{ "id": 11918248, "name": "CRAVEN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Petitioner v. VIRGINIA WILLOUGHBY, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Craven County Board of Education v. Willoughby", "decision_date": "1996-02-06", "docket_number": "No. COA95-155", "first_page": "495", "last_page": "500", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 N.C. App. 495" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "13 ALR2d 306", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "130 L.Ed. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539104, 2537890, 2538279, 2534383, 2538558 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0602-05", "/nc/336/0602-02", "/nc/336/0602-04", "/nc/336/0602-03", "/nc/336/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562562 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552479 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" }, { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" }, { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357876 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573011 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "quoting Hall v. Board of Education, 280 N.C. 600, 605, 187 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564387 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "quoting Hall v. Board of Education, 280 N.C. 600, 605, 187 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 509, "char_count": 10110, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.34113282280163826 }, "sha256": "68ca39d5e9a4099bb6417fd73d33f659dd75ac93457f1ef0d46ff6df826cb6f7", "simhash": "1:a762b2c455bf82ea", "word_count": 1600 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge ARNOLD and Judge MARTIN, John C., concur." ], "parties": [ "CRAVEN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Petitioner v. VIRGINIA WILLOUGHBY, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nPetitioner first argues that Danyun is not entitled to a free appropriate education because he is neither a domiciliary or a resident of Craven County, North Carolina. We disagree and affirm because we conclude that Danyun is a resident, although not a domiciliary, of Craven County.\nOur Supreme Court has long recognized that the terms \u201cresidence\u201d and \u201cdomicile\u201d have different meanings.\n\u201cPrecisely speaking, residence and domicile are not convertible terms. A person may have his residence in one place and his domicile in another. Residence simply indicates a person\u2019s actual place of abode, whether permanent or temporary. Domicile denotes one\u2019s permanent, established home as distinguished from a temporary, although actual, place of residence.\u201d\nIn re Annexation Ordinance, 296 N.C. 1, 15, 249 S.E.2d 698, 706 (1978) (quoting Hall v. Board of Education, 280 N.C. 600, 605, 187 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1972)). We have also recognized that, \u201c[traditionally, residence is taken to signify one\u2019s place of actual abode, whether it be temporary or permanent.\u201d Vinson Realty Co. v. Honig, 88 N.C. App. 113, 116, 362 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1987). More specifically, \u201c[a]n uneman-cipated minor may not establish a domicile different from his parents, surviving parents, or legal guardian, . .. but [he] obviously may reside in a-place separate from his parents.\u201d Chapel-Hill-Carrboro City Schools System v. Chavioux, 116 N.C. App. 131, 133, 446 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1994).\nDanyun Walker\u2019s place of actual abode is clearly Craven County, North Carolina. Petitioner does not dispute that Danyun actually lives or resides with his grandmother in Craven County. Accordingly, we conclude that by virtue of his living either temporarily or permanently with respondent in Craven County, Danyun Walker is a legal resident of Craven County so long as he continues to live there. Vinson, 88 N.C. App. at 116, 362 S.E.2d at 603. Even so, we conclude that Danyun is not a domiciliary of Craven County because an unemancipated child may not establish a \u201cdomicile different from his parents.\u201d Chavioux, 116 N.C.App. at 133, 446 S.E.2d at 614.\nHaving determined that Danyun is a resident, though not a domiciliary, of Craven County, we now consider whether a resident child with special needs must be a domiciliary in order to receive a free appropriate education. Petitioner argues that domicile must be established in order to entitle a resident child with special needs to a free appropriate education. We disagree.\nPetitioner argues that G.S. 115C-366 is controlling. G.S. 115C-366(a) states in pertinent part:\n(a) all students under the age of 21 years who are domiciled in a school administrative unit... are entitled to all the privileges and advantages of the public schools to which they are assigned by the local boards of education.\nG.S. 115C-366(a) (1991). Petitioner reads this section as creating a domicile requirement for all children under 21 years of age who are not specifically excepted in G.S. 115C-366.2. Finding no mention of children with special needs in G.S. 115C-366.2, petitioner concludes that children with special needs are among those who must be domi-ciliarles of a school administrative unit in order to receive a free appropriate education. We conclude that petitioner\u2019s argument fails because G.S. 115C-366 is not controlling here.\nChildren with special needs fall within the purview of Chapter 115C, Article 9, entitled \u201cSpecial Education.\u201d Within Article 9, G.S. 115C-110(i) states that:\nEach local educational agency shall provide free appropriate special education and related services in accordance with the provisions of this Article for all children with special needs who are residents of, or whose parents or guardians are residents of, the agency\u2019s district, beginning with children aged five.\nG.S. 115C-110(i) (1989). When a more generally applicable statute such as G.S. 115C-366(a) conflicts with a more specific, special statute such as G.S. 115C-110(i), the \u201cspecial statute is viewed as an exception to the provisions of the general statute . . . .\u201d Electric Service v. City of Rocky Mount, 20 N.C. App. 347, 350, 201 S.E.2d 508, 510, aff'd, 285 N.C. 135, 203 S.E.2d 838 (1974). Accordingly, we conclude that the specific requirements of G.S. 115C-110(i) control where in conflict with the general requirements of G.S. 115C-366(a).\nThe only requirement imposed by G.S. 115C-110(i) is that the child with special needs be a resident of the school district in which the child is seeking free appropriate education. As we have held, Danyun Walker is a resident of Craven County. Accordingly, based on G.S. 115C-110(i), we conclude that Danyun Walker is entitled to a free appropriate education in Craven County, North Carolina.\nThis conclusion is consistent with the policies motivating enactment of Chapter 115C, Article 9. We have recognized that Chapter 115C, Article 9 was enacted in accordance with the federal \u201cEducation for All Handicapped Children Act\u201d of 1975, which is now entitled the \u201cIndividuals with Disabilities Education Act\u201d (\u201cIDEA\u201d). Beaufort County Schools v. Roach, 114 N.C. App. 330, 335, 443 S.E.2d 339, 341, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 602, 447 S.E.2d 384, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 130 L.Ed. 2d 398 (1994). The IDEA created a \u201cstate grant program to aid states in educating handicapped children.\u201d Id. The IDEA \u201crequires all states receiving funds under [the IDEA] to provide a \u2018free appropriate public education\u2019 for all children with disabilities in the state.\u201d Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. 1412 (1988)). As we recognized, \u201cNorth Carolina receives funds under the [IDEA] and is, therefore, required to provide a free appropriate public education to children with disabilities living in the State.\u201d Roach, 114 N.C. App. at 335, 443 S.E.2d at 342. For the reasons stated, the decision of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge ARNOLD and Judge MARTIN, John C., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Henderson, Baxter & Alford, P.A, by David S. Henderson, for petitioner-appellant.", "Pamlico Sound Legal Services, by Jack Hansel, for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CRAVEN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Petitioner v. VIRGINIA WILLOUGHBY, Respondent\nNo. COA95-155\n(Filed 6 February 1996)\n1. Domicil and Residence \u00a7 9 (NCI4th)\u2014 child living in Craven County with grandmother \u2014 child resident but not domiciliary\nBy virtue of his living either temporarily or permanently with his grandmother, respondent, in Craven County, the child in question was a legal resident of Craven County so long as he continued to live there, but he was not a domiciliary of the county because his mother lived in Florida, and an unemancipated child may not establish a domicile different from his parents.\nAm Jur 2d, Domicil \u00a7 41.\nSeparate domicil of mother as affecting domicil or residence of infant. 13 ALR2d 306.\n2. Domicil and Residence \u00a7 9 (NCI4th); Schools \u00a7 112 (NCI4th)\u2014 resident child not domiciliary \u2014 special needs child \u2014 right to free appropriate education\nA resident child with special needs need not be a domiciliary in order to receive a free appropriate education; therefore, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-110(i), respondent\u2019s grandchild who lived with her in Craven County was entitled to a free appropriate education in that county.\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7 220.\nAppeal by petitioner from judgment entered 4 August 1994 by Judge James E. Ragan, III, in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 November 1995.\nRespondent, Virginia Willoughby, is the maternal grandmother of Danyun Walker who is a sixteen-year-old \u201cchild with special needs.\u201d Until the summer of 1993, Danyun Walker had lived with his mother, Queenie Walker, in Duval County, Florida. In Florida, Danyun had been treated as a child with special needs by the Duval County public school system, and he accordingly received a free and appropriate education.\nAfter school was over for the day in Florida, Danyun\u2019s brother would care for Danyun until Ms. Walker was able to come home from her job at Blue Cross/Blue Shield. This care-giving arrangement was important because Danyun required almost constant care, and because Ms. Walker\u2019s job was essential to the family\u2019s economic welfare. Danyun\u2019s brother, however, graduated from high school in 1993 and was no longer able to help care for Danyun.\nTo ensure that Danyun received all necessary care, respondent grandmother and Danyun\u2019s mother agreed that Danyun would live in Craven County, North Carolina, with respondent. Respondent grandmother then applied on Danyun\u2019s behalf for his admission to Craven County Schools for the fall 1993 term as a child with special needs. The school administration denied Danyun\u2019s application asserting that Danyun was neither a resident nor a domiciliary of North Carolina. Respondent pursued no further administrative procedures before the Board of Education; instead, on 20 October 1993, respondent initiated this action before the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to G.S. 150B-23. Respondent\u2019s complaint alleged (1) that Danyun was a resident of Craven County, North Carolina, (2) that respondent acts in the role \u201cas a parent,\u201d and (3) that by refusing to enroll Danyun in public school, the Board was denying Danyun the free appropriate education to which he is entitled. Petitioner in its answer moved to dismiss respondent\u2019s claim alleging that Danyun was neither a resident nor a domiciliary and alleging that respondent had no standing to maintain this action on Danyun\u2019s behalf.\nOn 3 December 1993, respondent\u2019s claim was heard before Chief Administrative Law Judge Julian Mann, III. On 17 December 1993, Judge Mann rendered a written decision in respondent\u2019s favor. Petitioner then filed for an appeal before a Hearing Review Officer pursuant to G.S. 115C-116. On 18 January 1994, the Hearing Review Officer, Dr. Joe D. Walters, decided that Danyun was entitled to a free appropriate education in the Craven County public schools. Petitioner then appealed to the Superior Court of Craven County. After hearing on 5 July 1994, Superior Court Judge James E. Ragan, III, entered judgement in favor of respondent.\nPetitioner appeals.\nHenderson, Baxter & Alford, P.A, by David S. Henderson, for petitioner-appellant.\nPamlico Sound Legal Services, by Jack Hansel, for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0495-01", "first_page_order": 529, "last_page_order": 534 }