{ "id": 11918466, "name": "RENEE JOHNSON JONES, Plaintiff v. PRUITT HERBERT JONES, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Jones", "decision_date": "1996-02-06", "docket_number": "No. COA95-32", "first_page": "523", "last_page": "526", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 N.C. App. 523" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 ALR4th 481", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "56 ALR4th 12", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 644770 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/188/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2565730, 2564201, 2566281, 2561236, 2562006 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0174-04", "/nc/323/0174-01", "/nc/323/0174-05", "/nc/323/0174-03", "/nc/323/0174-02" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522291 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537090, 2535435, 2534187, 2537979, 2538428 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0781-03", "/nc/336/0781-02", "/nc/336/0781-05", "/nc/336/0781-01", "/nc/336/0781-04" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524447 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)(12)" }, { "page": "(c)(lla)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168525 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917138 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5020", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 367, "char_count": 6838, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.887802655666277e-07, "percentile": 0.8440756584650302 }, "sha256": "129ccb061b9d127e67d688142c0df68cf10f54778e8116882ab04bf6e2dd48ed", "simhash": "1:037ec722950e5dd6", "word_count": 1073 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge ARNOLD and Judge LEWIS concur." ], "parties": [ "RENEE JOHNSON JONES, Plaintiff v. PRUITT HERBERT JONES, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nPlaintiff and defendant separated on 12 September 1987. A decree of absolute divorce was entered on 3 March 1992. Following a hearing on 23 November 1993, the trial court entered a judgment and order of equitable distribution from which defendant appeals.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in its treatment of defendant\u2019s VA loan eligibility. The evidence showed that plaintiff and defendant used defendant\u2019s VA loan eligibility to obtain a VA loan which was applied toward the purchase of the marital residence. The VA loan obligation at the time of the purchase was greater than the purchase price of the residence. Defendant contended at the hearing that the VA loan eligibility was his separate property and that since \u201cat the date of separation the only value to the residence was the VA loan,\u201d the court was required to distribute the residence to him in order to restore his separate property to him. The trial court rejected defendant\u2019s contention, finding that defendant\u2019s VA loan eligibility did not qualify as property subject to distribution.\nIn his attempt to persuade us that the VA loan eligibility constitutes his separate property, defendant argues that since military pensions are considered distributable property under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5020(b), his VA loan eligibility is, by analogy, also distributable property. However, we find that military pensions are distinguishable from the \u201cproperty interest\u201d claimed by defendant here. A military pension is a quantifiable, legally enforceable property interest. In contrast, defendant\u2019s VA loan eligibility in itself created no enforceable right in defendant other than the right to apply for a VA loan. In order to receive a loan, defendant still had to qualify for such a loan. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant\u2019s VA loan eligibility did not constitute distributable property for purposes of equitable distribution.\nDefendant further contended at the hearing that if the court declined to classify his VA loan eligibility as his separate property, the court should find that it was a distributional factor justifying an unequal division of marital property in defendant\u2019s favor. The court considered defendant\u2019s contention but found that the use of defendant\u2019s VA loan eligibility to purchase the marital residence did not constitute a factor warranting an unequal division of marital assets since qualification for the VA loan was based on both parties\u2019 financial contributions to the marriage. The trial court has broad discretion in evaluating and applying the statutory distributional factors and will not be reversed absent a showing that its decision is manifestly unsupported by reason. Leighow v. Leighow, 120 N.C. App. 619, 622, 463 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1995). Defendant has made no such showing here.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant claims the trial court erred by ordering an unequal division of the marital property in favor of plaintiff. We disagree. The decision whether to divide the marital estate equally or unequally is entirely within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and the trial court\u2019s decision in this regard can be disturbed only if a clear abuse of that discretion has occurred. Harris v. Harris, 84 N.C. App. 353, 358, 352 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1987). Furthermore, the finding of a single distributional factor under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c) may support an unequal division. Judkins v. Judkins, 113 N.C. App. 734, 741, 441 S.E.2d 139, 143, review denied, 336 N.C. 781, 447 S.E.2d 424 (1994). Here, the trial court made thorough findings regarding the statutory distributional factors, including those argued by the parties under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c)(12). The court found that \u201c[plaintiff\u2019s contributions towards the mortgage, homeowners insurance, property taxes, maintenance and preservation of the marital residence do constitute factors for an unequal division\u201d in favor of plaintiff. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c)(lla) (1992 and Cum. Supp. 1994). The court then found and concluded that an equal division of marital assets was not equitable. Defendant has shown no abuse of discretion relative to this finding and conclusion.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not supported by the evidence. A careful review of defendant\u2019s brief reveals that this assignment has already been addressed in defendant\u2019s second assignment of error where he challenges the court\u2019s findings and conclusions regarding the proper distribution of the marital estate. We have already determined that the trial court did not err in this regard. To the extent defendant\u2019s third assignment of error challenges the values assigned by the court to various items of marital property, suffice it to say that the trial court\u2019s findings as to the valuation of the marital property were supported by competent evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. See Mishler v. Mishler, 90 N.C. App. 72, 74, 367 S.E.2d 385, 386, review denied, 323 N.C. 174, 373 S.E.2d 111 (1988).\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge ARNOLD and Judge LEWIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "No brief for plaintiff-appellee.", "Mary K. Nicholson for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RENEE JOHNSON JONES, Plaintiff v. PRUITT HERBERT JONES, Defendant\nNo. COA95-32\n(Filed 6 February 1996)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 112 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 VA loan eligibility \u2014 no distributional factor\nDefendant husband\u2019s VA loan eligibility did not constitute distributable property for purposes of equitable distribution; furthermore, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant\u2019s VA loan eligibility was not a distributional factor justifying an unequal division of marital property in defendant\u2019s favor.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 878, 897.\nDivorce: excessiveness or adequacy of trial court\u2019s property award \u2014 modern cases. 56 ALR4th 12.\n2. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 151 (NCI4th)\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 plaintiffs contributions to marital home \u2014 unequal division of property \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiff wife\u2019s contributions toward the mortgage, insurance, taxes, maintenance, and preservation of the marital residence constituted factors for an unequal division in her favor and in concluding that an equal division of marital assets was not equitable.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7 870, 903.\nDivorce: equitable distribution doctrine. 41 ALR4th 481.\nDivorce: excessiveness or adequacy of trial court\u2019s property award \u2014 modern cases. 56 ALR4th 12.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment and order entered out of session 28 June 1994, nunc pro tunc 16 June 1994, by Judge Joseph E. Turner in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 1996.\nNo brief for plaintiff-appellee.\nMary K. Nicholson for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0523-01", "first_page_order": 557, "last_page_order": 560 }