{ "id": 11915505, "name": "Ward G. Tarlton and John P. Tarlton, Co-Executors of the Estate of Edna T. Griggs, Harvey Hollis Tarlton, Ward Gerald Tarlton, John P. Tarlton, Frances T. Webb, James B. Tarlton, Jr., Randy H. Tarlton, Sandy B. Tarlton, Rena Ann Tarlton, Patti J. Tarlton, Robert L. Cagle, III, Mary Edna Williams, Ned Frye Tarlton, and Jean T. Pelletier, Plaintiffs v. Shirley Griggs Stidham, Administratrix of the Estate of John C. Griggs, Jr., and Shirley Griggs Stidham, Individually, and husband, Kyle Stidham; Ruth Griggs Short and husband, William M. Short; Sara Griggs Jarman and husband, Edward Jarman; Peggy Griggs Hurst and husband, Mickey Hurst; Patricia Griggs Locklear and husband, Cameron Locklear; Paula Stork and husband, R. J. Stork, Jr.; and Ruth Coley Griggs, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Tarlton v. Stidham", "decision_date": "1996-03-19", "docket_number": "No. COA95-177", "first_page": "77", "last_page": "83", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 N.C. App. 77" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 ALR4th 90", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "48 ALR4th 972", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "7 ALR4th 621", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564495, 2561577, 2560493, 2565935 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0370-04", "/nc/323/0370-03", "/nc/323/0370-01", "/nc/323/0370-02" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519016 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914042 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677-78" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8602050 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522178 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505954, 2505575, 2505196, 2506733, 2507386 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0344-02", "/nc/332/0344-03", "/nc/332/0344-04", "/nc/332/0344-01", "/nc/332/0344-05" ] }, { "cite": "396 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526820 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313611 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574244, 8574215, 8574280, 8574226, 8574263 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0543-03", "/nc/303/0543-01", "/nc/303/0543-05", "/nc/303/0543-02", "/nc/303/0543-04" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646656 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569764 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 30-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8594789 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2082967 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/57/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-8", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "375", "parenthetical": "emphasis ours" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523744 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" }, { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0523-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 759, "char_count": 15983, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.701012047527744e-07, "percentile": 0.8284241668143587 }, "sha256": "3bb39b4e55ed8e432c2461e64f6caa3d5aba26b61ce1a9c4ece9c19d35f12ccc", "simhash": "1:0739c46cccbfec52", "word_count": 2642 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "Ward G. Tarlton and John P. Tarlton, Co-Executors of the Estate of Edna T. Griggs, Harvey Hollis Tarlton, Ward Gerald Tarlton, John P. Tarlton, Frances T. Webb, James B. Tarlton, Jr., Randy H. Tarlton, Sandy B. Tarlton, Rena Ann Tarlton, Patti J. Tarlton, Robert L. Cagle, III, Mary Edna Williams, Ned Frye Tarlton, and Jean T. Pelletier, Plaintiffs v. Shirley Griggs Stidham, Administratrix of the Estate of John C. Griggs, Jr., and Shirley Griggs Stidham, Individually, and husband, Kyle Stidham; Ruth Griggs Short and husband, William M. Short; Sara Griggs Jarman and husband, Edward Jarman; Peggy Griggs Hurst and husband, Mickey Hurst; Patricia Griggs Locklear and husband, Cameron Locklear; Paula Stork and husband, R. J. Stork, Jr.; and Ruth Coley Griggs, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nIn this appeal from summary judgment against them, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment concerning distribution of property under a will. Plaintiffs represent the estate of Edna T. Griggs (decedent), who died testate in 1994. Defendants are the brothers and sisters (and others similarly situated) of the decedent\u2019s late husband, Walter Eugene Griggs (Griggs), who died partially testate in 1982. The central issue concerns whether four parcels of land from the Griggs estate passed as a life estate to decedent, with remainder to defendants, or in fee simple to decedent, with no remainder to defendants. As a subsidiary issue, defendants cross appeal, claiming the trial court should not have granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of estoppel.\nWe hold that the four parcels in question passed to plaintiffs in fee simple, via North Carolina\u2019s Intestate Succession Act. We also hold that plaintiffs are not equitably estopped from claiming a fee simple interest in the property involved in this dispute. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court on the will construction issue and affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 estoppel claim against plaintiffs.\nThe facts in this case are undisputed. Thus, to sustain the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on the partial intestacy issue, defendants (as the moving party) must show they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kessing v. National Mortg. Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971). Defendants have not met this burden, as is explained herein.\nWalter Eugene Griggs executed a will in 1963. In that will, Walter Eugene Griggs bequeathed all of his personal property, and a life estate in all of his real property, to his wife Edna T. Griggs. At his death in 1982, Walter Griggs owned seven parcels of land. Walter Griggs\u2019 will specifically reserved a remainder interest in three of the seven tracts of land to his brothers and sisters. In the will, Walter Griggs did not specifically dispose of the remaining four parcels, which were acquired by him subsequent to the execution of his will in 1963. Walter Griggs\u2019 will contained no residuary clause; thus no provision exists under the will for the passing of the four parcels not specifically bequeathed.\nIn 1994, Edna T. Griggs died testate. Edna Griggs\u2019 will contained a residuary clause, which allocated all of her property not specifically bequeathed to the instant plaintiffs, her brothers and sisters and their lineal descendents. Defendants argue Edna Griggs was not an heir to the four parcels in question, as \u201cshe could not take under the intestacy laws,\u201d because \u201ca reversion was created [under Walter Griggs\u2019 will] which vested in his heirs.\u201d Defendants contend this \u201creversion\u201d reflects the \u201cparamount intent of the testator.\u201d By \u201chis heirs,\u201d defendants mean the brothers and sisters (and their lineal descendents) of Walter Griggs. Defendants also argue that Edna Griggs must have dissented from Walter Griggs\u2019 will in order to claim the remainder interest in the four parcels. Defendants are mistaken.\nOur case law and statutes address the issues in this case without ambiguity. In Ferguson v. Croom, 73 N.C. App. 316, 318, 326 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1985), a case analytically identical to the instant one, this Court held that a disinherited party may still take in the event of a partial intestacy. The Ferguson Court arrived at this disposition by applying N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-8 (1984), which states: \u201cIf part but not all of the estate of a decedent is validly disposed of by his will, the part not disposed of by .such will shall descend and be distributed as intestate property.\u201d Ferguson, 73 N.C. App. at 318, 326 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting \u00a7 29-8) (emphasis in original).\nIn this case, Walter Griggs did not provide a testamentary disposition, either specifically or through a residuary clause,' for the four parcels of land in dispute between the instant parties. Therefore, this property did not pass under Walter Griggs\u2019 will. Instead, the four parcels constitute a partial intestacy, as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-8. As such,\nG.S. 29-8 creates a mandatory plan for disposing of a decedent\u2019s property which does not pass by will. It directs that the property pass by intestate succession without regard to the intent expressed by a testator in a will. The statute, which was adopted in 1959, was a codification of our common law. See Dunlap v. Ingram, 57 N.C. 178 (4 Jones Eq.) (1858) (where our Supreme Court held that property not disposed of by will passes as directed by the law regardless of attempts by the testator to disinherit the lawful takers).\nFerguson, 73 N.C. App. at 318, 326 S.E.2d at 375 (emphasis ours).\nBased on Ferguson, then, the question here becomes one of determining the proper heir to the four parcels under our Intestate Succession Act. Id. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-14 (1984) of the Intestate Succession Act, a surviving spouse receives \u201call the real property\u201d if \u201cthe intestate is not survived by a child, children or any lineal descendent of a deceased child or children, or by a parent.\u201d Neither party disputes that Walter Griggs had no lineal heirs or parents living at the time of his death; no one questions Edna Griggs\u2019 status as the surviving spouse. Therefore, Edna Griggs was the proper recipient of the remainder interests in the four parcels of land contested here.\nOnce the remainder interests in the four parcels passed to Edna Griggs via intestacy, the doctrine of merger, as espoused in Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 23, 59 S.E.2d 205, 213 (1950) became operative.\nMerger is the absorption of a lesser estate by a greater estate, and takes place when two distinct estates of greater and lesser rank meet in the same person or class of persons at the same time without any intermediate estate.\nId. In this case, Edna Griggs\u2019 remainder interest in the four parcels merged with her life interest in same, creating a fee simple estate in the four parcels. Id.\nDefendants argue in their brief that: \u201cWalter Eugene Griggs gave his wife, Edna Tarlton Griggs, all his personal property and a life estate in his land so since she did not dissent from his will she lost her right to intestate succession.\u201d Defendants cite no authority for this proposition. However, we interpret defendants\u2019 argument as meaning that Edna Griggs should have been forced to dissent, if she sought to exercise her rights to the four parcels under the Intestate Succession Act, while simultaneously taking under Walter Griggs\u2019 will.\nWe do not agree the statute governing the right to dissent, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 30-1 (1992), requires such an election. See generally Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979). The right to dissent is not an obligation to dissent. \u201cIt is a common principle of law in North Carolina that a surviving spouse must elect between taking under a Will and dissenting from the Will. The spouse cannot do both; the election of one precludes the other.\u201d Hill v. Smith, 51 N.C. App. 670, 674, 277 S.E.2d 542, 545, disc. review denied, 303 N.C. 543, 281 S.E.2d 392 (1981). Here, the surviving spouse did not seek to do both. Edna Griggs simply took a life estate in the real property of her late husband under his will, and received a remainder interest in four parcels of Walter Griggs\u2019 land per the Intestate Succession Act. This result is consistent with Ferguson, where the Court directed \u201cthat the property pass by intestate succession without regard to the intent expressed by testator in a will.\u201d Ferguson, 73 N.C. App. at 318, 326 S.E.2d at 375. Defendants\u2019 argument that a dissent election is mandated is without merit.\nFinally, defendants argue in their brief that plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming a fee simple interest in the four parcels, due to conduct of Edna Griggs after Walter Griggs\u2019 death. This Court has defined the \u201cessential elements of estoppel\u201d as:\n\u201c(1) conduct on the part of the party sought to be estopped which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the intention that such conduct will be acted on by the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.\u201d\nHensell v. Winslow, 106 N.C. App. 285, 290, 416 S.E.2d 426, 430, (quoting Parker v. Thompson-Arthur Paving Co., 100 N.C. App. 367, 370, 396 S.E.2d 626, 628-29 (1990)), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 344, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992). Estoppel principles do vary though, based on the facts of each case. Miller v. Taiton, 112 N.C. App. 484, 488, 435 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1993). \u201cIn determining whether the doctrine [of estoppel] applies, the conduct of both parties must be weighed in the balances of equity.\u201d Id. Finally, when only one inference can reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts, estoppel becomes a question of law, properly decided by this Court. Hawkins v. M & J Finance Corp., 238 N.C. 174, 185, 77 S.E.2d 669, 677-78 (1953).\nDefendants assert the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on the estoppel issue. To sustain summary judgment, plaintiffs, as the moving party, must show that no material facts are in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 120 N.C. App. 27, 36, 460 S.E.2d 899, 904 (1995). In addition, the record is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, giving it the benefit of all inferences which reasonably arise therefrom. Id. Evidence properly considered on a motion for summary judgment \u201cincludes admissions in the pleadings, depositions on file, answers to Rule 33 interrogatories, admissions on file . . . affidavits, and any other material which would be admissible in evidence or of which judicial notice may properly be taken.\u201d Kessing, 278 N.C. at 533, 180 S.E.2d at 829.\nUpon close scrutiny of the record, it is apparent plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the estoppel issue as a matter of law. Defendants have presented no evidence, which, if taken as true, would fulfill the elements of estoppel. For instance, defendants have not presented any evidence indicating that Edna Griggs acted with \u201c \u2018knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts\u2019 \u201d with regard to the four parcels. Hensell, 106 N.C. App. at 290, 416 S.E.2d at 430. Defendants assert that Edna Griggs \u201crepresented to her husband testator\u2019s brothers and sisters that she had a life estate in the land and that they, as remaindermen, owed inheritance taxes and under that representation induced the brothers and sisters to pay inheritance taxes [on the four parcels].\u201d Plaintiffs dispute this assertion.\nHowever, even if we assume defendants\u2019 allegations concerning the inheritance tax are true, these facts are insufficient to work an estoppel against plaintiffs. The party requesting estoppel must have had \u201c \u2018(1) a lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge as to the real facts in question; and (2) relied upon the conduct of the party sought to be estopped to his prejudice.\u2019 \u201d Hensell, 106 N.C. App. at 290-91, 416 S.E.2d at 430 (emphasis added). Defendants had every opportunity to determine their inheritance tax liability prior to paying same. They did not. \u201c[A]n estoppel ordinarily will be denied where the party claiming it was put on inquiry as to the truth and had available the means for ascertaining it.\u201d Hawkins, 238 N.C. at 179, 77 S.E.2d at 673.\nMoreover, even if defendants paid a tax on the four parcels for which they were not liable, the prejudice suffered them has no nexus to Edna Griggs\u2019 ownership rights. If the inheritance tax was errantly paid by defendants, the proper remedy would be for unjust enrichment, not equitable estoppel. See Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570, 369 S.E.2d 554, 555-56, (\u201c \u2018A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.\u2019 \u201d (citation omitted)), reh\u2019g denied, 323 N.C. 370, 373 S.E.2d 540 (1988). Based on the foregoing, we find that defendants have failed to present facts which, viewed in their most favorable light, establish material elements of their estoppel claim. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on the estoppel issue.\nIn conclusion, we reverse the trial court on the intestacy issue and affirm the trial court\u2019s disposition of defendants\u2019 estoppel claim.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nJudges JOHNSON and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson & Waller, P.A., by Betty S. Waller, for plaintiff appellants.", "E.A. Hightower and Robert G. Sanders for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Ward G. Tarlton and John P. Tarlton, Co-Executors of the Estate of Edna T. Griggs, Harvey Hollis Tarlton, Ward Gerald Tarlton, John P. Tarlton, Frances T. Webb, James B. Tarlton, Jr., Randy H. Tarlton, Sandy B. Tarlton, Rena Ann Tarlton, Patti J. Tarlton, Robert L. Cagle, III, Mary Edna Williams, Ned Frye Tarlton, and Jean T. Pelletier, Plaintiffs v. Shirley Griggs Stidham, Administratrix of the Estate of John C. Griggs, Jr., and Shirley Griggs Stidham, Individually, and husband, Kyle Stidham; Ruth Griggs Short and husband, William M. Short; Sara Griggs Jarman and husband, Edward Jarman; Peggy Griggs Hurst and husband, Mickey Hurst; Patricia Griggs Locklear and husband, Cameron Locklear; Paula Stork and husband, R. J. Stork, Jr.; and Ruth Coley Griggs, Defendants\nNo. COA95-177\n(Filed 19 March 1996)\n1. Wills \u00a7 100 (NCI4th)\u2014 life interest in land to wife\u2014 remainder interest to wife under intestate succession\u2014 doctrine of merger applicable\nWhere decedent\u2019s husband left her all his personal property and a life estate in his real property, he did not provide a testamentary disposition either specifically or through a residuary clause for the four parcels of land in dispute between the parties, and he died without lineal heirs or parents, then the remainder interests in the four parcels passed to decedent via intestacy, and, through the doctrine of merger, her remainder interest merged with her life interest, creating a fee simple estate in the four parcels, which passed, pursuant to her will, to plaintiffs.\nAm Jur 2d, Trusts \u00a7 116.\nTrusts: merger of legal and equitable estates where sole trustees are sole beneficiaries. 7 ALR4th 621.\n2. Wills \u00a7 152 (NCI4th)\u2014 life interest in property to wife \u2014 remainder interest to wife under intestate succession\u2014 dissent from will not required\nThere was no merit to defendants\u2019 contention that decedent, who, pursuant to her husband\u2019s will, took a life interest in his land, was required to dissent from the will if she wanted to take a remainder interest in the land under intestate succession, since N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-1 does not require such an election.\nAm Jur 2d, Wills \u00a7 1646.\nConstruction, application, and effect of statutes which deny or qualify surviving spouse\u2019s right to elect against deceased spouse\u2019s will. 48 ALR4th 972.\n3. Estoppel \u00a7 13 (NCI4th)\u2014 distribution under will \u2014 equitable estoppel \u2014 summary judgment for plaintiffs proper\nIn a declaratory judgment action to determine distribution of real property under a will, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of estoppel, since defendant did not present any evidence indicating that decedent acted with knowledge of the real facts with regard to the four parcels; even it decedent did represent to defendants that they, as remaindermen, owed inheritance taxes on the parcels, defendants did not demonstrate a lack of knowledge and means of knowledge as to the real facts in question; and if the inheritance tax was improperly paid by defendants, the proper remedy would be for unjust enrichment, not equitable estoppel.\nAm Jur 2d, Summary Judgment \u00a7\u00a7 15, 26, 27.\nEstoppel to contest will or attack its validity by acceptance of benefits thereunder. 78 ALR4th 90.\nAppeal by plaintiffs and cross appeal by defendants from summary judgment entered 12 December 1994 by Judge Marvin K. Gray in Anson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 1995.\nWilson & Waller, P.A., by Betty S. Waller, for plaintiff appellants.\nE.A. Hightower and Robert G. Sanders for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0077-01", "first_page_order": 113, "last_page_order": 119 }