{ "id": 11919771, "name": "MARGIE S. PULLEY, Employee, Plaintiff v. CITY OF DURHAM, Self-Insured Employer, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Pulley v. City of Durham", "decision_date": "1996-03-05", "docket_number": "No. COA95-365", "first_page": "688", "last_page": "694", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 N.C. App. 688" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "97 ALR3d 161", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "66 ALR2d 1082", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525105 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723558, 4724691, 4730039, 4730552, 4729849 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0631-05", "/nc/320/0631-03", "/nc/320/0631-04", "/nc/320/0631-01", "/nc/320/0631-02" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170146 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565283 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981)" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "369-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707972 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981)" }, { "page": "93-94" }, { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 S.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2399854, 2401808, 2396509, 2399198, 2403167 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0743-02", "/nc/310/0743-01", "/nc/310/0743-05", "/nc/310/0743-04", "/nc/310/0743-03" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" }, { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525640 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" }, { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551366 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" }, { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522900 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527201 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0478-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 645, "char_count": 14959, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7237672967577845e-07, "percentile": 0.7043314108274266 }, "sha256": "32e41ba55cdf0c2234704cb6fb78f062797bee0769808b48c54c089598e39901", "simhash": "1:24584f8a627f7256", "word_count": 2272 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:48.563497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, John C., and MARTIN, Mark D., concur." ], "parties": [ "MARGIE S. PULLEY, Employee, Plaintiff v. CITY OF DURHAM, Self-Insured Employer, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nI.\nDefendant argues that the Full Commission erred in overruling the deputy commissioner because the Full Commission did not rehear the evidence. When the Full Commission reviews a deputy commissioner\u2019s award, the Full Commission may \u201cdetermine the case from the written transcript of the hearing before the deputy commissioner\u201d and the entire record of the proceedings. Joyner v. Rocky Mount Mills, 92 N.C. App. 478, 482, 374 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1988). \u201cAlternatively, the full Commission shall reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, or rehear the parties or their representatives \u2018if good ground be shown therefor.\u2019 \u201d Crump v. Independence Nissan, 112 N.C. App. 587, 589, 436 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1993), quoting G.S. 97-85. The Full Commission\u2019s determination of the existence of \u201cgood ground\u201d will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the Full Commission manifestly abused its discretion. Crump, 112 N.C. App. at 589, 436 S.E.2d at 592.\nHere, the Full Commission reconsidered the evidence after determining that \u201cgood ground\u201d existed. Defendant has not argued that the Full Commission abused its discretion in deciding to reconsider the evidence. Instead, defendant argues that the Full Commission should have reheard the evidence. Defendant cites no law to support its position. In fact, as we stated, supra, the law is clear that the Full Commission does not have to rehear the evidence. If the Full Commission finds \u201cgood ground,\u201d it may also choose to reconsider the evidence or receive further evidence. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument fails.\nDefendant also argues that the Full Commission erred in overruling the deputy commissioner\u2019s opinion because the Full Commission did not make findings of fact regarding the credibility of Dr. Hostetter\u2019s and Dr. Ziel\u2019s testimony. It is well-established that the Full Commission \u201cmay adopt, modify, or reject the findings of fact of the Hearing Commissioner, and in doing so may weigh the evidence and make its own determination as to the weight and credibility of the evidence.\u201d Hollar v. Furniture Co., 48 N.C. App. 489, 497, 269 S.E.2d 667, 672 (1980). Here, the Full Commission found inter alia:\n20. Hendey Hostetter first testified by way of deposition in this matter on July 23, 1991. At the time of her initial testimony, Hendey Hostetter testified that during the first several years of her treatment of plaintiff \u201cit was not extremely clear what the cause of the stressors were.\u201d Dr. Hostetter testified that plaintiff was disabled and had been so since 1984 as a result of depression and post-traumatic syndrome. When asked the causes of the depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome, Dr. Hostetter testified at extreme length concerning a number of factors, all of which were related to plaintiffs job.\n22. Dr. Zeil [sic] testified by way of deposition on July 25, 1991. Dr. Zeil [sic] based her testimony upon her sessions with plaintiff and information she had received from Hendey Hostetter in the period shortly before the deposition. Dr. Zeil [sic] felt plaintiffs employment as a public safety officer for the city of Durham significantly contributed to her development of depression. Dr. Zeil [sic] further testified there is a recognizable link between the nature of police work and increased risk of contracting depression. Dr. Zeil [sic] felt plaintiffs work was causally connected to plaintiffs depression.\n23. Plaintiffs depression was causally connected to the stressors of her work.\nWe conclude that these findings of fact adequately show that the Full Commission found Dr. Hostetter\u2019s and Dr. Ziel\u2019s testimony credible.\nNevertheless, defendant also argues that the Full Commission erred in relying on Dr. Hostetter\u2019s and Dr. Ziel\u2019s testimony because their opinions were based on speculation instead of reasonable medical probability. Defendant argues that Dr. Hostetter\u2019s opinion was mere speculation because Dr. Hostetter relied in part on articles in magazines to form her opinion. Defendant also argues that Dr. Hostetter\u2019s opinion was nothing more than speculation because Dr. Hostetter had no \u201cspecialized training in dealing with police officers.\u201d \u201cAn expert witness may base his opinion upon facts within his own knowledge or upon information supplied to him by others; however, an expert is not competent to testify as to the issue of causal relation founded upon mere speculation or possibility.\u201d Ballenger v. Burris Industries, 66 N.C. App. 556, 567, 311 S.E.2d 881, 887, disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984). Here, there was competent evidence in the record to show that Dr. Hostetter based her opinion on her own observations of plaintiff, combined with her study of materials and her discussions with other professionals. Although Dr. Hostetter had no \u201cspecialized training in dealing with police officers,\u201d there was competent evidence that Dr. Hostetter had extensive experience working with women who suffer from post-traumatic stress and depression. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Dr. Hostetter\u2019s opinion was competent because it was based on \u201creasonable scientific certainty,\u201d see Ballenger, 66 N.C. App. at 567, 311 S.E.2d at 887, rather than mere speculation. We also conclude that Dr. Ziel\u2019s testimony was based on \u201creasonable scientific certainty.\u201d Dr. Ziel stated that she had clinical experience working with police officers and that she had several areas of expertise, including working with \u201ca lot of women, a lot of depression.\u201d Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument fails.\nII.\nDefendant also argues that the Full Commission\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law fail to support its judgment awarding plaintiff temporary total disability compensation benefits. To be compensable as an occupational disease pursuant to G.S. 97-53(13), the disease\nmust be (1) characteristic of persons engaged in the particular trade or occupation in which the claimant is engaged; (2) not an ordinary disease of life to which the public generally is equally exposed with those engaged in that particular trade or occupation; and (3) there must be \u201ca causal connection between the disease and the [claimant\u2019s] employment.\u201d\nRutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 93, 301 S.E.2d 359, 365 (1983) (quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981)). \u201c[T]he first two elements are satisfied if, as a matter of fact, the employment exposed the worker to a greater risk of contracting the disease than the public generally.\u201d Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 93-94, 301 S.E.2d at 365. The third element is satisfied \u201cif the employment \u2018significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease\u2019s development.\u2019 \u201d Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dept., 85 N.C. App. 540, 544, 355 S.E.2d 147, 150 (quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 631, 360 S.E.2d 86 (1987).\nOn appeal, the Full Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by competent evidence, even if there is evidence that would support contrary findings. Pollard v. Krispy Waffle, 63 N.C. App. 354, 355-56, 304 S.E.2d 762, 763 (1983). The Full Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on appeal. Id. Here, the Full Commission found that:\nThroughout [plaintiffs] employment as a Police Officer and Public Safety Officer with defendant-employer, plaintiff was involved in dealing with situations in which people were the victims of or had committed criminal acts. Plaintiff was also involved in dealing with situations involving motor vehicles, including instances of personal injury or death. During her period as an officer with the Youth Division, she was involved in dealing with minors who were either committing criminal acts or against whom criminal acts had been committed.\nThe Full Commission also made a finding of fact that \u201cDr. Zeil [sic] . . . testified there is a recognizable link between the nature of police work and increased risk of contracting depression.\u201d There is competent evidence in the record to support these findings of fact. Accordingly, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the first two elements for finding the existence of an occupational disease.\nThe Full Commission found that \u201c[w]hen asked the causes of the depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome, Dr. Hostetter testified at extreme length concerning a number of factors, all of which were related to plaintiff\u2019s job.\u201d The Full Commission also found that \u201cDr. Zeil [sic] felt plaintiffs employment as a public safety officer for the city of Durham significantly contributed to her development of depression. ... Dr. Zeil [sic] felt plaintiffs work was causally connected to plaintiffs depression.\u201d There is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support these findings of fact by the Full Commission and to satisfy the third element for establishing the existence of an occupational disease. Accordingly, we conclude that the Full Commission did not err in awarding plaintiff workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN, John C., and MARTIN, Mark D., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bryant, Patterson, Covington & Idol, P.A., by David O. Lewis, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Brooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Robert Simpson Welch, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARGIE S. PULLEY, Employee, Plaintiff v. CITY OF DURHAM, Self-Insured Employer, Defendant\nNo. COA95-365\n(Filed 5 March 1996)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 415 (NCI4th)\u2014 Full Commission not required to rehear evidence \u2014 findings regarding witnesses\u2019 credibility\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the Industrial Commission erred in overruling the deputy commissioner because the Full Commission did not rehear the evidence, or that the Full Commission erred in overruling the deputy commissioner\u2019s opinion because the Full Commission did not make findings of fact regarding the credibility of the doctors\u2019 testimony, since the law is clear that the Full Commission does not have to rehear the evidence, and the Commission made findings of fact adequate to show that it found the doctors\u2019 testimony to be credible.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 686, 687.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 390 (NCI4th)\u2014 doctors\u2019 testimony \u2014 opinions not based on speculation\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the Full Commission erred in relying on the testimony of two doctors because their opinions were based on speculation instead of reasonable medical probability, since one doctor based her opinion on her own observations of plaintiff combined with her study of materials and her discussions with other professionals, and the other doctor had clinical experience working with police officers like plaintiff and had several areas of expertise including working with women and depression.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 586, 587.\nAdmissibility of opinion evidence as to cause of death, disease, or injury. 66 ALR2d 1082.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 208 (NCI4th)\u2014 psychiatric problems of police officer \u2014 award of benefits \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe evidence was sufficient to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s judgment awarding plaintiff temporary total disability compensation benefits based on its determination that claimant suffered from emotional and psychiatric problems caused by her work as a police and public safety officer.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 339, 340.\nMental disorders as compensable under workmen\u2019s compensation acts. 97 ALR3d 161.\nAppeal by defendant from opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission filed 18 November 1994. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 January 1996.\nThis appeal arises from the Industrial Commission\u2019s award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits to a claimant based on its determination that the claimant suffered from emotional and psychiatric problems caused by her work as a police and public safety officer.\nMargie S. Pulley (hereinafter plaintiff) went to work as a police officer for the City of Durham (hereinafter defendant) in November 1975. In 1984, plaintiff began seeing Dr. Hendey Hostetter, a clinical psychologist, because plaintiff felt bad physically and was having trouble concentrating at work and handling the stresses involved \u2022with her job. During the initial visit with Dr. Hostetter, the stressors plaintiff discussed included \u201chaving recently filed bankruptcy, having day care problems for her Down\u2019s syndrome son, and her husband getting into legal problems and also leaving home periodically.\u201d Accordingly, Dr. Hostetter\u2019s initial \u201cworking hypothesis\u201d was that the primary stressors in plaintiff\u2019s life were not job-related, but instead related to plaintiff\u2019s husband and child. Dr. Hostetter diagnosed plaintiff \u201cas having a major depressive disorder with some psychotic symptoms\u201d and recommended that plaintiff take a three-month medical leave of absence. Plaintiff took three months off from work, but she then had to return to work because she had used all of her leave time. After continuing sessions with plaintiff, Dr. Hostetter changed her \u201cworking hypothesis\u201d and concluded that plaintiff\u2019s problems were \u201creally longstanding events of post traumatic stress syndrome \u2014 the post traumatic stress syndrome arising from multiple traumatic situations that she encountered as a public safety officer over a long period of time.\u201d\nPlaintiff also sought assistance from other doctors including Dr. Patricia Ziel, a specialist in psychiatry, who saw plaintiff on four separate occasions in March and April 1991 to recommend a course of treatment for plaintiff. Dr. Ziel found that plaintiffs employment as a public safety officer was causally connected to plaintiffs psychological problems.\nPlaintiff ended her employment with defendant in April 1989. Thereafter, she filed a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits for occupational stress allegedly caused by her employment with defendant. After conducting hearings regarding the case, Deputy Commissioner Roger L. Dillard, Jr. found that the testimony of Dr. Hostetter and Dr. Ziel was not credible and that plaintiff\u2019s medical records and testimony failed to show that plaintiff\u2019s condition resulted from her employment with defendant. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner denied plaintiff\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Plaintiff appealed and the Full Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s decision. The Full Commission made findings of fact that Dr. Hostetter and Dr. Ziel had testified that plaintiff\u2019s employment as a police officer significantly contributed to plaintiff\u2019s emotional problems. There was no expert opinion evidence that plaintiff\u2019s ailment was not job-related. The Full Commission then concluded that plaintiff \u201csuffered] from emotional and psychiatric disabilities causally connected to the stressors of her employment as a Public Safety Officer.\u201d\nDefendant appeals from the Full Commission\u2019s opinion awarding plaintiff temporary total disability compensation benefits.\nBryant, Patterson, Covington & Idol, P.A., by David O. Lewis, for plaintiff-appellee.\nBrooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Robert Simpson Welch, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0688-01", "first_page_order": 722, "last_page_order": 728 }