{
  "id": 11915780,
  "name": "SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY OF CONOVER, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION",
  "name_abbreviation": "Southern Furniture Co. of Conover, Inc. v. Department of Transportation",
  "decision_date": "1996-03-19",
  "docket_number": "No. COA95-563",
  "first_page": "113",
  "last_page": "116",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "122 N.C. App. 113"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "222 S.E.2d 412",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "423-24"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "289 N.C. 303",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8569569
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "320"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/289/0303-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "312 S.E.2d 648",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "310 N.C. 150",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2399919
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/310/0150-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "299 S.E.2d 640",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "appeal from denial of motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity addressed, although interlocutory nature of appeal not addressed"
        },
        {
          "page": "643"
        },
        {
          "page": "643"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "307 N.C. 569",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8564203
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "appeal from denial of motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity addressed, although interlocutory nature of appeal not addressed"
        },
        {
          "page": "574"
        },
        {
          "page": "574"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/307/0569-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "432 S.E.2d 358",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1993,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "334 N.C. 162",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2528864,
        2531851,
        2531639,
        2531743
      ],
      "year": 1993,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/334/0162-01",
        "/nc/334/0162-04",
        "/nc/334/0162-02",
        "/nc/334/0162-03"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "424 S.E.2d 420",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "423"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "108 N.C. App. 357",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8524345
      ],
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "365"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/108/0357-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-111",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 337,
    "char_count": 5910,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.756,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.235013741447273e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9145218505017088
    },
    "sha256": "66304e56aa6ff1e37eca4c280b5b69226a492b0d0d537480bd4ba2fb7c03491d",
    "simhash": "1:196b755680398450",
    "word_count": 916
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges LEWIS and SMITH concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY OF CONOVER, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nThe North Carolina Department of Transportation (defendant) appeals from the trial court\u2019s 2 March 1995 order denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),(2), (6).\nThe predecessor in interest of Southern Furniture Company of Conover, Inc. (plaintiff) and defendant\u2019s predecessor in interest, the State Highway and Public Works Commission, entered a right-of-way agreement in 1953, with respect to access to U.S. 29/70 (highway) from plaintiffs property. The agreement granted defendant a right-of-way over plaintiff\u2019s property, and it is not disputed that plaintiff was compensated for the right-of-way. Plaintiff contends that the 1953 agreement requires the defendant to maintain a secondary road, on which plaintiff\u2019s property has frontage, and a median crossover on the highway. On 25 July 1990, defendant closed the median crossover by which plaintiff gained access to the secondary road from the highway.\nAfter the closing of the crossover, plaintiff sued defendant for breach of the 1953 contract, requesting a determination of the parties\u2019 rights under the contract, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253, and specific enforcement of the 1953 contract or damages in the alternative. As defenses, defendant asserted sovereign immunity and that plaintiff\u2019s action is barred by the statute of limitations provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-111. Defendant made a motion that the plaintiff\u2019s complaint be dismissed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), (2), (6), which the trial court denied on 2 March 1995.\nThe issues are whether (I) defendant\u2019s appeal is interlocutory; and if not, (II) the plaintiff\u2019s suit for breach of contract is barred by sovereign immunity.\nI\nAlthough generally the denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not immediately appealable, where the denial affects a substantial right it may be appealed. Faulkenbury v. Teachers\u2019 & State Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys., 108 N.C. App. 357, 365, 424 S.E.2d 420, 423, disc. rev. denied, 334 N.C. 162, 432 S.E.2d 358 (1993). The denial of a motion to dismiss based upon the defense of sovereign immunity affects a substantial right and is thus immediately appealable. See id.; see also Middlesex Constr. Corp. v. State ex rel. Art Museum Bldg. Comm\u2019n, 307 N.C. 569, 299 S.E.2d 640 (1983) (appeal from denial of motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity addressed, although interlocutory nature of appeal not addressed), reh\u2019g denied, 310 N.C. 150, 312 S.E.2d 648 (1984). Thus, defendant\u2019s appeal is properly before this Court.\nII\nIt is not disputed that defendant is an agency of the State and is generally protected from suit by sovereign immunity. This immunity is waived whenever the State enters into a valid contract because it \u201cimplicitly consents to be sued for damages on the contract in the event it breaches the contract.\u201d Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 320, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (1976). Where, however, \u201cadministrative or judicial relief in a contract action against the State\u201d has \u201cbeen afforded through statutory provisions\u201d sovereign immunity bars a common law action for breach of that contract. Middlesex Constr. Corp., 307 N.C. at 574, 299 S.E.2d at 643. Defendant argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-111, which provides a cause of action for inverse condemnation, and the rule in Middlesex bar plaintiff\u2019s contract action. We disagree.\nSection 136-111 provides a special proceeding for inverse condemnation when the Department of Transportation has taken land without just compensation to the landowner. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-111 (1993). The section does not provide a procedure for plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim and defendant has cited no other statutory procedure which would control plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract action. Thus, plaintiff is a \u201ccontractor[] who [is] completely foreclosed, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, from obtaining administrative or judicial relief in a contract action against the State.\u201d See Middlesex Constr. Corp., 307 N.C. at 574, 299 S.E.2d at 643. Accordingly, the rule set forth in Smith applies in this case to abolish the bar of sovereign immunity in plaintiffs contract action, and the trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on that basis.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and SMITH concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GREENE, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Keziah, Gates & Samet, L.L.P., by Andrew S. Lasine, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Eugene A. Smith and Assistant Attorney General David R. Minges, for defendant-appellant Department of Transportation."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY OF CONOVER, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nNo. COA95-563\n(Filed 19 March 1996)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 111 (NCI4th)\u2014 denial of motion to dismiss \u2014 sovereign immunity \u2014 denial immediately appealable\nThe denial of a motion to dismiss based upon the defense of sovereign immunity affects a substantial right and is thus immediately appealable\nAm Jur 2d, Appellate Review \u00a7 164.\n2. State \u00a7 27 (NCI4th)\u2014 contract with state \u2014 claim of breach \u2014 sovereign immunity no bar\nWhere the parties\u2019 predecessors in interest entered a right-of-way agreement which granted defendant DOT a right-of-way over plaintiff\u2019s property, compensated plaintiff for the right-of-way, required defendant to maintain a secondary road on which plaintiff\u2019s property had frontage, and required defendant to maintain a median crossover, plaintiff\u2019s suit for breach of contract was not barred by sovereign immunity since the DOT implicitly consented to be sued for breach of its contract, and the statute providing a special proceeding for inverse condemnation, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-111, did not provide for plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim.\nAm Jur 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies \u00a7 119.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 2 March 1995 in Guilford County Superior Court by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 February 1996.\nKeziah, Gates & Samet, L.L.P., by Andrew S. Lasine, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Eugene A. Smith and Assistant Attorney General David R. Minges, for defendant-appellant Department of Transportation."
  },
  "file_name": "0113-01",
  "first_page_order": 149,
  "last_page_order": 152
}