{ "id": 11919488, "name": "KIMBERLY J. PASTVA, Individually and as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF DAVID S. PASTVA and JOSEPH W. HENZLER, Plaintiff-Appellants v. NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., d/b/a FAIRWAY OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Pastva v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc.", "decision_date": "1996-03-05", "docket_number": "No. COA95-483", "first_page": "656", "last_page": "662", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 N.C. App. 656" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "9 ALR4th 778", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "96 ALR3d 1064", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "not sufficient to merely allege elements of claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520430 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129", "parenthetical": "not sufficient to merely allege elements of claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555838 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527191 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612", "parenthetical": "\"complaint must. . . state enough to give the substantive elements of a legally recognized claim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516944 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "\"complaint must. . . state enough to give the substantive elements of a legally recognized claim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121342 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795996 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790083, 790182, 790069, 790070, 790172 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0359-05", "/nc/340/0359-02", "/nc/340/0359-01", "/nc/340/0359-03", "/nc/340/0359-04" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" }, { "page": "852", "parenthetical": "reversing dismissal of Woodson claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918154 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796131, 795974, 795947, 795925, 795897 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0190-03", "/nc/342/0190-01", "/nc/342/0190-05", "/nc/342/0190-02", "/nc/342/0190-04" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914421 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749409 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4780326, 4777709, 4778478, 4779983, 4776954 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0334-03", "/nc/317/0334-02", "/nc/317/0334-05", "/nc/317/0334-01", "/nc/317/0334-04" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570211, 8570083, 8570149, 8570194, 8570168 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0395-05", "/nc/305/0395-01", "/nc/305/0395-02", "/nc/305/0395-04", "/nc/305/0395-03" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526858 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 184", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166005 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197", "parenthetical": "Stewart, J., concurring" }, { "page": "1683", "parenthetical": "Stewart, J., concurring" }, { "parenthetical": "Stewart, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 725", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193706 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "Stevens, J., concurring" }, { "page": "2672", "parenthetical": "Stevens, J., concurring" }, { "parenthetical": "Stevens, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "WYNN, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527535 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "WYNN, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796026 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795931 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548756 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790083, 790182, 790069, 790070, 790172 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0359-05", "/nc/340/0359-02", "/nc/340/0359-01", "/nc/340/0359-03", "/nc/340/0359-04" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918154 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0328-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 758, "char_count": 14345, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.548800712634275e-07, "percentile": 0.8851629959893415 }, "sha256": "68e88b62c85a5b15bac5540475042c8f7e79ce7e31116fd2b147581fa207f5af", "simhash": "1:83a1441a449f36de", "word_count": 2287 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge WYNN concurs with separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "KIMBERLY J. PASTVA, Individually and as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF DAVID S. PASTVA and JOSEPH W. HENZLER, Plaintiff-Appellants v. NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., d/b/a FAIRWAY OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, Defendant-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nKimberly Pastva, individually and as administratrix of the estate of David Pastva, and Joseph Henzler (plaintiffs), appeal an order granting Naegele Outdoor Advertising Inc., d/b/a Fairway Outdoor Advertising (defendant), its motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\nPlaintiffs allege that: (1) they were employees of the defendant; (2) they were instructed by the defendant to work on a particular billboard; (3) the billboard collapsed causing injuries to the plaintiffs; (4) the collapse was caused by a structural failure of critical components of the billboard; (5) the structural failure was caused in part by the defendant\u2019s use of improper components and in part by improperly moving the billboard; (6) the defendant did not perform any inspections on the billboard; (7) the defendant did not provide any training in workplace safety; (8) the defendant had actual knowledge that the billboard was unsafe and dangerous immediately before it collapsed; (9) defendant had been cited and fined numerous times by governmental authorities for workplace safety violations; (10) subsequent to the collapse of the billboard, the defendant was cited for failing to furnish a place of employment free of recognized hazards; (11) subsequent to the collapse, the defendant acknowledged that the collapse would not have occurred but for the defendant\u2019s \u201cacts, conduct and omissions\u201d with regard to the billboard; and (12) the acts and omissions of the defendant constituted \u201cintentional conduct which [defendant knew was substantially certain to cause serious injury or death.\u201d\nThe issue is whether plaintiffs\u2019 complaint sufficiently states a claim pursuant to Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).\nOur legislature has provided that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for employees injured in a workplace accident. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-9; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-10.1 (1991). There are four exceptions to this general rule: (1) an injured employee may maintain a tort action against a co-employee for intentional injury, Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 128, 284 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982); (2) an injured employee may maintain a tort action against his employer for intentional injury, Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 488, 340 S.E.2d 116, 120, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986); (3) an injured employee may maintain a tort action against a co-employee for his \u201cwillful, wanton and reckless negligence,\u201d Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 716, 325 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1985); and (4) an injured employee may maintain a tort action against his employer if the \u201cemployer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct.\u201d Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340, 407 S.E.2d at 228. \u201cSubstantial certainty\u201d \u201cis more than the \u2018mere possibility\u2019 or \u2018substantial probability\u2019 of serious injury or death,\u201d Arroyo v. Scottie\u2019s Professional Window Cleaning, 120 N.C. App. 154, 159, 461 S.E.2d 13, 16, disc. rev. allowed, 342 N.C. 190, 463 S.E.2d 231, quoting Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Prods., 118 N.C. App. 328, 331, 454 S.E.2d 849, 852, disc. rev. denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 189 (1995), but is something less than \u201cactual certainty.\u201d Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 110, 463 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1995).\nA complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):\nwhen one or more of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) when on its face the complaint reveals no law supports plaintiffs claim; (2) when on its face the complaint reveals the absence of fact sufficient to make a good claim; and (3) when some fact disclosed in the complaint necessarily defeats plaintiffs claim.\nJohnson v. Bollinger, 86 N.C. App. 1, 4, 356 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1987). Thus, a complaint is sufficient \u201cwhere no \u2018insurmountable bar\u2019 to recovery appears on the face of the complaint and the complaint\u2019s allegations give adequate notice of the nature and extent of the claim.\u201d Id. Notice of the nature and extent of the claim is adequate if the complaint contains \u201csufficient information to outline the elements of [the] claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist.\u201d 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 1357, at 340 (2d ed. 1990); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 205, 367 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1988) (\u201ccomplaint must. . . state enough to give the substantive elements of a legally recognized claim\u201d), appeal after remand, 101 N.C. App. 1, 398 S.E.2d 889 (1990), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 329 N.C. 646, 407 S.E.2d 178 (1991); Bynum v. Fredrickson Motor Express Corp., 112 N.C. App. 125, 129, 434 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1993) (not sufficient to merely allege elements of claim). The elements of a Woodson claim are: (1) misconduct by the employer; (2) intentionally engaged in; (3) with the knowledge that the misconduct is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to an employee; and (4) that employee is injured as a consequence of the misconduct. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.\nThe defendant argues that the complaint in this case does not allege sufficient facts to support a Woodson claim. We disagree. The complaint does not reveal an insurmountable bar to recovery and the allegations provide adequate notice of the nature and extent of the claim. The allegations of misconduct, particularly the directing of the plaintiffs to work on the billboard after notice of its dangerous condition, are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that each of the four elements of the Woodson claim exist. See Regan, 118 N.C. App at 331, 454 S.E.2d at 852 (reversing dismissal of Woodson claim).\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge WYNN concurs with separate opinion.\n. The Supreme Court has justified treating tort actions against co-employees different from tort actions against employers on the grounds that co-employees \u201cdo not finance or otherwise directly participate in workers\u2019 compensation programs; employers, on the other hand, do.\u201d Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Wynn\nconcurring.\nI agree with the majority that this matter should be returned to the trial court because the pleadings allege sufficient facts to overcome a 12(b)(6) motion. However, the opportunity should not be lost to point out the continuing dilemma faced by our trial judges and litigators in trying to assess what is needed to set forth a Woodson claim.\nIn all candor, plaintiff\u2019s victory may be short lived. In the four occasions that our Supreme Court has applied Woodson, the Court has not recognized a claim that would survive pretrial dismissal. In Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 239, 424 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1993), the Supreme Court upheld a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal finding that plaintiffs allegations did not rise to the level of negligence defined in Woodson. Most recently in the trilogy of Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 343 N.C. 103, 463 S.E.2d 206 (1995); Powell v. S & G Prestress Co., 342 N.C. 182, 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995); and, Echols v. Zarn, Inc., 342 N.C. 184, 463 S.E.2d 228 (1995), the Supreme Court found that the claimants had failed to forecast evidence sufficient to set forth a Woodson claim and thus concluded that summary judgment was properly allowed in each case. Significantly, our Supreme Court rejected the Restatement of Tort\u2019s bomb throwing example as an analogy for defining \u201csubstantial certainty,\u201d explicitly finding that example defined \u201cactual certainty\u201d which is not required for a successful claim under the Woodson exception. Mickles, 342 N.C. at 110, 463 S.E.2d at 211.\nIn short, since creating the Woodson exception, the Court has consistently pointed out facts that do not establish a Woodson claim. However, it remains an uncertainty as to what facts do allege a Woodson claim sufficient to overcome pretrial dismissal.\nAt this point, as candidly recognized by the counsels during oral argument, we have the Woodson facts and nothing else. As I have stated previously, \u201c[a]fter establishing the \u2018substantial certainty\u2019 standard, the Woodson Court did not further define it, except as it found the Woodson facts met it.\u201d Powell v. S & G Prestress Co., 114 N.C. App. 319, 328, 442 S.E.2d 143, 148 (1994) (WYNN, J., dissenting), aff'd, 342 N.C. 182, 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995). This in effect means that \u201cthe Woodson facts provide the authoritative understanding of \u2018substantial certainty\u2019 . . . .\u201d See Id. The problem with this approach is borne out by the difficulty in finding facts that match those in Woodson. That is why we have a continuing dilemma \u2014 trial advocates are called upon to compare the facts in their case with those in Woodson, rather than seeking a determination of whether their particular facts meet the definition of \u201csubstantial certainty,\u201d irrespective of the Woodson facts. The better approach would be to set forth a more articulate standard of law which would lend itself to an application of facts needed to overcome pretrial dismissal.\nTo be sure, even the Woodson facts appear to set forth conduct which could be construed as intentional. Whether the Supreme Court has really created a separate exception by the use of the language \u201csubstantial certainty\u201d remains to be seen. In any event, the paradox put to trial judges and litigators and eventually to this Court, could easily be remedied by a decisive directive opinion from our Supreme Court. In addition to clarifying the meaning of the term \u201csubstantial certainty,\u201d guidance could be gained from articulating factors that the trial court should consider in determining if the evidence is sufficient to be submitted to the jury, e.g., whether there were Federal and State Occupational Safety and Health Acts (OSHA) citations prior to the accident and if so, did the employer respond appropriately; whether the employer willfully failed to enforce either its own safety guidelines or safety measures required by OSHA; whether the employer willfully circumvented specified manufacturer\u2019s safety rules; whether the employer through its supervising personnel had knowledge of the dangerous condition; whether the employer willfully failed to provide adequate safety training for inexperienced personnel; whether the employer was aware that the failure to use safety equipment created an inherently dangerous condition that would be substantially certain to lead to death or great injury; whether the employer required the worker to work without necessary safety equipment; whether the employer encouraged and permitted non-compliance with the safety rules among its employees; etc.\nIn the alternative, our Supreme Court could revisit Woodson and declare that the employer\u2019s conduct in that case was indeed intentional conduct \u2014 an already established exception to the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act.\nRegardless of which approach is taken, any direction is better than the uncertainty that currently exists with the state of the law on this issue. To paraphrase an observation made by Justice Stevens in a different context, one need not use Justice Stewart\u2019s classic definition of obscenity \u2014 \u201cI know it when I see it\u201d \u2014 as an ultimate determinate of what is sufficient to allege a Woodson claim.\n. Our Supreme Court has let stand a reversal by this Court of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the grounds that sufficient facts were alleged by a claimant to set forth a Woodson claim. See Regan v. Amerimark Building Products, Inc. 118 N.C. App. 328, 454 S.E.2d 849, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 189 (1995).\n. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2672, 77 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).\n. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Judge Wynn" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donaldson & Horsley, P.A., by Jeffrey K. Peraldo, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Pinto, Coates & Kyre, L.L.P., by Paul D. Coates and David L. Brown, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KIMBERLY J. PASTVA, Individually and as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF DAVID S. PASTVA and JOSEPH W. HENZLER, Plaintiff-Appellants v. NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., d/b/a FAIRWAY OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, Defendant-Appellee\nNo. COA95-483\n(Filed 5 March 1996)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 62 (NCI4th)\u2014 Woodson v. Rowland claim \u2014 sufficiency of complaint\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint was sufficient to state a claim under Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, where it alleged that plaintiffs were employees of defendant who were instructed by defendant to work on a particular billboard which collapsed causing them injury; the collapse was caused by a structural failure of critical components of the billboard; the structural failure was caused in part by defendant\u2019s use of improper components and in part by improperly moving the billboard; defendant did not perform any inspections on the billboard and did not provide any training in workplace safety; defendant had actual knowledge that the billboard was unsafe and dangerous immediately before it collapsed; defendant had been cited and fined numerous times by governmental authorities for workplace safety violations; subsequent to the collapse, defendant was cited for failing to furnish a place of employment free of recognized hazards; subsequent to the collapse defendant acknowledged that the collapse would not have occurred but for defendant\u2019s acts, conduct and omissions with regard to the billboard; and the acts and omissions of defendant constituted intentional conduct which defendant knew was substantially certain to cause serious injury or death.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 75-80.\nWhat conduct is willful, intentional, or deliberate within workmen\u2019s compensation act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct. 96 ALR3d 1064.\nEmployer\u2019s tort liability to worker for concealing workplace hazard or nature or extent of injury. 9 ALR4th 778.\nJudge Wynn concurring.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 8 March 1995 in Guilford County Superior Court by Judge James E. Ragan. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 February 1996.\nDonaldson & Horsley, P.A., by Jeffrey K. Peraldo, for plaintiff-appellants.\nPinto, Coates & Kyre, L.L.P., by Paul D. Coates and David L. Brown, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0656-01", "first_page_order": 690, "last_page_order": 696 }