{ "id": 11915999, "name": "MARY LOIS TART RYALS, Plaintiff v. HALL-LANE MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY, INC., RAYMOND JENSEN, HOLLY LEE WILLIAMS and FRANK MAHONEY, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Ryals v. Hall-Lane Moving & Storage Co.", "decision_date": "1996-04-02", "docket_number": "No. COA94-748", "first_page": "134", "last_page": "143", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 N.C. App. 134" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 ALR Fed. 492", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "77 ALR3d 366", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527253 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603297 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625807 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573255 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "\"[P]arty asserting error must show from the record not only that the trial court committed error, but that the aggrieved party was prejudiced as a result.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522057 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "\"[P]arty asserting error must show from the record not only that the trial court committed error, but that the aggrieved party was prejudiced as a result.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 So.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7473972, 7473925 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "\"Mary Carter\" agreement despite lack of evidence that settling defendant's liability could be reduced by participating in the trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/624/0241-02", "/so2d/624/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 A.L.R.5th 483", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4766361, 4767131, 4763555, 4767775 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0634-02", "/nc/309/0634-01", "/nc/309/0634-03", "/nc/309/0634-04" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525421 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 So.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9746860 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/284/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 So.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9745182 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/202/0008-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 907, "char_count": 19964, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2594989010267782e-07, "percentile": 0.7824794032393394 }, "sha256": "3243fda7371281dd28cd538a8dab5bdcc1b6c7b1fe3cbe5f774f2f8ea1fc669e", "simhash": "1:df6b99c845af2551", "word_count": 3183 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge ARNOLD and Judge WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "MARY LOIS TART RYALS, Plaintiff v. HALL-LANE MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY, INC., RAYMOND JENSEN, HOLLY LEE WILLIAMS and FRANK MAHONEY, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff filed suit against defendants Raymond Jensen (Jensen), Hall-Lane Moving and Storage Company, Inc. (Hall-Lane), Holly Lee Williams (Williams) and Frank Mahoney (Mahoney) for personal injuries sustained when an automobile owned by Mahoney and operated by Williams collided with a vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger. Williams and Mahoney appeal the judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding them liable for plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Williams and Mahoney assign error to the trial court\u2019s refusal to admit evidence of a pre-trial settlement agreement between plaintiff and defendants Jensen and Hall-Lane. Plaintiff also appeals, citing as error the trial court\u2019s reduction of her damages award by the amount she received in settlement from Jensen and Hall-Lane. We find no error by the trial court.\nFacts pertinent to this appeal are as follows: On 20 April 1991, plaintiff was injured in a collision on Interstate 40 while a passenger in her daughter\u2019s Dodge which was struck by a Toyota driven by Williams. Plaintiff filed suit in December 1991 against Jensen, a truck driver who was operating his vehicle on the highway near Williams\u2019 Toyota at the time of the accident, and Hall-Lane, which owned the truck being driven by Jensen. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Jensen struck Williams\u2019 automobile as he attempted to change lanes, thereby causing Williams to careen across the highway and collide with the oncoming Dodge. Jensen and Hall-Lane filed answer denying the essential allegations of plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nPlaintiff filed an amended complaint in June 1992, adding Williams and Mahoney as defendants. In addition to her original allegations against Jensen, plaintiff set forth as an alternative theory that Williams lost control of her automobile and collided with the Dodge due to Williams\u2019 own negligence as she attempted to overtake a vehicle ahead of her at too great a speed.\nHall-Lane and Jensen thereafter filed cross-claims against Williams and Mahoney for indemnity and contribution in the event the former were held liable. Williams and Mahoney followed with similar cross-claims against Jensen and Hall-Lane for contribution and indemnity as well as claims for personal and property damage incurred when Jensen\u2019s truck allegedly hit the vehicle occupied by Williams and Mahoney.\nTrial began 18 January 1994. At the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, Jensen and Hall-Lane moved for directed verdict on grounds that plaintiff had presented no evidence that Jensen had caused the collision. After allowing plaintiff the chance to re-open her case, which opportunity plaintiff declined, the trial court granted the motion.\nAt that point, Williams and Mahoney became aware that plaintiff had settled with Jensen and Hall-Lane in the amount of $10,000 prior to trial based upon the contingency that Jensen and Hall-Lane continue as defendants at trial. Williams and Mahoney then dismissed without prejudice their claims against Jensen and Hall-Lane. The jury subsequently rendered a verdict finding Williams and Mahoney liable for plaintiffs injuries in the amount of $25,000. In a judgment filed 28 January 1994 and \u201cpursuant to N.C.G.S. Chapter IB,\u201d the trial court reduced the award to plaintiff by the $10,000 she had received in settlement with Jensen and Hall-Lane. The parties to this appeal filed timely notice thereof 21 February 1994.\nWilliams and Mahoney argue that\nthe trial court committed reversible error by refusing to allow evidence of the pretrial settlement between plaintiff and defendants Jensen and Hall-Lane where the pretrial settlement was kept secret from the trial court and from the other defendants until after the plaintiff rested her case-in-chief.\nWe disagree.\nWilliams and Mahoney contend the settlement between plaintiff and Jensen and Hall-Lane constituted a \u201cMary Carter\u201d agreement. This is a type of settlement which derives its designation from a Florida c\u00e1se, Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Company, 202 So.2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), overruled by Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973), in which the plaintiff made a secret settlement arrangement with one defendant who then continued as a party at trial. This Court has defined a \u201cMary Carter\u201d agreement as \u201cone in which a co-defendant secretly settles a case and continues as an ostensible co-defendant.\u201d Wright v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 63 N.C. App. 465, 470, 305 S.E.2d 190, 193, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 634, 308 S.E.2d 719 (1983).\nThe legality of \u201cMary Carter\u201d agreements has not been addressed by North Carolina courts. Other states considering the propriety of such agreements have reached differing results, including banning the use of this type of agreement or requiring the existence and terms of such a settlement to be disclosed to the jury. See Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Validity and Effect of \u201cMary Carter\u201d or Similar Agreement Setting Maximum Liability of One Cotortfeasor and Providing for Reduction or Extinguishment Thereof Relative to Recovery Against Nonagreeing Cotortfeasor, 22 A.L.R.5th 483 (1994).\n\u201cMary Carter\u201d agreements characteristically set the amount of the settling defendant\u2019s financial responsibility as contingent upon the judgment ultimately obtained against the non-settling defendant, i.e., as the judgment amount against the non-settling defendant increases, the settlement amount decreases, thereby giving the settling defendant an incentive to assist the plaintiff in obtaining as large an award as possible against the non-settling defendant. Vaeth, supra; but see Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So.2d 241, 247 (Fla. 1993) (\u201cMary Carter\u201d agreement despite lack of evidence that settling defendant\u2019s liability could be reduced by participating in the trial).\nBy contrast, there is no contention in the case sub judice that the settlement between plaintiff and Jensen and Hall-Lane was not in the fixed, pre-determined amount of $10,000. The settling defendants, Jensen and Hall-Lane, thus had no direct incentive as a result of their settlement with plaintiff to assist her in obtaining any award against Williams and Mahoney, much less one as substantial as possible. However, Jensen and Hall-Lane did possess a motive to paint Williams and Mahoney as the sole tortfeasors due to the former\u2019s position as defendants in the cross-claim of Williams and Mahoney for personal and property damages. With or without a \u201csecret\u201d settlement with plaintiff, Jensen and Hall-Lane accordingly remained in an adversarial role against their co-defendants.\nFor the foregoing reasons, it is doubtful the settlement between plaintiff and Jensen and Hall-Lane may truly be characterized as a \u201cMary Carter\u201d agreement. In any event, it is unnecessary to label the agreement definitively or reach the issue of the propriety of \u201cMary Carter\u201d agreements in general in order to resolve the instant appeal against Williams and Mahoney. We conclude the latter were not prejudiced by ignorance until mid-trial of a settlement agreement between plaintiff and the co-defendants such that exclusion of evidence of that agreement constituted reversible error. See Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 162, 344 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1986) (\u201c[P]arty asserting error must show from the record not only that the trial court committed error, but that the aggrieved party was prejudiced as a result.\u201d); see also N.C.R. Civ. R 61 (\u201cHarmless error\u201d).\nWilliams and Mahoney maintain they were victimized by an unfair trial, having based their trial strategy on the assumption plaintiff would attack all defendants with equal vehemence and that Jensen and Hall-Lane were equally likely to be found liable. For example, Williams and Mahoney claim to have selected a jury \u201csympathetic to all of the injured parties,\u201d so as to enhance the opportunity to recover on their personal injury cross-claims against Jensen and Hall-Lane. They further assert concessions advanced during jury selection and in opening statement that plaintiff was entitled to recover from some party. Finally, Williams and Mahoney cite their election at trial not to dispute plaintiff\u2019s damages and their consequent failure to cross-examine plaintiff or her chiropractor in this regard.\nOf the foregoing, only the lack of cross-examination \u2014 but not counsel\u2019s explanation \u2014 may be verified from the record. See N.C.R. App. P. 9(a) (appellate \u201creview is solely upon the record on appeal\u201d). In any event, we find unpersuasive the contention of Williams and Mahoney that they were surprised, and consequently prejudiced, when plaintiff failed to present evidence against Jensen and Hall-Lane. For example, plaintiff\u2019s attorney advised the court immediately preceding trial:\n[O]ur evidence will be \u2014 we don\u2019t have any evidence that Hall-Lane was actually at fault other than what we were told by Mrs. Williams and Mr. Mahoney through their agents early on. That\u2019s why the lawsuit was originally filed against the trucking company. Our evidence will be that we saw the Mahoney-Williams\u2019 vehicle going out of control so our evidence will only be that they were negligent. So, I think then that would be their responsibility, or then it would be their burden to show someone else may or may not have caused the accident.\nShortly thereafter, counsel for Jensen and Hall-Lane commented:\nThis is sort of \u2014 this is not your typical case in terms of plaintiff versus defendants. This is sort of defendants scratching each others\u2019 [sic] eye\u2019s out. And I don\u2019t know whether \u2014 and so I say that because our interests are \u2014 and the stories, the testimony, is going to be so diametrically opposed to each other, I think, that there\u2019s no real alignment between defendants in this case.\nIndeed, nothing in the record indicates any attempt by plaintiff to conceal her pursuit at trial of Williams and Mahoney as opposed to Jensen and Hall-Lane. To the contrary, as noted above, plaintiff\u2019s attorney insisted in open court before the trial began, \u201c[0]ur evidence will only be that [Williams and Mahoney] were negligent.\u201d (emphasis added). Further, as also discussed above, Jensen and Hall-Lane had cause to present evidence that Williams and Mahoney were the sole tortfeasors in that the latter had filed indemnity and contribution claims as well as cross-claims against Jensen and Hall-Lane for personal and property damage.\nWilliams and Mahoney also assert that\n[t]he mere fact that Jensen and Hall-Lane were suddenly absent from the courtroom probably caused the jury to believe that the Court had made some determination that Jensen and Hall-Lane were free of negligence ....\nThis argument is rank speculation and absent foundation in the record. We observe that, after giving counsel an opportunity to comment on \u201cwhat, if anything, [counsel wished the court] to tell the jury about\u201d the absence of Jensen and Hall-Lane following the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the trial court properly instructed the jury to refrain from attaching significance to the defendants\u2019 absence. Counsel for Williams and Mahoney made no further objection nor requested special instructions. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (party must object at trial to preserve question for appellate review). The jury, moreover, is presumed to understand and comply with the instructions of the court. State v. Self, 280 N.C. 665, 672, 187 S.E.2d 93, 97 (1972). Lastly, it was Williams and Mahoney who made the tactical choice at trial to dismiss their cross-claims and claims for contribution and indemnity after learning of plaintiff\u2019s settlement agreement with Jensen and Hall-Lane. Williams and Mahoney thus were ultimately responsible for their co-defendants\u2019 absence from the courtroom.\nIn sum, the contention of Williams and Mahoney that the trial below was unfair because they had no advance warning it was going to be \u201ctwo against one\u201d rings false. We reiterate that plaintiff\u2019s pretrial comments unequivocally put all who would hear on notice that she was proceeding against Williams and Mahoney and not Jensen and Hall-Lane.\nAccordingly, we find unavailing the argument of Williams and Mahoney that they were unduly prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to suspend the normal rule prohibiting evidence of settlements, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 408 (1992), and to allow evidence of plaintiff\u2019s settlement with Jensen and Hall-Lane to come before the jury.\nWe similarly reject the contention of Williams and Mahoney that the trial court erred by denying their motion for mistrial \u201cmade after the court\u2019s refusal to allow evidence of the secret pretrial settlement between the plaintiff and the other defendants.\u201d It is well established that the decision whether to declare a mistrial is one \u201cresting in the sound discretion of the [trial court].\u201d Keener v. Beal, 246 N.C. 247, 256, 98 S.E.2d 19, 25 (1957). In that we have determined Williams and Mahoney suffered no prejudice as the result of the trial court\u2019s exclusion of evidence of settlement, we find no abuse of discretion in the court\u2019s failure to grant the motion for mistrial based upon exclusion of that evidence.\nPlaintiff also appeals to this Court, challenging the trial court\u2019s reduction of her damages award from $25,000 to $15,000. The court acted pursuant to the \u201cUniform Contribution among Tort-Feasors Act,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 IB-4 (1983), which provides, inter alia, as follows:\nWhen a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:\n(1) It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater[.]\nPlaintiff contends she did not allege the two sets of defendants were jointly liable for her injuries, but rather that each was liable in the alternative. She claims N.C.G.S. \u00a7 IB-4 is not operative unless the co-defendants involved are alleged to have acted jointly to cause the plaintiff\u2019s injury. We do not agree.\nThe Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 885(3), at 333 (1979) provides:\nA payment by any person made in compensation of a claim for a harm for which others are liable as tortfeasors diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors, at least to the extent of the payment made, whether or not the person making the payment is liable to the injured person and whether or not it is so agreed at the time of payment or the payment is made before or after judgment.\nThe comments to this subsection state in part:\nPayments made by one who is not himself liable as a joint tort-feasor will go to diminish the claim of the injured person against others responsible for the same harm if they are made in compensation of that claim, as distinguished from payments from collateral sources such as insurance, sick benefits, donated medical or nursing services, voluntary continuance of wages by an employer, and the like. These payments are commonly made by one who fears that he may be held liable as a tortfeasor and who turns out not to be.\nId. at 335-36.\nOur North Carolina Supreme Court anticipated the foregoing in a nearly identical statement:\n[T]he weight of both authority and reason is to the effect that any amount paid by anybody, whether they be joint tort-feasors or otherwise, for and on account of any injury or damage should be held for a credit on the total recovery in any action for the same injury or damage.\nHolland v. Utilities Co., 208 N.C. 289, 292, 180 S.E. 592, 593-94 (1935).\nWhile the Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Holland seems disposi-tive of the issue herein, plaintiff directs our attention to Cox v. Robert C. Rhein Interest, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 584, 397 S.E.2d 358 (1990). Plaintiff focuses upon this Court\u2019s statement in Cox that the non-settling defendant would be entitled to a credit \u201conly [when it] appear[s] that [all] defendants are tort-feasors [and] that the negligence of all . . . defendants caused an indivisible injury.\u201d Id. at 587, 397 S.E.2d at 360. However, a close reading of Cox reveals the Court\u2019s holding turned upon suit having been initiated against the defendants on the basis of an identical injury, rather than on the basis that the defendants\u2019 actions may have jointly, as opposed to alternatively, caused plaintiff\u2019s injury.\nSimilarly, in the case sub judice, both Jensen and Hall-Lane as well as Williams and Mahoney were alleged to have been liable for the entire harm done to plaintiff. Even assuming arguendo plaintiff correctly characterizes her complaint as setting out mutually exclusive claims against Williams and Mahoney on the one hand and the settling defendants on the other, we find unavailing plaintiff\u2019s contention that her settlement with one set of defendants should have no effect on the amount recoverable from the other. Plaintiff indisputably sued both sets of defendants to recover for but one indivisible injury. Her damages are limited to the \u201ctotal recovery,\u201d Holland, 208 N.C. at 292, 160 S.E.2d at 594, for that single injury.\nIn conclusion, we hold the trial court did not err in declining to allow into evidence plaintiff\u2019s pre-trial settlement with Jensen and Hall-Lane or in reducing the judgment against Williams and Mahoney by the amount plaintiff received in that settlement.\nNo error.\nChief Judge ARNOLD and Judge WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellant.", "Smith & Holmes, P.C., by Robert P. Holmes, for defendant-appellants Holly Lee Williams and Frank Mahoney." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARY LOIS TART RYALS, Plaintiff v. HALL-LANE MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY, INC., RAYMOND JENSEN, HOLLY LEE WILLIAMS and FRANK MAHONEY, Defendants\nNo. COA94-748\n(Filed 2 April 1996)\n1. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 160 (NCI4th)\u2014 secret settlement with two of four defendants \u2014 defendants not prejudiced by lack of knowledge of settlement \u2014 evidence of settlement properly excluded\nDefendants Williams and Mahoney were not unduly prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to suspend the normal rule prohibiting evidence of settlements and to allow evidence of plaintiff\u2019s pretrial settlement with defendants Jensen and Hall-Lane to come before the jury, although Jensen and Hall-Lane remained in the case, where plaintiff\u2019s pretrial comments unequivocally put all who would hear on notice that she was proceeding against Williams and Mahoney and not Jensen and Hall-Lane. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 408.\nAm Jur 2d, Compromise and Settlement \u00a7 48.\n2. Damages \u00a7 53 (NCI4th)\u2014 reduction in award by settlement amount \u2014 no error\nEven if plaintiff correctly characterized her complaint as setting out mutually exclusive claims against the driver and owner of an automobile involved in a collision and the driver and owner of a truck which allegedly caused the accident, there was no merit to plaintiffs contention that her pretrial settlement with the truck driver and owner should have no effect on the amount recoverable from the automobile driver and owner, since plaintiff sued both sets of defendants to recover for but one indivisible injury. Therefore, the trial court did not err by reducing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 IB-4 plaintiffs $25,000 recovery against the automobile driver and owner by the $10,000 settlement she had received from the truck driver and owner.\nAm Jur 2d, Damages \u00a7\u00a7 566-590.\nUnsatisfied claim and judgment statutes: validity and construction of provisions for deduction from award of sums collectible by claimant from other sources. 7 AJLR3d 836.\nReceipt of public relief or gratuity as affecting recovery in personal injury action. 77 ALR3d 366.\nApplication of collateral source rule in actions under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USCS sec. 2674). 104 ALR Fed. 492.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendants Holly Lee Williams and Frank Mahoney from judgment entered 28 January 1994 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 April 1995.\nE. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellant.\nSmith & Holmes, P.C., by Robert P. Holmes, for defendant-appellants Holly Lee Williams and Frank Mahoney." }, "file_name": "0134-01", "first_page_order": 170, "last_page_order": 179 }