{ "id": 11915140, "name": "KATHLEEN M. LEANDRO, individually and as guardian ad litem of Robert A. Leandro; STEVEN R. SUNKEL, individually and as guardian ad litem for Andrew J. Sunkel; CLARENCE L. PENDER, individually and as guardian ad litem of Schnika N. Pender; TYRONE T. WILLIAMS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Trevelyn L. Williams; D. E. LOCKLEAR, JR., individually and as guardian ad litem of Jason E. Locklear; ANGUS B. THOMPSON, II, individually and as guardian ad litem of Vandauah J. Thompson; JENNIE G. PEARSON, individually and as guardian ad litem of Sharese D. Pearson; WAYNE TEW, individually and as guardian ad litem of Natosha L. Tew; DANA HOLTON JENKINS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Rachel M. Jenkins; FLOYD VICK, individually and as guardian ad litem of Ervin D. Vick; HOKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; HALIFAX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; ROBESON COUNTY. BOARD OF EDUCATION; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; VANCE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Plaintiff-Appellees, and CASSANDRA INGRAM, individually and as guardian ad litem of Darris Ingram; CAROL PENLAND, individually and as guardian ad litem of Jeremy Penland; DARLENE HARRIS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Shamek Harris; NETTIE THOMPSON, individually and as guardian ad litem of Annette Renee Thompson; DAVID MARTINEZ, individually and as guardian ad litem of Daniela Martinez; OPHELIA AIKEN, individually and as guardian ad litem of Brandon Bell; ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION; DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellees v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; Defendant-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Leandro v. State", "decision_date": "1996-03-19", "docket_number": "No. COA95-321", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "14", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "43 ALR4th 19", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "41 ALR3d 1220", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "11 ALR3d 780", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311-12", "parenthetical": "citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566779 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-02", "parenthetical": "citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561018 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575668 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E. 1001", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254446 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/174/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 N.C. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1955379 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1871, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/65/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4728992, 4724768, 4725943, 4730841, 4728572 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0790-04", "/nc/320/0790-02", "/nc/320/0790-03", "/nc/320/0790-01", "/nc/320/0790-05" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "435-36" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "436-37" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12128161 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 260", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601576 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "expressing the same reservations about the role of federal judges in education" }, { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "expressing the same reservations about the role of federal judges in education" }, { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523801 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556-57", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" }, { "page": "326-27" }, { "page": "183-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568484 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0324-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1087, "char_count": 33007, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.604238512286754e-07, "percentile": 0.8198035870044933 }, "sha256": "896172801a65f3905a986c2b59aa9932a95e6558924575685fd930b9ae897678", "simhash": "1:232dc07e918691d3", "word_count": 5102 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "KATHLEEN M. LEANDRO, individually and as guardian ad litem of Robert A. Leandro; STEVEN R. SUNKEL, individually and as guardian ad litem for Andrew J. Sunkel; CLARENCE L. PENDER, individually and as guardian ad litem of Schnika N. Pender; TYRONE T. WILLIAMS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Trevelyn L. Williams; D. E. LOCKLEAR, JR., individually and as guardian ad litem of Jason E. Locklear; ANGUS B. THOMPSON, II, individually and as guardian ad litem of Vandauah J. Thompson; JENNIE G. PEARSON, individually and as guardian ad litem of Sharese D. Pearson; WAYNE TEW, individually and as guardian ad litem of Natosha L. Tew; DANA HOLTON JENKINS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Rachel M. Jenkins; FLOYD VICK, individually and as guardian ad litem of Ervin D. Vick; HOKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; HALIFAX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; ROBESON COUNTY. BOARD OF EDUCATION; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; VANCE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Plaintiff-Appellees, and CASSANDRA INGRAM, individually and as guardian ad litem of Darris Ingram; CAROL PENLAND, individually and as guardian ad litem of Jeremy Penland; DARLENE HARRIS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Shamek Harris; NETTIE THOMPSON, individually and as guardian ad litem of Annette Renee Thompson; DAVID MARTINEZ, individually and as guardian ad litem of Daniela Martinez; OPHELIA AIKEN, individually and as guardian ad litem of Brandon Bell; ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION; DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellees v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; Defendant-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nAlthough denial of a motion to dismiss under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(2) is immediately appealable, Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 327, 293 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1982), denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) is ordinarily interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Id. at 326-27, 293 S.E.2d at 183-84. Pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, petition for writ of certiorari was allowed in order to review the trial court\u2019s order denying the motions to dismiss under G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6).\nThe standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is\nwhether the pleading is legally sufficient to state a cause of action. In ruling on the motion, the allegations of the complaint are treated as true, and on that basis the trial court must determine as a matter of law whether the allegations state a claim for which relief may be granted. The \u201c \u2018issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.\u2019 \u201d\nMorris v. Plyler Paper Stock Co., 89 N.C. App. 555, 556-57, 366 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1988) (citations omitted). Moreover, a 12(b)(6) motion\nis seldom appropriate \u201cin actions for declaratory judgments, and will not be allowed simply because the plaintiff may not be able to prevail.\u201d The motion is allowed only when \u201cthere is no basis for declaratory relief, as when the complaint does not allege an actual, genuine existing controversy.\u201d\nId. at 557, 366 S.E.2d at 558 (citations omitted).\nAs a preliminary matter, we recognize that education is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of state judges. See Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592, 606 (1988) (expressing the same reservations about the role of federal judges in education). Judicial intervention in educational issues is appropriate only when a constitutional right is \u201c \u2018directly and sharply implicate^].\u2019 \u201d Id., 98 L. Ed. 2d at 607 (citation omitted).\nThe State first argues that the trial court erred in denying its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff parties\u2019 claims that the school funding system violates the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d and \u201cequal opportunities\u201d clauses of Article IX, \u00a7 2(1) of the Constitution. The State contends that the structure of its educational system is indeed general and uniform and argues that this Court\u2019s decision in Britt v. N.C. State Board of Education, 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987), forecloses plaintiff parties\u2019 \u201cequal opportunities\u201d claims. We agree.\nArticle IX, \u00a7 2(1) of the present Constitution, as amended in 1970, provides:\nThe General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.\nPlaintiffs claim that the State\u2019s educational funding system is not constitutionally \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d because \u201cthe quality of the education programs and amounts of funding vary substantially between plaintiff school districts and wealthy school districts.\u201d Plaintiff-intervenors similarly argue that the State does not meet its constitutional mandate to provide a general and uniform system of public schools because the \u201ceducational financing system fails properly to take account of the significant differences in the educational and resource needs of students and school districts throughout the State.\u201d\nThe State responds that the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d language of Article IX, \u00a7 2(1) refers to uniformity not in its educational programs or facilities, but in the State\u2019s system of public education. Plaintiffs argue that the State\u2019s emphasis on the organization and administration of the educational system is misplaced, maintaining that the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d language \u201cat its origin was understood to require a school system that treated schoolchildren throughout the State with substantial equality.\u201d Plaintiff-intervenors similarly claim that the State \u201cmiss[es] the essential point of having a \u2018general and uniform system.\u2019 \u201d\nCases interpreting the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d clause, however, clearly contradict plaintiffs\u2019 arguments. In Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153 (1871), the Supreme Court offered an early examination of the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d clause of Article IX, observing that\nit is to be a \u201csystem,\u201d it is to be \u201cgeneral,\u201d and it is to be \u201cuniform.\u201d It is not to be subject to the caprice of localities, but every locality, yea, every child, is to have the same advantage, and be subject to the same rules and regulations.\n. . . [I]f every township were allowed to have its own regulations, and to consult its own caprices . . . [t]here would be no \u201cuniformity\u201d and but little usefulness, and the great aim of the government in giving all of its citizens a good education would be defeated.\nId. at 157-58. While plaintiffs urge that Lane reinforces the requirement of substantial equality, we find that the Court simply interpreted the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d provision to ensure a system of public education that was administered uniformly across the state.\nIn Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners, 174 N.C. 469, 93 S.E. 1001 (1917), the Supreme Court reinforced its limited interpretation of the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d clause:\nThe term \u201cuniform\u201d here clearly does not relate to \u201cschools,\u201d requiring that each and every school in the same or other districts throughout the State shall be of the same fixed grade, regardless of the age or attainments of the pupils, but the term has reference to and qualifies the word \u201csystem\u201d and is sufficiently complied with where, by statute or authorized regulation of the public-school authorities, provision is made for establishment of schools of like kind throughout all sections of the State and available to all of the school population of the territories contributing to their support.\nId. at 473, 93 S.E. at 1002. We agree with the State that the uniformity required is system uniformity, not spending or programming uniformity, as plaintiff parties contend. Their claims pursuant to the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d clause of the Constitution should have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).\nPlaintiffs also claim that the State\u2019s educational funding system fails to provide equal educational opportunities for all children because the opportunities available to them are substantially inferior to those in wealthy school districts. The plaintiffs in Britt made a similar claim, arguing that Article I, \u00a7 15 and Article IX, \u00a7 2(1) of the Constitution conferred upon them a fundamental right to equal educational opportunity, \u201cthat is to say that each student in the State has a fundamental right to an education substantially equal to that enjoyed by every other student in the State, and that the present statutory scheme for financing public education violates that right.\u201d Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 285, 357 S.E.2d at 434. Rejecting this claim, Britt established that the Constitution provides no fundamental right to equal educational opportunities, but simply \u201cequal access to our public schools \u2014 that is, every child has a fundamental right to an education in our public schools.\u201d Id. at 289, 357 S.E.2d at 436 (citing Sneed v. Board of Education, 299 N.C. 609, 618, 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1980)).\nTo state a valid claim for relief, plaintiffs must therefore distinguish their \u201cequal opportunities\u201d claims from those of the plaintiffs in Britt. Plaintiffs argue that their claim is for substantial rather than absolute equality among school systems. They urge that Britt is inapplicable to their case because the Court \u201cdid not address itself to a claim for \u2018substantial equality, rather than absolute equality.\u2019 \u201d We disagree.\nIn Britt, the plaintiffs similarly argued that their claim did not require absolute equality among systems, \u201cbut rather... that the State cannot ignore the relative ability of counties to raise funds when disparities in county wealth deprive students of equal educational opportunity.\u201d Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 289, 357 S.E.2d at 436. We find plaintiffs\u2019 claim in the instant case indistinguishable. The Britt Court found that the Constitution contemplated \u201cdisparities] between counties as to the financial resources available,\u201d id. at 288, 357 S.E.2d at 435-36, and concluded that\nif our Constitution demands that each child receive equality of opportunity in the sense argued by plaintiffs, only absolute equality between all systems across the State will satisfy the constitutional mandate. Any disparity between systems results in opportunities offered some students and denied others. Our Constitution clearly does not contemplate such absolute uniformity across the State.\nId. at 289, 357 S.E.2d at 436. The plaintiffs in Britt did not argue for absolute equality, but the Court recognized that the equality they sought could only be absolute. The same is true for plaintiffs\u2019 equal opportunities claim, and we find that their claim under the \u201cequal opportunities\u201d clause of Article IX, \u00a7 2(1) of the Constitution is foreclosed by our decision in Britt. The trial court erred in not dismissing this claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nPlaintiff-intervenors also attempt to distinguish their \u201cequal opportunities\u201d claim from that in Britt, contending that \u201ceach North Carolina student, regardless of where he or she lives, has an equal right to funding sufficient to provide him or her with an adequate education. . . . The right the urban plaintiffs seek to enforce, therefore, is not a right to equal funding, but a right to equal opportunity.\u201d Although plaintiff-intervenors\u2019 claim might be distinguished from the plaintiffs\u2019 unsuccessful claim in Britt, the Britt Court\u2019s analysis of the limited purpose of the \u201cequal opportunities\u201d clause applies with the same force to bar plaintiff-intervenors\u2019 claim.\nDiscussing the origin of the \u201cequal opportunities\u201d clause, added to the Constitution by amendment in 1970, the Britt Court declared:\nIn our view, the only plausible way to interpret that provision is to relate it to the \u201cseparate but equal\u201d phrase of the 1868 Constitution that it replaced. ... By mandating equal opportunities for all students, the framers of the Constitution and the voters that adopted it were emphasizing that the days of \u201cseparate but equal\u201d education in North Carolina were over, and that the people of this State were committed to providing all students with equal access to full participation in our public schools, regardless of race or other classifications. Any other interpretation, we believe, would require drawing inferences and conclusions that not only cannot be supported, but are, in fact, contradicted by the history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution.\nId. at 289-90, 357 S.E.2d at 436. Although plaintiff-intervenors\u2019 claim may not mirror that of the plaintiffs in Britt, it nevertheless fails to state a claim for relief according to the Britt Court\u2019s interpretation of the \u201cequal opportunities\u201d clause.\nAs in Britt, both plaintiffs\u2019 and plaintiff-intervenors\u2019 claims for relief are \u201cpremised upon the violation of a right which we have concluded does not exist in the context alleged_\u201d Id. at 290, 357 S.E.2d at 436-37. The trial court should have granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff parties\u2019 equal opportunities claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nIn its second assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred in denying its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff parties\u2019 claims that they have a fundamental constitutional right to adequate educational opportunities. We agree.\nPlaintiff parties claim that the State\u2019s system for funding public education violates their alleged fundamental constitutional right to adequate educational opportunities because it has failed to provide the necessary funds. They maintain that although the Constitution does not expressly provide for \u201cadequate\u201d educational opportunities, the framers intended to impose an adequacy standard. The State responds that the Constitution is silent on the issue of \u201cadequate education,\u201d and that there is no such constitutional right.\nArticle I, \u00a7 15 of the Constitution provides that \u201c[t]he people have a right to the privilege of education,\u201d and the State asserts that this \u201cprivilege\u201d simply denotes access to education and does not command any qualitative standard. Indeed, our Supreme Court in Sneed v. Board of Education, 299 N.C. 609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980), examined this constitutional provision along with Article IX, \u00a7 2(1), and held: \u201cIt is clear, then, that equal access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process.\u201d Id. at 618, 264 S.E.2d at 113. The Britt Court reiterated Sneed\u2019s declaration, holding that \u201c [t]he fundamental right that is guaranteed by our Constitution, then, is to equal access to our public schools \u2014 that is, every child has a fundamental right to receive an education in our public schools.\u201d Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 289, 357 S.E.2d at 436.\nWe hold that under Sneed and Britt, the fundamental educational right under the North Carolina Constitution is limited to one of equal access to education, and it does not embrace a qualitative standard. As in Britt, plaintiff parties here \u201chave not alleged that they are being denied an education . ...\u201d Id. Thus, their claims that the Constitution provides a fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities, and that the State has violated that alleged right, should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\nThe State contends in the alternative that plaintiff parties\u2019 educational adequacy claims present nonjusticiable political questions, and the trial court should have dismissed these claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). Because we find that plaintiff parties\u2019 educational adequacy claims should have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we decline to address this contention.\nThe State argues in its third assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff parties\u2019 equal protection and due process claims. We agree.\nPlaintiffs assert that the State has denied them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under Article I, \u00a7 19 of the Constitution because of the substantial disparities in school funding that result from the State\u2019s educational finance system. To trigger strict scrutiny in considering an equal protection claim, \u201cit is necessary that there be a preliminary finding that there is a suspect classification or an infringement of a fundamental right.\u201d Texfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980). Plaintiff parties do not claim that they comprise a suspect class, but rather that the State has infringed an alleged fundamental right.\nAlthough plaintiffs\u2019 claim on its face simply maintains that the State has violated their fundamental right to education, the substance of their allegation shows that they base their equal protection claim on an asserted fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities. They argue that the State violates equal protection because under its educational funding system the educational opportunities they receive are substantially inferior to those offered to children in wealthy school districts. Plaintiff-intervenors claim that the State has denied them equal protection because its supplemental funding scheme irrationally discriminates against school districts not defined as \u201clow wealth\u201d or \u201csmall\u201d and fails to provide them with an adequate education. Their equal protection claim is also premised upon the assertion that they have a fundamental right to an adequate education.\nSince we found above that a constitutional fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities does not exist, it follows that plaintiff parties\u2019 equal protection claims, based on this asserted fundamental right, necessarily fail. The trial court should have dismissed their equal protection claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nPlaintiff parties also base due process claims upon the assertion that they have a fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities. Plaintiffs argue that this alleged fundamental right \u201cmay not be withheld or eliminated except in accordance with due process,\u201d as guaranteed under the law of the land clause of Article I, \u00a7 19 of the Constitution. They maintain that under substantive due process analysis, strict scrutiny should be applied to invalidate any limitation on a fundamental right not justified by a compelling State interest. See In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 101-02, 221 S.E.2d 307, 311-12 (1976) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)). However, we established above that there is no fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities, and absent a properly asserted fundamental right, plaintiff parties\u2019 substantive due process claims cannot be maintained.\nPlaintiffs claim in addition that \u201ccompelling schoolchildren to attend schools without providing adequate educational opportunities is a deprivation of their liberty that requires due process of law under the state Constitution.\u201d Plaintiff-intervenors claim both property and liberty interests in education and allege that \u201c[b]ecause the State has failed to provide the individual intervenors with adequate educational programs and facilities, they have been denied due process of law.\u201d We find that plaintiff parties\u2019 additional due process claims present no genuine controversy, and we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of the State\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all of their due process claims.\nIn its fourth assignment of error, the State contends that the trial court erred in denying its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff parties\u2019 statutory claims for relief based upon provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat., Chapter 115C. Plaintiffs allege that the State has violated the requirements of certain provisions of Chapter 115C by failing to provide them with equal access to the BEP and \u201cby failing to assure that plaintiffs receive necessary resources for instructional purposes on an equitable basis.\u201d Plaintiff-intervenors similarly claim that by failing to provide necessary resources, the State has failed to meet its statutory obligations under Chapter 115C to provide adequate and equal educational opportunities. The State contends that plaintiff parties\u2019 statutory claims are not actionable. We agree.\nPlaintiff parties assert that certain provisions of Chapter 115C affirm their alleged constitutional fundamental right to an adequate education, and other provisions must be carried out in accordance with this fundamental right. However, we found above that there is no constitutional fundamental right to adequate education. Therefore, plaintiff parties\u2019 statutory claims, all based on violations of this nonexistent fundamental right, necessarily fail.\nMoreover, the specific statutory provisions themselves provide no basis for relief. First, G.S. \u00a7 115C-1 simply codifies the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d and \u201cequal opportunities\u201d clauses of the Constitution, which we found above to provide no cognizable claim, and it affords no additional basis for relief. Next, the BEP, set forth in G.S. \u00a7 115C-81, simply directs the State Board to adopt and implement a program of basic instruction in specified areas and declares that the goal of the General Assembly is to provide funds to implement the BEP. Accordingly, it confers no actionable rights upon plaintiff parties.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claim under G.S. \u00a7 115C-122(3) is likewise without merit. This provision is contained in Article 9 of Chapter 115C, which applies only to schoolchildren with special needs as defined under G.S. \u00a7 115C-109. Plaintiffs do not assert, however, that they fall within the purview of Article 9. In addition, plaintiff-intervenors\u2019 complaint does not on its face state a claim under G.S. \u00a7 115C-122(3). Thus, plaintiff parties\u2019 attempts to extract language from this provision and apply it generally, outside the context of Article 9, are not persuasive.\nFinally, G.S. \u00a7 115C-408 simply declares the State\u2019s policy to provide from state revenue the instructional expenses for current operations of the public school system and indicates that \u201cthe facilities requirements for a public education system will be met by county governments.\u201d As a policy statement, the statutory provision confers no actionable right upon plaintiff parties, and their claims under this statute also fail.\nIn its last assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred in denying its motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (2) for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, claiming as affirmative defenses the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the lack of standing on the part of the plaintiff boards of education, and the contention that the constitutionality of no statute is properly at issue under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Because we reverse the trial court and dismiss both plaintiffs\u2019 and plaintiff-intervenors\u2019 complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state cognizable claims, we need not consider the State\u2019s jurisdictional arguments.\nThe trial court\u2019s order denying the State\u2019s motions to dismiss is\nReversed.\nJudges LEWIS and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General Tiare B. Smiley, and Special Deputy Attorney General Ronald M. Marquette, for defendant appellants.", "Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein L.L.P., by Robert W. Spearman, Robert H. Tiller, and Hern\u00e1n R. Clark, and Hux Livermon & Armstrong, by H. Lawrence Armstrong, Jr., for plaintiff appellees.", "Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by Gary R. Govert, and Hogan & Hartson, L.L.R, by Allen R. Snyder, for plaintiff-intervenor appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KATHLEEN M. LEANDRO, individually and as guardian ad litem of Robert A. Leandro; STEVEN R. SUNKEL, individually and as guardian ad litem for Andrew J. Sunkel; CLARENCE L. PENDER, individually and as guardian ad litem of Schnika N. Pender; TYRONE T. WILLIAMS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Trevelyn L. Williams; D. E. LOCKLEAR, JR., individually and as guardian ad litem of Jason E. Locklear; ANGUS B. THOMPSON, II, individually and as guardian ad litem of Vandauah J. Thompson; JENNIE G. PEARSON, individually and as guardian ad litem of Sharese D. Pearson; WAYNE TEW, individually and as guardian ad litem of Natosha L. Tew; DANA HOLTON JENKINS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Rachel M. Jenkins; FLOYD VICK, individually and as guardian ad litem of Ervin D. Vick; HOKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; HALIFAX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; ROBESON COUNTY. BOARD OF EDUCATION; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; VANCE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Plaintiff-Appellees, and CASSANDRA INGRAM, individually and as guardian ad litem of Darris Ingram; CAROL PENLAND, individually and as guardian ad litem of Jeremy Penland; DARLENE HARRIS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Shamek Harris; NETTIE THOMPSON, individually and as guardian ad litem of Annette Renee Thompson; DAVID MARTINEZ, individually and as guardian ad litem of Daniela Martinez; OPHELIA AIKEN, individually and as guardian ad litem of Brandon Bell; ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION; DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellees v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; Defendant-Appellants\nNo. COA95-321\n(Filed 19 March 1996)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 94 (NCI4th)\u2014 school funding system-general and uniform clause \u2014 equal opportunities clause\nThe trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 claims that the state school funding system violates the \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d and \u201cequal opportunities\u201d clauses of Article IX, \u00a7 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution, since the uniformity required is system uniformity, as contended by defendant, and not spending or programming uniformity, as contended by plaintiffs; and the Constitution provides no fundamental right to equal educational opportunities, but simply equal access to the public schools.\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7\u00a7 5, 216, 252.\nDe facto segregation of races in public schools. 11 ALR3d 780.\nValidity of basing public school financing system on local property taxes. 41 ALR3d 1220.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 94 (NCI4th)\u2014 constitutional right to education \u2014 equal access protected \u2014 no qualitative standard\nThe fundamental educational right under the North Carolina Constitution is limited to one of equal access to education, and it does not embrace a qualitative standard; therefore, plaintiffs\u2019 claims that the Constitution provides a fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities and that the State violated that right by its system for funding public education should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7\u00a7 5, 216, 252.\nDe facto segregation of races in public schools. 11 ALR3d 780.\nValidity of basing public school financing system on local property taxes. 41 ALR3d 1220.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 94 (NCI4th)\u2014 educational funding\u2014 due process and equal protection claims \u2014 no fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities\nThe trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 equal protection and due process claims where plaintiffs argued that under the State\u2019s educational funding system the opportunities they received were substantially inferior to those offered to children in wealthy school districts since this claim was based on an asserted fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities, and a constitutional fundamental right to adequate educational opportunities does not exist.\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7 45.\nDe facto segregation of races in public schools. 11 ALR3d 780.\nValidity of basing public school financing system on local property taxes. 41 ALR3d 1220.\n4. Schools \u00a7 51 (NCI4th)\u2014 failure of defendant to provide necessary resources \u2014 no right to adequate education \u2014 no statutory basis for claim\nThe trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 claims that the State has violated certain provisions of N.C.G.S. Ch. 115C by failing to provide necessary resources for instructional purposes on an equal basis since statutory claims based on violations of the nonexistent fundamental right to an adequate education must fail; the statutory provisions themselves provide no basis for relief; and some of the provisions under which plaintiffs claim apply only to schoolchildren with special needs. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-1, 115C-81, 115C-122(3), and 115C-408.\nAm Jur 2d, Schools \u00a7 216.\nValidity and construction of statute or ordinance limiting the kinds or amount of actual damages recoverable in tort action against governmental unit. 43 ALR4th 19.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 1 February 1995 by Judge E. Maurice Braswell in Halifax County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 January 1996.\nThis appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action against the State of North Carolina and the State Board of Education (hereinafter collectively, the State) challenging the State\u2019s method for financing the public school system. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on 25 May 1994 and an amended complaint on 26 September 1994, seeking a declaration, among others, that North Carolina\u2019s public education system, including its system of funding, violates the North Carolina Constitution (hereinafter the Constitution) and various state statutes by failing to provide adequate and substantially equal educational opportunities for all schoolchildren in the state. On 17 October 1994 the trial court allowed the intervention of plaintiff-intervenors, and they filed a complaint on 18 October 1994, seeking declarations that the State has failed to fulfill its duty to establish a general and uniform system of free public schools with equal educational opportunities for all students and that it has failed to fulfill its duty to provide an adequate system of public schools in the urban school districts.\nPlaintiffs are five boards of education in low-wealth school districts and twenty individuals in those districts who allege generally that the State has failed in numerous respects to satisfy its obligations under the Constitution and N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 115C by maintaining a system for funding public schools that does not take sufficient account of the substantial disparities in wealth among school districts.\nMore specifically, plaintiffs complain that there is a large gap in educational opportunities between their districts and wealthier ones as demonstrated by their dilapidated school facilities, short supply of textbooks, and limited curricula, among other things, all leading to difficulty in attracting and attaining qualified teachers. The result, they argue, is a lack of adequate educational opportunities reflected in part by low test scores. Plaintiffs assert that the root of the problem is the State\u2019s system for funding public education, which delegates to local governments the responsibility for capital expenses and some current school expenses. These funds are raised by property taxes, and plaintiff districts\u2019 property tax bases are lower than other counties, requiring greater tax effort. The greater tax effort, however, does not make up differences in per pupil funding, and plaintiffs claim that they still receive less funding per pupil than wealthy districts.\nIn addition, plaintiffs argue that the State\u2019s supplemental funding program for low-wealth school districts does not provide them with funding sufficient to support an adequate education. They also maintain that they do not have access to programs required by the State\u2019s Basic Education Program (BEP), set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-81. Thus, the State\u2019s funding system, plaintiffs allege, results in inadequate funding, which leads to inadequate and unequal educational opportunities.\nPlaintiff-intervenors, six boards of education in urban districts and twelve individuals in those districts, allege generally that the State is failing to meet its constitutional and statutory obligations by \u201cfailing to implement a public education system that adequately and equitably takes into account the educational and resource needs of all students and school districts.\u201d They claim that some students in urban districts, especially those who live in or near poverty, \u201cface environmental and other disadvantages that require more educational resources than the State currently provides if they are to receive an adequate education.\u201d Other students require special education services, English-as-a-second-language services, and academically gifted services, which require the urban school boards to \u201cdivert substantial resources from their regular education programs.\u201d\nMoreover, plaintiff-intervenors claim that \u201cthe State has failed to address sufficiently the high costs and \u2018municipal overburden\u2019 that characterize the urban school districts.\u201d They assert that the BEP, even if fully funded, would not meet their needs. In sum, plaintiff-intervenors argue that the State has \u201cfailed to provide sufficient resources to enable the urban school boards to provide all of their students with an adequate education,\u201d and the school funding system \u201cis inequitable, irrational, arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the North Carolina Constitution and State law.\u201d\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaints of both plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors (hereinafter collectively, plaintiff parties), asserting defenses, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6), that the trial court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction and that plaintiff parties failed to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants also requested a transfer of venue to Wake County, which was granted. After a hearing on 9 and 10 January 1995, Judge E. Maurice Braswell denied defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss.\nDefendants filed a timely notice of appeal of the order denying their motions to dismiss. The parties then filed a joint petition in the Supreme Court for discretionary review, which was denied on 11 April 1995. Subsequently, defendants filed an alternative petition for writ of certiorari in this Court pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. The petition was allowed on 4 May 1995.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General Tiare B. Smiley, and Special Deputy Attorney General Ronald M. Marquette, for defendant appellants.\nParker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein L.L.P., by Robert W. Spearman, Robert H. Tiller, and Hern\u00e1n R. Clark, and Hux Livermon & Armstrong, by H. Lawrence Armstrong, Jr., for plaintiff appellees.\nSmith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by Gary R. Govert, and Hogan & Hartson, L.L.R, by Allen R. Snyder, for plaintiff-intervenor appellees." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 37, "last_page_order": 50 }