{
  "id": 11918408,
  "name": "THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, Plaintiff v AREANDA WEAVER, THAD A. THRONEBURG, and CAUDLE & SPEARS, P.A., a North Carolina Corporation, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina Department of Human Resources v. Weaver",
  "decision_date": "1996-02-06",
  "docket_number": "No. COA94-1426",
  "first_page": "517",
  "last_page": "520",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "121 N.C. App. 517"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges JOHNSON and WALKER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, Plaintiff v AREANDA WEAVER, THAD A. THRONEBURG, and CAUDLE & SPEARS, P.A., a North Carolina Corporation, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff\u2019s motions regarding the interpretation of G.S. 108A-57 because plaintiff contends that G.S. 108A-57 limits attorney\u2019s fees for private attorneys recovering from a third party on behalf of a medicaid beneficiary to one-third of the gross recovery. We disagree with plaintiff\u2019s construction of the statute and affirm.\nWhen a person accepts medical assistance through the Department of Human Resources, Division of Medical Assistance, the person assigns to the State the right to any third party benefits the person may subsequently recover. G.S. 108A-59(a). However, G.S. 108A-57 provides in part:\n(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law, to the extent of payments under this Part, the State, or the county providing medical assistance benefits, shall be subrogated to all rights of recovery, contractual or otherwise, of the beneficiary of such assistance, or of his personal representative, his heirs, or the administrator or executor of his estate, against any person. It shall be the responsibility of the county attorney or an attorney retained by the county and/or the State or an attorney retained by the beneficiary of the assistance if such attorney has actual notice of payments made under this Part to enforce this section, and said attorney shall be compensated for his services in accordance with the attorneys\u2019 fee arrangements approved by the Department; provided, however, that any attorney retained by the beneficiary of the assistance shall be compensated for his services in accordance with the following schedule and in the following order of priority from any amount obtained on behalf of the beneficiary by settlement with, judgment against, or otherwise from a third party by reason of such injury or death:\n(1) First to the payment of any court costs taxed by the judgment;\n(2) Second to the payment of the fee of the attorney representing the beneficiary making the settlement or obtaining the judgment, but this fee shall not exceed one-third of the amount obtained or recovered to which the right of subrogation applies;\n(3) Third to the payment of the amount of assistance received by the beneficiary as prorated with other claims against the amount obtained or received from the third party to which the right of subrogation applies, but the amount shall not exceed one third of the amount obtained or recovered to which the right of subrogation applies; and\n(4) Fourth to the payment of any amount remaining to the beneficiary or his personal representative.\nContrary to plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of G.S. 108A-57, the plain language of the statute does not provide that the State is subrogated to all rights of recovery to the extent of all money a medical assistance beneficiary receives. The first sentence of G.S. 108A-57(a) only provides that the State is subrogated to all rights of recovery of the beneficiary of medical assistance \u201cto the extent of payments under this Part [i.e. Part 6, entitled Medical Assistance Program].\u201d (Emphasis added.) It follows that defendant Caudle & Spears lawfully took one-third of the \u201cmedicaid lien\u201d as part of its attorney\u2019s fee because G.S. 108A-57(a)(2) provides that the attorney\u2019s fee shall not exceed one-third of the amount recovered \u201cto which the right of sub-rogation applies.\u201d Here, defendant Caudle & Spears received as its fee representing defendant Weaver in her medical malpractice claim one-third of the gross recovery and received in addition one-third of the \u201cmedicaid lien\u201d amount payable to plaintiff pursuant to G.S. 108A-57. The statute does not govern a private attorney\u2019s fee arrangement with its client. The statute regulates the amount of the attorney\u2019s fee only as it relates to the amount of the \u201cmedicaid lien\u201d payable to plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied plaintiff\u2019s motions regarding the interpretation of G.S. 108A-57.\nBecause we conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants, we need not address defendants\u2019 cross-assignment of error.\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHNSON and WALKER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EAGLES, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Elizabeth L. Oxley, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Wyrick, Robbins, Yates & Ponton, by Lee M. Whitman, for defendant-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, Plaintiff v AREANDA WEAVER, THAD A. THRONEBURG, and CAUDLE & SPEARS, P.A., a North Carolina Corporation, Defendants\nNo. COA94-1426\n(Filed 6 February 1996)\nSocial Services and Public Welfare \u00a7 27 (NCI4th)\u2014 \u201cmedicaid lien\u201d \u2014 one-third as attorney\u2019s fees \u2014 statutory authority\nThere was no merit to plaintiffs contention that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 108A-57 limits attorney\u2019s fees for private attorneys recovering from a third party on behalf of a medicaid beneficiary to one-third of the gross recovery, since the plain language of the statute does not provide that the State is subrogated to all rights of recovery to the extent of all money a medical assistance beneficiary received, but provides only that the State is subrogated to all rights of recovery of the beneficiary of medical assistance \u201cto the extent of payments under this Part\u201d; therefore, defendant law firm lawfully took one-third of a \u201cmedicaid lien\u201d as part of its attorney\u2019s fee because the statute provides that the attorney\u2019s fee shall not exceed one-third of the amount recovered \u201cto which the right to subrogation applies.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Welfare Laws \u00a7\u00a7 38-41.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 20 October 1994 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 October 1995.\nAreanda Weaver (hereinafter defendant Weaver) received $36,026.54 in Medicaid benefits through the Department of Human Resources, Division of Medical Assistance (hereinafter plaintiff). Thereafter, the law firm of Caudle & Spears (hereinafter defendant Caudle & Spears) represented defendant Weaver in her medical malpractice claim against defendant Weaver\u2019s physician for failure to diagnose her Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Defendant Caudle & Spears recovered $1,000,000 on behalf of defendant Weaver. The firm received one-third of this amount as its attorney\u2019s fee for representing defendant Weaver in her malpractice claim against her physician.\nOn 4 August 1992, defendant Caudle & Spears sent plaintiff a check for $24,017.69 and stated in an accompanying letter that the check \u201crepresented] payment of [the] medicaid lien minus our 1/3 attorney\u2019s fee of $12,008.85.\u201d Plaintiff demanded that defendant Caudle & Spears remit the $12,008.85 to plaintiff, claiming that defendant Caudle & Spears did not have the right to attorney\u2019s fees from the amount of the \u201cmedicaid lien.\u201d After defendant Caudle & Spears did not remit the money, plaintiff sued defendants to recover the money. Defendants answered plaintiff\u2019s complaint and included three defenses. First, defendants stated that plaintiff had agreed to pay the $12,008.85 in attorney\u2019s fees and that the agreement constituted a bar and estoppel of plaintiff\u2019s claim. Second, defendants pled accord and satisfaction in defense of plaintiff\u2019s claim. Finally, defendants pled G.S. 108A-57 as a bar to plaintiff\u2019s claim, stating that the statute allowed defendant Caudle & Spears to retain one-third of the \u201cmedicaid lien\u201d as attorney\u2019s fees.\nOn 28 September 1994, defendants made motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff then made cross-motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s motions with respect to the first and second defenses set forth in defendants\u2019 answer, but denied the remainder of plaintiff\u2019s motions. Correspondingly, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions as to the first and second defenses but granted defendants\u2019 motions regarding the application of G.S. 108A-57.\nPlaintiff appeals the entry of partial summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings for defendants. Defendants cross-assign error to the trial court\u2019s partial grant of plaintiff\u2019s motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Elizabeth L. Oxley, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWyrick, Robbins, Yates & Ponton, by Lee M. Whitman, for defendant-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0517-01",
  "first_page_order": 551,
  "last_page_order": 554
}