound inflicted upon the decedent. Given the relatively small size of the entry wound, Detective White concluded the shotgun\u2019s discharge must have come from close range, not across the room as defendant claimed at the shooting scene.\nDefendant was asked by Detective White to explain this apparent anomaly, stating it \u201ccould not have happened the way you told me that it happened.\u201d In response to Detective White\u2019s question, and in the presence of Detective Hamrick, defendant retorted, \u201cWell, okay, I shot him.\u201d At this point, Detective White asked defendant if she would recapitulate her admission while being tape-recorded. Defendant agreed.\nDefendant then repeated her story to Detective White while being tape-recorded. The tape recording took place at 8:30 p.m., 21 February 1991, and was witnessed by Detective Hamrick. In the transcript of the tape, the defendant affirms she was \u201cadvised of [her] constitutional rights\u201d prior to making the recorded statement.\nDefendant\u2019s recorded statement elaborated upon her earlier admission of culpability. In her recorded statement, defendant admits shooting the decedent because she \u201chad had all she could take.\u201d Further, defendant explains how she selected a red shell, loaded the shell into the breech of the shotgun, and shot decedent from a distance of approximately two feet, while he was asleep on the couch. Defendant described the shooting as \u201ca way out,\u201d apparently meaning a way out of the marriage.\nThe next morning, 22 February 1991, at 10:02 A.M., defendant read and signed a transcript of her recorded statement, affirming the transcript to be her \u201centire statement.\u201d\nAt trial, the defense theory was premised upon defendant\u2019s purported inability to form the capacity necessary to knowingly and voluntarily waive her constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The evidence offered by defendant to support a defense based on incapacity centered on expert psychiatric testimony. The ostensible reason for the psychiatric testimony was to show that defendant \u201cwas impaired by an allergic reaction to prescription narcotics and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) so as to render any responses to police interrogation unknowing and involuntary.\u201d The State objected to the use of psychiatric testimony as substantive evidence of defendant\u2019s lack of capacity, and the trial court sustained the objection. In ruling on the objection, the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s use of psychiatric testimony only for the limited purpose of corroboration.\nWe note preemptively that defendant has not set out all of her assignments of error in her brief on appeal. As such, those assignments of error are deemed abandoned. State v. Ledford, 41 N.C. App. 213, 218, 254 S.E.2d 780, 782 (197.9); N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (1995). Defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error address the trial court\u2019s failure to suppress defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements, and the trial court\u2019s limitations on defendant\u2019s expert psychiatric testimony.\nDefendant maintains the trial court improperly allowed admission of her inculpatory statements, in derogation of the rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The purpose of the Miranda holding is to ensure \u201cthe use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the [constitutional] privilege against self-incrimination.\u201d Id. at 443, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. Accordingly, defendant attempted to suppress her inculpatory statements, but that motion was denied by the trial court.\nDefendant\u2019s Miranda-based theory is twofold. Defendant argues \u201cshe was impaired by an allergic reaction to prescription narcotics and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) so as to render any responses to police interrogation unknowing and involuntary.\u201d Otherwise stated, defendant asserts she lacked capacity to waive her Miranda protections. Next, defendant argues Miranda warnings should have been given at each stage of the interrogation process, not just at the initial period of questioning. Because repeated warnings were not given, defendant asserts the original Miranda warnings became stale at the point the tape-recorded statement was made.\nAppellate courts reviewing the voluntariness of a confession must apply a totality of the circumstances test. State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 114, 400 S.E.2d 712, 720 (1991). Application of this totality test is based upon scrutiny of the \u201c \u2018findings of fact made by the trial judge following a voir dire hearing on the voluntariness of a defendant\u2019s confession [which are] conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence in the record.\u2019 \u201d State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 598-99, 342 S.E.2d 823, 827 (1986) (quoting State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 39, 320 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1984)). Conclusions of law flowing from the trial court\u2019s findings are a proper matter for review. Smith, 328 N.C. at 114, 400 S.E.2d at 720.\nIn the instant case, the trial judge\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress is replete with findings supported by competent evidence. Those findings justify a legal conclusion that defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements were voluntary. Defendant\u2019s arguments that she lacked capacity are belied by her actions indicative of rationality. For instance, the trial court found that \u201cdefendant was not hysterical, was not crying but was upset\u201d during the period prior to questioning. Further, the trial court found defendant\u2019s tape-recorded statements demonstrative of a person answering questions \u201cin a clear manner generally, thoughtfully, responsively generally.\u201d Defendant\u2019s claim of incapacity, based on PTSD or an allergic reaction to drugs, is simply not borne out by the trial court\u2019s findings or the record. Based on the enumerated examples herein, and others extant in the trial court\u2019s findings, there was \u201cplenary competent evidence\u201d to support the conclusion that the confession was voluntary. State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 52, 311 S.E.2d 540, 547 (1984). Defendant\u2019s signed waiver of her rights was therefore in accord with Miranda.\nDefendant\u2019s claim that the initial Miranda warnings were inadequate, or stale, with regard to defendant\u2019s recorded statement (and the signing of the transcript therefrom) is ill-founded. The test for staleness is whether the Miranda warnings initially given were adequate to ensure defendant\u2019s awareness of her rights during subsequent interrogations. Smith, 328 N.C. at 113, 400 S.E.2d at 719. A determination of adequacy is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id.\nThe record discloses that defendant was advised of her Miranda rights prior to any custodial interrogation. Defendant signed a waiver of those rights in close temporal proximity to the actual explanation of the warnings. The record shows the initial warnings, and defendant\u2019s signing of the Miranda waiver, took place over a period of approximately eight minutes, from 7:31 RM. to 7:38 P.M. on 21 February 1991. The record is also clear that the taped questioning, and defendant\u2019s statement arising therefrom, commenced at 8:30 P.M., 21 February 1991.\nPrior to the substantive portion of defendant\u2019s recorded statement, Detective White had the following tape-recorded colloquy with defendant:\nDetective White: And did you understand all of those [Miranda] rights as I read them to you?\nDefendant: Yes.\nDetective White: And are you willing to answer questions and make a statement at this time, having these rights in mind?\nDefendant: Yes.\nThe next morning, on 22 February 1991 at 10:02 A.M., defendant was presented with a transcription of her recorded statement. Defendant acknowledged the transcript, by affirming through signature the following annotation: \u201cI, [defendant], have read the material contained herein and attest to the fact that it is my entire statement . . . .\u201d The transcribed statement included the colloquy with Detective White above, explicitly referring to defendant\u2019s Miranda rights. Simply put, defendant was reminded at least twice of the rights she now claims to lack memory of.\n\u201cMany courts have considered the question whether Miranda warnings must be repeated at subsequent interrogations when they have been properly given at the initial one.\u201d State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 433, 219 S.E.2d 201, 212 (1975), vacated in nonrelevant part, 428 U.S. 904, 49 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1976). The McZom Court answered this question, holding that Miranda warnings retain efficacy, so long as\nno inordinate time elapses between interrogations, the subject matter of the questioning remains the same, and there is no evidence that in the interval between the two interrogations anything occurred to dilute the first warning ....\nMcZorn, 288 N.C. at 433, 219 S.E.2d at 212.\nThe trial court found and concluded defendant \u201cwas advised of her rights ... at an appropriate time and in an appropriate manner . . . [and] [t]hat the rights of the defendant. . . were not violated by her detention, interrogation, or arrest[.]\u201d This conclusion is well supported by the trial court\u2019s findings that the tape-recorded statements were made in \u201ca clear manner generally,\u201d and were \u201cthoughtful[]\u201d and \u201cresponsive[] generally.\u201d From these circumstances, it cannot be said that \u201cdefendant was so intellectually deficient or emotionally unstable that [s]he had forgotten [her] constitutional rights that had been fully explained to [her] a short time earlier.\u201d McZorn, 288 N.C. at 435, 219 S.E.2d at 212. As such, the initial warnings given the instant defendant retained vitality throughout the questioning at issue here, i.e., the warnings were not stale.\nFinally, defendant argues the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of her expert witness. The trial court refused to allow defendant\u2019s expert witness to testify on the substantive issue of defendant\u2019s capacity to waive her constitutional rights under Miranda, based on claims of PTSD and drug impairment. The trial court allowed the psychiatric testimony only to the extent necessary to corroborate defendant\u2019s testimony.\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court made clear in State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 263, 446 S.E.2d 298, 311 (1994), that a witness \u201cmay not testify as to whether the defendant had the capacity to waive [her] rights [under Miranda]. \u201d Just as the rule is clear, so is the result here. Defendant\u2019s brief argues the testimony of the \u201cexpert witnesses on PTSD and psychogenic shock . . . [was] for the purpose of showing that the defendant lacked the capacity to understandingly and voluntarily waive her rights and confess.\u201d Defendant\u2019s position ineluctably runs afoul of Daniels, and is without merit.\nIn summary, we conclude defendant had the capacity to waive her rights under Miranda; that such rights were properly explained to defendant by Detective White. We further hold that the Miranda warnings were not stale at the time of defendant\u2019s recorded statements, or at the time the transcript of the recordings was signed by defendant. As well, the testimony of the defendant\u2019s expert psychiatrist was properly limited by the trial court to corroborative purposes only.\nNo error.\nChief Judge ARNOLD and Judge GREENE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General John F. Maddrey, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellant Defender J. Michael Smith, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEBORAH SUZANNE FLOWERS\nNo. COA94-993\n(Filed 2 January 1996)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1298 (NCI4th)\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 confession\u2014waiver of rights \u2014 emotional condition of defendant\nThe trial court did not err in a second-degree murder prosecution by admitting defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements where defendant argued that she was impaired by an allergic reaction to prescription narcotics and by post-traumatic stress disorder so as to render any responses to police interrogation unknowing and involuntary. The trial court found that defendant was not hysterical, was not crying but was upset during the period prior to questioning and that defendant\u2019s tape-recorded statements were demonstrative of a person answering questions thoughtfully and responsively. Defendant\u2019s claim of incapacity is simply not borne out by the trial court\u2019s findings or the record.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 1357.\nSufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs. 25 ALR4th 419.\nValidity or admissibility, under Federal Constitution, of accused\u2019s pretrial confession as affected by accused\u2019s mental illness or impairment at time of confession \u2014 Supreme Court cases. 93 L. Ed. 2d 1078.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1268 (NCI4th)\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 confession\u2014subsequent waiver not obtained\nMiranda warnings given to a murder defendant retained vitality where defendant was advised of her rights prior to any custodial interrogation; she signed a waiver of those rights in close temporal proximity to the actual explanation of the warnings; the record shows that the initial warnings, and defendant\u2019s signing of the waiver, took place over a period of approximately eight minutes, from 7:31 p.m. to 7:38 p.m.; the taped questioning, and defendant\u2019s statement arising therefrom, began at 8:30 p.m.; defendant was presented the next morning with a transcription of her recorded statement, which explicitly referred to her Miranda rights; and defendant acknowledged the transcript.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 1357.\nNecessity of informing suspect of rights under privilege against self-incrimination, prior to police interrogation. 10 ALR3d 1054.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7\u00a7 2292, 2152 (NCX4th)\u2014 confession \u2014 mental capacity to waive rights \u2014 expert psychiatric testimony excluded \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by refusing to allow defendant\u2019s expert psychiatric witness to testify on the substantive issue of defendant\u2019s capacity to waive her constitutional rights under Miranda based on claims of PTSD and drug impairment where the court allowed the testimony only to the extent necessary to corroborate defendant\u2019s testimony. Under State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 263, a witness may not testify as to whether the defendant had the capacity to waive Miranda rights.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 6, 41.\nSufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs. 25 ALR4th 419.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 July 1993 by Judge Beverly T. Beal in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 October 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General John F. Maddrey, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellant Defender J. Michael Smith, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0299-01", "first_page_order": 333, "last_page_order": 340 }